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Abstract 
 
This thesis relies on realist and neo-mercantilist approaches to explain the consolidation of the US 
and European aerospace and defence industry during the second half of the 1990s. Based on two 
case studies, the Boeing / McDonnell Douglas (BMD) merger in 1997 and the EADS merger in 
1999, the thesis analyses the different political and economic motivations that led these aerospace 
and defence companies as well as their respective home governments to pursue either ethnocentric 
consolidation (in the case of the US) or regiocentric consolidation (in the case of France, Germany, 
and Spain) strategies. The BMD merger is interpreted as an attempt by the American hegemon to 
ensure that the important military, economic, and technological benefits derived from this strategic 
sector continue to accrue, above all, to the United States and its aerospace and defence industrial 
base. The cross-border EADS merger, in contrast, is viewed as a Franco-German-led 
counterbalancing attempt to guarantee the survival and autonomy of the European aerospace and 
defence industry, including Airbus, in the face of growing competitive pressures from the rapidly-
consolidating US mega-primes like Boeing. The thesis contrasts several high-profile transatlantic 
M&A deals in a variety of business sectors with the marked absence of similar transactions between 
US and European aerospace and defence companies. It thus highlights the strategic nature of this 
particular sector as well as American concerns about the proliferation of advanced US technologies 
to third countries, including to European NATO allies. Ultimately, realist and neo-mercantilist 
arguments prevailed over liberal-institutionalist / globalisation arguments among policymakers and 
business leaders on both sides of the Atlantic (especially in Washington, DC and Paris) – thus 
paving the way for the BMD and EADS mergers. 
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Chapter 1: The Aerospace and Defence Industry in a Globalising World 
1.1  What this thesis is all about 
 
In my PhD thesis at LSE I analyse the consolidation of the American and European aerospace and 
defence (A&D) industries in the late 1990s. Based on two case studies – the 1997 Boeing / 
McDonnell Douglas (BMD) merger in the United States and the creation of EADS (European 
Aeronautics Defence and Space Company) in Europe in 1999 – I set out to to answer the following 
questions: 
 
 Why did the Americans consolidate their A&D industry at a purely national level, with virtually 
no involvement from other Western allies? 
 By contrast, why did the French, Germans, and Spaniards decide to merge their leading national 
A&D companies into EADS? 
 What do these two case studies tell us about the potential for competition and cooperation in 
international relations (IR)? 
 Are national security concerns the real reason or just a convenient pretext used by policymakers 
and business leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to justify the treatment of the A&D industry 
as a “special” sector? 
 
The A&D business has three key characteristics that make it a strategic industry: “(1) it produces 
goods or services directly related to national security; (2) it generates special benefits for the rest of 
the economy; and (3) it is prestigious.”1 As a result, the A&D industry has traditionally been 
characterised by a high degree of governmental control and intervention. In this context, it is 
important to differentiate between the commercial and the defence side of the aerospace sector. In 
particular, what is the exact status of the commercial aerospace industry? Is it part of the private 
sector in an open economy, or is it rather intricately linked to the public sector because of its 
Research and Development, Production (R&DP) overlaps with military aviation construction? 
 
This thesis explores whether neo-realism or neo-liberalism offers a better explanation for the BMD 
and EADS mergers under review. In particular, it argues that the two case studies suggest that 
transatlantic rivalries over the political, military, economic, and technological power and prestige 
derived from the A&D industry exist even among close Western NATO allies. The thesis concludes 
that the BMD and EADS mergers can best be explained by the fact that realist arguments prevailed 
over liberal-institutionalist arguments among policymakers and business leaders in the countries 
involved, especially in Washington and Paris. With the A&D industry caught between two very 
                                                      
1 Golich (1992) p. 910 
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different worlds – realism and national security vs. liberalism, cooperation, globalisation and open 
markets – political leaders and business executives in the United States and Europe put a premium 
on the former, thus reinforcing the notion that this strategic industry sector remains of tremendous 
importance for a nation’s military and “geo-economic”2 security. 
 
The United States was the first country to restructure and consolidate its A&D industry in response 
to the new post-Cold War environment (sharp cuts in national defence spending, skyrocketing 
R&DP, etc.). In doing so, Washington embraced what Keith Hayward has termed an 
“ethnocentric”3 consolidation approach; i.e., one that regards the retention of American control and 
ownership over key companies such as Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) as 
paramount to national security considerations. This ethnocentric approach to A&D industry 
consolidation is fully in line with the key tenets of realism, which would posits that sovereign, 
independent states will try to prevent strategic companies and entire industries of critical 
importance to their national security and survival from coming under full or even partial foreign 
control. In this context, one must not forget that during the 1990s, relations between Washington 
and many of its European allies were strained over a number of issues, ranging from the Kyoto 
Protocol to the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as the EU’s attempt to establish a 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to act independently of the US and NATO if 
necessary. Given that America and Europe were no longer united by a common Soviet threat, but 
found themselves increasingly at odds over the fundamental principles governing the exercise of 
power in the international arena (unilateralism vs. multilateralism, etc.) – it is understandable that 
Washington was not eager to provide the Europeans and their A&D players with the substantial 
relative gains (in terms of access to US state-of-the-art technologies, etc.) that full-fledged 
transatlantic mergers (of equals) would have entailed. Furthermore, the Clinton administration’s 
neo-mercantilist agenda – defined as the attempt “to assure that the aeronautical capabilities 
(technological, industrial, and commercial) of the respective countries are nurtured and protected 
and given every advantage over their rivals”4 – also played a role in shaping US industrial and 
export promotion policies in the A&D sector. 
 
In the case of the US, realism interprets the ethnocentric BMD merger as an attempt by the 
American hegemon to consolidate and defend its dominant military, economic, and technological 
                                                      
2 “Geo-economics” – first developed in the 1980s / 1990s – is essentially “a concept based on a confrontational model 
of international economic activity […] which posits a state of economic ‘warfare’ between leading countries. It is 
argued that the US, the EU, Japan (and increasingly China) are essentially adversaries though the weapons in 
countering threats to national security are economic policy measures rather than cruise missiles and stealth bombers.” 
Cable (1995) pp. 305; 307 
3 Hayward (1999) pp. 3-14 
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status vis-à-vis all potential challengers, including NATO allies like France, Germany, and Spain – 
the EADS founding nations. Realists fear that transatlantic defence mergers could potentially create 
two major national security risks and vulnerabilities for the US. First, full-blown mergers between 
US and European A&D companies could make the United States overly dependent on foreign-
based supply sources of critical military and commercial systems or components. Second, 
transatlantic defence consolidation and integration could also increase the likelihood of 
unauthorized technology transfers, not only from technologically more advanced US companies to 
their European partners but also, and more importantly, from European companies to third 
countries. For the American hegemon, the gradual diffusion of key technological capabilities to its 
European allies and, possibly, to hostile third countries or non-state actors is of great concern 
because it risks undermining one of the main elements of America’s dominance in the world today.5 
As stated in a  2002 USAF-sponsored RAND report on the implications of the globalisation of the 
American A&D industry: “Globalisation’s most potent threat lies in its potential to equip hostile 
nations and groups with advanced weapons and technologies designed by the United States and 
paid for by the US government.”6 As one analyst put it, “the development and exploitation of 
technology tends to change power relations, whether these are social, economic, political or 
military”.7 For realists, national autonomy in defence R&DP is paramount as a basis for an 
independent foreign, security, and defence policy. Even if from a primarily economic and business 
perspective (i.e., the logic of a globalising world economy), a transatlantic merger between Boeing 
and a European partner had made more sense than the BMD merger, realists would nonetheless 
have predicted and advocated that Washington block such a move on national security grounds and 
embrace an ethnocentric consolidation approach instead.8 
 
America’s European allies, in contrast, lagged behind the US and were in a largely reactive mode 
when it came to post-Cold War A&D industrial consolidation. In this context, the EADS merger 
involving three European “national champions” conformed to the model of a “regiocentric” 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
4 Thornton (1999) p. 72 
5 “From a long-term strategic standpoint, globalisation’s most significant manifestation is the irresistible levelling effect 
it is having on the international military-technological environment in which DoD must compete. Over time, all states – 
not just the US and its allies – will share access to much of the same technology underpinning the modern military. [...] 
[W]ith the whole world working from essentially the same military-technological ‘cookbook’, the [US] will need to rely 
on its unique strengths as ‘chef’, that is, as the world’s most innovative integrator of militarily-useful – though not 
always US-developed – technology.” Defense Science Board (1999), pp. v ; 29 
6 (Lorell et al., 2003) p. xvii. This quote reflects a decidedly American ethnocentric as well as state-centric defence 
industrial approach as it refers for example, to “advanced weapons and technologies designed by the [US] and paid for 
by the US government” but fails to make a reference to the relevant contributions by relevant (foreign or domestic) 
private sector companies. 
7 Williams (1984) pp. 70-71 
8 At the time of the BMD merger, national security hawks in Congress and at the State Department were the strongest 
opponents of transatlantic mergers at the prime contractor level. The Pentagon, in contrast, was very open to such an 
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company “blending strategic interests with regional integration / national sensitivity”.9 Hayward 
coined these concepts of ethnocentric vs. regiocentric A&D industrial integration during the crucial 
1997-1998 period: after the BMD merger but before the creation of EADS. Like the creation of 
BMD in the United States, Europe’s transnational EADS merger can also be explained by a 
predominantly realist analytical framework. By pooling their major A&D assets into one company, 
France, Germany, and Spain were trying to foster the creation of an economically and 
technologically competitive European champion that would be able to survive the onslaught of the 
emerging American mega-primes. 
 
For the French and German private sector A&D firms (Lagardère and DCX10) negotiating the 
EADS deal, the merger was primarily about improving their relative international competitiveness 
by gaining the critical mass necessary to realise economies of scale that could only be reached by 
going beyond the confines of the existing “national champions”. Neither French nor German 
business leaders involved had any interest in seeing the EADS merger foster a “Fortress America” 
vs. “Fortress Europe” trade confrontation. Escalating protectionist sentiment on both sides 
potentially risked severely hurting EADS’s bottom line. Furthermore, corporate A&D leaders in 
Germany, France, and the UK shared a strong desire to gain access to the lucrative American 
defence procurement market. 
 
From the perspective of Europe’s political leaders, especially those in France and Germany, the 
rapid ethnocentric consolidation of the US A&D industry appeared to be part of America’s 
ambition to preserve its post-Cold War superpower status and prevent the rise of any potential peer 
competitors (including NATO allies). Several factors both external and internal to the EU 
(European Union) spurred the continent’s two leading powers – the Franco-German engine – to 
venture into a political, strategic, and military territory (i.e., the EADS merger) where neither one of 
them, nor any other countries in the world, had gone before. During the 1990s, with the Soviet 
threat gone and America emerging as the world’s sole superpower, one witnessed transatlantic 
tensions over a number of issues, ranging from the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol to the EU’s attempt 
to build its own security and defence capability outside of NATO. The ESDP effort, in particular, 
raised American suspicions that Europe was no longer merely a major economic competitor – 
something that had already triggered US concerns in the 1960s and 1970s – but was now also trying 
to position itself as a strategic competitor and possible counterweight to Washington. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
idea (especially regarding a potential merger with BAe) as the military had a strong interest in fostering more 
competition for US defence bids in an effort to get “more bang for the buck”. Hamre (2007) 
9 Hayward (1999) p. 9 
10 DCX = DaimlerChrysler Corporation 
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The cooling in transatlantic relations made it relatively easy for France and Germany to come to 
think of the US as “the other” – a crucial element in any collective identity-building process. 
Therefore, transatlantic political differences with Washington, coupled with the preponderance of 
US power in the international system, called for selective European counterbalancing against the 
American hegemon. For sure, neither France nor Germany had the ambition or capacity to turn the 
EU into a strategic / military peer competitor to the United States. However, the unwillingness and 
inability of Paris and Berlin to transform the EU into a credible strategic rival to the US did not 
mean that the two countries were not able to get their act together when core national security and 
economic interests – i.e., the need to maintain technologically advanced and internationally 
competitive A&D companies (including the respective national champions as well as Airbus) – 
were threatened by US mega-primes. A fundamental change that occurred in connection with the 
end of the Cold War was that Washington (through the Pentagon) had lost the strategic incentive to 
support the European defence industrial base (including technology transfers, which had begun in 
the 1950s), since the Soviet threat had disappeared and Europe was no longer the most important 
strategic theatre for the US. The French response to the rise of the American mega-primes in the 
1990s is reminiscent of General de Gaulle’s attempt to counter-balance the US in the 1960s, when 
he “pledged to restore French greatness through technology, not empire”11. As a result, “the identity 
of Gaullist France [became] wedded to the prestige and power of technological dynamism more 
consciously even than Kennedy’s America”12. 
 
The competitive threat posed by the BMD merger was compounded by the fact that any weakening 
of Europe’s (relative) economic and technological position in the international A&D industry was 
likely to have a corresponding negative impact on Europe’s ability to act collectively as an 
independent security and defence player (i.e., outside of the American-dominated Atlantic Alliance 
if necessary). For example, the 1999 Kosovo War served as a dramatic reminder of Europe’s 
military and technological deficits vis-à-vis the US. Subsequently, the strengthening of European 
A&D industrial capabilities became an important priority for policymakers in Paris, Berlin, 
London, and beyond. In the wake of the Kosovo War, the EU’s major arms-producing countries 
(France, Germany, UK, Italy, Spain, Sweden) repeatedly emphasised the crucial role played by the 
A&D industry in providing the power-projection capabilities necessary to conduct EU-led security 
and defence operations abroad. 
 
                                                      
11 McDougall (1985) pp. 179-180 
12 Ibid., p. 180 
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This thesis analyses the complex relationship between the A&D industry and national governments 
in Europe and the United States after the Cold War. The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the break-
up of the Soviet Union were followed by a sharp decline in defence and weapons procurement 
expenditures (see Annex T able 4). As a result, both US and European A&D companies came under 
tremendous pressure to cut costs and consolidate their operations through M&As. However, the 
aerospace industries in America and Europe in conjunction with their respective national 
governments adopted different strategies to cope with similar problems and challenges. The 
Americans decided to go it alone and pursued the creation of “national champions” like BMD 
through the promotion of large-scale national M&As. France, Germany and Spain, in contrast, 
decided to move beyond the confines of “national champions” to create EADS, a “European 
champion”. The stark choice faced by the Europeans at the time was either to join forces and merge 
their national champions or risk becoming a junior-partner-type subcontractor to the Americans.13 
 
Boeing’s US$16.3 billion acquisition of MDC in 1997 is the biggest take-over in the US aerospace 
industry to date. Both in terms of its size and its political-military implications, the BMD merger is 
an important subject of academic scrutiny. In view of America’s global political, economic, and 
military preponderance, US aerospace companies saw no need to look for partners abroad to 
consolidate their operations, reap economies of scale, and improve their overall competitiveness. 
Boasting an unparalleled technological lead and the world’s largest A&D market, the American 
aerospace industry along with the US government decided that it was better to consolidate 
nationally than to cooperate internationally. From a realist perspective, cooperation always carries 
risks, notably in the form of cheating. Even if international cooperation works fine and produces 
absolute gains for all parties, hegemonic powers like the US remain concerned about the potential 
consequences of the weaker partners deriving relatively greater gains from cooperation, thus 
precipitating the hegemon’s eventual decline. Historically, the transfer and diffusion of 
technological innovations from the hegemonic core to the periphery has played a key role in the rise 
and fall of great powers.14 This point raises a further question: namely whether private-sector 
multinational corporations (MNCs) share the same kind of strategic, long-term thinking as their 
home governments or whether they are rather interested in short-term profit maximisation.15 16 17 18  
                                                      
13 Key Western European countries and their A&D industrial companies had already faced this choice vis-à-vis 
America since the 1960s (“le défi américain”). That being said, this issue became much more pressing and the choice 
much more acute in a shrinking post-Cold War defence market. 
14 Gilpin (1981) 
15 “Because [MNCs] are the major force in international trade and are deeply enmeshed in local economies, they are 
influential in national politics and essential to industry. But because they span national borders, many [MNCs] are less 
concerned with advancing national goals than with pursuing objectives internal to the firm-principally growth, profits, 
proprietary technology, strategic alliances, return on investment, and market power.” OTA (1993) pp. 1-2 
16 The aerospace industry’s dealings with China would suggest the latter. After all, Beijing has been able to secure 
favourable production sharing and final assembly deals from Airbus and Boeing as it played off the two Western 
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Even though America and its European allies were both part of NATO and had just prevailed over 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the US adopted an A&D industrial policy designed to 
preserve and advance the country’s hegemony for years to come. In fact, it is conventional wisdom 
among conservative and neo-conservative thinkers that President Ronald Reagan’s massive military 
build-up in the 1980s proved to be decisive in out-spending and out-researching the Soviet Union, 
thus ushering in the end of the Cold War. “The US will need to redouble its efforts at out-
innovating, out-integrating, and out-investing its competitors.”19 America’s go-it-alone approach 
was driven by a concern that other major powers, including a resurgent Europe, could try to 
counterbalance US hegemony. Washington’s unilateralism is evidence that its concerns were based 
on a realist assessment of potential absolute and relative gains. The fact that the US consolidated its 
aerospace industry at a purely national level is a stark reminder that uncertainty and distrust remain 
powerful shapers of international relations, even among close allies. Warnings by Congress and the 
Bush administration in 2004-2005, that Washington could sharply curtail transatlantic defence 
cooperation if the EU were to lift its China arms embargo, illustrate that the US and Europe no 
longer necessarily share the same strategic outlook.20 21 22 23 This is particularly true with respect to 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
aerospace giants in their race to meet the country’s projected vast demand for commercial aircraft. Interestingly, similar 
dynamics were already at play earlier, when Boeing and MDC also competed for access to the Chinese market: “For 
weaker states, the industry’s strategic value is an added centripetal force, impelling them to seek participation in the 
industry at any level. As a result of shifting power relationships, these relatively weak states may be able to coerce 
dominant states to pursue internationalised production strategies. For example, […] China […] has benefited from the 
competition between Boeing and [MDC], coercing each to establish joint venture projects that include various levels of 
production in the PRC.” Golich (1992) p. 913 
17 During the early stages of the Cold War, when the US was able to rely both on “structural hegemony” – “the 
concentration of economic resources (i.e., aid, credits, markets) in a single state” – and “ideological hegemony” – “the 
ability of the dominant state to convince other actors to accept its frame of reference as their own” – “to persuade 
[foreign / allied] host governments and home offices [of US-based MNCs] to cooperate in extending embargoes and 
export controls to its corporations abroad.” However, since the 1970s, “hegemonic decline and the global spread of 
American business have placed an increasing proportion of US corporate decision making beyond the control of public 
officials. MNCs cannot be seen simply as instruments of foreign policy but as independent actors whose autonomy 
from state control can frustrate diplomatic preferences.” Rodman (1995) pp. 107 ; 137. However, Rodman’s 
observation only holds true for “normal” US non-defence MNCs. The fact that all major US A&D companies are highly 
dependent on the Pentagon’s vast and lucrative procurement as well as R&D budgets gives the US government 
unparalleled leverage, and influence over this strategic industry sector. 
18 “A number of studies have shown that since the 1970s, corporate managers have veered away from an ethnocentric 
identification with American [C]old [W]ar aims and toward a self-conscious ideology of ‘business internationalism’, 
which sought to isolate commercial and financial activity from political manipulations. Corporate spokesmen 
increasingly asserted their willingness to deal with any state regardless of ideology and contended that diplomatic 
hostility should not spill over into economic relations. Moreover, they characterised their operations in repressive or 
hostile states as neutral and apolitical – a necessity for survival in an ideologically diverse world. This change in 
corporate outlook, however, made it less likely that MNCs could be persuaded to act in ways that conformed to 
American diplomatic aims.” Ibid., p. 112 
19 Defense Science Board (1999) pp. 29-30 
20 (Fata & Gaspers, 2005) 
21 It is important to point out that various US administrations as well as Congress have long used double standards with 
regard to third-party arms exports to China. On the one hand, Washington lashed out at Brussels and warned that the 
US would sharply reduce transatlantic defence industrial cooperation if the EU were to lift its weapons embargo on 
China imposed in 1989. On the other hand, however, Washington largely ignored and turned a blind eye on Israel’s 
long-time track record of exporting advanced weapons systems including sensitive US technologies to China – often in 
clear violation of US re-export regulations. 
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Asia, where America has a strong military presence while the Europeans focus primarily on their 
economic and trade interests. 
 
The 1999 EADS merger marked the first time that A&D companies from several sovereign 
countries decided to fully merge their operations into one company. The gradual expansion of 
political, military and economic cooperation through institutions like the EU, WEU24, and NATO, 
as well as the Airbus consortium, created a new level of intra-European interdependencies that 
helped to overcome traditional security dilemmas. This is the explanation put forward by neo-
liberal institutionalists belonging to the functionalist and interdependence school. From this 
perspective, the process of European integration, developed through political, economic, and also 
military institutions, played a key role in overcoming centuries of bloody conflicts and two 
devastating world wars. Based on decades of mutually beneficial cooperation within the context of 
European integration and Airbus, France and Germany concluded that their interests – defined 
through national as well as European identities – were better served by merging their key aerospace 
industrial assets into one “European champion” rather than pursuing the creation of different 
“national champions”. Confronted with the choice between maintaining a nationally independent, 
yet comparatively small and inefficient aerospace industrial base and creating a fully integrated 
“European” aerospace company, France, Germany, and Spain opted for the latter. 
 
Turning to the realist perspective on the EADS merger, it is relevant to note that the EADS merger 
coincided with primarily French-led EU efforts to create an ESDP distinct from NATO. The 
development of ESDP and the corresponding creation of EADS in 1999 were also triggered by the 
BMD merger two years earlier. Faced with an America that could potentially dominate Europe both 
on the politico-military level (NATO) and economic level (Boeing vs. Airbus, etc.) France, 
Germany, and Spain decided to join forces to counterbalance American supremacy. Boeing’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
22 During the early stages of the Cold War, Washington “generally gained allied […] compliance [with US-led 
sanctions regimes] despite significant differences over questions of both policy and law. In terms of policy the [US] 
sought to forge a multilateral consensus behind policies of economic warfare against the Soviet Union and other 
Communist states such as China and Cuba. In contrast, the allies generally preferred to limit embargoes to items of 
direct military significance while encouraging the expansion on non-strategic trade. In terms of law, the [US] and its 
allies disagreed as to whose legal system had the final authority over the foreign subsidiaries of US firms. The [US] 
asserted that the nationality of the home office gave it the right to extend its law to the foreign operations of American 
firms even if those operations have an adverse impact on important public interests (the effects doctrine) or national 
security (the protective principle). The Trading with the Enemy Act and the Export Control Act gave the executive 
branch the statutory authority to apply embargoes and export controls to foreign subsidiaries. Canada and Europe, 
however, believed that jurisdiction should be determined by the territory in which a foreign subsidiary is incorporated 
rather than the nationality of the home country. Consequently, they defined US claims of extraterritoriality as 
infringements of their national sovereignty.” Rodman (1995) pp. 107-108 
23 There is a long history of European suspicions that Washington used strategic embargoes like this to disadvantage 
European companies in competing with US companies, as an outcome of industrial lobbying and campaign funding for 
Members of Congress rather than the strategic / security reasons stated. 
24 WEU = Western European Union 
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acquisition of MDC – the smallest of the three remaining manufacturers of large passenger aircraft 
– effectively transformed the dogfight between Boeing and Airbus into a zero-sum game. If left 
unanswered, the Boeing-MDC merger threatened to permanently tip the balance in favour of the 
Americans, thus potentially forcing Airbus to gradually exit the market. From a realist perspective, 
this rather confrontational “us vs. them” process of identity creation has traditionally been one of 
the strongest and most effective drivers of international collaboration. The rationale behind EADS 
was thus a combination of both business objectives – rationalisation, increased economies of scale – 
and political objectives – fostering the process of European integration and providing the industrial 
basis for a European security and defence policy distinct from the US. 
 
The globalisation of the A&D industries – which gained momentum after the fall of Communism in 
the 1990s – made both the US and its European allies increasingly dependent on “foreign 
technologies, foreign-sourced products, or domestic-sourced products purchased from the local 
subsidiaries of foreign corporations”.25 As a result, policymakers and business leaders were forced 
to strike a difficult balance between the competing demands of maximising economic efficiency 
while at the same time minimising foreign control of their defence industrial base. From a purely 
neo-liberal economic and business perspective, the nationality of the owners, managers, or workers 
of a given A&D company do not matter that much. Defence procurement decisions should be 
primarily driven by the desire to find the cheapest, most effective weapons systems available on the 
market, irrespective of whether the company is foreign or domestic.26 For economists, the 
leveraging of international comparative advantages through the expansion of cross-border trade and 
investment is the key to increasing a nation’s overall welfare. Costly experiments in industrial 
policy, i.e., the creation of “national champions”, are “nothing more than new instances of old 
attempts at protectionism and the preservation of inefficiency”27. 
 
For national security strategists, in contrast, it is of utmost importance where production takes place 
and who controls the process. The erosion of a country’s “capacity to build or replace critical force 
structures independently of economic and political decisions of other sovereign powers”28 poses a 
serious potential national security threat. The creation of “national champions” in the A&D industry 
in Europe in the late 1980s was partly driven by a neo-mercantilist agenda that strives to achieve 
maximum national autonomy in key strategic industries. As one analyst argued, the worst fear of 
mercantilists is that “dependence on foreign corporations whose key operations take place outside 
                                                      
25 Moran (1990) p. 57 
26 “Left to themselves, defence companies will go as international as they can in their operations so as to maximise their 
access to markets and minimise the price of their products.” Taylor (1990) p. 70 
27 Moran (1990) p. 58 
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national borders opens up a real threat of interference on the part of their home country 
governments.”29 Mercantilism, the economic dimension of realism, also offers relevant insights into 
the EADS and BMD mergers. From the 16th to the 18th century, the period that coincides with the 
emergence of European nation states, mercantilism was the dominant school of economics. While 
mercantilism never developed into a unified theory of economics, its various proponents shared a 
common belief that the wealth, status, and power of a state are a function of its capital holdings. 
Mercantilists also agreed on the zero-sum nature of the international economic system, where the 
global volume of trade is “unchangeable” and where the gain of one country comes at the inevitable 
loss of another. According to mercantilists, the best strategy for a country’s government to grow 
and maximize its capital account surplus was to encourage exports and to discourage imports, 
primarily through the imposition of high tariffs. In essence, mercantilism calls for a highly 
interventionist economic and industrial policy, where the state creates national champions and 
shields them from foreign competition. 
 
Despite frequent public pronouncements in support of international trade liberalisation, political 
leaders in key Western countries, especially in France and the US – have retained strong (neo-) 
mercantilist and protectionist instincts, especially with regard to strategic industries like the A&D 
sector. From a mercantilist perspective, the BMD and EADS mergers were designed to ensure that 
a) the aerospace giants could reap economies of scale to become more competitive internationally 
and to capture an ever bigger share of the world’s lucrative civil and military aerospace market; and 
b) to allow each of the national governments involved to benefit from additional tax revenues, a 
boost in employment, increased civil and military technological sophistication, as well as 
heightened international prestige as a result of the commercial success of “their” respective 
aerospace champion. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
28 Defense Science Board (1988) p. 2 
29 Moran (1990) p. 61 
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1.2  The economic and strategic importance of the aerospace industry 
 
A comparative overview of the composition and value of both commercial and military US aircraft 
shipments during the 1971-2006 period compiled by the US Department of Commerce (DoC) 
illustrates the shifting relative economic weight of the two industry sectors as well as their increased 
technological sophistication over time:30 
 
Year Military Aircraft Commercial Aircraft Total 
 Output Value (billion) Output Value (billion) Output Value (billion) 
1971 2,914 US$8.4 
(77 percent of total) 
8,142 US$3.0 
(23 percent of total) 
11,056 US$11.4 
(100 percent) 
1988 1,210 US$43.7 
(78 percent of total) 
1,800 US$12.1 
(22 percent of total) 
3,010 US$55.8 
(100 percent) 
1999 359 US$35.8 
(44 percent of total) 
3,440 US$45.2 
(56 percent of total) 
3,799 US$81.0 (100 
percent) 
 
In 1971, America manufactured 11,056 aircraft with a combined value of US$11.4 billion. That 
year, the commercial aircraft sector accounted for 8,142 units valued at US$3.0 billion; in contrast, 
the US manufactured 2,914 military aircraft worth US$8.4 billion. Hence, the ratio between the 
total value of military and commercial aircraft production in the United States stood at a stunning 
77 vs. 23 percent in 1971. By 1988, at the height of President Reagan’s arms build-up, America 
manufactured 1,210 military aircraft worth US$43.7 billion; in comparison, the commercial aircraft 
sector delivered 1,800 units at a combined value of US$12.1 billion – thus putting the ratio between 
US defence and commercial sales even slightly higher at 78 vs. 22 percent. By 1999, however, the 
relative weight of the two sectors had shifted dramatically. Total aircraft deliveries reached 3,799 
units, with a combined value of US$81.0 billion. The commercial sector accounted for 3,440 units 
worth US$45.2 billion; in contrast, military aircraft production had dropped to 359 planes, with a 
combined value of US$35.8 billion. So, just ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the relative 
dominance of military vs. civil aircraft production in the United States had been reversed (44 vs. 56 
percent) – a development due to a combination of defence procurement cuts and a sharp increase in 
demand for commercial aircraft. Between 1996 and 1999 alone, the value of annual US commercial 
aircraft deliveries more than doubled from US$22.2 billion to US$45.2 billion. 
 
Is the civil aviation industry part of the private sector in an open economy, or is it rather intricately 
linked to the public sector because of its R&DP overlaps with military aviation construction? In a 
1992 article which “uses commercial class aircraft manufacturing to focus on the dynamic 
relationship between states and markets”, Vicki Golich writes: 
                                                      
30 ITA (2006) 
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“In the case of commercial-class aircraft manufacturing, structural changes in the 
international system and industry dynamics act as centripetal forces impelling states and 
corporations toward collaboration, while the industry’s strategic value acts as a centrifugal 
force impelling protectionist policies designed to avoid perceived vulnerabilities associated 
with mutual dependency.”31 
 
Several different, partly opposing forces have been shaping the commercial aerospace industry in 
recent years and decades. At the international systemic level, Golich identifies the following four 
centripetal forces: 
 
“First, transnational interdependencies extend across an increasing number of political 
boundaries and link a growing number of issue areas. Few national leaders believe that it is 
possible to disengage from the network of economic interdependence. […] 
Second, power capabilities are more equally, if still asymmetrically, distributed among 
states. […] The growth of aerospace manufacturing capabilities in Europe and the newly 
industrialising countries of Brazil, Indonesia, and Israel reflect this change. […] 
Third, the large foreign debt that emerged as a structural problem in the 1980s depresses 
purchasing power. […] 
Finally, market dimensions are no longer delineated by a series of distinct national markets 
linked by trade.”32 
 
Dramatically changing dynamics within the commercial aerospace industry itself have also acted as 
centripetal forces pushing the companies concerned towards closer (national and transnational) 
collaboration; i.e., FDI33, co-production and licensing arrangements as well as collaborative 
undertakings to design, produce, and market aerospace products as well as systems:34 
 
“During the last fifty years the industry has been transformed into a sector characterised by 
an oligopolistic production structure, an extremely high survival risk, and intense 
competition for sales in a global market. […] Technological advances have extended 
developmental lead time, increased launch costs, complicated marketing, and lengthened 
the time between initial research and revenue earning.”35 
 
                                                      
31 Golich (1992) p. 902 
32 Ibid., pp. 902-903 
33 FDI = Foreign Direct Investment 
34 Golich (1992) p. 924 
35 Ibid., p. 903 
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Virtually all of these industry dynamics are driven by the exponentially rising R&DP costs of 
building next-generation aircraft. For example, the average commercial aircraft manufacturing costs 
per seat increased from US$65,000 in 1970 to US$275,000 in 1991 – a more than four-fold increase 
in 21 years.36 As a result, soaring R&DP expenditures “have increased the proportion of launching 
cost to equity from 42 percent (for the development of the Douglas DC6 in the 1940s) to 155 
percent (for the development of the DC10 in the late 1960s and early 1970s)”.37 Detailed shipment 
statistics by the US Department of Commerce cited earlier also illustrate the exploding average unit 
costs for both US commercial and military aircraft.38 In 1971, the average US civil aircraft cost 
US$367,000; the corresponding average figure for military aircraft stood at US$2.9 million. By 
1987, the average price of a US commercial aircraft had skyrocketed to US$6.7 million; in 
comparison, US military aircraft cost an average US$36.1 million. In 1999, US civil aircraft, on 
average, cost US$13.1 million while the corresponding figure for military planes stood at US$99.7 
million.39 
 
Pentagon procurement programmes have long been hampered by major delays and cost overruns:40 
 
“Every service has to some extent mortgaged its future by failing to contain equipment 
costs, and by trading existing equipment and force elements to develop new systems that it 
may never be able to procure in the numbers planned. These failures in cost containment 
have been compounded by the failure to make realistic assessments of technology and 
production capabilities, and the failure to set reasonable performance specifications and 
then stop the grow of technological risk and even more demanding performance 
specifications over time.”41 
“Almost every major aircraft development programme is in so much trouble that the 
replacements are stuck in a morass of procurement and development problems, cost 
explosions, and rifts within the [DoD]42. Fifth-generation tactical aircraft are affected by 
significant delays and cost increases.”43 
 
                                                      
36 Ibid., p. 907 
37 Golich (1992) p. 906 
38 ITA (2006) 
39 In 1983, legendary US aerospace executive Norm Augustine pointed to the problems arising from the fact that unit 
costs of next-generation military aircraft rise exponentially while defence budgets only grow linearly. Coining what has 
become known as “Augustine’s Law”, he extrapolated this trend and took it to a tongue-in-cheek extreme: “In the year 
2054, the entire defence budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and 
Navy 3½ days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.” See 
Law 16 in Augustine (1983). 
40 Art (1972) pp. 95-114 
41 (Cordesman & Kaeser, 2008) p. 1 
42 DoD = Department of Defense 
43 (Cordesman & Kaeser, 2008) p. ii 
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In civil aviation, Boeing’s Dreamliner and the Airbus A380 serve as reminders of how the multi-
billion dollar investments required for building next-generation aircraft as well as the extremely 
complex production processes – which often cause costly delays – are even exposing the world’s 
leading aerospace companies to major financial and business risks. It is precisely this high-stakes 
tendency for aerospace companies to bet their future on the development of new aircraft that led 
John Newhouse to title his classic study about the industry sector and the Boeing vs. Airbus 
competition “The Sporty Game”.44 Rising R&DP expenditures explain the cutthroat competition 
between Boeing and Airbus as both are scrambling to boost profits by spreading their rising fixed 
costs over an ever-larger number of sold aircraft units. This intense sales competition also accounts 
for the fact that major acquisition decisions by airlines in Asia, the Middle East, etc. are often the 
subject of top-level political lobbying by US / European officials trying to secure a deal on behalf 
of “their” aerospace companies. “Successful aircraft sales depend on price, performance, politics, 
and timing.”45 
 
“Perhaps ironically, the combination of dramatically increased risk and the need to sell 
aircraft to a global market characterised by greater parity and proliferating 
interdependencies among actors has impelled some state and corporate policymakers to 
pursue collaborative production structures as a survival strategy.”46 
 
The highly integrated nature of the commercial and defence aerospace industrial base explains why 
national governments tend to maintain close political and even direct financial links (through 
shareholdings, etc.) with “their” respective aerospace companies. 
 
“Despite the differing requirements for civil and military aircraft, the technology base, 
much of the supplier base, and the skills and processes used are essentially common. They 
become mutually supportive in attaining diverse civil and military objectives. The 
technological synergies are very constructive. Military developments stress performance, 
while commercial aircraft developments emphasise lowered production costs, vehicle 
operating efficiency, and high availability with low maintenance – attributes that are 
valuable to the military establishment.”47 48 
                                                      
44 Newhouse (1982) 
45 Golich (1992) p. 906. In this context, key performance indicators include “capacity and frequency demands; payload; 
range; fuel efficiency; airport and environmental requirements; capital costs of acquiring the aircraft; training and 
maintenance costs; and fleet standardisation and commonality within a single airline or among those that pool 
equipment and ancillary services.” Ibid., p. 908 
46 Ibid., pp. 909-910 
47 National Academy of Engineering (1985) p. 101 
48 “Currently, the fact that the two sectors share virtually the same production base supports the military-commercial 
connection. Commercial design and production teams can and have developed military hardware. A complex 
infrastructure of firms […] supplies sophisticated components, materials, and equipment including electronics, 
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Aerospace companies also deliver significant economic benefits for their home countries (export 
earnings, jobs, technology clusters, etc.), thus providing additional mercantilist incentives for 
national governments to keep a particularly close eye on firms in this sector and to prevent them 
from simply falling into the hands of foreign competitors (see Annex Table 1, 2, and 3). In 
America, the sector has been the most important industrial contributor to US export revenues since 
the 1950s.49 If the commercial aerospace business were a “normal” industry sector in a globalised 
economy, one would certainly expect to see large-scale cross-border M&As leading to the creation 
of fully-integrated multinational civil aerospace firms. However, with the exception of EADS, that 
has not (yet) happened. Things are made more complicated by the fact that virtually all of today’s 
major aerospace companies – with the exception of Lockheed Martin (LMC) have sizeable 
commercial and defence operations. Therefore, governments on both sides of the Atlantic do care 
how and what their aerospace companies are doing. To a certain degree, it is fair to say that the US 
government has generally adopted a more laissez-faire-dominated approach towards the aerospace 
industry than its counterparts in Europe. Unlike Paris, Washington holds no direct equity stake in 
any major A&D group. That being said, however, it is also quite clear that the US government does 
not view these companies as part of a “normal”, non-strategic industry sector which should simply 
be left to the competitive dynamics of the global markets place: 
 
“US decision-makers remained convinced that mutual economic dependency created 
undesirable vulnerabilities and that the state should intervene in the private sector only to 
achieve national security-related goals.”50 
“US corporate behaviour has been affected by the prevailing American political ideology, 
which views cooperation suspiciously and has historically placed a higher priority on 
political-military security than on economic relations.”51 
 
Nonetheless, American commercial aerospace companies did significantly expand their 
transnational collaborative production strategies during the 1980s and 1990s.52 This shift towards 
more internationalised production structures was partly driven by the rapidly increasing share of the 
aircrafts’ overall production value that was outsourced / offshored to subcontractors located in 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
communications equipment, and scientific instruments to both sectors. […] Market requirements have triggered 
technological and product advances relevant to military needs and vice versa. Together, these factors reduce the cost of 
providing an essential military industrial base.” Golich (1992) p. 911 
49 Ibid., pp. 911-912 
50 Ibid., p. 918 
51 Ibid., p. 921 
52 These cross-border arrangements were primarily based on co-production agreements rather than joint R&D 
programmes, which are politically much more sensitive and potentially involve technology transfers harmful to US 
national security interests. Ibid., p. 927 
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Europe, Japan, China, etc.53 54 So again, what is the exact status of the commercial aerospace 
industry? Is it part of the private sector in an open economy, or is it rather intricately linked to the 
public sector because of its R&DP overlaps with military aviation construction? On the one hand, 
all major US aerospace companies are fully privatised and even in Europe, traditionally more 
interventionist governments in France and Spain have agreed to at least a partial privatisation of 
their country’s A&D base. At first glance, aerospace giants such as EADS and Boeing thus appear 
to be part of the private sector in an open economy. Both firms are listed on the stock market and 
their top management and supervisory boards are appointed by the shareholders. At the same time, 
however, the strategic, economic, and technological importance of integrated commercial A&D 
companies such as Boeing and EADS makes them subject to political interference by their 
respective home governments. Political decision-makers in Washington, Paris, Berlin, London, etc. 
do care about how and what “their” A&D players are doing.55 56 At the same time, these corporate 
players also exert political influence in a two-way relationship: the “Military-Industrial Complex”, 
the money Boeing and other major A&D companies spend lobbying on Capitol Hill, etc.: 
“[D]efence contractors lobby Congress constantly and aggressively; their skill in dealing with the 
government is in fact one of their core competencies.”57 In the US, the sharp reduction in the 
number of prime defence contractors after the end of the Cold War and the corresponding loss of 
competition over major procurement programs has led to even closer ties between industry and “the 
state”: 
 
“Competition barely exists in the defence industry and is growing weaker by the day. It was 
a different story just two decades ago. In the 1980s, 20 or more prime contractors competed 
for most defence contracts. Today, the Pentagon relies primarily on six main contractors to 
build our nation’s aircraft, missiles, ships and other weapons systems. It is a system that 
largely forgoes competition on price, delivery and performance and replaces it with a kind 
of ‘design bureau’ competition, similar to what the Soviet Union used – hardly a recipe for 
success. […] 
The United States is approaching an ‘arsenal system’ for developing and producing its 
weapons – that is, one in which the government manufactures its own weaponry. […] 
                                                      
53 “[T]he proportion of subcontract work has risen from a typical level of 40 [percent] for the Lockheed Electra in the 
1950s, to over 70 [percent] for the Boeing 747”. Hayward (1986) p. 27 
54 Furthermore, “primary US incentives [to pursue transnational production processes] include financial support [from 
governments of programme participants], avoiding potential European tariff barriers, nullifying or diluting competition 
from European firms and avoiding antitrust restrictions.” Golich (1992) p. 923 
55 “In each country, the [g]overnment “accepts or denies the setting up of armaments activities on its national territory, 
and therefore has a decisive influence on any restructuring process of its defence industry, regardless of the legal status 
of the companies”. Van Eekelen (2005) p. 5 
56 London retains Golden Shares in BAE, Rolls-Royce, etc. 
57 (Gholz & Sapolsky, 1999/2000) p. 16 
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Unless we act soon, we may find that the only solutions available will be to nationalize the 
military industrial base or to ‘outsource’ production of our weapons systems, with excessive 
portions of that work going overseas.58 
 
Government intervention in the A&D industry is also very common in Europe. Paris in particular – 
which had historically relied on an arsenal system – put a premium on the creation and maintenance 
of an autonomous, technologically advanced A&D industrial base and ultimately viewed it as the 
best guarantee to defend France’s power position and interests in the world. Against this backdrop, 
French and German governments have been fighting regularly over the exact distribution of EADS / 
Airbus top management positions along national lines. This state of affairs is even more surprising 
given the fact that Berlin has no equity stake in EADS. However, in order to push back against 
Paris and to prevent a potential sell-out of Germany’s A&D base to the French, the German 
government has repeatedly felt it necessary to get directly involved in strategic decisions or crucial 
top-level personnel choices. While France has been “gradually moving away from the traditional 
model of protecting state interests through total government ownership and control and toward a 
private ownership-based model that allows foreign investment even in firms with sensitive 
capabilities”59, there is simply “no evidence the French government intends at this time to fully 
divest its shareholdings in defence firms or [more importantly] eliminate its Golden Shares”.60 61 
 
“The boundaries between industrial corporations and the state are not easily drawn in 
aerospace. […] those in high political office are wont to regard the aircraft industry and its 
products as symbols of national prowess. As a consequence, industrial competition is all too 
often transmuted into deeper conflicts between states over what they deem their rightful 
political and economic territories. […] 
While aircraft industries retain strong national affiliations, international collaboration has 
nevertheless become normal practice in airframe and aero-engine research and 
development and production. […] Intense competition is, paradoxically, giving rise to 
increasingly extensive and intricate patterns of collaboration, with firms that are working 
together in one area frequently competing in others. 
[…] Hayward has understandably chosen in the face of such complexity to concentrate on 
the civil industry. Yet military production is a more extensive activity for most of the firms in 
this industry, and it is ultimately the factor that ensures its special status. We must now hope 
that he will turn his attention to the military sector, and help us overcome our present 
                                                      
58 (Zakheim & Kadish, 2008) 
59 Bialos (2009) vol. II, p. 345 
60 Ibid., p. 347 
61 French government interference also extends to non-strategic firms like Renault. (Hall & Tait, 2010) 
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ignorance of the relationship between civil and military activities in this important 
industry.”62 
 
Due to the aerospace industry’s strategic importance, the basic principles of the West’s post-WWII 
international economic order – based on the free flow of goods, services, and money across borders 
– never fully applied to that industry sector. For instance, governments have generally imposed 
unique accounting and security restrictions on both private and state-owned aerospace companies. 
Furthermore, governments tightly regulate arms exports, technology transfers, and foreign direct 
investment in this strategic industry sector.63 Even within the EU, the aerospace industry has been 
shielded from the competitive dynamics of the Common Market.64 Until the end of the 20th century, 
this national security logic also extended to the airline industry, where the protection of state-
controlled national carriers through the distribution of exclusive landing rights has long been 
commonplace. Apart from access restrictions, many countries have stringent rules limiting foreign 
ownership of their national airlines. Washington, for instance, has limited foreign non-voting equity 
stakes in US airlines to a total of 49 percent while the total voting rights of foreigners must not 
exceed 25 percent. In the US, these ownership restrictions are justified in terms of national security 
as most US commercial airlines are part of the DoD-controlled Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).65 
 
In the military domain, national governments are usually the main customer of their respective 
national aerospace companies. This monopsonic market power has given governments 
extraordinary leverage over “their” aerospace companies, including a key role in defining the 
requirements for military products. Furthermore, given the capital intensity of advanced weapons 
technologies, national governments usually support the research and development of new military 
systems. As a result of these barriers, the aerospace industry has typically been insulated from the 
commercial pressures and disciplines of “normal” businesses. In Europe in particular, governments 
at times even seized direct control of parts of their national A&D industrial base. In this context, 
governments can leverage monopsonic market powers to determine the structure, conduct and 
performance of their A&D industry. The government’s overall objective – especially during high-
threat / high-risk periods like the Cold War – is clear: to retain a certain degree of national autarky 
and autonomy in arms development and production to safeguard the country’s vital security 
interests and to protect their technological innovation. In the US, in particular, the close, 
                                                      
62 Walker (1987) 
63 Hayward (2000) pp. 115-132 
64  “[A]ny Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of 
its security which are connected with the production or of the trade in arms, munitions and war material […].” Art. 296 
(ex Art. 223), EC Treaty. 
65 CRS (2006) 
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interdependent relationship between the government (Congress, the Pentagon, etc.) and the A&D 
industry also fostered the emergence of what President Eisenhower dubbed the “Military-Industrial 
Complex” (MIC):66 politically powerful lobbies that mix corporate and state interests by leveraging 
the flow of multi-billion dollar procurement contracts for their own, narrow commercial and 
political gain. In particular, Eisenhower warned his fellow countrymen that they should “guard 
against the acquisition of undue influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial 
complex”, something which could potentially put it beyond the reach of effective democratic 
political control. 
 
Historically, the rise of the aerospace industry is inextricably intertwined with WWI and WWII. 
The two wars – especially WWII – provided a major boost to the aerospace industry as 
governments on both sides of the conflict rushed to build up and strengthen their respective 
aerospace industrial base. In WWI, planes were used primarily for reconnaissance purposes as their 
offensive capabilities were still rather limited. In WWII, in contrast, aircraft performed a wide range 
of tactical and strategic operations, including as bombers, fighters, close air support / ground-attack 
aircraft, transport and reconnaissance planes, etc. In addition, WWII also saw the introduction of 
revolutionary technologies like missiles and nuclear weapons – virtually all of which were 
developed in government-sponsored research establishments which employed tens of thousands of 
scientist to work on weapons that might provide crucial military advantages over the enemy. 
Policymakers were quick to draw the lessons from the two world wars and recognised the crucial 
importance of maintaining technological superiority in military and civilian affairs in ensuring 
one’s own national security and survival. Nuclear warheads and missiles would subsequently 
become the basis for Cold War strategic deterrence. For a long time – that is, from the industry’s 
inception during WWI until the 1970s / 1980s – the defence sector served as the aerospace 
industry’s technology driver and delivered important spin-off benefits for commercial aircraft 
applications as well as other industry sectors:67 
 
“Historically, civil aeronautics development was triggered by military advancements, which 
the civil industry could refine or improve to gain the efficiency or technical objectives 
                                                      
66 Eisenhower (1961) 
67 The aerospace industry in general has long been regarded as a technology leader that generates valuable spin-offs for 
other industries. For example, innovative composite materials from aerospace manufacturing – initially designed to save 
weight and thus fuel costs – have found their way into the automotive industry, rapid transit vehicles, boats, and even 
sporting equipment. In the aerospace business, the introduction of innovative light-weight composite materials promises 
significant benefits for defence and commercial products alike as “The design of stronger, lighter, and more fuel-
efficient aircraft is a common goal of both sectors.” ITC (2001) ch. 7-6 
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required in civilian application – for example the swept-wing, fly-by-wire controls, and 
retractable landing gear.”68 
“During the Cold War period, the drive to achieve numerical and tactical superiority in 
aircraft and missile technology prompted governments to spend lavishly on R&D for 
military aircraft that resulted in spill-over benefits for civil aircraft […].”69 
 
However, as the centre of technology leadership in important areas like computers, 
communications, composite materials, etc. began to shift from government-sponsored entities to the 
private sector, the flow of net benefits from the military sector to the civil sector “diminished and 
possibly reversed in recent years”70.71 
 
 “In more recent years, a reverse situation has become common, with the results of civil 
research or component design subsequently being used for military purposes, e.g., improved 
fuel efficiency, maintainability and reliability of jet engines, super-aluminium alloys, flight 
management systems and flight structures.”72 
“There has been a major shift towards military use of technology driven by civilian 
research and development [R&D], particularly in electronics. Also, the success of civilian 
technology production has fostered the move away from a particular military culture of 
technology generation.”73 74 
 
In the late 1980s / 1990s, the growing evidence of “gold-plating” in the defence sector as well as the 
discovery that commercial-grade Japanese semiconductors were far cheaper and had almost the 
same performance characteristics as US military semiconductors played an important role in 
transforming outdated traditional perceptions regarding the flow of innovation between the military 
and civilian sectors. “The Decision to broaden commercially – and thus internationally – DoD’s 
supporting industrial base, made in earnest during the 1990s, was both conscious and necessary.”75 
                                                      
68 National Academy of Engineering (1985) p. 101 
69 ITC (2001) ch. 7-6 
70 Ibid., ch. 7-5 
71 “Commercial R&D began outpacing defence R&D in the 1970s. Some studies have concluded that the private 
sector’s sophistication and rates of progress have exceeded the government and defence industry, and that commercial 
R&D is making militarily useful technology available to allies and adversaries, thereby narrowing the equipment 
advantages long enjoyed by the US military. Moreover, many believe that the costs of developing new technologies 
within the defence industrial base have grown over the years at a much more rapid pace than the government’s or 
companies’ investment rates. Consequently, even in the face of continued spending on R&D, both the US government 
and its defence industry have had to reduce the number of new projects in which they invest. The net impact is that the 
scope of the government’s pursuit of, and leadership in, technology has declined.” Watts (2008) pp. 55-56 
72 National Academy of Engineering (1985) p. 101 
73 Brzoska (2007) p. 1 
74 “There also has been something of a shift toward reliance, where possible, on commercial standards, solutions, and 
components – although the shift is by no means consistent and varies from one product market to another.” Bialos 
(2009) vol. I, p. 44 
75 Defense Science Board (1999) p. 8 
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The increasing importance of technologies originating in the commercial sector is also illustrated by 
stepped-up efforts to control the export / proliferation of dual-use goods which have both civilian 
and military applications.76 Foreign collection efforts targeted at the US cleared defence industry 
have increased sharply in recent years, primarily “because our organisations research, develop, and 
manufacture advanced dual-use (commercial and military) technologies and products”77. 
Information systems are by far the most targeted technology. Experts estimate that world-wide 
expenditures on military R&D totalled US$85 billion in 2004; 60 percent of which was spent by the 
US government alone.78 In contrast, total global spending on defence and civilian R&D amounted 
to about US$850 billion that same year – putting the ratio between military and commercial R&D at 
1 to 10. In the US, the share of military R&D is significantly higher and amounts to about 17 
percent.79 During 1996-2004, total US military R&D spending increased from US$44.7 billion to 
US$54.1 billion annually while the combined figure for the UK, France, and Germany dropped 
from US$10.4 billion to US$7.9 billion. However, there is no consensus that the commercial sector 
has become the (aerospace) industry’s ultimate technology driver: 
 
“Proponents of the viewpoint that the net flow of R&D benefits continues to be from the 
military to the civil sector argue that the military sector has always been and will continue 
to be more innovative and willing to take risks on new technologies. This innovative drive is 
fuelled by the desire to maintain technological superiority over other countries. This group 
also points out that the greater demands on military aircraft in terms of speed, 
manoeuvrability, and survivability will ensure that technological breakthroughs will first be 
achieved by the military sector.”80 
 
The US A&D industry constitutes the backbone of the country’s impressive global military 
dominance. Boasting virtually unrivalled technological superiority, a vast fleet of American fighter 
planes and bombers, aircraft carriers, helicopters, missiles, spacecraft and satellites enable the US to 
project its military power around the world and gather unprecedented amounts of intelligence on 
foes and friends alike. The A&D industry is also a key element of the Pentagon’s transformation81 
                                                      
76 “Over the past half century, knowledge of advanced weapon technologies has proliferated around the globe and 
become more widely accessible to small states and even non-state groups. No longer are the nations of the developed 
West and the former Soviet Union in a position to dominate R&D or maintain effective control over the more important 
military technologies and capabilities.” Watts (2008) p. 64 
77 US Defence Security Service Counterintelligence Office (2006) p. 1 
78 Watts (2008) p. 4 
79 The figures for the UK, France, and Germany are 10, 9, and 2 percent, respectively. Ibid., p. 5 
80 ITC (2001) ch. 7-6 
81 DoD (2003) 
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82 designed to move from “an industrial age to an information age military” with fundamentally 
joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects 
across the battle-space.83 Industrial-age warfare in WWI and WWII was characterised by large-
scale battles. Achieving quantitative superiority by out-producing the enemy in terms of tanks, 
ships, planes, bombers, etc. was key to victory. In contrast, victory in information-age wars is 
dependent on the combination of superior intelligence / reconnaissance information and the timely 
projection of accurate, massive firepower.84 Information-age warfare leverages aerospace 
technology to first gather intelligence (through satellites, etc.) and then strike from a “safe” 
distance.85 
 
Kosovo may well be the first war won through air power only.86 In Afghanistan, America 
maximised the accuracy of its air strikes by inserting special forces with Afghan militias to allow 
for the targeted, laser-guided destruction of enemy forces. In Iraq, the Pentagon launched massive 
aerial bombardments followed by armoured Blitzkrieg operations. However, while airpower played 
a crucial role in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, subsequent counterinsurgency 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the importance of having “boots on the ground” to 
stabilize a country after the high tech / high-intensity fighting is over. The future role of airpower in 
(US) military strategy continues to be the subject of heated debate.87 Proponents of air power will 
also need to show how it can effectively contribute to the fight against terrorists and WMD88 
proliferation. 
                                                      
82 RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) is “a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which 
either renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies in a dominant player, or creates one or more new 
core competencies in some dimension of warfare, or both”. Hundley (1999) p. xiii 
83 DoD (2003) pp. 9-11 
84 “Arguably the most important single proposition influencing contemporary American strategic thought in both 
official and unofficial circles is the identification of information as the key factor in military operations”. Freedman 
(2006) pp. 16-17 
85 The political vulnerability of Western leaders to troop casualties coupled with clear Western air superiority have 
created the “temptation of air power” as a “virtually risk-free military option”. Freedman (2006) pp. 61-65 
86 During the 1991 Gulf War only 10 percent of the bombs used in the US-led coalition air campaign were precision-
guided weapons; during the 1999 Kosovo War 90 percent of the bombs were guided by laser or GPS satellites. See 
(Byman & Waxman, 2000) for a more cautious and nuanced assessment of airpower’s role during the Kosovo War. 
87 “The US would not be the first apparently unbeatable military power to find itself undone by an inability to take 
seriously or even to comprehend enemies that rely on their ability to emerge out of the shadows of civil society, 
preferring minor skirmish to major battle, accepting no possibility for decisive victory but instead aiming to unsettle, 
harass, demoralise, humiliate and eventually to wear down their opponents”. Freedman (2006) pp. 5-6 
88 WMD = Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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1.3 The consolidation of the US and European aerospace industries after the end of the Cold War 
 
The end of the Cold War posed particular challenges for the A&D industry, especially since “the 
long duration and special requirements of the Cold War [had] created a large group of highly 
specialised private and public establishments with limited exposure to non-defence markets.”89 
With the Soviet threat gone, Western governments cashed in the “peace dividend” and embarked on 
an extended “procurement holiday” (see Annex Table 4).90 At the same time, the emerging RMA 
led to a dramatic increase in military R&D costs for new weapons systems. Skyrocketing R&D 
expenses, combined with a sharp reduction in the number of produced weapons systems, caused a 
massive increase in the unit cost of advanced military aircraft – further accelerating a trend that had 
begun decades earlier.91 As a result, US and European A&D companies faced tremendous pressure 
to consolidate and reap economies of scale. Streamlining, rationalisation, and consolidation were 
the buzzwords. To put it simply, governments were aiming to get “more bang for the buck” while 
defence companies were looking for economies of scale and scope as well as increased operational 
efficiency. 
 
While the Bush administration (1989-1993) rejected government intervention to foster industry 
consolidation, the Clinton administration decided to reverse this policy and allowed A&D 
companies to include the M&A restructuring costs (plant modifications, equipment relocation, 
severance pay, retraining, etc.) in the reimbursable part of their cost-plus contracts – provided that 
the consolidation process resulted in long-term net procurement savings for the Pentagon.92 
Between 1990 and 2002, the number of major contractors in the US A&D industry came down 
from about 18 to four prime contractors, the so-called mega-primes: Boeing, LMC, Raytheon, and 
Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC). Due to the sheer size of the US defence market, by far the 
largest in the world, and serious concerns about potential leaks and illegal technology transfers to 
foreign companies93, the rationalisation and consolidation in the American defence sector involved 
virtually no partners from abroad. According to Dr. Hamre, protectionist security hawks in 
Congress and at DoS94 would certainly have blocked such a move on national security grounds and 
did push for ethnocentric consolidation instead.95 
 
                                                      
89 Oden (1999) pp. 74-105 
90 Annual US defence procurement spending fell from US$150 billion in the mid-1980s to US$50 billion in 2001. 
91 Since 1945, the real unit costs of combat aircraft built for the RAF increased at a compound annual growth rate of 
11.5 percent. Kirkpatrick (1995) 
92 Korb (1996); (Gholz & Sapolsky, 1999/2000) 
93 The diffusion of military technology from the hegemonic core to the periphery, combined with the pitfalls of 
“military overstretch”, has played a key role in bringing about the decline of empires throughout history. 
94 DoS = Department of State 
95 Hamre (2007) 
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However, the massive consolidation of the US A&D industry through “pure play” mergers – 
leading to the formation of a few giant, defence-heavy companies – also caused major concerns; 
especially among those in charge of the Pentagon’s procurement budget. In 1997, the Clinton 
administration abandoned its initial pro-merger policy in an effort to maintain a certain degree of 
competition and to prevent the creation of harmful monopolies. The potential shift of market power 
from buyers (governments) to sellers (A&D companies) is a major public policy risk associated 
with large-scale industry consolidation leading to the creation of duo- or monopolies. There is a 
danger that “the West could end up with a small set of very large, very powerful, and not very 
competitive defence firms, favouring the maintenance of Cold War thinking and technologies.”96 
The key issue is how the gains from industry consolidation are divided between taxpayers (in terms 
of cheaper, more capable weapons systems) and shareholders (in terms of corporate profits). 
 
In Europe, defence budgets shrank even more dramatically after the end of the Cold War than in the 
US. National governments and their respective A&D companies were reluctantly sacrificing 
national autonomy in favour of increased European integration and interdependence in arms R&DP. 
A major breakthrough came in October 1999 with the creation of EADS as the largest aerospace 
firm in Europe. All three EADS founders (AM97, DASA98, CASA99) were part of Airbus and had 
thus gained valuable experience in collaborating successfully across different languages, business 
cultures, and regulatory frameworks.100 101 Prior to the EADS merger, the acquisition of GEC-
Marconi by BAe102 – both privately owned, UK-based companies – in 1999 had led to the creation 
of BAE Systems (BAE).103 Due to the US-UK “special relationship”, BAE is the only European 
firm with significant exposure and access to the lucrative American defence market.104 105 In 
essence, the “special relationship” refers to the fact that “The [UK] and the [US] are each other’s 
closest ally and security partner”.106 107 108 109 
                                                      
96 (Markusen & Costigan, 1999) p. 29 
97 AM = Aérospatiale-Matra 
98 DASA = Daimler-Benz Aerospace AG / DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG 
99 CASA = Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA 
100 Airbus was initially organised as a GIE – a construct under French law that allowed all four partner companies to 
retain their full legal, financial, and managerial independence. The profits from Airbus were allocated to each 
participating company according to its stake in the consortium. In July 2001, the GIE was transformed into Airbus 
Integrated Company. 
101 Following the decision by BAE to sell its 20-percent stake in Airbus in October 2006, EADS now owns 100 percent 
of Airbus, which accounts for more than two-thirds of the company’s revenues and an even higher share of its profits. 
102 BAe = British Aerospace 
103 BAE derives three-quarters of its turnover from defence and counts the US as the most important market. 
104 BAE is the biggest non-US subcontractor for LMC’s JSF. 
105 In 2007, BAE ranked as the sixth-largest Pentagon contractor. 
106 “The US-UK special relationship today has a political and ideological superstructure and an embedded military and 
intelligence substructure. […] Defence cooperation was at the heart of the special relationship from the outset, and 
remains central to it.” (Wallace & Phillips, 2009) pp. 263 ; 267 
107 (Chao & Niblett, 2006) p. 4 
 
35 
 
“A cursory look across four facets of this [US-UK] relationship shows that in three 
dimensions, at least – commitment to the Atlantic political-military alliance, nuclear 
cooperation110, and intelligence sharing – a strong case can be made for the emergence of a 
distinct and privileged bilateral partnership over the past forty years. The fourth area – 
defence industrial cooperation – reflects a more ambiguous situation […].”111 
 
Chapter 7 discusses in more detail why – the long-standing US-UK “special relationship” and 
BAE’s privileged access to the American defence market notwithstanding – Washington continues 
to maintain political and institutional barriers preventing even closer US-UK defence industrial 
cooperation; chief among them cumbersome US export licensing procedures imposing restrictions 
on the transfer of sensitive technologies and / or on the sharing of relevant R&D results across the 
Atlantic. In sum, however, it is nonetheless correct to point out that UK A&D companies like BAE 
generally enjoy a much higher degree of trust and confidence among Washington’s key political 
players than their competitors from other European countries. US political and military leaders 
widely regard the UK as a loyal and trustworthy ally with whom they share not only a common 
language and values but also a long history of wars fought side-by-side (including, most recently, 
the controversial 2003 Iraq War). 
 
In contrast, France has generally been viewed with much more scepticism by Washington and is 
suspected of wanting to undermine America’s dominant leadership position – both within NATO 
and on the global stage in general.112 France’s long-standing aspiration to be a great power in a 
multi-polar world order built on strong multilateral institutions (notably the UNSC, where Paris 
wields a veto) has been particularly troubling for US policymakers.113 During the Cold War, France 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
108 “After Suez, the British resolved never to get out of step with US foreign policy again. This was the point at which 
British governments began to be obsessed with the idea of a special relationship. It was apparent that the UK could not 
expect to play a major role in the world either independently of or in opposition to the [US]. Its future strategy would be 
to trade loyalty for privileged access to Washington’s foreign-policy making.” Freedman (June 2006) p. 61 
109 The 1956 Suez conflict marked the last time that London and Washington adopted openly antagonistic positions 
during a major international security crisis (Britain’s refusal to commit combat troops to Vietnam is different in the 
sense that London did not actively work against US interests; it simply failed to support the US). Drawing the painful 
“Lessons of Suez”, the UK accepted its fall from great power status and decided to closely align its security and defence 
policy with Washington. 
110 “The UK’s nuclear deterrent has been developed and maintained in close cooperation with the [US] through the 
creation of a trusted community of American and British scientists, engineers, officials, company executives, and 
firms”. (Chao & Niblett, 2006) p. 12 
111 Ibid., p. 11 
112 France and Germany are the two major European countries that opposed the Bush administration over Iraq. In April 
2003, France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg called for the creation of a separate command headquarters for EU-
led military operations. However, this “praline summit” initiative was quickly blocked by the UK and other Atlanticist 
EU members for fear that it would undermine NATO. 
113 “1. France considers itself a pivotal great power. 2. France can only play this pivotal role in a multi-polar world. 3. 
France considers a multipolar world the best guarantee of international relations that are based on a multilateral 
approach. France favours a strong role for international fora, especially for the Security Council of the UN, of which it 
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charted its own foreign and security policy, engaged in the 1956 Suez adventure, established its 
independent “force de frappe” nuclear deterrent (ironically with US technological support) and 
pulled out of NATO’s Integrated Military Structure (IMS) in 1966.114 In the post-Cold War era, 
French President Chirac became not only the chief proponent of the EU’s autonomous ESDP; he 
also seized on the controversial 2003 Iraq War to forge a Paris-Berlin-Moscow-Beijing coalition in 
an effort to counter the perceived unilateral exercise of American military power and Washington’s 
blatant disregard for international law, including the primacy of the UNSC.115 Apart from 
geopolitical rivalries between Paris and Washington, Franco-American / transatlantic A&D 
industrial collaboration has also been hampered by different approaches to export controls, raising 
US concerns that American state-of-the-art defence / dual-use technologies shared with France or 
other mainlined European countries could ultimately find their way to US adversaries around the 
world.116 Ultimately, mutual trust and a perceived congruence of foreign and security policy 
objectives as well as the strategies to achieve them are they key reasons why America’s defence 
industrial collaboration with the UK is so much closer than with any other European country. 
 
Before the creation of EADS and BAE Systems, DASA and BAe had been in advanced 
negotiations about a potential merger. For DASA, the option to join forces with BAe – also 
privately owned – was much more attractive than to merge with AM, a company controlled and 
partly owned by the French state. It is important to emphasise France’s state-centred A&D 
industrial structure and management strategy. A 1992 report commissioned by the US Congress put 
it bluntly: 
 
“Nearly four-fifths of the French defence industry is owned directly or indirectly by the 
state, either in the form of government-owned and operated arsenals, nationalised 
companies […] or firms in which the government owns a large share of the stock […].117 
 
The DGA (Délégation Générale pour l’Armement) has long served as the French government’s 
main vehicle to shape and structure the country’s defence industrial base.118 As a centralised 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
is a permanent member. Such a role will not only strengthen international law, but also confirm France’s great power 
status.” van Herpen (2003) 
114 “In France there exists a certain nostalgia for the Cold War era. In this period the world was not ideal, because not 
multi-polar, but its bipolarity offered (Gaullist) France a relative independence vis-à-vis both superpowers.” Ibid. 
115 The 2007 election of President Sarkozy dramatically improved French-American relations as exemplified by 
France’s reintegration into NATO’s IMS in 2009. 
116 For example, during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), France alone accounted for about 20 percent of Saddam 
Hussein’s major weapon systems imports. While these strategically-motivated arms exports were authorised by the 
highest political authorities in Paris, they subsequently came back to haunt France (and its Western allies such as the 
US) in the 1991 Gulf War over Kuwait. During “Operation Desert Storm”, France’s Mirage fighter jets had to stay out 
of combat because of concerns that they might be confused with Iraq’s French-built Mirage fighters. OTA (1992) 
117 Ibid. 
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procurement agency within the Ministry of Defence (MoD), “The DGA is the linchpin of the 
French arms-procurement system, mediating among the political authorities, the defence industry, 
and the military operators”. As one analyst put it, the DGA’s primary mission is “the preservation 
and promotion of an ever-modernising arms industry within an internationally competitive French 
industrial system”.119 “While DGA officials do not intervene in day-to-day company operations, 
they must concur in major strategic decisions such as large investments, new ventures, or 
international collaborative programs.” The DGA director “has greater control over research, 
engineering, and industrial matters than any other European or American defence officials”.120 
Other European governments, especially in the UK and Germany, were much more hesitant and 
reluctant to adopt such an interventionist approach towards their A&D industry players. DASA 
managers thus feared that the French government would use its considerable political leverage to 
unduly influence the corporate strategy of the new, merged Franco-German company – making the 
hoped-for rationalisation and consolidation of production sites as well as related potential job cuts 
very difficult to implement. As subsequent Franco-German clashes among the top EADS leadership 
have demonstrated, these fears were not unfounded. Furthermore, DASA reasoned that a merger 
with BAe would make it easier to enter the lucrative US defence market. 
 
It is important to note that EADS and BAE were created after most of the consolidation in the US 
A&D industry – notably the BMD merger – had already taken place. Faced with increasing 
competition from American mega-primes, European A&D companies had virtually no choice but to 
co-operate more closely to reap economies of scale. This dramatic post-Cold War shift towards 
more European transnational A&D industrial collaboration – notably in the form of the EADS 
merger – was particularly hard to stomach for the French government, which had long put a 
premium on largely state controlled defence companies achieving national autonomy across the full 
range of armaments. For sure, Paris had decided to pursue collaborative defence industrial programs 
with its European neighbours from the 1960s to the 1980s121; but virtually all of these programmes 
were bilateral in nature because they offered “greater control and lower transaction costs”122 
compared to bigger, multi-national consortia. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
118 “De Gaulle’s political goal of achieving national autonomy in the full range of armaments – particularly nuclear 
weapons – in the face of tight budgetary constraints required the careful husbanding and allocation of resources. To this 
end, in 1961 de Gaulle replaced the weapons directorates reporting to the individual services with a centralised 
procurement agency known as [DGA].” Ibid., p. 11. This report provides also an excellent overview of the DGA’s 
structure and functioning. 
119 Kolodziej (1987) p. 258 
120 OTA (1989) p. 11 
121 Franco-British arms programs included both helicopters (Puma, Gazelle, Lynx) and attack aircraft (Jaguar); Franco-
German defence projects included the Transall and the Alpha Jet. OTA (1992) p. 27 
122 Ibid., p. 27 
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“But Gaullist imperatives caused France to collaborate mainly on systems of secondary 
military importance, such as helicopters, trainers, and transport aircraft, while preserving 
national autonomy in “strategic” areas such as nuclear weapons, nuclear-capable delivery 
systems, and high-performance combat aircraft.”123 
 
In sum, the EADS merger was significant for the French in several respects. First, it weakened the 
government’s control over the A&D industry; second, the EADS merger was multilateral in nature; 
and third, the EADS merger also covered strategic areas such as high-performance combat 
aircraft.124 125 126 
                                                      
123 Ibid., pp. 27-28 
124 The EADS merger excluded France’s military nuclear activities. 
125 “The DGA has concluded that France no longer has the financial means to maintain an independent capability across 
the full spectrum of weapon systems and must increasingly rationalise defence production on a European scale, while 
concentrating on its competitive strengths.” Ibid., p. 20 
126 “DGA officials have promoted international collaborative programs as a strategy for countering the monopolistic 
practices of national-champion firms.” Ibid., p. 15 
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1.4 International collaboration and governmental intervention in the aerospace industry 
 
In principle, international collaboration in armaments production is only a second-best solution.127 
“As a policy instrument, collaboration seeks to resolve the underlying tension between nationalistic 
conceptions of security and the globalisation of advanced industries.”128 For national security 
reasons, states would generally prefer complete national autonomy in armaments research, 
development, and production. In an “ideal” world this would be the “best” solution. However, due 
to limited financial and technological resources, many states decide to collaborate, notably to cope 
with skyrocketing R&DP costs for advanced weapons systems. States have basically four options to 
acquire weapons and advanced aerospace systems.129 First, states with sufficient financial and 
technological resources will generally opt for “autonomous armament production”. Second, states 
that are technologically advanced but lack the financial resources to develop weapons systems on 
their own opt for “co-development”; an arrangement where two or more states share in all aspects 
of the development and production of a weapons project. Third, states that have sufficient financial 
assets but lack the necessary technological know-how will opt for “co-production”, where they 
assemble foreign weapons under licensing agreements. Finally, the least desirable political option is 
the “import” of weapons systems from abroad. While this last strategy is often the “cheapest”, in 
purely financial terms, states that import weapons could become dependent on suppliers abroad for 
their national security. All things being equal, the (military) acquisition preferences of states can 
therefore be ranked as follows: autonomy > co-development > co-production > import. 
 
Historically, there exist important differences in the developmental trajectories of the European and 
American aircraft industries. In Europe, small, captive markets and the associated high degrees of 
national fragmentation made it quite difficult to reap economies of scale across different companies 
and national boundaries. European aircraft makers forged close links with their respective national 
home governments early on, especially after the outbreak of WWI. Some aircraft makers were even 
either partially or fully nationalised to better support their countries’ respective war efforts.130 In the 
US, in contrast, all aircraft companies have remained in private hands since the industry’s inception 
more than a hundred years ago.131 132 That being said, Washington played an important role in 
                                                      
127 Kapstein (1991-1992) pp. 657-675 
128 Ibid., p. 658 
129 Ibid., pp. 658-661 
130 Despite the fragmentation of Europe’s aeronautics industry, “transnational production strategies were not uncommon 
before the war” and “The ‘Golden Age of Aviation’ (1927-1932) was marked by widespread use of licensed production 
of foreign aircraft”. Golich (1992) p. 910 
131 Washington has repeatedly given loan guarantees and favourable anti-trust review treatment to military aerospace 
manufacturers threatened by bankruptcy (i.e., Douglas Aircraft and its subsequent “shotgun wedding” to McDonnell in 
the mid-1960s and the rescue of Lockheed in 1971). (Moran & Mowery, 1991) p. 137 
132 While the US defence sector is, in principle, fully privatized, it is important to point out that there exist a number of 
so-called GOCOs (government-owned and contractor-operated facilities) and even GOGOs (government-owned and 
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promoting the development of the US civil aviation industry, for example through the creation of a 
transcontinental airmail service supported by a network of rotating beacons (“lighted airways”) 
designed for night flight navigation in 1924 and by establishing the Civil Aviation Authority in 
1938, with responsibility for “direct subsidies to promote passenger travel, economic regulation of 
airlines, air traffic control, and safety”133. In sum, a crucial factor in explaining the global 
dominance of the US aviation industry after WWII has been “a productive, decades-long 
relationship among the government, the major airlines, and the aircraft manufacturers in the context 
of a free-market economy” dating back as early as WWI.134 135 
 
In the wake of WWII, much of Europe’s once impressive aerospace industrial base was left 
severely weakened. US aerospace companies, in contrast, suffered no devastation as a result of 
WWII and were thus able to increase both the production and technological sophistication of their 
airplanes during the post-war period.136 137 After the Berlin crisis of 1947-1948, as the Cold War 
consolidated into a long-term confrontation, the US government provided its Western European 
allies with defence and aerospace equipment in an effort to help build a credible conventional 
deterrent vis-à-vis the growing Soviet military threat. Initially, most of the US matériel was given 
to Europe for free. In contrast, American military assistance programmes launched in the early 
1950s were part of the “Cold War” rearmament effort and thus generally tied to the sale (and later 
extensive co-production) of US military aircraft such as the F-104 to European countries such as 
Germany. In the 1950s and 1960s, America also sold civil aviation aircraft at steep discounts to 
airlines in friendly countries. While this strategy contributed to the emergence of a burgeoning 
airline industry in many parts of the world, it also made these foreign airlines “path dependent” on 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
government-operated factories) for the production of military products. The GOCO structure is primarily used for the 
manufacturing of sophisticated ammunitions in an effort to protect private contractors from potential lawsuits and 
liability claims related to the adverse environmental impact of their operations. Current GOCO examples include the 
Holston Army Ammunition Plant located in Kingsport Tennessee, which remains the primary source of military 
explosives in the United States. Since 1999, BAE Systems (through its Royal Ordnance subsidiary) has been the private 
contractor operating this particular GOCO. 
133 National Academy of Engineering (1985) p. 27 
134 Ibid., p. 26 
135 1934 also saw “the separation of airlines from manufacturers by government fiat to increase competition and 
industry development”. Ibid., p. 27 
136 “In 1943, the [UK] had agreed with the [US] that the former would concentrate on developing and manufacturing 
fighter aircraft while the latter would specialise in heavy bombers and military transports. The resulting division of 
labour placed Britain at a commercial disadvantage after the war, for the American wartime experience was more 
relevant to peacetime industrial requirements than that of the British.” Grieco (1979) p. 519 
137 After WWII, the Allies moved quickly to snatch Germany’s top aerospace talents like Werner von Braun and make 
them work on their own national defence programs, thus leading to a significant German / European “brain drain”. The 
US Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CIA, brought hundreds of German military scientists to America 
as part of clandestine “Operation Paperclip”. These scientists would subsequently make crucial contributions to US 
space missions, including the Saturn rockets and the Apollo programmes. 
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US aerospace companies.138 As a result of this US export promotion policy and the related path 
dependency of many airlines, American aerospace companies held around 80 percent of the world 
market for civil aircraft by 1970.139 140 
 
To counter America’s dominance of the civil aircraft market, three European aerospace companies 
from Germany, France and the UK – politically and financially supported by their national 
governments – launched the Airbus consortium on 20 July 1967. “Airbus must be seen as an 
international collaboration that arises out of the failure of European states to develop successful 
strategies to compete with the [US].”141 142 The Airbus project thus reflected Europe’s 
determination “to resist and match American technological ‘imperialism’”.143 For Airbus, the only 
feasible way to enter the rapidly growing commercial aviation market and break the existing US 
monopoly was to develop a new type of large passenger aircraft. Previous British and French efforts 
to market their own jet airliners (Comet, Caravelle) had failed. However, the driving forces behind 
Airbus were not only economic or technological considerations. Airbus was also a European 
political project designed to support Europe’s historic integration process towards “an ever closer 
union”.144 145 
 
Drawing costly lessons from their previous failures, European governments gave the Airbus 
partners considerable leeway to independently develop and execute their commercial two-pronged 
strategy. First, Airbus set itself the goal to capture a significant part – at least 30 percent – of the 
global market for large passenger aircraft above 100 seats. Second, to achieve this ambitious goal, 
Airbus decided to build an entire “family” of similar aircraft to respond flexibly to the changing 
needs of aerospace markets around the world. However, the first Airbus – christened A-300 since it 
had room for 300 passengers – had difficulties taking off commercially after its maiden flight in 
October 1972. On the economic front, the oil shock in 1973 pushed many Western economies into 
recession and drove up the price of kerosene – the most important variable cost factor of any 
                                                      
138 It is expensive for airlines to switch from one aircraft manufacturer to another since pilots, crews, and technical 
personnel have to be retrained, new maintenance equipment needs to be bought, etc. 
139 McGuire (1999) p. 2 
140 America remains the world’s most important civilian and military aerospace market. In the 1960s, US commercial 
aircraft companies earned 90 percent of their revenues from the domestic market. 
141 McGuire (1999) p. 26 
142 “The aircraft industry is the clearest example of foreign targeting that adversely affect US firms. The [US] has 
traditionally dominated the production of large commercial aircraft but has now been challenged by Airbus […]. The 
key to the Airbus challenge is government financial support.” Krugman (1984) p. 116 
143 Nau (1974) p. 12 
144 McGuire (1999) p. 37 
145 France’s decision to build the Rafale fighter aircraft, the nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier and the 
Triomphant-class nuclear submarine underline the French governments’ clear commitment of political capital and 
economic resources for the country’s national military industrial independence and grandeur. Kapstein (2002) p. 143 
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airline.146 Despite the clear business focus of Airbus and the considerable operational independence 
enjoyed by its partners, the consortium’s administrative structures revealed the close links between 
European governments and their Airbus aerospace companies. For the definition of its political 
orientations, for instance, Airbus reported to the so-called Intergovernmental Committee (IGC), 
composed of representatives from the different ministries responsible for the Airbus project. The 
IGC also provided the institutional link between the founding nations of Airbus and the European 
Commission (EC), which plays a key role in transatlantic disputes over trade and industrial policy. 
“Essentially Airbus represented a bargain struck between aerospace firms and governments. 
Governments would back the consortium with money and political support. Airbus, for its part, 
undertook to develop a commercially credible product.”147 Airbus was founded as a public-private 
partnership designed to preserve the independence and autonomy of the European aerospace 
industry vis-à-vis the crushing dominance of the American competitors. 
 
Between 1972 and 1977, US aerospace manufacturers continued to dominate the global commercial 
aircraft market. In 1977, however, Airbus had a major strategic breakthrough and sold 23 A-300 to 
its first American customer, Eastern Air Lines. On the political front, Congress and the Carter 
administration exerted pressure to discourage American carriers from buying Airbus or any other 
non-US aircraft for that matter.148 149 Washington’s political leaders argued that US airlines should 
“Buy American” in order to save jobs in the US aerospace industry. At one point, the Carter 
administration even threatened to impose countervailing duties on all Airbus imported into the US 
in an effort “to protect domestic manufacturers from foreign competition backed by government 
finance”.150 It is clear, though, that during the 1970s, both Boeing and MDC wanted to avoid a 
transatlantic trade war and did not call on the US administration / Congress to impose import 
restrictions or other trade remedies vis-à-vis Airbus.151 152 As the 1970s progressed, however, 
Airbus increasingly began to put its US rivals on the defensive. By 1979, the European consortium 
                                                      
146 “Airbus was also lucky in that fuel price increases of the mid-1970s made a large twin-engined airliner more 
attractive when the A-300 was the only one available.” Hayward (1987-1988) p. 20 
147 McGuire (1999) p. 39 
148 Eastern Air Lines’s A-300 order and Pan Am’s purchase of the UK-manufactured TriStar 500/RB.211 triggered a 
House hearing, and there was “little doubt in Washington that a major Congressional investigation would have resulted 
if United Airlines had decided to buy $1,000 million-worth of Airbus A-300-10s instead of Boeing 767s” in 1978. 
Flight International (1978) 
149 In 1961, Mohawk Airlines purchased four British-made BAC 1-11 aircraft, and American Airlines ordered 15 such 
aircraft in 1963, triggering a storm of protest from US aircraft makers and Congress. 
150 Flight International (1978) 
151 “The Carter administration was concerned about creeping subsidies in civil aviation, but no countervailing duties or 
other retaliatory measures were imposed. Instead we negotiated an agreement, in the context of the OECD 
[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] Gentleman’s accord on export credits that brought some 
discipline to aircraft financing. In the 1970s and 1980s, Boeing didn’t want to trigger a trade war, for lots of good 
commercial reasons.” Hufbauer (2009). 
152 “Since Boeing and [MDC] were profitable and export-dependent and had extensive overseas connections, both could 
be expected to oppose any closure of the American market.” (Milner & Yoffie, 1989) p. 256 
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had managed to replace MDC as the world’s second-largest commercial aircraft manufacturer 
behind Boeing.153 154 155 
 
In response to Airbus’ meteoric rise, Boeing and MDC started lobbying the US Congress and the 
Carter administration to push for negotiations on a GATT156 accord that would, inter alia, abolish 
all R&D subsidies for commercial aircraft, the preferred mode of support in Europe.157 158 In April 
1979, after quite long and laborious negotiations, the US and European governments signed the 
“GATT Aircraft Agreement” in Geneva. This accord contained three key provisions.159 First, all 
import tariffs on aerospace products would be completely abolished by 1 January 1980; second, all 
participating governments agreed not to exert “unreasonable pressure” to influence the acquisition 
policy of the airline companies; and third, the aerospace companies would have to sell their aircraft 
at a price that takes into account all relevant R&D and production costs; in other words, this anti-
dumping clause made it illegal to sell aircraft at an artificially low price in an effort to squeeze out 
competitors. However, the GATT Agreement did not ban direct financial support / “launch aid” 
packages provided to Airbus by European governments. As a result, US-European tensions over the 
aerospace industry continued to mount throughout the 1980s.160 
 
Today, as throughout the Cold War, America has still the most stringent military and dual-use 
export controls in place. These constraints are due to the fact that the US government has a long 
tradition of imposing rather complex and cumbersome unilateral technology export controls that go 
beyond the limitations set by the respective multilateral regimes. 
 
“[US] export control rules written during the Cold War have been extended, reflecting 
unchanging and even growing concern within the policy bureaucracies about the risk of the 
                                                      
153 Airbus managed to boost its share of the world’s commercial aircraft market from 3 percent in the early 1970s to 30 
percent in 1979. Ibid., p. 257 
154 Lockheed pulled out of the commercial aircraft market in 1981 due to poor sales of its L-1011 TriStar planes amid 
growing competition from Airbus. Martel (2000) p. 35 
155 MDC did not only cross-subsidise the loss-making commercial aircraft unit through its profitable fighter business 
but also benefited from Pentagon contracts for military transport planes (spin-off effects, etc.). 
156 GATT = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
157 “By the 1980s, Boeing, in particular, made stronger and more complicated demands. […] The charges against 
Airbus included its willingness to undersell at all costs and its use of political pressure to buy from Airbus.” (Milner & 
Yoffie, 1989) p. 260 
158 In America, in contrast, the aerospace manufacturers received huge R&D grants from the Pentagon to develop 
military aircraft that also generated important positive spin-off effects for Boeing and MDC’s commercial aircraft 
business. Boeing’s 707 commercial aircraft benefited tremendously from military spin-off effects: “A large share of the 
technology developed for the engines and airframes of the long-range military bombers and tankers of the 1950s had 
important commercial applications, helping to lay the foundation for the 707.” (Moran & Mowery, 1991) p. 136 
159 McGuire (1999) pp. 68-90 
160 In 1987, “Boeing threatened to file a Section 301 petition as well as anti-dumping and countervailing duties suits 
against Airbus, noting that ‘under any of these laws, the US government could negotiate with Airbus to limit the 
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loss of technological superiority and the proliferation of capabilities that could be used, one 
day, against the [US]. This concern is mirrored in the US Congress where issues relating to 
defence technology exports and direct foreign investment by European firms in the US defence 
industrial economy have been hotly debated.”161 
 
It has been argued that as a result, US high-tech companies have often been at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to their foreign rivals from other Western and non-Western countries.162 163 
Matters are made worse by the extraterritorial reach of American export control provisions, which 
extend to foreign subsidiaries of US companies, foreign companies using American technology, 
etc.164 However, the weight of US government support for American defence companies as well as 
the vast size of the Pentagon’s (highly protected) military procurement market gives US companies 
a major competitive advantage vis-à-vis foreign firms, thus counterbalancing any negative 
economic impact due to strict defence export regulations.165 Sales of US weapons systems are 
buoyed by their technological sophistication and competitive pricing (due to superior economies of 
scale) as well as Washington’s status as the world’s last remaining superpower, which provides 
unique political and military levers to convince foreign governments to opt in favour of US-made 
weapons.166 Despite stringent export controls, America remains by far the world’s biggest arms 
exporter. Therefore, demands from Washington that other countries exercise restraint and adhere to 
stricter export controls are often viewed as protectionism bordering on hypocrisy: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
quantity of exports, eliminate subsidies, impose taxes, or reach some other solutions’.” (Milner & Yoffie, 1989) p. 260. 
Inserted quotations from Congressional testimony by a senior Boeing executive in June 1987. 
161 CSIS (2003) p. 27 
162 “[T]o the extent that [export] controls are interpreted / implemented unevenly, firms from countries with more liberal 
policies enjoy a bonus of greater sales revenues and world market share, lower compliance costs, higher resources for 
R&D, and hence continuing competitive advantages over their handicapped [US] rivals.” Parkhe (1992) p. 50 
163 “Evidence shows that states routinely curtail capitalists’ global activities if these interfere with states’ other projects 
or interests, despite capitalists’ complaints that government constraints cost them lucrative markets or stigmatise them 
as unreliable trading partners. The US, for example, restricts Boeing’s missile sales to China, to comply with 
international arms control treaties, protect Taiwan, and preserve the US traditional ‘hard’ geopolitical hegemony.” 
Gritsch (2005) p. 14 
164 US export control regulations apply “to US foreign subsidiaries and independent foreign companies selling US-
origin end products, US-origin parts and components incorporated in foreign equipment and even foreign products 
manufactured with US-origin technology”. Parkhe (1992) p. 54 
165 US defence export control regimes also have major holes, for example with regard to Israel, which has continued to 
benefit from extensive transfer of advanced US military technologies despite a rather long history of violating US re-
export regulations vis-a-vis South Africa, China, and India. 
166 The 1991 Gulf War highlighted the superiority of US military technology and demonstrated Washington’s role as a 
guarantor of international security. “The superior performance of American weapons in the Gulf War positioned US 
companies to win major new business from that and other regions. […] As the industrialised Western powers reduced 
their procurement budgets, foreign business became a critical profit centre, even determining the survival of many 
companies. The White House helped whenever it could. The Bush administration actively promoted and negotiated the 
lion’s share of the [US]$83.1 billion in arms export agreements in the four years following 1990 (up from [US]$34.5 
billion during the previous years). (Keller & Nolan, 1997-1998) pp. 116-117 
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“It is both morally and politically indefensible to tell other nations – such as China, France, 
and Russia – to reduce arms sales when US officials and arms companies are conducting a 
full-court press to dominate international markets.”167 
 
The US Arms Export Control Act (AECA) gives the President the statutory authority “to control the 
export and import of defence articles and defence services.”168 In practice, however, AECA 
delegates the authority for the US export control system to the Secretary of State, who is 
responsible for the “continuous supervision and general direction of sales, leases, financing, 
cooperation projects and exports” of defence articles and services.169 The DoS compiles a list of 
military goods and services covered by the AECA, the so-called US Munitions List. The Commerce 
Department, in turn, maintains the Commerce Control List covering dual-use items. In general, the 
DoS, which runs the ITAR licensing procedure, has taken a conservative view of military export 
licenses. The State Department has been particularly careful to guard against potentially risky 
export of military items and related technology transfers to other countries. Any US company 
intending to export a defence-related product or technology, or that wants to negotiate with a 
foreign partner over an export deal, joint venture, merger or acquisition has to obtain a license from 
the Office of Defence Trade Controls (ODTC). These strict, complex and lengthy export licensing 
procedures have made it extremely difficult for aerospace companies in Europe and the US to co-
operate on major, state-of-the-art defence projects.170 
 
During the second Clinton administration, the Pentagon lobbied the DoS to ease US export controls 
to facilitate international co-operation on the development and production of defence systems. In 
February 2000, the Pentagon signed Declarations of Principles (DOPs) with the UK and Australia 
to begin a dialogue on the potential harmonisation of the countries’ respective defence trade rules 
and procedures. While the DoS initially resisted the Pentagon’s reform efforts, it launched the 
Defence Trade Security Initiatives (DTSI) in May 2000.171 The most important element of the 
proposed reform process was to exempt those countries from the lengthy ITAR172 process “that 
                                                      
167 Ibid., p. 124 
168 AECA section 38 
169 The DoD covers military technology exports, the DoS reviews arms shipments, the DoC is in charge of dual-use 
exports, the DoE (Department of Energy) controls nuclear material exports, and the NSA (National Security Agency) 
controls the export of encryption technologies. Parkhe (2003) p. 52 
170 “[A] fundamental overlap of export license jurisdiction between the DoC […] and the DoS […] has resulted in 
unclear and conflicting policies, long delays in reaching closure, and uncertain lines of authority.” Ibid., pp. 50-51 
171 “The [DTSI] comprises 17 reforms […] designed to streamline the processing of munitions export licenses. The 
initiatives include, amongst other things, granting [ITAR] exemptions for unclassified exports to certain foreign 
governments and companies, and a range of flexible, new licensing vehicles for NATO member countries, Japan, and 
Australia.” Pentagon: http://www.dsca.osd.mil/dtsi/DTSI_links.htm 
172 ITAR = International Traffic in Arms Regulation 
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share with the [US] congruent and reciprocal policies in export controls, industrial security, 
intelligence, law enforcement, and reciprocity in market access.”173 
 
Due to wide-spread US doubts about the effectiveness of Europe’s defence export and technology 
transfer regimes, any attempt by European companies to make direct investments in the vast and 
highly lucrative American defence market is generally viewed with a mix of suspicion and hostility. 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is the key institution to 
evaluate the potential impact of any FDI on America’s national security posture.174 In the aerospace 
sector, the Pentagon normally takes the lead in investigating whether FDI / M&As involving an 
American company could potentially undermine the country’s military-technological position by 
creating new vulnerabilities and dependencies. CFIUS reviews involve an analysis of how the 
planned transactions would affect the American aerospace industry’s ability to independently meet 
the country’s national defence requirements. CFIUS can either be notified by any of the parties 
involved in the planned transaction, or it may itself decide to review the FDI / M&A. Once CFIUS 
has been notified, at least three Committee members must decide within 30 days that a formal 
review of the case is warranted. If the answer is ‘yes’, CFIUS has another 45 days to review the 
transaction and make a recommendation to the President on whether the operation should be cleared 
or blocked. Finally, it is up to the President to decide within 15 days whether the transaction can go 
ahead or not. While the vast majority of CFIUS decisions across the different industry sectors are 
made rather quickly, large-scale (aerospace) M&As consume significant time and resources and 
tend to attract unwanted political attention from members of the US Congress prone to lobbying by 
interested third parties. 
 
Finally, European aerospace companies generally face tough obstacles to selling their products on 
the lucrative US defence market. The Pentagon’s acquisition policy favours American over 
European / foreign companies, whose management, technology base, production facilities and 
supply chains are at an elevated risk of potential political and economic pressure / interference by 
foreign governments and companies. This ‘Fortress America’ approach is partly mirrored by a 
‘Fortress Europe’ defence acquisition policy. However, European defence markets are generally 
much more open to US companies than vice versa – not least because American A&D companies 
can often deliver proven high technology products at more competitive prices and delivery dates 
than their rivals from Europe and elsewhere. In addition, advanced arms sales do always have an 
                                                      
173 AECA section 38 
174 CFIUS, formed in 1975, is chaired by the Treasury Secretary and includes the Secretaries of Defense, State and 
Commerce, the Attorney General, the OMB Director, the USTR, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, 
and several other government representatives. 
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important political dimension. Today, US defence experts fully recognise that America’s defence 
export and technology controls are a double-edged sword, posing potentially fundamental 
challenges to the long-term viability of the American defence industrial base.175 
                                                      
175 “On the one hand, the US government would like to restrict the flow of militarily useful technologies and systems 
from the [US] while, at the same time, limiting the dependence of the US military on overseas suppliers. On the other 
hand, selling American systems and weapons overseas lowers their cost to the US taxpayer and spurs innovation, but 
tends to create overseas competitors to US defence firms. Foreign sales can also be a subtle tool of US defence strategy 
to increase the dependence of other nations’ forces and industries on America. But the [ITAR] regulations have also 
hampered the flow of non-critical items and technologies overseas, thereby hindering US companies from competing in 
foreign markets. […] This hobbling of US aerospace firms in non-military overseas markets is likely to continue 
without some overhaul of ITAR and thus encourage the development of increasingly advanced indigenous military 
capabilities in Europe, China, and other countries.” Watts (2008) pp. 56-57 
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Chapter 2: The Intellectual Battlefield: Competing Theoretical Frameworks 
2.1 Bound to compete: realism and the BMD / EADS mergers 
 
This chapter analyses the BMD / EADS mergers from the perspective of two major IR theories: 
realism and neo-liberal institutionalism (or “neo-liberalism”), whose proponents are locked in a 
long-standing fight over intellectual battlefield dominance in IR theory: 
 
“[T]he debate between these two approaches has dominated much of international 
relations theory for the last decade. It is now commonplace for an article about some aspect 
of international relations theory to begin by locating itself in terms of this debate”176. 
 
Historically, realism has long been the pre-eminent school of IR theory. Political and military 
leaders in particular, have come to value realism for its theoretical simplicity, its high explanatory 
and predictive capacity, as well as its direct applicability to the practice of international relations. 
Especially on hard-core defence and national security issues, realism is arguably still the only 800-
pound gorilla in the jungle of IR theories. A PhD student analysing the consolidation of the US and 
European aeronautics and defence industry is therefore well advised to take a close look at realism 
and the analytical framework that this IR theory provides. 
 
Realism is based on the following key assumptions:177 First, states are the primary actors in 
international relations. In other words, despite the rise of international organisations (UN178, 
WTO179, etc.) and transnational actors (MNCs, NGOs, etc.), sovereign, independent states remain 
the dominant players in the international system today. Sovereign states form governments, raise 
taxes, control borders, maintain armies, and are the ultimate source of political control and authority 
on their respective national territories. 
 
“Second, the international environment severely penalises states if they fail to protect their 
vital interests or if they pursue objectives beyond their means; hence, states are ‘sensitive to 
costs’ and behave as unitary-rational agents. Third, international anarchy is the principal 
force shaping the motives and actions of states.”180 
 
                                                      
176 Powell (1994) p. 313 
177 Grieco (1988) 
177 Ibid., p. 488 
178 UN = United Nations 
179 WTO = World Trade Organisation 
180 Ibid., p. 488 
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International anarchy means that there is no world government with a (legitimate) monopoly of 
force to enforce treaties and rules between sovereign countries.181 “Fourth, states in anarchy are 
preoccupied with power and security, are predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often 
fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests.”182 Realists argue that states live in a self-
help system and cannot base their (military) security on the false promises of multilateral 
institutions. A state is “the guardian of its own security and independence”.183 States must always 
fear for their physical survival and are therefore constantly striving to maximise their relative 
political, military, and economic power position in the international system. Realists also assume 
that there exists a certain hierarchy of issues in world politics, with the so-called “high politics” of 
military and security matters dominating the “low politics” of economic and social issues. Hard-line 
realists also believe that states are inherently aggressive (“offensive realism”) and that their 
insatiable appetite for territorial expansion is only constrained by countervailing (military) force 
exercised by other states. “For the political Realist, rivalry and some form of strife among nation-
states are the rule and not a mere accident of backwardness in the past.”184 
 
“Finally, international institutions affect the prospects for cooperation only marginally.”185 Realists 
identify two major obstacles to cooperation: a state’s concerns about cheating and its concerns 
about relative gains. Neo-liberal institutionalists believe that institutions can overcome state 
concerns about cheating by providing objective, independent verification mechanisms to ensure that 
all partners involved really live up to their commitments. Realists, however, argue that, in the end, 
states are more concerned about relative rather than absolute gains from cooperation. For example, 
even if two states cooperate successfully, one of the partners may still decide to terminate 
cooperation if it believes that the other state derives a relatively greater benefit from cooperation. 
“According to realists, states worry that today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy in war, and fear 
that achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more 
dangerous potential foe in the future.”186 Neo-liberal institutionalism, realists would argue, does 
only address a state’s concerns about cheating, but not the dilemma posed by concerns about 
relative vs. absolute gains from cooperation. 
 
Classical realism can be traced to Greek antiquity (Thucydides “Peloponnesian War”; 431 BC) and 
was subsequently shaped by important thinkers and politicians such as Niccolò Machiavelli (“The 
                                                      
181 Neo-liberal institutionalism does not claim that there is a world government. However, it does claim that cooperation 
among sovereign states is a positive-sum game and that institutions can promote cooperation among them. 
182 Grieco (1988) p. 488 
183 Spanier (1978) p. 11 
184 Thompson (1952) p. 446 
185 Grieco (1988) p. 488 
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Prince”; 1532), Thomas Hobbes (“Leviathan”; 1651), Cardinal de Richelieu (who formulated the 
concept of “raison d’état”), Carl von Clausewitz (“On War”; 1832). Classical realism is based on a 
gloomy view of human nature. The rise of (modern) realism in the 20th century was above all a 
response to the disillusionment with utopian / liberal ideas following the failure of the League of 
Nations, the devastation of WWII, and the beginning of the Cold War superpower confrontation. 
The term “realism” itself derives from the German word “Realpolitik”. It was originally coined in 
the 19th century by Otto von Bismarck, who combined the Spanish adjective real (royal) and the 
German noun Politik (politics) and proved to be a master in balance-of-power politics – a key 
concept of realism. 
 
The period following the end of WWI, supposedly the “war to end all wars, was characterised by 
enormous optimism and a belief in the possibilities of peaceful cooperation – expressed both in the 
theory and practice of international relations. President Wilson framed his Fourteen Points as a 
basis for permanent international peace. By banning secret treaties, reducing (offensive) weapons 
arsenals, applying the principle of self-determination and, most importantly, founding the League of 
Nations, Wilson hoped, states would be finally able to overcome the scourge of war. And “idealist” 
IR theorists at the time saw it as academia’s responsibility to be another nail in the coffin of armed 
conflict. 
 
In “The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations”187, Edward Carr provides a critical analysis of the “idealist” twenty-year period between 
WWI and II. Carr, who published his book shortly after the outbreak of WWII, exposes the wishful 
thinking and naïve belief in the power of international law that was so widespread at the time. He is 
particularly critical of the League of Nations, an institution that President Wilson proposed but 
could not get approved by the US Senate due to the strong isolationist sentiment in America at the 
time. In Carr’s view, international law is the law of an “undeveloped and not fully integrated 
community” and “lacks three institutions which are essential parts of any developed system of […] 
law: a judicature, an executive and a legislature.” 
 
After the enormous material and moral devastations of WWII, realism became the dominant school 
of IR theory in America. Hans Morgenthau and his seminal 1948 book “Politics Among Nations: 
The Struggle for Power and Peace”188 had arguably the biggest impact on (realist) IR theory, 
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turning it into a US-dominated academic discipline. In the first chapter, Morgenthau laid out the 
“Six Principles of Realism”: 
 
1. Politics is governed by objective laws. 
2. A state’s interests are defined in terms of power. 
3. National interest is identified with national survival. 
4. States are not subject to universal moral principles. 
5. Morals have no place in foreign policy. 
6. The political sphere is autonomous. 
 
While Morgenthau’s contribution to realism is heavily influenced by his pessimistic image of 
mankind, the neo-realist theory of IR focuses much more on the structural forces shaping the action 
of states in the international system. In “Man, the State, and War”, Kenneth Waltz laid the 
intellectual foundations for neo-realism by identifying three relevant “images” or levels of analysis 
for the study of IR. First-image explanations are concerned with how the actions of individual 
human beings (for example as statesmen, generals, scientist, etc.) are shaping international politics. 
Second-image explanations, in contrast, are concerned with how the internal structure and 
characteristics of states – i.e., whether a country is a democracy or dictatorship, rich or poor, 
capitalist or communist, stable or unstable, ethnically homogenous or diverse, etc. – affect the 
interactions among them (i.e., cooperation vs. conflict, etc.). Finally, the third image focuses on 
how the overall distribution of power in the international system (i.e., uni-, bi-, and multipolar 
structures) affects the foreign and domestic policy choices of individual states. 
 
In “Theory of International Politics”, Kenneth Waltz further refined neo-realism based on systemic 
third-image analysis.189 He defines structure as a “set of constraining conditions”.190 Waltz refers to 
first- and second-image approaches as “reductive explanations”, implying that they are insufficient 
in explaining and predicting international politics. Juxtaposing realism’s reductive and systemic 
explanations, one author put it succinctly: 
 
“Fixing [structural] constraints and varying units’ attributes comprise the essential 
conceptual experiment underlying reductive explanations. […] Fixing the units’ attributes 
and varying the constraints facing the units comprise the fundamental conceptual 
experiment underlying systemic explanations.”191 
 
                                                      
189 Waltz (1979) 
190 Ibid., p. 73 
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Both realists and neo-realists agree that international relations are in a state of anarchy, i.e., there is 
no authority / institution above the independent, sovereign states with an effective monopoly of 
force and the legitimacy to enforce international law and agreements between states; both are state-
centric and regard the nation state as the most important unit of analysis for the theory and practice 
of IR; both view international politics as inherently competitive; both emphasize material factors, 
rather than nonmaterial factors, such as ideas and institutions; and both assume states are egoistic 
actors that pursue self-help strategies. 
 
Neo-realists differ from realists in that they believe that qualitative differences in the structure of 
the international system have a direct, generally predictable, impact on the interactions among the 
states composing the system. According to Waltz, “the idea that international politics can be 
thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure is neo-realism’s fundamental departure 
from traditional realism.” Furthermore, neo-realists put much more emphasis on the economic 
dimensions of power (as opposed to classical realists who focus almost exclusively on a country’s 
military might); neo-realists recognize that policymakers face important, difficult choices when it 
comes to trade-offs between the pursuit of military might and economic welfare (“guns vs. butter” 
dichotomy). Realists, in contrast, believe that a state’s long-term pursuit of military power and 
security always and automatically takes precedence over any near-term economic and trade 
interests. 
 
Multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity are the most important structural configurations of the 
distribution of power in the international system. For neo-realists, the international system’s 
structure affects the foreign policy decisions of states first and foremost through balancing of power 
dynamics. On the one hand, each state desires, in principle, to become the international system’s 
most powerful actor, or hegemon. At the same time, all other states – while each pursuing 
hegemonic ambitions – share a common interest in making sure that no such dominant hegemon 
emerges in order to safeguard their own national sovereignty and autonomy. According to balance 
of power theory, a rising state will therefore be countered or balanced against by a coalition of other 
states in the international system. The risk of war is particularly high during those times when a 
rising state is challenging the established distribution of power in the international system or, 
alternatively, when a hegemon in decline is trying to fend off potential challengers to its dominant 
status. 
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Unipolarity can be a very stable192 structure for the international system, especially if the hegemon 
is dominant in “all the underlying components of power: economic, military, technological, and 
geopolitical”193. In its most extreme form, unipolarity would describe a situation where one state 
enjoys a monopoly of force in the international arena. As a result, such a world government 
(“Leviathan”) would bring inter-state war and armed conflict to an end, since no other state would 
have the means to challenge the authority of the system’s hegemon. In reality, however, such a 
complete and total unipolarity has rarely if ever existed. While bipolarity is less stable than 
unipolarity, it is more stable than multipolarity. In a bipolar system, states can more easily balance 
and / or deter each other. Once the adversary can be clearly defined, there is less chance of 
miscalculation than in a multipolar system.194 Historically speaking, the Cold War is the most 
prominent example of a bipolar international system.195 
 
In “The Origins of Alliances”196, Stephen Walt further refined balance-of-threat theory as an 
important element of neo-realist thinking. Walt differs from classic neo-realists like Waltz in that he 
believes that states balance above all against threats, not purely against power. The (perceived) 
intentions and ambitions of the states involved play a crucial role in foreign-policy making, in 
addition to the assessments of their aggregate and offensive power as well as their geographic 
proximity.197 According to Walt, states can adopt two different approaches to respond to a 
perceived external threat, i.e., the rise of a (potentially hostile) state. First, they could decide to 
directly confront the threat by balancing and / or joining coalitions against the aspiring hegemon. 
Alternatively, they could decide to bandwagon and join the coalition of the hegemon in the hope of 
maintaining a certain degree of political / military autonomy while at the same time sharing in the 
hegemon’s expected future spoils of conquest. In general, Walt expects strong states to balance 
against threats; weak states, in contrast, are more likely to bandwagon. Walt also coined and then 
disproved the so-called “birds of a feather” theory, according to which states with similar ideologies 
will cooperate with rather than fight each other (i.e., Democratic Peace Theory). According to Walt, 
however, this theory does not really square with the harsh reality of international politics, where the 
balancing against threats is a much more common foreign policy strategy. 
                                                      
192 The characteristics of a “stable” international system are peacefulness and durability. Wohlforth (1999) p. 8 
193 Ibid., p. 7. Wohlforth acknowledges that this ‘unipolarity-breeds-stability thesis’ is contested by many neo-realists, 
who argue “that any great concentration of power threatens other states and causes them to take action to restore the 
balance” Ibid., p. 5 
194 WWI demonstrates how strategic miscalculations mixed with alliance politics pushed a multipolar system down the 
abyss. The argument that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity is informed by the relative stability of the Cold 
War, during which nuclear deterrence played a crucial role in limiting / containing the outbreak of direct hostilities 
between the superpowers. For the opposite argument, see (Deutsch & Singer, 1964). 
195 Sparta vs. Athens and Carthagene vs. Rome are other historical manifestations of (regional) bipolarity. 
196 Walt (1987) 
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Other important members of the (neo)realist school include John Mearsheimer, Robert Jervis, and 
Robert Gilpin. In “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War”198, Mearsheimer 
predicted Europe’s return to an antagonistic 19th-century-style multipolar system – including a 
resurgent, nuclear-armed, reunified Germany – following the end of the Cold War and the retreat of 
US forces from the Old Continent. His prediction turned out to be wrong; but Mearsheimer’s 
characterisation of foreign policy as an aggressive power struggle is still accurate in many parts of 
the world, most notably in the Middle East and, albeit to a lesser degree, in Asia:199 “[I]n the 
anarchic world of international politics, it is better to be Godzilla than Bambi.”200 
 
Robert Jervis also made important contributions to IR theory, notably by further refining the 
concept of “security dilemma”. Originally developed by John Herz in the 1950s, the “security 
dilemma” refers to the fact that an increase in one state’s security decreases the security of the other 
states in the system. As state A tries to improve its own security posture, i.e., by building up its 
military base, it inadvertently leads states B, C, etc. to do the same as they are now feeling more 
threatened by A’s initial military build-up. Ironically, state A may therefore feel more insecure after 
the military build-up than before it. In international relations, this cycle of mutual distrust and 
insecurity – the “security dilemma” – leads to an escalation of (military) threat perceptions that, in 
turn, makes war between all states involved much more likely. From a realist perspective, there is 
possibly no way to resolve the security dilemma as the world remains, in essence, a self-help 
system where each state has to provide for its own security and cannot realistically rely on 
international institutions like the UN to defend its political autonomy and territorial integrity. 
 
In “War and Change in World Politics”,201 Robert Gilpin develops a theoretical framework for 
understanding international political change. In particular, Gilpin attempts to explain the rise and 
fall of hegemons (“hegemonic transitions”). Two factors explain why hegemons are ultimately 
bound to decline and to be replaced by a rising challenger. First, as a hegemon expands and 
(militarily) dominates other countries in the system, it has to devote an ever-increasing share of its 
GDP202 to military and security-related expenditures; this leaves the hegemon with less and less 
money to invest into its infrastructure and economic base. Over time, the hegemon’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
197 “States feel threatened when they face powers that combine superior capabilities with geostrategic proximity, 
offensive military power, and offensive ideology.” Risse-Kappen (1996) p. 360 
198 Mearsheimer (1990) 
199 Nuclear weapons, coupled with credible second-strike capacities, have reduced the potential for military aggression 
(India vs. China or India vs. Pakistan). 
200 (Brzezinski & Mearsheimer, 2005) pp. 46-50 
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competitiveness declines and it will no longer have the necessary economic resources to sustain its 
hegemonic military posture abroad. The second factor precipitating a hegemon’s decline is the 
gradual diffusion of technological expertise from the hegemonic core to its periphery. In the long 
run, this transfer of (military) technological expertise will reduce the hegemon’s technological 
superiority and thus undermine one of the key pillars of its political, economic, and military 
preponderance. 
 
This chapter can only provide an overview of (neo-)realist IR theory. By tracing realism back to its 
ancient origins, one can show that the theory of IR has often been heavily influenced by the practice 
of IR. As a general rule, realist thinking has always thrived at times when the world was particularly 
bleak, characterized by war and human suffering. Realism is a pessimistic IR theory based on a 
pessimistic image of mankind. Having discussed realism’s key assumptions and main authors, it is 
now time to examine the prepositions and hypotheses that realism would make about the BMD / 
EADS mergers. By applying realism to these two mergers, it is possible to test the theory’s 
explanatory and predictive capacity and to contribute to the advancement of the study of IR. The 
key question that this thesis answers is why – following the sharp drop in defence expenditures after 
the end of the Cold War – did the US A&D industry consolidate at a national level whereas France, 
Germany, and Spain consolidated their major A&D assets at a transnational level and merged them 
into one fully integrated European company, EADS? 
 
From a realist perspective, the BMD merger makes perfect sense. In a competitive, anarchic 
international system, the American hegemon must be naturally concerned about defending its 
dominant military, economic, and technological status vis-à-vis all potential challengers (“no peer 
competitor”), including NATO allies like France, Germany, and Spain.203 For realists, national 
autonomy in defence production is of paramount importance and provides the basis for an 
independent foreign, security, and defence policy. Even if from a purely economic / business 
perspective, a transatlantic merger between Boeing and a major European partner had made more 
sense than the BMD merger, realists would still predict that the US government would have 
blocked such a move on national security grounds and pushed for ethnocentric consolidation 
instead. In the realist world, long-term national security considerations always prevail over near-
term economic considerations. The primacy of “realist” national security considerations in the 
strategic A&D industry is not to suggest that America still considers the possibility of future war 
                                                      
203 The US has shared sensitive nuclear technology with the UK for more than six decades and also helped France 
acquire nuclear weapons. Both moves run counter to traditional notions of realism, which would assume that 
Washington would have kept its nuclear cards close in an effort to maximise its own power and national security 
position in the international system. 
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with Europe (or vice versa for that matter). The advent of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed 
the nature of war between major powers by adding the elements of mutual deterrence and restraint 
that led to the emergence of “a [Cold War] nuclear order”.204 The outbreak of military hostilities or 
full-sale war across the Atlantic – be it at the conventional let alone at the WMD level – remains 
unthinkable. However, what the primacy of “realist” national security considerations does mean is 
that even among close political, economic, and military allies there will never be a perfect 
congruence of political interests and perceptions on all matters at all times and that, as a result, there 
will never be full transparency and mutual trust among the countries concerned.205 Therefore, 
governments on both sides of the Atlantic will continue having serious differences over matters 
deemed important or even vital to at least one of the parties involved (e.g., 2003 Iraq War). 
 
From a realist perspective, cooperation always carries risks, notably in the form of cheating. But 
even if international cooperation works and produces positive, absolute gains for all parties 
involved, hegemonic powers – like the US – are concerned about the potential consequences of 
their (currently weaker) partners deriving relatively greater gains from cooperation, thus 
precipitating the hegemon’s eventual decline. According to realism, states evaluate opportunities for 
international cooperation in terms of relative rather than absolute gains. They prefer short-term 
relative gains through non-cooperation over potential long-term absolute gains through cooperation. 
A transatlantic A&D merger deal would have risked potential US technology transfers that could 
undermine America’s technological leadership in this strategic industry sector. Apart from 
(defence) technology transfers from to European NATO members, which would take place between 
close political, economic, and military allies, a transatlantic merger would also have raised the 
spectre of technology transfers to third countries, including US adversaries and competitors like 
China.206 For realists, there is little, if any, room for mutual (permanent) trust between states in the 
harsh world of international politics – not even among transatlantic allies. Based on a realist 
assessment, America and its defence companies also feared that a transatlantic merger would 
provide foreign governments with direct influence over the merged company’s corporate decisions 
in strategically important areas such as weapons development and production, relocation of 
production sites, and potential future mergers with third companies. 
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205 One indicator of the continued prevalence of mistrust and competition in the international arena is the fact that states 
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It is striking to note that successive US administrations have authorised the transfer of cutting-edge 
US technologies to Israel, despite the fact that the Jewish state appears to have repeatedly violated 
American re-export controls governing the transfer of such US technologies to third countries like 
South Africa, China, and India.207 208 Unauthorised Israeli re-exports of US military hardware and 
technology to Beijing were particularly sensitive as they risked upsetting the regional balance-of-
power, especially across the Taiwan Straits where US forces might have to repel a massive 
conventional attack by China on Taiwan.209 Despite occasional (largely behind-the-scenes) 
American criticism of these Israeli arms exports, US military and technology transfers to Israel 
continued unimpeded. This lenient and accommodating US technology transfer policy – which runs 
counter to what realism would normally expect – can be explained by a strong pro-Israel lobby in 
Washington, DC (especially in Congress), a common ideological orientation between America and 
Israel (i.e., Israel as the only free and democratic state in the Middle East), and a “framing” of the 
definition of strategic threats in the Middle East in ways that favours Israel.210 211 212 
                                                      
207 “Evidence shows that Israel has systematically circumvented US restrictions on the re-export of US defence 
products, components and technical data. […] Israel’s unauthorized retransfer of US defence products is part of a larger 
pattern of illicit behaviour that includes diversions of US military aid, industrial espionage, and improper end use of US 
military equipment. Israel often retransfers US defence products to states that are potentially hostile to the [US] or are 
blatant violators of human rights. These retransfers have threatened American commercial interests, compromised 
intelligence, upset regional stability, strained diplomatic relations, and confirmed the US national security 
bureaucracy’s long-standing distrust of Israeli technology transfer practices. […] Israel engages in unauthorized defence 
re-exports largely to nourish its economy’s large defence sector and because it is confident, for good reason, that 
Washington will not or cannot enforce the law.” Clarke (1995) pp. 89-90; 109 
208 A 1992 report by the DoS Inspector General declared that alleged Israeli violations of US laws and regulations 
“cited and supported by reliable intelligence information show a systematic and growing pattern of unauthorized 
transfers […] dating back to about 1983”. DoS (1992) 
209 For China, Israel was an extremely attractive arms supplier: “No other country had accumulated as much experience 
in fighting Soviet weapons, or in upgrading and integrating them into its own arsenal. In addition, Israel had acquired 
some of the most advanced Western weapons systems and also skilfully developed its own. […] Even indirect access to 
these systems could enable the Chinese to circumvent the restrictions on transferring military technology to 
[C]ommunist countries. Following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the Israeli connection was vindicated for 
Beijing. Israel reacted mildly to the incident and did not impose military sanctions, unlike most Western governments. 
Unconfirmed reports suggest that Israel exploited the opportunity to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of 
Western arms suppliers. Shichor (1998) p. 74 
210 “[T]he thrust of US policy in the region derives almost entirely from domestic politics, and especially the activities 
of the ‘Israel Lobby’. Other special-interest groups have managed to skew foreign policy, but no lobby has managed to 
divert it as far from what the national interest would suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that US 
interests and those of the other country – in this case, Israel – are essentially identical. […] The Lobby pursues two 
broad strategies. First, it wields its significant influence in Washington, pressuring both Congress and the executive 
branch. Whatever an individual lawmaker or policymaker’s own views may be, the Lobby tries to make supporting 
Israel the ‘smart’ choice. Second, it strives to ensure that public discourse portrays Israel in a positive light, by repeating 
myths about its founding and by promoting its point of view in policy debates. The goal is to prevent critical comments 
from getting a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential to guaranteeing US support, because 
a candid discussion of US-Israeli relations might lead Americans to favour a different policy. A key pillar of the 
Lobby’s effectiveness is its influence in Congress, where Israel is virtually immune from criticism.” (Mearsheimer & 
Walt, 2003) London Review of Books. See also (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2003) KSG Faculty Research Working Paper. 
For a rebuke of Mearsheimer & Walt, see Cohen (2006). 
211 “State and DoD officials say that it is not politically possible to submit to Congress, as an administration proposal, a 
lower FMS [Foreign Military Sales] figure for Israel than that for the previous year.” Furthermore, the draft GAO report 
stated that “Information relative to any threat assessment, Israel’s defence posture and the needs of Israeli armed forces 
were accepted from responsible US and Israeli officials without verification.” Leaked excerpts from the classified 1983 
GAO report “US Assistance to the State of Israel”, quoted in (Stork & Wenger, 1983) p. 28 
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According to an authoritative study of trade and investment ties across the Atlantic, the “economic 
relationship between the [US] and Europe is by a wide margin the deepest and broadest between 
any two continents in history – and those ties are accelerating”.213 
 
“[T]he transatlantic economy generates roughly US$2.5 trillion in total commercial sales a 
year and employs over 12 million workers in mutually ‘insourced’ on both sides of the 
Atlantic who enjoy high wages, high labour and environmental standards, and open, largely 
non-discriminatory access to each other’s markets.”214 
 
While transatlantic trade flows totalled US$600 billion in 2005215, the report states that they are a 
“misleading benchmark of transatlantic economic integration. Foreign investment, not trade, drives 
transatlantic commerce […]”.216 As a result, “foreign-affiliate sales, not trade, are the backbone of 
the transatlantic economy”.217 
 
Despite these close transatlantic economic ties, serious barriers to trade and investment in the A&D 
sector continue to be imposed on national security grounds. “Like the [US], European countries 
tend to purchase major defence equipment from their domestic companies when such options 
exist.”218 In America, these barriers to defence trade “result from a complex set of rules and 
practices aiming at imposing ‘domestic source restrictions’ on US defence acquisition”219. These 
restrictions are designed “to preserve the domestic mobilisation basis and the overall preparedness 
posture of the [US]”220 by avoiding dependency on defence suppliers based abroad. Key elements 
of this protectionist “Fortress America” policy decried by the Europeans include 1) Pentagon 
requirements that any major defence procurement items be manufactured on American soil (often 
forcing EU and other companies to sell manufacturing licenses to US companies), 2) tight 
restrictions on the transfer of technical data by foreign nationals working in America to their parent 
companies abroad; and 3) lack of access to tender conferences as well as related security clearances 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
212 “For over a decade now, Israeli military sales have been the source of much confusion and mythology. Criticism of 
Israeli military-technology transfers to China is largely unfounded. The sales actually enjoyed tacit American support 
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US technologies reflect changed political considerations more than actual facts. Military sales to China have helped 
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213 (Hamilton & Quinlan, 2004) 
214 Ibid., p. xi 
215 EC (2006) p. 8 
216 (Hamilton & Quinlan, 2004) p. xi 
217 Ibid., p. xi 
218 GAO (1997), p. 3 
219 EC (2006) p. 43 
220 Ibid., p. 42 
 
59 
for pre-contract award procedures relevant for winning a defence contract from the Pentagon.221 
American defence company officials, in contrast, decry a “Fortress Europe” situation and “say they 
cannot export major defence items to Europe without involving European defence companies in the 
production of those items”.222 Such transatlantic industrial partnerships, which often provide 
offset223 benefits to European companies, include subcontracting arrangements, international 
consortia, and teaming arrangements.224 
 
Despite protectionist national security barriers to defence trade on both sides of the Atlantic, it is 
evident that America has continued to export overwhelmingly more defence articles and services 
than it imports. Commercial US defence exports (American companies selling directly to foreign 
entities under an official US export license) averaged US$11.5 billion / year during 2000-2004, 
while average annual defence imports amounted only to US$1.8 billion. During the same period, 
US military exports as part of the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme – 
essentially government-to-government arms sales or grants – averaged US$12.6 billion per year, 
while the corresponding annual imports amounted to only US$1.5 billion.225 Interesting to note is 
that “during the same [2000-2004] period, DoD purchases of defence articles and services from 
foreign companies decreased from 2.4 percent to 1.7 percent of all DoD purchases”.226 While these 
figures exclude DoD purchases from US subsidiaries of foreign-owned companies, it is obvious that 
the (transatlantic) defence trade and procurement business is frequently subject to significant 
restrictions justified on national security grounds. 
 
During 1992-1996, Washington’s FMS transactions with Europe amounted to US$20 billion.227 At 
the time, the most important US customers were Turkey, Finland, Greece, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, and the UK. Neither the three future EADS partner countries nor Italy ranked among 
the top US clients. Military aircraft, aircraft spares, and aircraft modifications alone accounted for 
US$15 billion (75 percent) of America’s FMS transactions with Europe during 1992-1996.228 
 
“Buy National” procurement policies are common on both sides of the Atlantic. France has 
traditionally had the strongest “Buy National” or, alternatively, “Buy European” procurement 
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policies of any European NATO ally, reflecting “France’s goal to retain a [national] defence 
industrial base and maintain autonomy in national security matters”229. In essence, “France has 
[only] purchased major US defence weapons systems when no French or European option is 
available”230. According to French MoD officials, “imports represented only two percent of 
France’s total defence procurement over the past five years” [1992-1996]231. In contrast, the UK 
and the Netherlands have traditionally embraced “open competition policies that seek the best 
equipment for the best value” and have regularly awarded major defence contracts to American 
bidders.232 US defence companies have been most successful in exporting their goods and services 
to European countries when they 1) provided unique, advanced technologies, 2) offered attractive 
offset arrangements to local firms, and 3) faced no competition from domestic European 
companies.233 In this context, the third factor is particularly important. While the UK “aims to 
competitively award about three-quarters of its defence contracts, […] UK companies [have been] 
winning at least 90 percent of the contracts over the past several years”234. Finally, Germany and 
Italy – which made drastic procurement cutbacks in the 1990s – fall somewhere in between France 
and the UK. “Both countries […] have an open competition defence procurement policy and buy a 
mixture of US and European products.”235 While the biggest share of the two countries’ defence 
imports has traditionally been supplied by the US, Germany and Italy decided in the 1990s to 
purchase major American defence items only in reduced quantities “to reserve a portion of their 
procurement funding for European cooperative solutions”236. 
 
To bolster the realists’ case, this thesis would have to provide evidence suggesting that the US 
government favoured national consolidation over international / transatlantic consolidation for 
reasons of national security; possibly despite the fact that an objective and rational cost-benefit 
assessment purely based on business and economic factors would have called for international / 
transatlantic defence industry consolidation. Such evidence would support realist explanations, 
which are based on the assumption that states, when having to choose between economic welfare 
(defined in terms of liberal economics rather than mercantilism) and autonomy in arms production, 
will virtually always chose the latter. If Washington were conscious of the fact that US industry 
consolidation within purely national confines would make it impossible to reach the same levels of 
                                                      
229 Ibid., p. 18. 
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increased economic scale and efficiency, it would demonstrate that the US government is literally 
willing to pay the price to ensure that they retain autonomous national arms production capabilities. 
Furthermore, if it can be shown that the Boeing and / or MDC management teams had 
unsuccessfully lobbied the US government for international / transatlantic consolidation, it would 
further bolster the realists’ case. Realists view states as the primary actors in international relations. 
Especially in the vital military and national security domain, realists would predict that national 
governments always prevail over the A&D companies on territory under their jurisdiction and that, 
in this key sector, liberal economics does not apply. 
 
To turn to the EADS merger, at first glance, it seems to be completely at odds with the realist IR 
theory. States after all, are expected to try to maximise their national autonomy in armaments 
production and, by extension, their national security posture. The EADS merger, which involves 
three sovereign countries merging their key A&D assets into one single company, poses therefore 
significant challenges to the explanatory and predictive capacities of realist IR theory. Realists view 
the world through the prism of international competition rather than cooperation. Realist IR theory, 
however, can be leveraged to explain the EADS merger. Balance of threat theory, a key element of 
realist thinking, is of critical importance in this context. As was discussed earlier, states have in 
essence two possible responses when confronted with a potential threat, i.e., a potential or actual 
hegemon; they can either balance against or bandwagon with the hegemon. According to Walt, 
strong states tend to pursue balancing strategies whereas weak states prefer to bandwagon. 
 
From a realist perspective, the EADS merger can therefore be interpreted as an attempt by France, 
Germany, and Spain to balance against the American hegemon in order to preserve the autonomy 
and independence of the European A&D industry. In particular, the EADS merger can be 
interpreted as a pan-European mobilisation in the transatlantic dogfight between Airbus and Boeing 
for supremacy on the world market for large commercial aircraft. When Airbus was launched in the 
late 1960s, the consortium could already be viewed as a European attempt to counterbalance the US 
to break the American dominance of the (civilian) aircraft market in the non-Communist world.237 
The creation of Airbus can also be viewed as part of a Gaullist French strategy to avoid or at least 
minimise US dependence. 
 
                                                      
237 The Concorde was Europe’s first cooperative civilian airliner project. The UK and French governments saw 
supersonic transport as a way to leapfrog US jet aircraft development and to break America’s dominance of the world 
commercial aircraft market. Ultimately, the Concorde was both a technological masterpiece and a terrible market 
failure. 
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After the end of the Cold War, America emerged as the world’s only superpower. The demise of the 
Soviet Union left Europe far less dependent on US security guarantees – making it thus easier for 
Europe to attempt to selectively balance against the American hegemon, including in the A&D 
industry through the EADS merger. Realists would argue that the three EADS founding countries – 
France, Germany, and (albeit to a lesser extent) Spain – were strong and proud enough to balance 
against rather than bandwagon with the American hegemon. It does not matter that DASA would 
have preferred to merge with BAe rather than with France’s state-controlled AM. All Airbus 
partners were scrambling to merge with other aerospace companies to quickly gain the critical mass 
necessary to survive the impending onslaught of the American mega-primes. In military aircraft, 
too, Americans and Europeans anticipated major competitive struggles: 
 
“[A]ccording to US defence company officials, sales of military aircraft to Europe are 
expected to be important in future competitions, particularly in the emerging defence 
markets in central Europe. Competition between major US and European defence 
companies for aircraft sales in these markets is expected to be intense.”238 
 
If it can be demonstrated that the decision to form EADS was primarily driven by geostrategic as 
well as economic factors rooted in Europe’s desire to balance against America – both in the military 
as well as in the civilian / economic domains – realism would be proven right. “The neo-realist 
analysis argues that states will start competing and balancing over economic issues after the Cold 
War as much as they competed and balanced over security issues during the Cold War.”239 Realists 
would predict that European governments put a premium on pan-European cooperation and 
consolidation in the A&D industry – including a full-blown EADS style merger – if that is 
perceived to be the only feasible option to at least attempt to form a credible counterweight to 
America. Such a prediction, however, assumes that in the case of EADS, France, Germany, and 
(albeit to a lesser extent) Spain concluded that they had more to gain from cooperating among 
themselves rather than bandwagoning with America. Given Spain’s significant financial and 
economic dependence on EU funding, it should not come as a surprise that Madrid decided to throw 
its weight behind the Franco-German EADS merger, which was supported by the two most 
powerful and influential EU member countries. If key European countries had decided to 
bandwagon with rather than balance against the US hegemon, it would have put the European allies 
into a position of inferiority vis-à-vis America. While gaining more access to the US defence 
market, the Europeans would have lost much of their political, economic, and technological 
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autonomy as a result of unequal transatlantic mergers with the much bigger American mega-primes 
like Boeing or LMC. 
 
While realists would expect governments to value national autonomy over potential economic gains 
from international collaboration in the A&D industry (especially if it implied a loss of political / 
economic sovereignty), it is far more difficult to say what realism would predict about the 
preferences of the private sector actors. Realism does assume that sovereign states are the dominant 
IR players, leaving little – if any – room for independent corporate policies by private sector 
companies. In the case of the BMD / EADS mergers, however, it is necessary to analyse the actions 
of both the public sector and the private sector. It should be noted that bandwagoning with America 
has been – and in fact remains to this day – a potentially very attractive option for European A&D 
companies, especially if it concerns “mergers between equals”. Strictly speaking, however, such 
transatlantic mergers would probably not qualify as “bandwagoning”, which involves a weak actor 
supporting a hegemon in order to preserve a minimum of autonomy and to share in the spoils of 
(future) conquest. Bandwagoning with the American hegemon promises privileged access to the 
lucrative US defence market, by far the largest in the world. Bandwagoning with Washington also 
raises the spectre of increased transatlantic (defence) technology transfers, especially if the 
American government and US aerospace / defence companies have sufficient trust in their 
European partners to believe that they would not transfer sensitive know-how to third countries. For 
realists, however – who live in a world where mutual trust is a scarce commodity – that is a very big 
“if”. 
 
Private shareholders are primarily interested in maximising their return on investment. If 
transatlantic A&D mergers – even between un-equals (i.e., smaller European players with American 
mega-primes) – are expected to deliver superior company profits / shareholder value, then private 
shareholders should have no concerns about the associated loss of political sovereignty of either 
their home country and / or the loss of business autonomy of their company. They would be 
shareholders of the combined American / European A&D company after the completion of such an 
(unequal) transatlantic merger. In contrast, the top management of European A&D companies can 
be expected to be much more concerned about the potential loss of power and influence as a result 
of an unequal merger with an American mega-prime. The top management of an acquired company 
(especially if it is a “hostile takeover”) is often forced to resign or moved to secondary management 
positions. Generally speaking, private shareholders care more about how a company is run (i.e., 
how profitable it is) than who is running the company (i.e., whether it’s a Frenchman, German or 
American). 
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A key analytical question concerns whether the major US and European A&D companies should be 
considered as part of their respective home states or not. As a general rule, the stronger the 
involvement of governments in this industry sector, the stronger the case for a realist approach to 
explain the BMD / EADS mergers as one can then assume that the strategic choices and preferences 
of the companies involved were closely aligned with the interests of their home governments 
(usually defined in terms of maximising national security and military-technological leadership).  
 
The relationship of A&D companies with their home governments in Europe and America can be 
analysed from two different perspectives. First, to what extent, if any, have governments retained 
direct equity stakes in their countries’ A&D industrial base, particularly at the prime contractor 
level? If key elements of a country’s A&D industry are in fact nationalised and under the financial / 
managerial control of the government, then one can argue that, by definition, these companies are 
part of “the state”. By this standard, the American A&D industry is separate from the government 
since Washington does not hold equity stakes in any of the major contractors. In Europe, in 
contrast, countries such as France and Spain have retained direct or indirect (minority) stakes in 
companies like EADS. That being said, the UK and West Germany had also been direct A&D 
industrial shareholders before pursuing privatisation strategies in the 1980s. 
 
The second benchmark concerns the extent to which senior executives in the A&D sector are 
influenced by the stated or anticipated preferences of elected politicians and government officials 
when making their own corporate (strategic) decisions. For example, even if a transatlantic A&D 
prime contractor merger is a theoretical possibility under US law, corporate leaders on both sides of 
the Atlantic (especially in America) are likely to refrain from making any moves in that direction if 
(1) they know that the political climate is not conducive to such a step and (2) if they fear that it 
could hurt their relationship with key government officials moving forward. The anticipated 
negative political fall-out becomes even more important if corporate leaders have reasons to believe 
that their attempt to engineer a transatlantic merger could make Washington’s political 
establishment (especially powerful defence appropriators on Capitol Hill) upset and thus harm the 
companies’ chances of securing future Pentagon contracts.240 During the late 1990s, both factors 
appeared to weigh heavily on the minds of A&D industry executives – repeated administration 
statements about the desirability of closer transatlantic defence industrial cooperation 
                                                      
240 The fact that US A&D companies are highly dependent on the Pentagon’s procurement and R&D budgets gives 
Washington unparalleled leverage over this industry sector. The higher a company’s economic dependence / market 
exposure to the government and / or the country in general, the higher the leverage that political leaders enjoy to ensure 
that the respective corporate leaders are not engaged in business practices deemed harmful to the national interest. 
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notwithstanding. The third benchmark concerns the degree of influence the companies wield, 
directly or indirectly, over the respective governments as well as the closeness of the links between 
company leaders and political leaders. This last aspect is particularly relevant with regard to the 
influence of the MIC and the massive procurement lobbying campaigns by defence contractors vis-
à-vis Congress. 
 
It is also necessary to look at the overall impact of the A&D industry’s rapid consolidation on the 
relationship between this sector and the government. To the extent that previous rounds of 
consolidation significantly reduced the competitive dynamics at the prime contractor level, one 
should expect this process to cause a corresponding shift in the balance of power in favour of the 
private sector. The government’s decreased ability to find suitable bidders for major defence 
procurement contracts should generally translate into increased pricing power for those remaining 
companies still able and willing to participate in these tenders. This is what one would expect in a 
“normal”, non-strategic industry sector. The sharp reduction in competition as a result of successive 
rounds of consolidation has led former top Pentagon officials to warn that the “The [US] is 
approaching an ‘arsenal system’ for developing and producing its weapons – that is, one in which 
the government manufactures its own weaponry.”241 In an arsenal-type system, the A&D industry is 
fully controlled by the government and part of “the state”. The sharp reduction in the number of US 
prime contractors coupled with the post-Cold War decrease in the Pentagon procurement budget – 
which, at least until 9/11, meant fewer dollars and fewer programmes to compete for – therefore led 
to increased interdependence between the A&D industry and the state. Ultimately, however, the 
state is the dominant player as it provides major R&D support and is often the industry’s sole 
customer. And even if potential export markets can provide for an expanded customer base, it is the 
US administration and ultimately Congress that decide what kind of (dual-use) technologies and 
military hardware the A&D companies get to export and what not. In that sense, the strategically 
important American A&D industry is closely linked with and dependent on the state, even though it 
remains formally independent and generally privately-owned. 
 
Mercantilism, the economic dimension of realism, also offers relevant insights into the EADS and 
BMD mergers. From the 16th to the 18th century, the period that coincides with the emergence of 
European nation states, mercantilism was the dominant school of economics. While mercantilism 
never developed into a unified theory of economics, its chief proponents like Jean-Baptiste Colbert 
(1619-1683), King Louis XIV’s finance minister, shared a common belief that the wealth, status, 
and power of a state are a function of its holdings of capital. “It is simply, and solely, the abundance 
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of money within a state [which] makes the difference in its grandeur and power”, as Colbert put it 
succinctly. Furthermore, mercantilists also agreed on the zero-sum nature of the international 
economic system, where the global volume of trade is “unchangeable” and where the gain of one 
country comes at the direct, inevitable loss of another. To maximize their power, states therefore 
had to strive to maximize their (state-controlled) hard currency holdings (precious metals such as 
gold or silver at the time).242 According to mercantilists, the best strategy for a country’s 
government to grow and maximize its capital account surplus was to encourage exports and to 
discourage imports, primarily through the imposition of high tariffs. Essentially, mercantilism calls 
for a highly interventionist economic / industrial policy where the state creates national champions 
and shields them from foreign competition. 
 
In 1663, Colbert provided state financial and technological support to “Les Gobelins”, the Royal 
Manufacture of Tapestries, to create the first-ever French “national champion” which would 
subsequently be able to out-perform its foreign competitors and to increase the country’s export 
revenues. Colbert was thus the first European to champion state intervention in a particular industry 
with positive results. Mercantilism also proved to be quite influential in America, where Alexander 
Hamilton, the first US Treasury Secretary, “believed that the state, not the free market, was the true 
source of economic prosperity”. In his “Report on Manufactures” written in 1792, he urged 
Congress to embrace mercantilist, protectionist policies to boost the American economy. In 
particular, Hamilton advocated high tariffs to (1) protect key American infant industries, (2) 
increase government revenues, (3) encourage an entrepreneurial spirit, and (4) transform the newly 
independent US into a technologically advanced manufacturing power. 
 
In “The Wealth of Nations”, Adam Smith strongly rejected mercantilism and protectionism and 
made the case for free trade based on the principle of both absolute and, more importantly, relative 
competitive advantages among the different countries of the world. Smith thus laid the foundations 
for what is known today as classical or laissez-faire economics. While mercantilism remained 
influential until the end of WWII – witness the competitive, export-promoting rounds of currency 
devaluations in Europe in the 1930s – Smith’s free-trade agenda provided the intellectual basis for 
the US-built post-WWII international economic system as well as the successive GATT / WTO 
trade liberalisation rounds designed to promote free trade through the continuing reduction and 
eventual elimination of tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. 
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Despite public pronouncements in support of trade liberalisation, Western political leaders, 
especially in France and the US – have retained strong mercantilist or rather protectionist instincts, 
especially with regard to strategic industry sectors. The French tradition, from Colbert, and the 
American tradition, from Hamilton, have deep roots in the A&D industry. Past and present 
government interventions in the A&D industrial base have drawn heavily on mercantilist ideas, 
coupled with national security considerations linked to the sector’s strategic importance. Civil and 
military aircraft sales are big-ticket items that have an important impact on a country’s balance of 
payment figures. To this day, Boeing remains America’s biggest corporate exporter at a time when 
the US trade deficit seems to be growing ever bigger, especially vis-à-vis China. US merchandise 
trade statistics demonstrate that the American A&D industry has consistently ranked as the nation’s 
top exporting sector for more than two decades. In 2008, that leading export earner had a positive 
trade balance of US$62 billion, the only bright spot in an otherwise gloomy trade statistic indicating 
that America had a total trade deficit of US$816 billion – driven by imports of energy (-US$415 
billion), electric machinery / consumer electronics (-US$99 billion), and cars / trucks (-US$83 
billion).243 Georgetown’s Theodore Moran laid out the three key elements of “An Economics 
Agenda for Neorealists”244 designed “for those who wish to pursue relative gains at the expense of 
mutual gains, or political power at the expense of economic welfare”245:246 (1) restoring equilibrium 
in trade and capital accounts; (2) enhancing the competitiveness of American firms and workers; 
and (3) avoiding dependence on foreigners: 
 
“An economics agenda for neorealists should address three principal dangers to America’s 
position in the international political system that emerge directly from US economic policy: 
a persistent imbalance in trade and capital accounts, which mortgages the assets of future 
generations or turns over the assets of the current generation to foreigners; a lagging 
competitiveness of firms and workers, which undermines the growth rate and skill level of a 
nation’s industrial base (and other sectors) in comparison to rival states; and a growing 
dependence on outsiders for critical products or technologies, which leaves the nation 
vulnerable to denial or manipulation by external suppliers.”247 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
political endeavours and internal pacification.” Gritsch (2005) p. 5 
243 For US merchandise trade statistics covering 1989-2008: 
http://tse.export.gov/NTDChartDisplay.aspx?UniqueURL=0pbpvr55wbczqmixsmsyq455-2009-10-31-10-16-1 
244 Moran (1993) pp. 211-215 
245 Ibid., p. 211 
246 “[I]n the context of geo-economics, relativities trigger concern because they are seen as affecting the capacities of 
countries to defend themselves.” Cable (1995) p. 312 
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Old-school mercantilists focused on promoting exports and curbing imports through tariffs and 
subsidies. Modern mercantilists have a more sophisticated understanding of the economic dynamics 
at play: 
 
“As long as a country consumes more than it produces, it will experience a trade deficit and 
a corresponding reliance on foreigners to finance it. Trade protection and investment 
restrictions, strategic or otherwise, cannot alter this; neither can vigorous efforts to open 
external markets for products or capital.”248 
 
Protectionist sentiment in Europe is particularly strong in France, where political leaders 
euphemistically talk about “patriotisme économique”249 and “intelligence économique”250. The 
first term is code for protectionist state interventionism and includes the creation of national 
champions in strategic industries as well as the protection of national (often state-owned) French 
companies against (hostile) foreign takeovers. This protectionist behaviour was illustrated by 
France’s blocking of an attempted takeover of French utility company Suez by Italy’s energy giant 
Enel in early 2006. Critics of these narrowly-defined national protectionist policies see them as 
completely outdated and instead call for “une solidarité économique européenne”, hailing EADS 
as “une véritable avancée pour l'Europe!”251. 
 
“Intelligence économique” describes more broadly how the (French) government should strive to 
promote – in conjunction with the private sector, academia, civil society, etc. – the country’s 
(economic) interests in an effort to boost overall national competitiveness and preserve the nation’s 
social and economic system in the context of an increasingly globalised economy. A June 2003 
report commissioned by the French Prime Minister defined the ultimate goal of “intelligence 
économique” to contribute to “a France that is wealthier, better protected and more respected” […], 
which shares her progress with her commercial allies, notably in Europe”. The report also argues 
that “intelligence économique” can help France achieve 
 
“the protection of her scientific and industrial heritage, gains in competitiveness and 
market shares, and a renewed influence in the world, especially among all those who do not 
want to depend on one exclusive supplier and, furthermore, all those who, within 
international organisations, do not want to accept the twisting and the rejection of the rules 
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of international law: yesterday those of Kyoto, today those of the UN, and tomorrow, 
perhaps more than yesterday, those of the WTO”.252 
 
From a mercantilist perspective, the BMD and EADS mergers were supported by the US on the one 
hand, and France and Germany on the other hand, to ensure that a) each of the two aerospace giants 
could reap economies of scale allowing them to become more competitive and to capture an ever-
bigger share of the world’s civil and military aerospace market; and b) to allow each of the national 
governments involved to benefit from additional tax revenues, increased civil and military 
technological sophistication as well as heightened international prestige as a result of the 
commercial success of “their” respective aerospace champions. 
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2.2  Bound to cooperate: neo-liberal institutionalism and the BMD / EADS mergers 
 
The other IR theory that this thesis applies to the BMD / EADS mergers is neo-liberal 
institutionalism, which forms part of liberalism. In IR theory, liberalism comprises four distinct 
schools of thought: 1) classical / utopian liberalism; 2) economic interdependence liberalism; 3) 
democratic peace liberalism; and 4) neo-liberal institutionalism. 
 
Classical / utopian liberalism is rooted in the belief in human progress and perfectibility. It assumes 
that men – based on education and rational deliberation – can become better, more rational human 
beings and are thus able to overcome their own egoistic, aggressive, and violent impulses. Classical 
/ utopian liberalism expects that men will cease to fight wars once they have realised that warfare is 
irrational and destructive. The economic interdependence school of liberalism is based on the 
assumption that increased international economic interdependence (more trade and FDI, etc.) will 
decrease the risk of war between all countries involved. As a result of economic interdependence, 
so the argument goes, states have an economic interest in the economic well-being and political 
stability of their neighbours and commercial partners. Therefore, the launch of military attacks 
against one’s trade partners or, alternatively, the failure to prevent the outbreak of hostilities among 
one’s trade partners, can cause massive economic disruptions, including the (partial) destruction of 
a country’s FDI in the war-torn countries or the cut-off from vital supplies like oil; gas, and other 
(raw) materials, goods, and services imported from abroad. The democratic peace theory is based 
on the assumption that liberal democracies never fight wars against one another. Liberal 
democracies, so the argument goes, share the same fundamental values of individual freedom, 
political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity and are therefore not likely to 
attack like-minded countries. The road to international peace therefore lies in the promotion of 
liberal democracies around the globe. 
 
Neo-liberal institutionalists (or “neo-liberals”) share the realist beliefs that the international system 
is anarchic and that states are self-interested actors who want to maximise their political, economic, 
and military well-being. Since cooperation among countries is expected to produce superior results 
for all parties involved, states have, in principle, an interest in pursuing cooperative rather than 
confrontational policies. Such cooperation, however, does not come automatically as a result of 
(economic) interdependence. Rather, international cooperation will only happen if there are proper 
institutions that shape the behaviour of states and change the expected future costs and benefits 
associated with certain types of either cooperative or confrontational behaviour. All four schools of 
liberalism believe that – given the right framework and circumstances – states’ common interest in 
cooperation (exemplified through superior cooperative policy outcomes) can overcome their 
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deeply-entrenched reliance on (confrontational) self-help strategies in pursuit of national autonomy 
and security. For liberals, it is possible to bridge the divide between national self-interest and 
common interest as states can / should give up confrontational self-help strategies and national 
autonomy in favour of increased international cooperation. 
 
Liberalism and realism have important differences. First, realism is driven by the competitive 
dynamics among unitary state actors struggling to achieve primacy in security and defence matters 
(or, at a minimum, to ensure their national survival). Liberals describe the world from an economic 
perspective and therefore reject the realist notion that military security trumps everything else. 
Liberals believe that private-sector companies can be IR actors in and of themselves, generating the 
mutual gains derived from international cooperation (through trade and FDI ties), and thus 
challenging the realists’ belief that states are unitary actors focused exclusively on maximising their 
(relative) national security gains rather than maximising their (absolute) economic gains. Second, 
realism is much more static than liberalism. Realists believe that in order to know the future, it is 
simply necessary to study the past because the fundamental characteristics and behaviour patterns 
of states and human beings are not going to change over time. Liberalism believes that the future 
can be fundamentally different from the past and that states and human beings can break out of the 
ancient cycles of warfare, distrust, and violence. While proponents of classical / utopian liberalism 
believed in the perfectibility of men, today’s neo-liberal institutionalists believe that the right 
institutions will promote better relations among states. 
 
Seventeenth-century British philosopher John Locke was the first to draw together the main tenets 
of liberalism, many of which had previously been developed by the Dutch legal scholar Hugo 
Grotius. Philosopher Immanuel Kant was the first to develop a blueprint for how to achieve 
permanent peace and reconciliation among states in the international system. In “Perpetual Peace” 
(1795), Kant argues that war could be banished if every state was organised as a republic, based on 
the consent of those governed. Kant laid the intellectual foundations for the Democratic Peace 
Theory that emerged in the 1980s. In his 1913 bestseller “The Great Illusion”253, Norman Angell 
claimed that “military and political power give a nation no commercial advantage, that it is an 
economic impossibility for one nation to seize or destroy the wealth of another, or for one nation to 
enrich itself by subjugating another”. Following the destructions of WWI, President Woodrow 
Wilson’s League of Nations was an ambitious, yet ultimately ineffective attempt to finally 
overcome the scourge of war.254 The outbreak of WWII was the last nail in the coffin of the League 
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of Nations and its concept of collective security where one state could supposedly trust that its 
security and territorial integrity would be defended against outside aggression by the collective 
solidarity of the international community. 
 
The beginning of the European integration process after WWII led to a renewed focus on the 
potential for international cooperation. The functionalist / neo-functionalist theory of international 
relations – developed in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s – is an important part of the intellectual 
antecedents of neo-liberal institutionalism. Heavily influenced by the nascent European integration 
process, neo/functionalists argued that existing barriers to closer cooperation among sovereign 
states in the “high politics” realm of foreign policy, security, and defence matters (i.e., competition, 
anarchy, the security dilemma, etc.) could best be overcome through gradual international 
integration in the “low politics” of economic and social affairs.255 Over time, so the neo-
functionalist line of reasoning, the trust and mutual (economic) benefits derived from successful 
economic integration and their corresponding new international institutions will create powerful 
“spill-over effects” that lead to increased international cooperation in the “high-politics” of security 
and defence matters. Ernst Haas defined political integration as “the process whereby political 
actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and 
political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the 
pre-existing national states”.256 
 
In his influential 1983 article “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”257, Michael Doyle lays 
out the so-called Democratic Peace Theory. Inspired by Kant, Doyle identifies several reasons for 
why liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. First, citizens in democracies are very 
cautious to support going to war, as they would have to pay higher taxes for increased defence 
expenditures, suffer potential material destruction, and risk being wounded or killed as a result of 
military action. Second, liberal democracies have an inherent respect for one another as a result of 
their shared fundamental values of individual freedom, political participation, private property, 
equality of opportunity, etc. Third, liberal democracies, based on mutual trade and FDI, are 
dependent on each other for their economic welfare and prosperity. This economic interdependence 
makes war between liberal democracies extremely costly for all parties involved. Finally, Doyle 
argues that increased international interactions as a result of opening societies, expanding trade, and 
new (communications) technologies will contribute to an increased understanding and appreciation 
of other countries and cultures. 
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Let’s turn to neo-liberal institutionalism, the most potent challenger to the dominance of neo-
realism in modern IR theory. In “Power and Interdependence”, Robert Keohane and Joe Nye 
challenge several key realist assumptions and develop neo-liberal institutionalism as a major IR 
theory. First, in disputing the primacy of states, Keohane and Nye point to the rise of international 
organisations, MNCs, NGOs, etc. in world politics. They also challenge the realist notion that states 
are coherent, unitary actors, arguing that different branches of government as well as different 
ministries / parts of a state’s bureaucracy can pursue different, even contradictory policies.258 
Second, talking about the declining importance of military force in modern politics, Keohane and 
Nye maintain that “particularly among industrialised, pluralist countries, the perceived margin of 
safety has widened: fears of attack in general have declined, and fears of attack by one another are 
virtually non-existent.”259 Finally, Keohane and Nye challenge realism’s primacy of “high politics” 
over low politics”. While conceding that “military power remains important in some critical 
domains of international relations”, they also point out that “information technology has some 
effects on the use of force that benefit the small and some that favour the already powerful. […] 
The key, however, will not be the possession of fancy hardware or advanced systems, but the ability 
to integrate a system of systems.”260 Keohane and Nye also coined the term “complex 
interdependence” to describe their perspective on world politics: first, states and their societies are 
connected through a complex web of multiple actors and institutions, including national 
governments, international organisations, MNCs, individuals travelling as tourists, etc.; second, 
there is no hierarchy among military, economic or social issues; and finally, military force is not 
used between states linked through complex interdependence. 
 
In “After Hegemony”261, Keohane further develops neo-liberal institutionalism by arguing that 
international institutions can foster cooperation even under (neo-)realist conditions of an anarchic 
system where all states are self-interested actors trying to maximise their political, economic, and 
military power. The main impediment to international cooperation is the fear of states that the other 
countries in the system will cheat or defect (prisoner’s dilemma). Keohane argues that states are 
interested in maximising their long-term absolute gains, a goal that can normally only be realised 
through international cooperation. Since cheating / defecting is the main obstacle, so the neo-
liberalist argument, international institutions play a crucial role in promoting international 
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cooperation by providing independent and objective verification mechanisms to ensure that all 
states live up to their declared commitments. Keohane’s main criticism of neo-realism, in essence, 
is that it over-emphasises inter-state conflict / confrontation while at the same time underestimating 
the potential role of international institutions in fostering inter-state cooperation.262 
 
There are two defences against Keohane’s neo-liberal critique of neo-realism.263 First, at a 
theoretical level, neo-realists could argue that Keohane’s choice of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
as the appropriate game theoretical model is in fact incompatible with the neo-realist assumptions 
about the international system. Joseph Grieco criticises Keohane for using the repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma and thus implicitly assuming that states are more concerned about maximising absolute 
gains rather than relative gains.264 “Neo-liberalism’s claims about cooperation are based on its 
belief that states are atomistic actors. It argues that states seek to maximise their individual absolute 
gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others.”265 Consequently, Grieco argues, 
Keohane’s claim that states confronted with the repeated prisoner’s dilemma will eventually – as a 
result of the shadow of the future – reach a cooperative equilibrium where they do no longer defect 
for short-term gain, does nothing to disprove neo-realism. Second, at an empirical level, neo-realists 
could counter that they never claimed that neo-realism was incompatible with instances of 
international cooperation. Therefore, Keohane’s (correct) observation that states do in fact 
cooperate under certain conditions is not to say that neo-realists got it wrong: 
 
“The real question is how much international cooperation exists and whether neo-realism 
or neo-liberalism does a better job of accounting for the observed patterns of international 
cooperation. This response would then go on to compare the relative explanatory power of 
these two approaches.”266 
 
The objective of this thesis is precisely to compare the relative explanatory power of neo-realism 
and neo-liberal institutionalism with regard to the lack as well as the existence of international 
cooperation during the post-Cold War consolidation of the US and European A&D industry – 
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exemplified by the BMD / EADS mergers. Which theory – neo-realism or neo-liberalism – explains 
better why states opted for or against international cooperation when deciding on the future 
structure of their national A&D industry? The first part of this chapter has already laid out the 
different predictions and hypotheses that (neo-) realism would make about the two mergers. The 
ethnocentric BMD merger was an attempt by the American hegemon to preserve its military-
technological dominance vis-à-vis the rest of the international system, including close Western 
European allies. The regiocentric EADS merger, in contrast, was an attempt by key European 
countries like France and Germany to balance against the American hegemon by forming a potent 
industrial counterweight to the crushing dominance of US mega-primes like Boeing. 
 
There are three major fault lines separating neo-realism and neo-liberalism267: 1) the meaning and 
implications of anarchy; 2) the problem of absolute vs. relative gains; and 3) the tension between 
coordination and distribution. First, realism defines anarchy as the absence of a central authority 
with the legitimacy / capacity to enforce order, treaties, and rules among states in the international 
system. This broad notion of anarchy refers to the overall structure of the international system and 
can easily be transposed to other (anarchic) systems, notably in the economic / business domain. 
The other notion of anarchy argues that the sovereign states constituting the system can and will 
eventually resort to military force to preserve their independence. Neo-liberals, however, believe 
that this second notion of anarchy is no longer applicable today,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
neither in terms of relations among Western allies nor in terms of relations among the world’s 
major states. Today, military conflict among the world’s major powers – especially between Europe 
and the US – over international primacy is virtually unthinkable. Even Samuel Huntington – who 
has argued in favour of continued US primacy in the world based on a neo-realist theoretical 
framework – concedes that “military conflict between major states is unlikely”268. Neo-liberals 
therefore believe that states – living under the conditions of a type of anarchy that is no longer 
shaped by the potential use of military force but simply characterised by the absence of a central 
authority – will feel less of an incentive to balance against a current or potential hegemon. Hence, 
the neo-realist explanation of the EADS merger as a European attempt to balance against American 
hegemony does not make much sense from the neo-liberal perspective. 
 
Neo-realists, however, counter that “states [have started] competing and balancing over economic 
issues after the Cold War as much as they competed and balanced over security issues during the 
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Cold War”269. Given that the BMD / EADS mergers involved both high military (security) and 
civilian (economic) stakes, neo-realists would contend that the European decision to balance against 
the US was fully justified and understandable because of serious concerns and concrete threat 
perceptions in Europe in the realm of security and economic affairs. 
 
Second, neo-realists and neo-liberals argue over whether states are more concerned with relative or 
absolute gains. As Waltz put it, “states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. 
They are compelled to ask not ‘Will both of us gain?’ but ‘Who will gain more?’”.270 Neo-liberals, 
in contrast, believe that states are primarily focused on maximising their absolute gains from 
(potential) international cooperation. According to Keohane, states’ preferences “are based on their 
assessments of their own welfare, not that of others”271. If neo-realists got it right, cooperation 
among states is much more fragile and difficult to establish than neo-liberals assume. For the latter, 
any type of cooperative international arrangement that works fine and produces positive, absolute 
gains is likely to continue as long as none of the states defect. However, if countries are primarily 
interested in maximising their relative gains – that is, if they want to make sure that their 
cooperation with other states does not benefit these countries disproportionately, thus leading to a 
negative shift in their own relative international power position – then states will constantly assess 
their on-going benefits from cooperation and compare them to the kind of perceived / assumed 
benefits that their partners derive from these cooperative arrangements. The neo-realists focus on 
maximising relative gains adds an important element of uncertainty since the continuation of 
international cooperation is always subject to a state’s potentially changing (subjective) assessments 
about its relative benefits from working together with other countries. Neo-liberals, in contrast, are 
primarily concerned with making sure that all states involved do not cheat so as to maximise the 
positive, absolute gains derived from international cooperative arrangements. 
 
International organisations and regimes play an important role in reducing uncertainty by providing 
independent, objective verification mechanisms to ensure that all states live up to their declared 
commitments. International institutions also reduce transaction costs by establishing permanent 
channels of communication among all participating partners. Finally, international institutions also 
extend the “shadow of the future” and raise the (expected) costs of potential defection for states 
considering whether or not to engage in international cooperation. Interestingly, there is a debate 
among neo-realists about the extent to which a state’s concern about maximising its relative gains is 
conditioned by the overall strategic setting it is confronted with. States that find themselves in high-
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risk, high-stakes environments are more likely to focus on maximising relative gains as they are 
more sensitive to potential negative shifts in their relative overall security posture as a result of 
(imbalanced) international cooperation.272 
 
Finally, neo-realists and neo-liberals differ over the tension between coordination and distribution – 
that is, the extent to which the existing relative power positions of states shape the potential 
collaborative and institutional arrangements among them. By definition, there are different ways to 
distribute the potential joint gains from international cooperation. “These multiple ways of 
achieving the joint gains from cooperation can create conflicts over how those gains will be 
distributed.”273 Neo-realists assume that, ultimately, the relative distribution of gains from 
international cooperation will directly reflect – or, at a minimum, closely resemble – the relative 
power position of all states. Furthermore, as states’ relative power positions change over time, 
existing international institutions and arrangements for the distribution of joint gains are potentially 
subject to renegotiation if the system’s increasingly powerful players believe that they deserve a 
bigger piece of the collective joint-gains pie. Neo-realists regard international institutions as 
dynamic arrangements that reflect the interests of the system’s most powerful actor(s) and also 
track changes in the concerned states’ relative power position over time. 
 
Neo-liberals believe that institutional rules and frameworks can alter state behaviour and lead to 
policy outcomes different from what a hard-nosed look at the relative power position of the 
respective countries involved would otherwise suggest. States, so the argument goes, agree to set up 
international institutions primarily to overcome existing obstacles to international cooperation – 
arising from the conditions of international anarchy – in order to collectively realise positive, 
absolute gains that are beyond each state’s individual reach. Neo-liberals argue that cooperation can 
better promote the interests of competing actors under well-established regimes. They do not 
believe the neo-realists’ claim that states will virtually always attempt to impose the least 
favourable distribution of joint gains from international cooperation on their weaker partners. “The 
cost of changing or constructing new regimes […] gives existing regimes some resilience to shifts 
in the distribution of power.”274 
 
What are the predictions and hypotheses that neo-liberal institutionalism would make about the 
BMD / EADS mergers? For neo-liberals, the key factor behind the EADS link-up was the process 
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of European integration and the fact that a strong track-record of successfully functioning 
institutions – EU, Airbus, WEU, and even NATO – allowed France, Germany, and Spain to 
overcome any potential security dilemmas or distrust among them. At the same time, since Europe 
and America are extremely unlikely to go to war with each other over primacy in the international 
system, key players such as France and Germany have no incentive or motivation to balance against 
the US by establishing EADS as a military / defence-industrial counterweight to America’s Boeing. 
However, there might be good reasons in favour of the creation of EADS in terms of economic 
competitiveness and industrial policy – not least because the governments concerned care about 
safeguarding jobs, export earnings, and technology leadership. 
 
When applying neo-liberalism to the BMD merger, the predictions and hypotheses are somewhat 
different. First, the BMD merger – in contrast to EADS – did not involve any international 
collaboration between sovereign, independent states. The US decision in favour of ethnocentric 
A&D industrial consolidation is therefore seen by neo-realists as proof of serious American 
concerns about potentially costly / risky relative losses in connection with transatlantic defence 
collaboration – i.e., the gradual diffusion of America’s military-technological edge as a result of 
inadvertent, accidental, or straightforward illegal technology transfers to potential European 
partners like France and Germany as well as third countries. 
 
On the one hand, neo-liberals may claim that the EADS merger constitutes a perfect example of 
how the process of European political and economic integration facilitated an unprecedented depth 
of military-industrial integration in the A&D sectors of France, Germany, and Spain. On the other 
hand, however, neo-liberals would have to respond to potential neo-realist charges that even a 
major institution like NATO – despite its existence since 1949 – did not manage to allay persisting 
security dilemmas / distrust between America and Europe in connection with potential transatlantic 
A&D mergers. In order to bolster the neo-liberals’ cause and to prove neo-realism wrong, this thesis 
would have to provide relevant evidence suggesting that the BMD merger was promoted by the US 
government based on a primarily economic cost / benefit analysis of potential synergies derived 
from the two companies’ product portfolio, business situation, etc. If this thesis therefore supported 
the notion that the BMD merger was driven primarily by economic / business factors – more than 
by US geostrategic interests rooted in a neo-realist vision of the world – it would suggest that neo-
realists are wrong and neo-liberals are right. 
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It is obvious that liberal institutionalism has been much more “realist” in describing the rapid 
growth of transatlantic trade and investment ties in recent decades than realism. By illustrating the 
intensification of FDI, integrated production, R&D, marketing and sales between America and 
Europe, the Hamilton/Quinlan study275 cited earlier provides ample intellectual ammunition to back 
up the liberal institutionalist notion that states (1) share a strong interest in cooperating 
economically and that (2) the private sector has become an important shaper of international 
relations in its own right. Against this backdrop, a key question at the heart of this thesis why the 
A&D sector, to this day, has remained the major exception to the wider rule of ever-closer 
transatlantic economic cooperation across virtually all other sectors and industries. Also, the 
objective of this thesis is to compare the relative explanatory power of neo-realism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism with regard to the lack as well as the existence of international cooperation during 
the post-Cold War consolidation of the US and European A&D industry – exemplified by the BMD 
/ EADS mergers. This thesis thus contributes to a better understanding of the potential opportunities 
for and constraints on international collaboration among sovereign and independent states, 
especially with regard to the strategically important A&D industry. 
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2.3  Highlighting actors’ beliefs and identities: the role of constructivist theory 
 
“Although our analytical coordinates for gauging global politics have proven to be 
inadequate for a world in rapid change, there has been remarkably little rethinking of our 
categories of analysis. Instead, in the first half of the 1990s North American scholarship on 
the theory of international relations was preoccupied with the issue of whether variants of 
realism or liberalism offered a superior way for explaining the world. Considering the 
dramatic international developments occurring during these years, many of the academic 
debates look arcane to the interested bystander. For it is hard to deny that existing theories 
of international relations have woefully fallen short in explaining an important revolution in 
world politics.”276 
 
The primary theoretical basis of this thesis is an exploration of neo-realism vs. neo-liberalism to 
explain the BMD and EADS mergers. To this day, these two approaches remain the dominant 
schools of thought in IR theory. Since the early 1990s, however, one could also witness the 
prominent rise of constructivist theory as a new, “sociological perspective on the politics of national 
security”.277 Spurred by Alexander Wendt’s seminal 1992 article “Anarchy Is what States Make of 
It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”278, constructivist theorists began to “[focus] on the 
effects that culture and identity have on national security”. In particular, they argued that “security 
interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors”:279 
 
“[Constructivists concentrate] on two underattended determinants of national security 
policy: the cultural-institutional context of policy on the one hand and the constructed 
identity of states, governments, and other political actors. We explore these determinants 
from the theoretical perspective of sociological institutionalism, with its focus on the 
character of the state’s environment and on the contested nature of political identities.”280 
 
The post-Cold War rise of constructivism was due, in large part, to the perceived failures and 
shortcomings of both neo-realism and neo-liberalism in explaining (let alone predicting) the end of 
the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, the appearance of new security challenges related to 
ethnic conflicts, nationalism, intensifying economic competition, environmental degradation, as 
well as the “perceived increases in the relevance of issues of cultural identity in international 
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politics, including human rights and religion”.281 282 Some of the empirical material analysed in this 
thesis relates to actors’ beliefs, identities, and their subjective understandings of the external 
political, military, and economic environments they were confronted with leading up to the BMD / 
EADS mergers. Furthermore, the thesis deals with a particular post-Cold War phenomenon – 
namely the lack or occurrence of cross-border integration involving U.S. and / or European A&D 
mega-primes. On both counts, the inclusion of constructivism (which rose to prominence in the 
very post-Cold War period that is being investigated) in this theoretical discussion is therefore 
justifiable, even though the evaluation of neo-realist vs. neo-liberalist explanations certainly 
remains the fundamental basis of this thesis. 
 
As was already explained above, there are three major fault lines separating neo-realism and neo-
liberalism: 1) the meaning and implications of anarchy; 2) the problem of absolute vs. relative 
gains; and 3) the tension between coordination and distribution. However, as constructivists are 
eager to emphasise, the two dominant IR theories also “share a similar, underlying analytical 
framework, susceptible to the same weakness”.283 For example, neo-realism and neo-liberalism 
“agree on the central importance of international anarchy for the analysis of international 
politics”.284 While neo-realists assume that states are locked into a constant battle for survival in an 
anarchic, international self-help system (zero-sum game), neo-liberalists believe that international 
institutions can help states overcome anarchy by clearly defining their common interests and by 
coordinating their conflicting policies (thus creating a positive-sum game). According to both 
theoretical approaches, the system’s anarchic structure – be it defined as competitive self-help 
anarchy or as anarchy mitigated by international institutions – shapes, drives, and ultimately 
determines state actions. “In this view states operate in environments that create constraints and 
opportunities.”285 
 
Furthermore, neo-realists and neo-liberalists assume that states’ interests and their perceptions of 
each other / of their respective external environments are “unproblematic” (in other words, they are 
“unvarying and acontextual”286). These interests and perceptions as well as the corresponding 
political choices (e.g., counterbalancing, bandwagoning, cooperation, etc.) are taken for granted 
because states are essentially viewed as rational, utilitarian actors that merely react and adapt to 
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external stimuli / changes in the international structure.287 Both IR theories also share a common 
belief that states are unitary and functionally undifferentiated actors. In other words, each country 
speaks and acts with just one voice; there is no analytical room for potential bureaucratic infighting 
or internal political differences that may limit the state’s ability to pursue a rational, utilitarian 
defence of its national interests. To sum things up, “the assumption of unified state actors and a 
focus on an anarchic, systemic context of states are common to both [neo-realism and neo-
liberalism]”.288 
 
Constructivists, in contrast, believe “that security interests are defined by actors who respond to 
cultural factors”.289 In particular, national interests are “constructed” through a process of social 
interaction, both at the domestic and at the international level. “[Constructivism] thus departs from 
materialist notions and the rationalist view of identities as exogenously given [put forward by neo-
realist and / or neo-liberal theories]”290 
 
“The international and domestic societies in which states are embedded shape their 
identities in powerful ways. The state is a social actor. It is embedded in social rules and 
conventions that constitute its identity and the reasons for the interests that motivate 
actors.”291 
 
Constructivists view the concept of “identity” “as a crucial link between environmental structures 
and interests”.292 At its most fundamental level, the term identity describes the “basic character” of 
states.293 294 According to constructivism, “Variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, 
affect the national security interests or policies of states.”295 
 
“Identities both generate and shape interests. Some interests, such as mere survival and 
minimal physical well-being, exist outside of specific social identities; they are relatively 
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generic. But many national security interests depend on a particular construction of self-
identity in relation to the conceived identity of others.”296 
 
For example, states such as Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Communist Russia in the 1930 / 
1940s as well as the current regime in Iran can be defined as “revisionist powers” that are openly 
challenging and defying the existing international order. Alternatively, states can also embrace a 
“trading power” identity, putting a premium on the expansion of their international economic 
relationships while generally eschewing the pursuit of “hard” military power. In the wake of WWII, 
both West Germany and Japan adopted this particular identity and strategy very successfully. In 
addition, states can also embrace a wide variety of other identities, ranging from the Jewish state 
(Israel) to the world’s leader in the global war on terror (the United States in response to 9/11 
during the first term of President George W. Bush, who decided to invade both Afghanistan and 
Iraq) to the champion of a “multipolar world order” (France under General de Gaulle or President 
Chirac). Other state identities might include leader of the non-aligned movement (India) or of 
Communist world revolution (USSR). In each of these cases, distinct state identities resulted in 
distinct foreign / national security policy interests and choices, thus rendering both analytical 
categories “problematic” (that is, varying and contextual).297 Hence, as Peter Katzenstein put it 
succinctly, “‘Defining’, not ‘defending’, the national interest is what [constructivism] seeks to 
understand.”298 
 
Domestically, a vast variety of actors – ranging from political leaders / parties, government 
bureaucracies, and interest groups such as labour union or business associations, to the media, 
religious organisations, companies, etc. – are often fiercely competing to promote their definition of 
what constitutes “the national interest” and, by extension, the country’s “identity”. 
 
“Conceiving of the state in relational terms and investigating the domestic sources of 
foreign policy focuses attention on the degree to which the identities of actors are 
constructed by state-society relations.”299 
“[Constructivists] […] refer to identity as a shorthand label for varying constructions of 
nation- and statehood. The process of construction typically is explicitly political and pits 
conflicting actors against each other.”300 
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Especially in open, liberal democracies, this rather complex and multi-faceted process to define the 
national interest is frequently messy, cumbersome, irrational, and sometimes also inconclusive. In 
practice, states are therefore rarely, if ever, the kind of purely rational and utilitarian actors that neo-
realists and neo-liberalists assume they are.301 Furthermore, states’ interests and perceptions are also 
shaped by interactions with the international environment. For example, a state may feel isolated 
and humiliated at the hands of other countries (i.e., Germany after the Versailles Treaty) and 
therefore embrace a revisionist identity that provides a compelling political narrative and 
justification to challenge the existing international order, if necessary even by military force. In this 
particular example, both Germany’s national identity and its national interests were clearly shaped 
by perceptions of and interactions with the external environment. However, that being said, the 
German domestic political environment also played an important role in framing the country’s 
national identity. For example, Germany’s pervasive economic malaise (which, in turn, was caused 
by the 1929 international “crash” as well as an extremely harsh Versailles sanctions regime), 
coupled with growing domestic political polarization, certainly fostered the rise of Adolf Hitler and 
his Nazi regime. The rest is history. As can be seen from this example, both domestic and 
international environments can and usually do have a crucially important impact on state interests 
and identities. Therefore, constructivists analyse “the impact of actors on their environment and the 
impact of environments on actors”.302 
 
“The analysis of transnational relations and of world systems offers analytical perspectives 
that elucidate the relations between states and their social environments. Often the social 
environments that affect state identities link international and domestic environments in a 
way that defies the reification of distinct domestic and international spheres of politics.”303 
 
When talking about international “systems” comprising a number of states in distinct social 
environments, constructivists also introduce the important analytical categories of “culture”, 
“norms”, and “values”. These terms are indispensable for a precise understanding of “The Culture 
of National Security” – the title of the first-ever book that brought together a broad range of 
constructivist authors working on national security:304 
 
“[Constructivists] […] invoke the term ‘culture’ as a broad label that denotes collective 
models of nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom or law. Culture refers both to 
a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set of cognitive standards 
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(such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they 
operate, and how they relate to one another.”305 
“Norms are collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity. […] Norms 
either define (‘constitute’) identities in the first place […] or prescribe or proscribe 
(‘regulate’) behaviours for already constituted identities […]. Taken together, then, norms 
establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about 
how these particular actors will behave.”306 
 
Constructivists argue that military and political alliances such as NATO or the EU have fostered the 
emergence of a distinct “culture” among their respective members. Drawing on the “security 
community” concept initially developed by Karl Deutsch307 – who defined it as a group of states for 
whom the use of military force against each other is virtually unthinkable – constructivist authors 
like Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett have further refined this notion by highlighting the 
importance of shared identities, norms, values, and cultures for the emergence and effective 
functioning of “security communities”.308 This aspect of constructivism is of course particularly 
relevant for the theoretical discussion underpinning this thesis, which analyses post-Cold War 
political, economic, and military relations – characterised by both cooperation and rivalry – among 
close Western NATO / EU allies through the prism of the strategically important A&D industry. 
 
Looking specifically at the EU context, it is interesting to note that constructivists consider neo-
functionalism and regional integration theories – which emerged in the 1950s with the launch of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and “developed sophisticated approaches to 
investigating the effects of integration processes on actor properties”309 – “as precursors of current 
theoretical alternatives to neo-realism and neo-liberalism”.310 Despite their differences in other 
areas, constructivists and neo-functionalists basically do agree that the external structural 
environment specific to a particular state system (for example, the EEC / EU area) can have a direct 
and lasting impact on the perceptions, expectations, political orientations, and identities of the 
countries involved. Having formed a system of like-minded states that share common values and 
norms – and that derive tangible economic, political, or even military benefits from their 
cooperation – the members of this (EEC / EU) “security community” thus essentially managed to 
create a new “culture of national security”: one that overcomes traditional (neo-realist) notions of 
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inter-state rivalry by substituting trust for distrust and by focusing actors’ interests / concerns away 
from zero-sum competition and towards positive-sum cooperation. 
 
That being said, the emergence of different systems of states – each characterised by distinct 
(security) cultures, identities, and interests – does also raise the spectre of rather conflictual “us vs. 
them” scenarios. For example, at the military level, the launch of the NATO security community 
was motivated by a desire to contain the aggressive and expansionist policies of the Soviet Union 
and its Communist proxies. At the economic level, the process of European integration – while 
initially viewed as a mechanism to overcome centuries of bloody Franco-German conflict – has in 
recent decades acquired a new dimension: namely to make sure that the EU punches at its weight in 
international fora (especially trade negotiations, etc.) – something that is most effectively achieved 
by channelling collective EU member interests and representing them with one voice. Looking at 
EU-US relations and specifically at the strategic A&D sector, these confrontational “us vs. them” 
notions have been featured most prominently in the fierce Airbus vs. Boeing dogfight. It is telling to 
note that at various points in the 1990s, both the United States and Europe had the perception that 
their aerospace industries were under serious competitive attack from the other side, threatening to 
cause a decline over the long-term. As Peter Katzenstein put it, “Definitions of identity that 
distinguish between self and other imply definitions of threat and interest that have strong effects on 
national security policies”.311 312 
 
With regard to this thesis, constructivist theory is helpful to the extent that it draws our attention to 
the importance of states’ identities and perceptions when defining or re-defining their national 
interests. For example, the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union caused many 
Western European nations to redefine their perception of and hence their relationship with the 
United States. While Washington was previously viewed, above all, as the leader of NATO and the 
ultimate guarantor of stability and deterrence vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, that Cold-War era 
geopolitical “glue” weakened substantially beginning in the early 1990s, giving rise to a more 
competitive notion of transatlantic relations, especially in the realm of economics and trade, but 
also in the area of foreign policy and defence matters. In other words: to the extent that the Soviet 
threat subsided / disappeared, Western European nations were simply far less dependent on the 
United States / NATO to ensure their national security through nuclear and conventional military 
deterrence. Due to the end of the Cold War, the “identity” of the NATO alliance thus changed 
considerably, at least for the Western European nations who were far less fearful of a Russian 
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resurgence than the newly-liberated former Eastern European Warsaw Pact members (many of 
whom were eager to join NATO in order to secure US protection guarantees vis-à-vis Moscow). 
 
As was already indicated above, constructivist theory is also a useful tool to analyse the emergence 
of regional integration and their corresponding intra-regional identities, especially in the EU 
context. Constructivists believe that external systemic changes in the global economy – that is, 
“deep” international economic integration through FDI, trade, and inter-connected capital markets – 
leads to shifts in the nature of the state actors involved (that is, their “constructed” interests, 
identities, etc.) which, in turn, can result in a new (regional) national security environment / culture:  
 
“The theoretical argument that regional economic integration helps promote peaceful 
security relationships is certainly very compelling. It is critical to recognise that it is the 
actual experience of deep economic integration – and not merely forming a group – that 
leads to the processes scholars highlight as beneficial for improved security ties. […] 
[T]he most successful regional economic integration scheme in the twentieth century – the 
European Economic Community / European Union – was consolidated in the presence of a 
common external security threat.”313 
 
Constructivist authors like Stephen Brooks argue that “the global economy can influence security 
by changing capabilities, incentives, and the nature of actors”.314 At the capabilities level, the 
“globalisation of production” – defined by the rise of MNCs built around a vast FDI network of 
internationally dispersed production facilities – has made it increasingly difficult for countries to 
pursue a “go-it-alone” approach to the development and manufacturing of advanced weapons 
systems: 
 
“[T]he scales have shifted decisively against a strategy of autarkic defence production: no 
state, including the great powers, can now effectively remain on the cutting edge in military 
technology if it does not pursue significant internationalisation in the production of 
weaponry.”315 
 
A state is therefore left with two basic options. First, if a country wants to have access to state-of-
the-art weapons systems it needs to embrace globalisation and, in particular, accept the 
corresponding dependencies / vulnerabilities vis-à-vis foreign technologies, suppliers, etc. From a 
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neo-mercantilist perspective, of course, this approach raises the spectre of “foreign influence, 
foreign control, and foreign domination”316 in the strategically important A&D industry. Second, 
any country that instead decides to rely on autarkic weapons production “will not have leading-edge 
military equipment and will thus be in a weaker position to pursue revisionist aims”.317 Either way, 
Stephen Brooks argues that the globalisation of (defence) production is bound to promote more 
peaceful great power relations by (1) creating structural international military / technological 
dependencies that make it much more difficult and costly for countries to go to war (something that 
would severely disrupt existing international supply chains, trigger embargoes, etc.) or by (2) 
leaving autarkic (revisionist) states with inferior weapons technologies, thus making them 
potentially easier to subdue by countervailing international coalitions.318 
 
At the incentives level, Brooks points out that “the globalisation of production has greatly lowered 
the economic benefits of conquest in the most economically advanced states, and hence among all 
of the current and future great powers”.319 Vastly increased international dependencies – based on 
the cross-border movement of goods (trade), capital (FDI), and people – as well as the shift from a 
resource-based to a knowledge-based economy have made it much more difficult for revisionist 
powers to extract significant economic benefits from conquered territories. After all, any military 
occupation will almost inevitably disrupt existing inter-state and intra-firm (MNC) trade and FDI 
relationships with other countries. While the aggressor would gain physical control over the 
production facilities located in the occupied territory, the globalisation of production essentially 
“means that conquering an advanced country may only result in possession of a portion of the 
value-added chain, perhaps a very small portion”.320 321 
 
Finally, Stephen Brooks argues that the “globalisation of production” can impact security relations 
by fostering the emergence of regional economic integration. In particular, geographically dispersed 
MNCs are viewed as the key driver of regional cooperation, as countries that enjoy close bilateral / 
multilateral trade and FDI ties have generally strong incentives to pursue closer economic and 
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political coordination at the governmental level. At first glance, this line of reasoning is similar to 
neo-functionalism and its projected “spill-over” effects from “low politics” to “high politics” 
already outlined earlier in this chapter. Brooks, however, pays particular attention to how the 
external environment (‘globalisation of production”) reshapes security relations by changing “the 
nature of the actors”. This last notion – which one could also refer to as the changing of the 
respective state “identities” – is a key element of constructivist IR theory. 
 
Constructivists also readily embrace the notion – first laid out by neo-realist author Stephen Walt in 
“The Origins of Alliances”322 – that states balance against threats, not simply against power. The 
question of why states B or C are viewed as specific threats in a given external environment – and 
how this threat perception is “constructed” internally based on state A’s identity / national security 
culture – goes to the heart of the constructivist approach to IR theory. As Peter Katzenstein reminds 
us, “‘Defining’, not ‘defending’, the national interest is what [constructivism] seeks to 
understand.”323 In other words, why do certain states view each other as “friends” or “allies” while 
other states perceive each other as “rivals” or even “enemies”? While neo-realists put a premium on 
balance-of-power considerations to explain these different inter-state political dynamics, 
constructivists, in contrast, emphasise the role played by individual state identities as well as norms 
and values in terms of constructing a certain “culture” fostering cooperative or confrontational 
international security relations. 
 
The fact that some of the empirical material analysed in this thesis relates to actors’ beliefs, 
identities, and their subjective understandings of the external political, military, and economic 
environments they were confronted with leading up to the BMD / EADS mergers justifies the 
inclusion of constructivism as a separate IR theory subchapter. That being said, however, the 
primary theoretical basis of the entire thesis remains an exploration of neo-realism vs. neo-
liberalism. In essence, the BMD / EADS case studies suggest that transatlantic rivalries over the 
political, military, economic, and technological power and prestige derived from the A&D industry 
do exist even among close Western NATO allies. The thesis concludes that the two mergers can 
best be explained by the fact that realist arguments prevailed over liberal-institutionalist arguments 
among policymakers and business leaders in the countries involved, especially in Washington and 
Paris. With the A&D industry caught between two very different worlds – realism and national 
security vs. liberalism, cooperation, globalisation and open markets – political leaders and business 
executives in the United States and Europe put a premium on the former, thus reinforcing the notion 
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that this strategic industry sector remains of tremendous importance for a nation’s military and geo-
economic security. 
 
While the ethnocentric BMD merger and the regiocentric EADS merger represent two diametrically 
opposite A&D consolidation strategies, this thesis argues that both transactions were ultimately 
driven by a similar mix of realist national security and neo-mercantilist ambitions: that is, on the 
one hand, US concerns about defending American military and economic hegemony in the post-
Cold War world vis-à-vis all countries (including close NATO allies like Germany, France, and 
even the UK); and, on the other hand, European concerns about counter-balancing by creating an 
internationally competitive A&D “European champion” that would also be able to serve as the 
defence industrial foundation for a viable ESDP autonomous from NATO and the United States. In 
contrast, transatlantic defence industrial M&As at the prime contractor level – something that 
proponents of neo-liberalism would normally have expected in a globalised economy – did not 
materialise. 
 
In essence, this thesis analyses intra-Alliance relations during the post-Cold War period through the 
prism of the strategically important A&D industry. The lack of full-scale transatlantic mergers and 
acquisitions involving major US and European A&D companies is interpreted as a sign of the 
(continuing) appeal of neo-realist thinking and associated relative gains considerations among US 
policymakers (especially on Capitol Hill and in certain parts of the Clinton administration, like the 
State Department). On the European side, too, neo-realist forces are seen as the key (political) 
drivers of the Franco-German-led creation of EADS. For sure, at first glance, one might be tempted 
to interpret the unprecedented level of deep, transnational A&D industrial integration between AM, 
Dasa, and CASA as an indication that neo-liberalism is best positioned to explain this merger. 
Rather, however, the case study research undertaken for this PhD thesis suggests that it was neo-
realist counter-balancing considerations vis-à-vis the American hegemon driving French, German, 
and Spanish political as well as business leaders to support the creation of EADS. The corporate 
executives involved, of course, were primarily concerned with gaining the necessary economies of 
scale to successfully compete with US rivals like Boeing. 
 
While constructivism can be a useful analytical tool, especially when it comes to matters of regional 
economic and political integration, the “problem” with the application of this theory in the context 
of this particular PhD thesis is that the interests and motivations underpinning the BMD / EADS 
mergers involve intra-Alliance relations shaped by different “cultures of national security” both 
within and between the respective NATO and EU frameworks. In other words, France and 
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Germany have not only a bilateral “security culture” but also an EU-specific “security culture” as 
well as a NATO-specific “security culture” – with only the latter directly involving the United 
States. The fact that France and Germany are part of the same NATO military alliance as the US 
while, at the same time, they form the engine of another regional bloc (the EU) that has repeatedly 
clashed with the United States on a range of political as well as economic and trade matters 
(including the crucial A&D sector via the Airbus-Boeing rivalry) makes it extremely difficult (if not 
impossible) to disaggregate the different norms, values, and identities that constructivists believe 
have shaped the development (and post-Cold War evolution) of national interests / threat 
perceptions within distinct NATO and EU “security cultures”. 
 
During the Cold War, the NATO security culture was clearly paramount since close military ties to 
Washington were seen as indispensable for deterring the Warsaw Pact. After the demise of the 
Soviet Union, however, one could witness that the EU began to develop a quite robust security 
culture of its own (especially in the context of ESDP and the stated desire for military autonomy 
from NATO / the United States). Of course, these two observations are rather obvious and 
straightforward. However, placing constructivism at the theoretical heart of the BMD / EADS 
mergers narrative – which involves an analysis of political, economic, and military motivations on 
both sides of the Atlantic – would require a disaggregation of the interests and identities of a wide 
range of actors (governments, corporate leaders, Congress, etc.) in different countries across an 
extended period of time. And even then, constructivism’s ultimate analytical “value-added” for the 
purpose of this thesis is rather questionable. Especially in the realm of foreign, security, and 
defence policy, national governments are the ultimate deciders. For example, while individual US 
mega-primes might have been, in principle, in favour of closer transatlantic defence industrial ties, 
the nature of the US political system is such that the corporate leaders concerned knew full well that 
such a deal would meet insurmountable opposition on Capitol Hill – the very political institution 
that is ultimately in charge of appropriating and approving the Pentagon’s lucrative procurement 
budget. In this particular context, the rather dominant ability of national governments to shape the 
A&D industry (derived from, inter alia, monopsonic market power and their role as the key 
regulator of this strategic sector) leaves constructivists with little analytical wiggle room to 
challenge neo-realist and neo-liberal assumptions regarding the essentially unitary and functionally 
undifferentiated nature of sovereign states. 
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2.4  PhD thesis methodology: the case for case studies 
 
Qualitative research “is an effort to understand situations in their uniqueness as part of a 
particular context and the interactions there. This understanding is an end in itself, so that it 
is not attempting to predict what may happen in the future necessarily, but to understand the 
nature of that setting – what it means for participants to be in that setting, what their lives are 
like, what’s going on for them, what their meanings are, what the world looks like in that 
particular setting. […] The analysis strives for depth of understanding.”324  
 
The point of departure for every PhD thesis is an initial research question – some kind of observed 
phenomenon that triggers a researcher’s interest and desire to conduct an in-depth analysis to 
explain the dynamics of the issue at hand. The initial research questions for this thesis can be 
formulated as follows: (1) Why did the Americans consolidate their A&D industry at a purely 
national level, with virtually no involvement from other Western allies? (2) Why did the French, 
Germans, and Spaniards decide to merge their leading national A&D companies into EADS?325 In 
an effort to guide (social) scientists in their methodological choices, Yin also developed the 
following overview of major research strategies and their usefulness / applicability to different 
research questions and contextual settings:  
 
strategy form of research 
question 
requires control over 
behavioural events? 
focuses on 
contemporary events? 
    
experiment how, why yes yes 
survey who, what, where, how 
many, how much  
no yes 
archival analysis who, what, where, how 
many, how much 
no yes / no 
history how, why no no 
case study how, why no yes 
 
As Robert Yin points out, “In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus 
in on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context”.326 After the core research 
questions have been defined, the next key step is the case selection process. According to Kathleen 
Eisenhardt, “it makes sense to choose cases such as extreme situations and polar types in which the 
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process of interest is ‘transparently observable’”.327 The BMD and EADS case selection for this 
PhD thesis was specifically guided by Eisenhardt’s methodological recommendation. 
 
This thesis uses two case studies – the BMD and EADS mergers – to test the relevant explanative 
power of two major IR theories, neo-realism and neo-liberalism. A case study can be defined as “a 
research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings”.328 
329 330 Given the focus on two unique and singular events, case studies were deemed to be the best 
and most appropriate (if not only suitable) methodological approach for the analysis of the BMD 
and EADS mergers. In general, case studies can be used for several purposes: (1) to provide 
description; (2) to test theory; and (3) to generate theory.331 332 This particular thesis leverages the 
case study approach to accomplish the first two of these objectives. After all, while describing and 
analysing a given phenomenon, a case study can, at the same time, test those theories that offer 
alternative explanations of the facts under review. 
 
The BMD case was selected for several reasons. First, it is the biggest-ever A&D industry merger, 
combining the world’s largest commercial aircraft manufacturer (Boeing) with the world’s largest 
military aircraft manufacturer (MDC). Second, both before and after the BMD merger, Boeing has 
been ranking as the single biggest U.S. industrial exporter, thus underscoring the company’s critical 
economic importance from a neo-mercantilist perspective. Third, the BMD merger touched directly 
on the fierce transatlantic rivalry between Boeing and Airbus for supremacy on the global civil 
aerospace market. For this reason, the BMD merger became the subject of an acrimonious and 
controversial anti-trust review process, pitting the Washington’s FTC against the EC in Brussels. 
Finally, the fact that top political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic decided to get personally 
involved in the BMD anti-trust review process, at times even threatening a U.S.-EU trade war if 
their demands were not met, demonstrates the unique strategic and economic importance of this 
particular A&D merger and justifies its selection as the first PhD case study. 
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In contrast, the 1994 LMC merger – while leading to the creation of the world’s largest defence 
company – was not selected as a separate case study in view of LMC’s much smaller export 
revenues, the absence of a corresponding zero-sum transatlantic rivalry à la Airbus vs. Boeing, and 
the fact that the LMC merger was not the subject of a high-stakes political and regulatory battle 
involving senior government leaders from the United States and Europe. The other major M&A 
transactions during America’s post-Cold War A&D industrial consolidation process leading to the 
creation of mega-primes such as NGC, GD, or Raytheon did not represent appropriate case studies 
either since each of the companies concerned had even less (transatlantic) strategic, economic, and 
political weight than the BMD merger. 
 
In comparison, the explanation for the selection of EADS as the second merger study is rather 
straightforward. After all, the creation of EADS marked the first (and so far only) time that several 
different, sovereign countries decided to merge the crown jewels of their respective A&D industrial 
base into one fully integrated company. The unique (quantitative and qualitative) characteristics of 
the EADS merger – that is, large-scale pan-European consolidation in the strategically important 
A&D sector – justify its inclusion as a separate case study. While the 1992 Franco-German creation 
of Eurocopter – through the combination of the rotorcraft divisions of Aérospatiale and DASA – 
represented “the first time that aeronautics companies from different European countries combined 
R&D and production capabilities”,333 the end result was a much smaller and much more limited 
case of pan-European defence consolidation than the EADS merger. 
 
Furthermore, the launch of EADS – which consolidated the combined 80-percent Airbus ownership 
interest of three of the four industry partners (AM, DASA, and CASA) into one corporate entity – 
also facilitated the subsequent transformation of the rather loose and cumbersome Airbus GIE 
consortium into a “normal” company (today organized as “Airbus SAS” under French law). Due to 
this crucial transnational corporate consolidation / streamlining process, first within EADS and then 
within Airbus, the leading European civil airplane manufacturer would subsequently be in a much 
better position to decisively break Boeing’s dominance on the world’s large commercial aircraft 
(LCA) market. Given Boeing’s long-time position as the single most important American industrial 
exporter, the EADS merger therefore affected core U.S. strategic and commercial interests. 
 
The EADS merger was also selected as a case study because it is – first and foremost – a Franco-
German transaction. Given France’s long-time desire to pursue an independent foreign and security 
policy, coupled with selective counter-balancing against the American hegemon, the EADS merger 
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thus promises particularly useful insights into the political and geo-strategic implications / 
motivations of paneuropean A&D industrial restructuring during the post-Cold War era. In other 
words, the BMD and EADS case studies are “extreme situations” / “polar types” as they cover both 
an ethnocentric merger backed by the U.S. hegemon (BMD) and a regiocentric merger (EADS) 
fostered by a French government that saw this transaction as a conditio sine qua non for the launch 
of an effective ESDP independent of NATO and the United States. 
 
Apart from the two “big” BMD / EADS case studies, this thesis also includes three smaller cases 
which are used to contrast large-scale transatlantic M&As in a wide range of industries (automotive, 
banking, and telecommunications) with the absence of major transatlantic mergers in the A&D 
sector. All three cases involved successful334 acquisitions of American firms by European (German) 
companies and were carefully selected to serve as counterfactuals for the ethnocentric BMD 
merger, which this thesis interprets as an attempt by the American hegemon to consolidate and 
defend its dominant military, economic, and technological status vis-à-vis all potential challengers, 
including NATO allies like France, Germany, and Spain – the EADS founding nations. 
 
The methodological rationale for including these three counterfactual case studies in this PhD thesis 
is to highlight those factors that separate the ethnocentric American BMD merger in the 
strategically important A&D sector from large-scale transatlantic M&A transactions in non-
strategic or less-strategic industries. That being said, at least two of the three European companies 
involved – Deutsche Bank (DB) and Deutsche Telekom (DT) – were able to overcome significant 
political opposition and / or regulatory hurdles to successfully take-over their respective U.S. 
acquisition targets. In the case of DT, U.S. resistance to the VoiceStream (VS) purchase was first 
and foremost based on national security / foreign eavesdropping concerns in the 
telecommunications industry, which forms an integral part of the country’s critical infrastructure. 
However, given strong free-trade backing by the Clinton administration and influential Senators on 
Capitol Hill, the rather sensitive DT-VS deal was ultimately approved, thus further underscoring the 
special status of the A&D sector as the strategic industry par excellence. 
 
The next key step in case study research is the collection of qualitative and quantitative data, 
leveraging a variety of methods and sources. As Eisenhardt points out: 
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“Of special note is the combination of qualitative with quantitative evidence. Although the 
terms ‘qualitative’ and ‘case study’ are often used interchangeably […], case study 
research can involve qualitative data only, quantitative only, or both.”335 336 
 
This particular thesis relies above all on qualitative data, even though quantitative data are also 
used, for example to analyse and compare relevant corporate statistics such as annual turnover, 
operating income / profit margins, per-unit-costs of aircraft, break-down of total sales by divisions 
and geographic markets, the number of employees, etc. Virtually all of these quantitative data are 
derived from the respective companies’ Annual Reports and other legal documents like SEC filings, 
etc. In addition, quantitative research is also based on defence / military procurement spending 
figures compiled by the IISS “Military Balance” series as well as other (official) statistics. 
However, it is important to emphasise that these quantitative data were used for illustrative or 
comparative thesis purposes only; but not as “data fodder” in mathematical models to “prove” 
certain hypotheses or theories. That being said, much relevant quantitative and especially 
qualitative data regarding the A&D industry and its impact on transatlantic security and defence 
relations was also collected from news articles and analytical pieces published by major newspapers 
(“Washington Post”, “Financial Times”, “New York Times”, etc.), the specialised A&D industry 
press (“Aviation Week & Space Technology”, etc.), and leading IR journals (“International 
Security”, “International Organization”, Survival, “Foreign Affairs”, “Foreign Policy”, etc.), as well 
as reports issued by influential think tanks (CSIS, Brookings, RAND, IISS, SIPRI, etc.) and 
relevant governmental institutions (European Commission, DoD, MoD, etc.). 
 
Last but not least, crucial qualitative research insights for this thesis were also generated through a 
variety of semi-structured interviews with relevant U.S. and European A&D executives, former 
government officials, think tank experts, academics, journalists, etc. These interviews were 
conducted for two key reasons: (1) to double-check previously gathered information contained, for 
example, in newspaper articles, think tank reports, etc.; and (2) to fill gaps in the existing body of 
publicly available literature. Given the sensitive, national security-related nature of the A&D 
industry, the “gap-filling” function of these interviews was of paramount importance for the 
completion of this PhD. As Eisenhardt points out, case study researchers “typically combine 
multiple data collection methods” including interviews, observations, and archival sources, which 
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are particularly common.337 As a result, this “triangulation made possible by multiple data 
collection methods provides stronger substantiation of constructs and hypotheses”.338 
 
In fact, a number of insights generated by this thesis – especially those relating to the U.S. 
government’s position vis-à-vis transatlantic defence industrial cooperation – were not clearly 
spelled out in the existing, publicly available literature. In this context, my interviews with former 
senior Clinton administration officials – including former Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre; 
Paul Kaminski, former US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and 
Jacques Gansler, former US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
– proved to be particularly valuable. Access to these high-level interview partners was made easier 
because (1) I could leverage personal introductions / referrals from people we knew in common; 
and (2) because my interviewees were all political appointees who had already left government and 
were thus in a position to speak their mind more freely. Personal referrals and recommendations are 
invaluable as they help establish the trust necessary to conduct frank, meaningful interviews. In 
addition, once an interview is successfully completed, that person might provide an introduction to 
another potential interviewee who would normally be either “out of reach” (like Airbus CEO Dr. 
Tom Enders) or not even known to me. 
 
That being said, of course, not all information gathered during these as well as my other interviews 
was on-the-record. In fact, virtually none of my interviewees would have felt comfortable having 
our conversations recorded. Therefore, I took hand-written notes during the interviews to capture 
key messages and relevant quotes (which generally had to be authorised prior to their inclusion in 
my thesis). Typically, my interviews would take in the office or personal home of the person 
concerned and would last somewhere between 60 and 75 minutes. For each interview, I prepared a 
list of about ten to twelve key questions that I wanted to ask for sure. Depending on how the 
interview went, I would then adapt my question structure to take the conversation into a new 
direction to gather additional insights, cross-reference information derived from previous 
interviews, etc.339 In that sense, it is important to be flexible, open-minded, and opportunistic about 
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theory-building and theory-testing research. 
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these interviews, primarily to identify – as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously put it – 
“unknown unknowns”.340 
 
As was already pointed out earlier, case study research generally involves the collection and 
analysis of large amounts of information required to reach the necessary intellectual depth to test or 
even build theories. In doing so, researchers have to walk a fine line between the “ever-present 
danger of ‘death by data asphyxation’”341 and the necessity “to become intimately familiar with 
each case as a stand-alone entity”.342 At a minimum, every case study should be based on a detailed 
write-up that describes the context, characteristics, and particular dynamics of the issues under 
review. As Eisenhardt puts it, “These write-ups are often simply pure description, but they are 
central to the generation of insights”.343 By looking at a certain questions from a variety of angles, 
using different methods of data collection, case study researchers increase the probability that they 
generate new insights that previously might simply have been overlooked. 
 
In this context, however, it is also important to reflect on the inherent methodological limitations of 
the case study / interview technique in particular, and of qualitative research in general. First of all, 
the fact that only a certain number of people can generally be interviewed (both because of time and 
space restrictions as well as because not everybody who would be a relevant interview partner is 
actually available for such a conversation) means that the data collection efforts are by definition 
limited. In other words, what about those people who were not interviewed and who might have 
given a rather different account of the A&D mergers under review? After all, there is always the 
risk that the researcher, either consciously or unconsciously, focuses precisely on those 
interviewees that tend to confirm his preconceived notions about the particular issue that is being 
analysed. By the same token, interview partners who offer to provide referrals to relevant 
colleagues and peers (“I think you should definitely talk to so and so…”) might inadvertently steer 
one to the very people who already share their perceptions and / or points of view. While these 
additional interviewees might thus all “fit the picture” and provide information that dovetails nicely 
with the previously gathered insights, the researcher involved does of course run the risk of 
pursuing a self-fulfilling research design; one that delivers just one side of the story. 
 
                                                      
340 During a press briefing on 12 February 2002, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made the following 
statement: “There are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns; that is to 
say, there are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns; there are things we do 
not know we don’t know.” 
341 Eisenhardt (1989) p. 540 
342 The term “death by data asphyxation” was first coined by Andrew Pettigrew in a 1988 paper presented to the 
National Science Foundation. See Ibid., p. 540 
343 Eisenhardt (1989) p. 540 
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Finally, this methodological section also reflects on the nature of proof and the use of evidence in 
qualitative research. In contrast to quantitative research techniques, which essentially rely on 
mathematical formulas and statistical modelling to establish theories and / or to verify hypotheses, 
qualitative research designs are focused on the description and ultimately subjective interpretation 
of the characteristics and particular dynamics of the question under review. 
 
“The key to understanding qualitative research lies with the idea that meaning is socially 
constructed by individuals in interaction with their world. The world, or reality, is not the 
fixed, single, agreed upon, or measurable phenomenon that it is assumed to be in positivist, 
quantitative research. Instead, there are multiple constructions and interpretations of reality 
that are in flux and that change over time. Qualitative researchers are interested in 
understanding what those interpretations are at a particular point in time and in a particular 
context.”344  
 
Given these inherent methodological limitations, qualitative research therefore cannot really 
provide the same type of clear-cut scientific “proof” that one would expect from quantitative 
research / data analysis based on mathematical formulas and statistical modelling, let alone 
experiments in the natural sciences. Rather, as was already pointed out above, the nature of proof 
and the use of evidence in qualitative research are virtually always based on a subjective 
interpretation of the issues under review. For example, as Robert Yin points out with regard to 
“case study attempts to explain a phenomenon”345 (i.e., why did the Americans consolidate their 
A&D industry at a purely national level, with virtually no involvement from other Western allies, 
while the French, Germans, and Spaniards decided to merge their leading national A&D companies 
into EADS?): 
 
“An explanatory case study consists of: (a) an accurate rendition of the facts of the case, (b) 
some consideration of alternative explanations of these facts, and (c) a conclusion based on 
the single explanation that appears most congruent with the facts.”346  
 
As point (b) indicates, qualitative (explanatory) case study research is generally based on the notion 
that a given phenomenon can be potentially accounted for by a variety of explanations. First of all, 
this state of affairs is due to the fact that qualitative case study researchers need to make decisions 
about (1) what types of evidence to consider, and (2) about how much relative weight / importance 
to assign to the different collected data. In fact, given the ever-present threat of “death by data-
asphyxation”, case study researchers are under constant pressure to reduce complexity by limiting 
                                                      
344 Merriam (2002) pp. 3-4 
345 Yin (1981) p. 61 
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the type and / or the amount of evidence admitted in their analysis. It is this very kind of necessary 
and deliberate reduction in complexity that inevitably leads to “multiple constructions […] of 
reality”347 in the case study write-up / narrative. In other words, different researchers working 
independently on the same case study topic are likely to arrive at different descriptions and 
appreciations of the issues under review. 
 
However, it is not only the data collection and reality construction processes that are subjectively 
influenced by the respective researcher’s individual perceptions, experiences, biases, and 
preferences. In addition, and very importantly, there are also “multiple […] interpretations [that is, 
explanations] of reality”.348  Ultimately, the one interpretation that a researcher settles on to account for 
a given phenomenon is the “conclusion based on the single explanation that appears most congruent 
with the facts”.349 In his excellent foreword to Robert Yin’s influential book titled “Case Study 
Research: Design and Methods”, Donald Campbell refers to this reasoning / elimination process as 
the “plausibility-reduction of rival hypotheses”: 
 
“More and more I have come to the conclusion that the core of the scientific method is not 
experimentation per se but the strategy connoted by the phrase ‘plausible rival hypotheses’. 
This strategy may start its puzzle-solving with ‘evidence’ or it may start with ‘hypothesis’. 
Rather than presenting this hypothesis or evidence in the context-independent manner of 
positivistic ‘confirmation’ (or even postpositivistic ‘corroboration’), it is presented instead 
in extended networks of implications that (while never complete) are nonetheless crucial to 
its scientific evaluation. 
This strategy includes […] seeking out rival explanations of the focal evidence and 
examining their plausibility. The plausibility of these rivals is usually reduced by 
‘ramification extinction’, that is, by looking at their implications on other data sets and 
seeing how well these fit.”350 
 
The decision about which explanation / hypothesis / theory fits the case most is of course rather 
subjective and might at times even be perceived as arbitrary, especially when it comes to singular 
event case studies like the BMD and the EADS merger which cannot be replicated. In this context, 
Yin compares the research and reasoning process involved to a crime investigation conducted by a 
detective: 
 
                                                      
347 Merriam (2002) pp. 3-4 
348 Ibid., pp. 3-4 
349 Yin (1981) p. 61 
350 Foreword by Donald T. Campbell in: Yin (1994) p. ix 
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“There are no fixed recipes for building or comparing explanations. An analogous situation 
may be found in doing detective work, where a detective must construct an explanation for a 
crime. […] Presented with the scene of a crime, its description, and possible reports from 
eyewitnesses, the detective must constantly make decisions regarding the relevance of various 
data. Some facts of the case will turn out to be unrelated to the crime; other clues must be 
recognized as such and pursued vigorously. The adequate explanation for the crime then be- 
comes a plausible rendition of a motive, opportunity, and method that more fully accounts for 
the facts than do alternative explanations.”351  
 
Applied to an academic setting, the goal of the researcher (detective) is thus to convince his relevant 
peers (the judge or jury) that his interpretation of the phenomenon is the most appropriate and the 
most congruent with the facts. Of course, in contrast to the legal burden of proof – usually defined 
as “beyond reasonable doubt” as required by the prosecution in most criminal cases within an 
adversarial system – the corresponding academic level of proof does not generally live up to the 
same standard. After all, given the traditional academic freedom of research, scientists are 
essentially free to chose their own “jury of peers” and often do so by associating themselves with a 
certain “school of thought” comprised of fellow academics that share similar core beliefs and 
assumptions about their discipline. In other words, the acceptable levels and types of (qualitative) 
proof in one academic community might differ significantly from the analogous standards in other 
communities. 
 
“The degree of certainty or consensus that the scientific community is able to achieve will 
usually be less in out-of-doors social science, due to the lesser degree of plausibility-
reduction of rival hypotheses that is likely to be achieved. The inability to replicate at will 
(and with variations to rule out specific rivals) is part of the problem. We should use those 
singular event case studies (which can never be replicated) to their fullest, but we should 
also be alert for opportunities to do intentionally replicated case studies.”352 
 
Furthermore, as was pointed out earlier, qualitative research involves “multiple constructions and 
interpretations of reality that are in flux and that change over time”.353 This clear reference to the 
dynamic nature of qualitative research is very important, because it further refines the 
corresponding methodological discussion of the nature of proof and the use of evidence. 
Constructions and interpretations of reality are in flux and can change over time for several reasons. 
First, researchers might discover new data (possibly by using new data collection methods). 
Second, researchers might discard previously used data because of concerns about their relevance, 
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validity, etc. Third, researchers might change the relative weight and importance of the different 
variables under consideration in a given situation. Fourth, researchers might develop a new theory 
to better explain a phenomenon. In qualitative case study research, this kind of theory building / 
theory improvement is often achieved as a result of cross-case analysis. As Yin puts it: 
 
“The craft of detective work again provides an analogous example. Assume that a detective 
has already produced a tentative explanation for a single crime (within-case analysis). Now 
the detective is confronted with another case, where the relevant conditions appear to be 
similar to those of the first case, and where the detective may be able to use the first 
explanation and establish that both crimes were committed by the same person. Modification 
may be necessary in applying the explanation to the second case, and the detective must learn 
to ignore irrelevant variations from case to case. How the detective carries out this work in 
(a) constructing an adequate explanation for each case singly, and (b) knowing the 
acceptable levels of modification in the original explanation as new cases are encountered, 
may be considered analogous to what confronts the researcher in doing cross-case 
analysis.”354  
 
Given these constraints, “proof” in qualitative research is thus much more tenuous compared to the 
findings in quantitative research. Therefore, a qualitative researcher is well advised to refrain from 
making any sweeping statements claiming, for example, that his research “proves” a certain theory 
right or that it “demonstrates” that there is a clear, causal relationship between factors A and B, etc. 
Rather, a qualitative researcher should phrase his findings much more carefully, for example by 
saying that the interpretation of the currently available data (and data collection methods) 
“suggests” that a certain theory is most appropriate to explain a particular phenomenon, or that 
there “appears” to be a causal relationship between A and B. Such a cautious approach is not only 
in line with the nature of proof and the use of evidence in qualitative research, it also demonstrates 
that this method of academic inquiry takes nothing for granted and that the quest for new and better 
insights continues unabatedly. 
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Chapter 3: The Boeing / McDonnell Douglas Merger 
3.1 Scaling back: the post-Cold War downturn in military spending 
 
The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, it describes the post-Cold War downturn in US 
military spending and its effect on the A&D industry. Second, this chapter analyses the efforts by 
the US government to promote national A&D industry consolidation, especially at the prime 
contractor level. Finally, it provides an overview of Boeing and MDC at the time of their 1997 
merger. Building on this chapter and incorporating additional research, chapter 5 will then provide 
an in-depth analysis of the different political and economic forces behind the BMD merger. 
 
US defence spending reached a peak at 6.5 percent of GDP in the mid-1980s – during President 
Reagan’s massive arms build-up – and dropped sharply after the end of the Cold War.355 During the 
1986-1989 period, overall US defence spending peaked at an average of US$356 billion per year.356 
The trough in military spending was reached during 1996-1997, when Washington had reduced the 
Pentagon budget by more than US$100 billion to US$254 billion (3.3 percent of GDP).357 This 
dramatic decline in US military spending also triggered an unprecedented consolidation in the 
American A&D industry. “The defence industry is more concentrated today than at any time in 
more than half a century”.358 Between 1990 and 1998, the number of US prime contractors 
“declined in 10 of the 12 markets DoD identified as important to national security”359. The biggest 
reductions occurred in the aerospace industry, namely in the areas of tactical missiles (2 contractors 
in 1998 vs. 13 in 1990), fixed-wing aircraft (2 vs. 8), expendable launch vehicles (2 vs. 6), and 
satellites (5 vs. 8). US defence industry consolidation was less pronounced in other sectors, such as 
surface ships (5 vs. 8 contractors), tactical wheeled vehicles (4 vs. 6), tracked combat vehicles (2 vs. 
3), strategic missiles (2 vs. 3), torpedoes (2 vs. 3) or rotary wing aircraft (3 vs. 4).360 Between 1990 
and 2002, the number of prime contractors in the US A&D industry came down from 18 to five so-
called mega-primes: Boeing, the world’s biggest A&D company; LMC, the world’s biggest defence 
firm; Raytheon, the world’s biggest missile manufacturer; NGC, a diversified defence conglomerate 
manufacturing reconnaissance aircraft, submarines, aircaft carriers, etc.; and diversified A&D 
conglomerate General Dynamics (GD). See Annex Table 5 for more details. 
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“The [US defence] industrial base inherited from the Cold War included significant excess capacity 
that was purposely maintained to meet national security requirements”361. After the end of the Cold 
War, the US government strongly encouraged America’s defence companies to consolidate 
production facilities and cut excess capacity through M&As to achieve the economies of scale and 
cost savings necessary to remain competitive and financially viable. The sharp reduction in defence 
spending following the Reagan-era military build-up – during which the number of US defence 
contractor employees had jumped from 1.7 million in 1976 to 3.3 million in 1986 – proved to be a 
serious shock with far-reaching repercussions: 
 
“More than two million defence workers, military personnel, and civil servants […] lost 
their jobs. Thousands of firms […] left the industry. More than one hundred military bases 
[…] closed, and the production of weapons is down considerably.”362 
 
A historical analysis of US military procurement and R&D expenditures between 1948 and 1998 
reveals clear boom and bust patterns.363 364 These cycles track closely the shifts in relative military 
threat perceptions over time. During WWII, US defence spending peaked in 1944/1945 at US$753 
billion (39.3 percent of GDP).365 After WWII, the US demobilised at record speed and made drastic 
defence budget cuts. Military spending increased again sharply with the beginning of the Cold War 
in the late 1940s – reaching US$316 billion (14.5 percent of GDP) in 1953366 – and then dropped 
significantly after the end of the Korean War that same year. American defence expenditures 
continued to decline (small hikes notwithstanding) until the early 1960s, when rising superpower 
tensions over Cuba and Vietnam triggered massive investments in military (missile and space) 
technology programs. In 1968, US defence spending reached US$358 billion (9.6 percent of 
GDP).367 Subsequently, defence expenditures declined again until the late 1970s, when the 1979 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and President Reagan’s election in 1980 triggered a major boost in 
US military spending. At the height of Reagan’s aggressive efforts to push the “Evil Empire” over 
the brink and into the dust bin of history (through SDI368 and other initiatives), total US defence 
spending reached 6.5 percent of GDP in 1986. Despite sharp increases in the Pentagon budget 
following the 9-11 attacks, current annual American military expenditures – projected to reach 
US$708 billion in FY2011369 including operations in Iraq and Afghanistan – amount to only about 
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4.7 percent of GDP. Yet even at these comparatively low levels of relative military spending, 
America still spends more on its national defence than the next twenty countries combined. 
 
During the three Cold War military boom cycles (Korea, Vietnam, Reagan-era), privately-owned 
American A&D companies heavily expanded their production and R&D capacities to respond to 
rising government demand. During the ensuing bust cycles, however, these firms cut less capacity 
than they had previously built up.370 
 
 “Even at the Cold War low points, outlays for R&D and defence procurement were 
sufficient to keep the defence industry focused on military rather than commercial markets 
[…]. During the cyclical downturns, the government closed the [government-owned] 
arsenals, shifting more business to private sector contractors, who were more politically 
influential than the managers and employees of the public facilities.”371 
 
Defence procurement is a highly political business, driven both by external threat perceptions and 
domestic lobbying efforts (targeted primarily at the legislative branch) led by the defence industry. 
Talking about lobbying, it is important to recognize that “the right to petition the government for 
redress of grievances” is enshrined in the US Constitution’s First Amendment. In the case of 
Senators and Congressmen, lobbying is not only the process through which special interest actors 
(i.e., trade associations, unions, companies) make their voices heard, but also how the elected 
officials on Capitol Hill interact with their constituents. That being said, legislative lobbying efforts 
by corporate actors related to defence procurement are often both particularly sensitive and 
effective as they involve millions if not billions of dollars worth of business with direct 
repercussions on jobs and capital investments for voters back home. 
 
In America, the crucial importance of money and the weakness of the party system have forced 
Members of Congress to constantly raise new funds and to run for re-election as the defender of his 
home district, its companies and their workers. The configuration of America’s political system has 
therefore provided lobbyists and industry associations much greater influence in Congress than in 
the finance-limited and party-controlled parliamentary systems of Europe. Furthermore, the 
separation of powers has enabled Congress repeatedly to block or delay administration preferences 
with regard to US defence acquisition programmes. In the late 1980s, then-Defense Secretary 
Cheney tried to “kill” the V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft after the projected development costs had 
skyrocketed from US$2.5 billion to US$30 billion. He was overruled by Congress, where 
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influential Members were determined to keep this multi-billion dollar procurement programme and 
the associated jobs in their home districts alive. 
 
“After more than two decades and $16.4 billion, the history of the V-22 is a sorry tale of 
cost overruns, shoddy construction, and managerial incompetence. Thirty people have died 
in four Osprey crashes, making the V-22 one of the killingest experimental planes ever. The 
program has teetered on the brink of elimination since almost the beginning. But it never 
went away, propped up by genuine need, pork barrel politics, and the hope that the money 
already spent wasn’t money wasted.”372 
 
In June 2009 – two months after US Defense Secretary Gates had called for the termination of the 
F-22 program by FY2011 (capping production at 187 aircraft) in favour of the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF) – the House and Senate Armed Services Committees allocated an additional 
US$368.1 million and US$1.75 billion, respectively, to the Pentagon defence authorisation bill to 
procure more F-22s and keep the production lines “hot.” President Obama, who decried this 
additional F-22 funding as an “inexcusable waste of money”373, threatened to veto his own defence 
budget and launched a Congressional lobbying campaign to ensure that his government’s defence 
procurement priorities prevail on Capitol Hill. The Obama administration’s massive push-back 
succeeded and in July 2009, the Senate voted 58-40 to defeat the F-22 funding amendment. “This is 
the first case in recent years when Congress, the defence industry and the dissident voices in the 
military haven’t been able to prevail in a contest with a Defense secretary over the fate of a 
weapons program”.374 375 However, there is also a more intriguing interpretation of the F-22 
episode: 
 
“Why is it that the Obama administration, the defence industry, and Congress have all lined 
up against the F-22 – a plane with known costs and capabilities – in favour of a plane that 
may cost more and offer less? Why isn’t Lockheed pushing to repeal the export ban on the 
F-22? For that matter, why did Lockheed stop lobbying the Hill for continued production of 
the F-22 once the Gates budget came out? And why did Lockheed request that Boeing – the 
junior partner on the F-22, responsible for about a third of the aircraft’s production – cease 
its own lobbying campaign on behalf of the aircraft? There is one obvious explanation for 
all of this: The military-industrial complex stands to make a lot more money off the F-35 
than it could from the F-22. And Boeing is not a Lockheed partner on the F-35. So once the 
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F-22 production line closes, Boeing will be out of the fighter business entirely, leaving 
Lockheed the US government’s only supplier of fighter aircraft.”376 
 
As lobbyist Jed Babbin – a former Pentagon official in the George H.W. Bush administration – 
summed up his work on Capitol Hill: “Money meant access, and access meant influence. Political 
campaign contributions were the currency of access.”377 The offering or solicitation of campaign 
contributions in exchange for a Member’s specific legislative action (i.e., to support or defeat a 
certain bill, etc.) certainly constitutes corruption and is illegal. That being said, it is clear that 
Senators and Congressmen do pay close attention to the needs and concerns of major (defence) 
firms located in their districts and will often steer procurement business to them. Defence lobbyists 
are especially eager to cultivate close ties with the chairmen and ranking members of relevant 
committees such as Armed Services or Appropriations in an effort to advance specific procurement 
projects. In a legislative branch operating on the principle of seniority, these key members are “Old 
Bulls” with “decades of service and around whom had grown a hard shell of power and influence. 
And money.”378 379 
 
A&D companies have a long history of over-promising and under-delivering when it comes to the 
procurement of new defence systems.380 “The US defence procurement system has effectively 
become a liar’s contest in terms of projected costs, risk, performance, and delivery schedules.”381 
One lobbying scandal erupted in 1982, when the GAO382 determined that officials from the US Air 
Force (USAF) and the OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) along with representatives from 
Lockheed and other defence (sub-)contractors made “an extensive and cooperative effort […] to 
influence [House Members] and later the House and Senate conferees, on the proposed US$10 
billion procurement of the C-5B “Galaxy” strategic lift aircraft”383. The lobbying campaign was 
triggered by opposition to the programme in the Senate and the House, both of which had voted 
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against the Pentagon’s C-5B procurement authorization and instead “authorized the procurement of 
new and used commercial wide-body cargo aircraft” to meet military airlift needs – thus favouring 
rival Boeing. The lobbying effort – which involved lobbyists working for Lockheed and relevant 
sub-contractors – was “initiated, organized, and directed”384 by senior Pentagon officials and the 
GAO established that “material, but undeterminable, amounts of appropriated and Government 
resources were [illegally] spent for the purpose of influencing this procurement authorization 
measure”385. 
 
The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed the West’s defence and security environment. 
With the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union gone, much of the US and European defence 
industries’ “economic distinctiveness” vanished as well:386 
 
 “[T]he defence industry has to an extent lost its singular character among manufacturing 
industries of having to attend mainly to very special technical requirements specified by 
military demand without a compelling attention to the costs incurred”387. 
 
As a result of this post-Cold War “normalisation”, US and European defence companies could no 
longer automatically rely on lucrative “cost-plus” procurement contracts to obtain specified and 
guaranteed profits irrespective of their own corporate cost structure. Furthermore, it became 
increasingly difficult for companies with military and civilian operations to use relatively steady 
profits from the defence side to cross-subsidise R&DP for commercial applications. “Such financial 
spill-over – in effect, cross-subsidy – has for a long time probably been much more significant than 
the technology spill-over from defence-related to civilian industrial activities.”388 It is important to 
emphasise this link in the defence / civil aerospace relationship since Boeing’s desire to balance its 
cyclical commercial aircraft business with MDC’s less cyclical military aircraft division was a 
crucial driver behind the BMD merger. EADS, in contrast, is at a competitive disadvantage since 
the European company derives most of its turnover and profits from the commercial (Airbus) 
division. 
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3.2 Corporate strategies to deal with the post-Cold War downturn in defence spending 
 
A&D companies could choose among different strategies to cope with the sharp post-Cold War 
downturn and the related military “procurement holiday”. The first corporate strategy was one of 
“market exit”389: companies divested of defence operations to concentrate on their core civilian 
business units. In the US, a number of diversified industrial companies like General Electric (GE), 
Ford, and General Motors (GM) made that choice.390 The second corporate strategy aimed at 
“achieving greater economies of scale and scope”391, namely through horizontal and vertical 
mergers with other defence companies, as well as the acquisition of defence operations from those 
companies seeking to exit the market. Consolidation through M&As also promised access to new 
markets and additional clout when negotiating with suppliers or government procurement 
agencies.392 The third corporate strategy, dubbed “integration with civilian industry”393, aimed at 
leveraging potential synergies between defence and civilian operations. In particular, companies 
were trying to identify spin-on and spin-off possibilities by increasing the use of civilian or dual-use 
technologies and production processes in their defence equipment and / or by deriving commercial 
applications from defence-related products. This last strategy promised to allow defence companies 
to weather the “procurement holiday” by (partly) reversing the direction of the long-standing cross-
subsidisation from defence to commercial products. The end of the Cold War created hyped 
expectations for a swift conversion of the defence industry from military to commercial 
applications. The Clinton administration launched a multi-billion dollar Technology Reinvestment 
Programme (TRP) to support the conversion and diversification efforts of US A&D companies. 
However, despite a high degree of integration and overlap between the commercial and military 
sectors within the aerospace industry – the technology base, much of the supplier base, and the 
skills and processes used were essentially common – virtually all of the post-Cold War defence 
conversion experiments failed as defence companies found it very difficult to adapt from the 
demands of slow-moving bureaucratic government procurement to the fast-paced, intense 
competitive pressures of the private sector. While defence companies relied on “cost-plus” contracts 
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that put a premium on high performance and state-of-the-art technology (with little or no regard to 
the costs and R&D / production lead times / delays involved), they suddenly had to deal with an 
environment in which cost and timely delivery of products were crucial factors in winning and 
retaining customers. Ultimately, defence conversion efforts were often a disappointment since the 
profound differences between doing business with the government and doing business with the 
private sector proved too difficult to overcome. 
 
While A&D companies frequently pursued a combination of the three strategic options outlined 
above, they often also tried a fourth option to compensate for the loss of US defence spending: 
“gaining new export markets abroad”. Conversion and diversification efforts became less and less 
relevant as A&D companies began pushing hard to find new customers abroad. During the Cold 
War, advanced US weapons sales were often driven by political and military-strategic 
considerations, notably to support allied governments against the Soviet Union and its proxies.394 
395 396 After the Cold War, economic factors began to play a much bigger role in the review of arms 
exports permits.397 398 In America, defence contractors successfully lobbied the Clinton 
administration to relax export restrictions by arguing that crucial yet expensive production lines and 
technological expertise could only be kept “hot” by producing for markets abroad. However, apart 
                                                      
394 American companies lobbied hard for defence sales to Europe (e.g., the 1975 “sale of the century”) even when 
successive US governments were trying to promote a transatlantic “two-way street” to encourage the European allies to 
spend more on military procurement through gaining a greater share in its production. 
395 “[F]rom the early 1960s to the late 1980s, the global arms traffic was largely governed by the competitive practices 
of Washington and Moscow. [...] In their pursuit of Third World allies, the superpowers concentrated their arms-supply 
activities in a number of major areas considered pivotal to the global correlation of forces – most notably the Middle 
East, South Asia, and East Asia. As a result, the bulk of the weapons transferred internationally during this period was 
delivered to a number of key states in each of these regions, including Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, and the two Koreas. Together, these key states (along with 
favoured allies Cuba and Vietnam) accounted for some three-quarters of all arms transfers during this period. In seeking 
to maintain their friendly ties with these states, moreover, the superpowers provided them with major combat systems – 
tanks, fighter planes, missiles, and so forth – of increasing sophistication, thus generating the high dollar values for 
global arms transfers in the late 1970s and the 1980s.” […] US and Soviet arms accounted for 65 percent of the total 
worldwide weapons traffic in 1972-1988 (when measured in dollars), while those provided by all NATO and Warsaw 
Pact countries combined accounted for about 90 percent of the traffic during this period.” Klare (1996) pp. 857-858; 
857 
396 The Cold War paradigm of arms trafficking can be summarised as follows: “(1) the overwhelming dominance of the 
two superpowers (and their respective allies) over the global arms flow; (2) the primacy of ideological and geopolitical 
factors in determining the recipients of arms; (3) the emergence and acceleration of regional arms rivalries in key Third 
World areas; and (4) a preference, on the part of leading recipients, for transfers of sophisticated front-line combat 
systems.” Ibid., p. 858 
397 The post-Cold War paradigm of arms trafficking can be summarised as follows: “(1) the unrivalled dominance of the 
[US] in the global arms traffic; (2) the primacy of economic (as against ideological and geopolitical) motives for arms 
exports; (3) the emergence of new arms rivalries in East Asia and the expansion of existing markets in a number of 
other areas; (4) a focus on internal (as against external) defence in the selection of arms by many states; (5) the growing 
salience in the arms trade of sectarian militias, insurgent groups, black-market dealers, and other non-state actors.” 
Ibid., p. 859 
398 “During the Cold War, the [US] did not consider that arms sales contributed to defence industry viability and placed 
little emphasis on the domestic impact of export decisions. From 1990, however, Washington began to attach greater 
importance to the economic value of defence exports. In February 1995, a presidential directive made strengthening the 
domestic defence industry one of the five main goals of US conventional-arms-transfer policy.” Grant (1997) p. 113 
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from potentially aggravating military tensions around the world, liberal arms export policies also 
increase the risk that Western weapons technologies fall into the hands of hostile regimes or 
terrorists and could be used for attacks against America and its allies. This post-Cold War “US 
export offensive”399 also put American A&D companies in fierce competition with their European 
counterparts, prompting senior French officials to accuse Washington of trying to “eliminate” 
Europe’s defence industrial base.400 
 
America’s status as the sole post-Cold War superpower provided its A&D companies with geo-
strategic and technological advantages over their European competitors. First, geo-strategically 
speaking – given America’s global preponderance – third countries in Eastern Europe Asia, etc. 
would often prefer to buy US over European weapons in an effort to cement ties with Washington 
and to gain “the implicit sympathetic [US] involvement in [their] security affairs that usually goes 
with such contracts”401. In contrast to the 800-pound American super gorilla, “the EU countries […] 
[were] obviously still lacking an important, often decisive selling point of any major arms exporter: 
the ability credibly to project military power and provide security cover beyond their immediate 
sphere of influence”402.403 BAe / BAE Systems’s Al-Yamamah contracts – first brokered between 
the UK and Saudi governments in 1985 with follow-on arrangements in 1988 and 2006 – is 
probably the only example of a European company striking a multi-billion dollar defence deal with 
a major non-European US ally.404 405 Second, technologically speaking, US weapons systems were 
                                                      
399 van Scherpenberg (1997) p. 104 
400 “Europeans have felt disadvantaged by this heightened competition with the US over weapons exports, because of 
the far larger domestic base from which US companies operate and a perceived undervaluation of the dollar. The US 
export drive fuelled European feelings, above all in France, that the US was deliberately attempting to ‘eliminate’ 
Europe's defence-industrial base.” Grant (1997) p. 114. The “elimination” charge was made by Yves Sillard, France’s 
defence acquisition chief during 1989-1993. 
401 van Scherpenberg (1997) p. 105 
402 Ibid., p. 105 
403 During 1987-1990, Washington and Paris accounted for 21 and 6 percent, respectively, of all global arms transfers to 
Third World countries (totalling US$190 billion in constant 1994 dollars). During 1991-1994, the two countries 
captured 48 and 21 percent, respectively, of that same market segment (totalling US$106 billion). US exports increased 
from US$40.8 billion to US$50.7 billion during these time periods whereas France nearly doubled its exports from 
US$11.9 billion to US$22.4 billion. The UK’s export share dropped from 15 percent during 1987-1990 to 5 percent 
during 1991-1994. Germany increased its share from 2 to 3 percent. Klare (1996) p. 861. French arms appealed 
especially to those countries looking for an alternative to US weapons. “There is a sound reason for keeping a healthy, 
if somewhat inferior, European defence industry producing locally designed goods. For example, [Washington] clearly 
wishes to wean the Egyptians away from Soviet arms, but cannot (or will not) provide them with large numbers of 
sophisticated aircraft. It is desirable, in that case, that they buy Jaguars and Mirage, which will have a lesser impact on 
Israel air superiority.” Cohen (1978) p. 89 
404 The Al-Yamamah 1 and 2 contracts totalled GBP42 billion. The Al-Yamamah 3 contract totalled GBP10 billion. 
Gribben (2006) 
405 Saudi Arabia decided not to buy military hardware from America for fear that pro-Israel Members of Congress 
would either block such a defence deal or would impose significant usage restrictions on any exported US aircraft. The 
Reagan administration supported the Al-Yamamah deals as they strengthened the Saudi military at a time of rising Gulf 
tensions and allowed Prime Minister Thatcher to secure the country’s biggest export contract ever. Hoewever, in the 
run-up to the 2006 Al-Yamamah 3 Eurofighter deal, there was lots of competition by US and French companies trying 
to sell planes to Riyadh. “BAE and the [UK] Government have been accommodating [the Saudis], helping to fight off 
competition from American and French rivals wanting to dip into the Saudi defence honey pot. They have benefited 
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often more advanced than those of their European competitors, and therefore also more appealing to 
potential buyers.406 “[F]or the [US], technological superiority is a conditio sine qua non of its 
military strategy”407. From a geo-strategic and technological perspective, “the Persian Gulf War [of 
1991] was great advertising for US weapons”408. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
from a regime anxious to avoid becoming too dependent on American suppliers and technology and risk being hit by an 
Israeli-influenced embargo as well as a fruitful 20-year [Saudi-UK defence] relationship.” Ibid. 
406 “Nations that seek the latest in military technology – and that possess the necessary funds or credits – have tended to 
acquire US weapons whenever possible.” Klare (1996) p. 862 
407 van Scherpenberg (1997) p. 106 
408 Pearlstein (1991) 
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3.3 “The Last Supper”: how the US government promoted and constrained aerospace and 
defence industry consolidation in the United States 
 
President Clinton was elected at a time of wide-spread unease and doubts about America’s 
industrial and technological competitiveness. In the 1980s, the US had experienced huge budget 
deficits, massive job losses and a steep decline in the dollar. In the early 1990s, Japan and a re-
unified Germany were expected to translate their (“soft”) industrial and technological power into 
(“hard”) political and military power. Therefore, US political pundits and public opinion feared a 
decline in America’s relative international economic as well as politico-military power position as 
an emboldened Japan and Germany were no longer limited by the constraints of the Cold War order 
and decided to pursue independent national foreign and security policies. In response to these 
perceived challenges, Bill Clinton and his team – probably more than any other administration in 
US history – put a heavy emphasis on economic security when defining their country’s national 
security strategy. In his 1993 “Report on The Bottom-Up Review: Forces For A New Era”, then-
Defense Secretary Les Aspin even argues that the “armed forces […] can play a significant role in 
[addressing] economic dangers to our national security”.409 “Linking military dominance with an 
aggressive pursuit of economic interest has since become a core element of the US economic policy 
agenda.”410 
 
Starting in 1993, the Clinton administration began a systematic push for greater consolidation in the 
American A&D industry. Given sharply reduced defence budgets, the overriding challenge for US 
policymakers was to ensure that military contractors remained active in all key weapons areas – 
both to produce current systems and to develop new ones. While the Bush Senior administration 
embraced “laissez-faire economics” and was opposed to any direct government actions to promote 
consolidation in the US A&D industrial base, the Clinton administration decided to change course 
soon after taking office. On 22 July 1993, US Defense Secretary Les Aspin invited 15 CEOs from 
America’s leading A&D companies for dinner to discuss the Pentagon’s plans for greater industry 
consolidation with Deputy Defence Secretary Bill Perry and Under Secretary for Technology and 
Acquisition John Deutch. Perry underlined the Pentagon’s concerns about the massive 
overcapacities plaguing the US defence industry. After the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon could 
                                                      
409 “The final – and in the post-Cold War period, perhaps most important – set of dangers that US strategy must 
confront is economic. In recent years, the U.S. economy has been plagued by an enormous and growing federal debt, 
sluggish growth, inadequate job creation, and a large trade imbalance. Further, our growing dependence on imported 
petroleum constitutes an economic danger of its own. The [Pentagon] can help address these economic dangers. DoD 
can help America seize the opportunity presented by the end of the Cold War to enhance its economic security. We 
must stress the productive reinvestment of defence resources, facilities, and technology into the civilian economy. 
Placing new emphasis on key technologies – information and manufacturing technologies and advanced materials – will 
help strengthen both the military and civilian sectors.” DoD (1993) 
410 van Scherpenberg (1997) p. 108 
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no longer afford to maintain several independent defence manufacturers for each major weapons 
platform. Perry and Deutch “[made] it abundantly clear the [DoD] was not going to solve industry’s 
overcapacity problem – that would be up to those in the audience”.411 However, Perry and Deutch 
assured the CEOs that “the DoD would strongly support industry consolidation and approve 
financial arrangements that benefited companies as long as they also significantly benefited the 
government”.412 
 
The day before, Deutch spelled out the Pentagon’s pro-consolidation merger strategy to “[promote] 
the rational downsizing of the defence industry”413. A&D companies were now allowed to include 
the restructuring costs (plant modifications, equipment relocation, severance pay and retraining 
costs)414 incurred as a result of M&As in the reimbursable cost base of their cost-plus contracts – 
provided that the consolidation process created long-term net procurement savings for the 
Pentagon.415 416 The Deutch memo was a direct response to lobbying pressures exerted by the CEOs 
of Martin Marietta, Lockheed, Loral and Hughes on Defense Secretary Perry.417 Otherwise, they 
argued, their companies would not be able to reap the rewards of post-merger integration savings 
since profits would remain constant given the fixed-price-contract nature of the defence business. 
LMC Chairman Norman Augustine claimed in 1994 that his company would not have made its 
acquisitions without DoD merger aid.418 By reimbursing the defence companies for part of their 
merger costs, the Pentagon aimed to create a win-win situation where corporate players are 
financially encouraged to generate synergies and savings through M&A transactions which would, 
in turn, benefit US taxpayers in the form of lower procurement spending (“more bang for the 
buck”). The “DoD provided significant direct and indirect subsidies to merging companies, an 
action that accelerated the merger and consolidation movement [during 1993-1996]”419. 
 
The Pentagon’s pro-merger policy was also sharply criticised. First, as Larry Korb pointed out, 
“like Mark Twain’s death, the decline of the defence industry in this country has been greatly 
exaggerated”420. Inflation-adjusted annual US defence spending in the mid-1990s was still about 
US$30 billion higher than in 1975. Using 1985, the height of the Reagan arms build-up as the 
                                                      
411 Augustine (2006) 
412 Ibid. 
413 Quoted in Korb (1996) 
414 Oden (1999) p. 81 
415 Defence contractors often sign cost-plus contracts with the government: the MoD reimburses the R&DP costs for 
weapons systems (which can vary significantly due to long development and production cycles and are therefore not 
fixed ahead of time to protect companies against excessive commercial risks) plus a fixed profit for the contractors. 
416 The merger subsidies did not apply to “fixed-price” contracts. 
417 Korb (1996) 
418 Mintz (1994) 
419 Oden (1999) p. 81 
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baseline year, clearly distorted the relative fluctuations of American defence spending over time. 
The bottom-line? “Defence is still a profitable business.”421 Second, taxpayer money should not be 
used to subsidise M&A transactions. Defence companies need to decide for themselves whether any 
given deal makes good business sense or not. Third, market forces, not Pentagon bureaucrats should 
determine the shape of the US defence industry. “While government shouldn’t discourage 
restructuring, it should stay at arm’s length.”422 Fourth, previous defence mergers did not yield the 
claimed procurement savings for the Pentagon.423 In fact, Deutch’s memo allowed defence 
contractors to bill the Pentagon in advance for projected future cost savings; a risky strategy given 
the uncertainties of the defence business. Finally, the Pentagon’s merger aid also sparked a backlash 
on Capitol Hill, where several Congressmen from those districts that lost jobs as a result of the 
DoD-promoted defence consolidation process convinced the House to pass a bill in early March 
1997 prohibiting the Pentagon to treat restructuring costs in connection with defence M&As as 
allowable costs in (“cost-plus”) defence contracts.424 The Senate, however, failed to follow suit and 
the provision did not become law.425 
 
John Deutch defended his pro-merger memo by arguing (1) that it merely “clarified” existing US 
laws and regulations and did not depart from previous government policy; (2) that the memo would 
be indispensable to allow for the consolidation and rationalisation of the American A&D industry; 
and (3) that it would ultimately save American taxpayers billions of dollars due to lower Pentagon 
acquisition costs.426 Interestingly, Deutch did not discuss his memo with the US military or 
Congress, which only found out about it nine months later when Martin Marietta attempted to re-
coup US$60 million of the US$200 million it had paid for GD’s space division from the 
Pentagon.427 Even strong supporters of the Deutch memo, including the Aerospace Industries 
Association, considered it a departure from existing government policy and were pushing the 
Pentagon to formally announce the policy change in the US Federal Register. Secretary Perry later 
conceded that the Pentagon should have received a green light from Congress before implementing 
the new policy.428 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
420 Korb (1996) 
421 Ibid. 
422 Ibid. 
423 Neither the GAO nor the DoD could verify Hughes Aircraft’s claim that the acquisition of GD’s missile division 
saved the Pentagon US$600 million. Ibid. 
424 Mintz (1994) 
425 Ibid. 
426 Oden (1999) 
427 Korb (1996) 
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The fact that there are no official figures reflecting the total cost of the Pentagon’s consolidation-
related subsidies to US defence companies during 1993-1996 raises red flags for those concerned 
about the non-transparent, behind-the-scenes power and influence exerted by the military-industrial 
complex. Korb estimates that LMC alone obtained US$1 billion in DoD merger support. By mid-
1996, the Pentagon had received about 30 aid requests from merging defence companies.429 Based 
on Korb’s US$1 billion LMC price tag, Oden estimates that the total amount of Pentagon merger 
aid could be in the US$3 billion to US$5 billion range.430 US defence companies also received 
government export subsidies worth between US$5 billion to US$7 billion annually431; a move 
which helped America regain its position as the world’s leading arms exporters in 1996. In contrast, 
the Pentagon paid only US$643 million to defence companies during 1993-1995 as part of the TRP 
dual-use technology development effort.432 
 
The Clinton administration’s merger strategy boiled down to the “Noah’s Ark approach to 
industrial policy: two makers of everything the [DoD] needs.”433 434 However, while the massive 
US defence consolidation in the 1990s led to a drastic reduction in the number of prime contractors, 
overall defence industrial capacity remained almost unchanged.435 “The most obvious interpretation 
of this murky process is that the DoD’s main concern is keeping capacity in weapons production 
and design.”436 By fostering the creation of mega-primes, the US government made it possible for 
these often highly diversified companies to keep less profitable production lines “hot” through 
cross-subsidisation from more lucrative defence / business units. 
 
“There are, therefore, strong reasons to believe that maintaining production and 
development capability was more important than cost savings in prompting the permissive 
[US] government stance towards mergers.”437 
 
Realist security concerns and corporate lobbying efforts targeted at Members of Congress eager to 
save A&D jobs in their districts thus trumped liberal economic concerns about realising potential 
cost-savings. However, the massive consolidation of the US A&D industry resulting in a few mega-
                                                      
429 Ibid. 
430 Oden (1999) p. 81 
431 Ibid., p. 84. 
432 Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (2004) 
433 (Crock, Schine, & Borrus, 1996) 
434 In support of their “Noah’s Ark” approach, Pentagon leaders pointed to the US aircraft engine market, where GE and 
P&W fiercely competed for DoD contracts. Gansler (2006) p. 12 
435 LMC manufactures F-22s in Georgia and F-35s in Texas. Boeing still has production facilities in Washington, 
Missouri, and California. Gansler (2006) p. 15. On the political and economic impediments to the consolidation and 
conversion of the defence industry, see (Gholz & Sapolsky, 1999/2000). 
436 Oden (1999) p. 84 
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primes also raised alarm, especially among those managing the Pentagon’s procurement budget and 
the DoJ438 / FTC439 anti-trust watchers. In 1997, the Clinton administration abandoned its pro-
merger policy to maintain a certain degree of competition and to prevent the creation of harmful 
monopolies. The potential shift of market power from buyers (governments) to sellers (A&D 
companies) is a major public policy risk associated with large-scale industry consolidation leading 
to duo- or monopolies. Specifically, defence experts feared that “the West could end up with a 
small set of very large, very powerful, and not very competitive defence firms, favouring the 
maintenance of Cold War thinking and technologies.”440 This quote is an explicit acknowledgment 
of the A&D sector’s significant political influence vis-à-vis their respective national 
governments.441 
 
Neither monopolies nor duopolies are generally conducive to fostering technological breakthroughs 
as the dominant companies are often reluctant to embrace radical change for fear of losing their 
existing government contracts. The industry structure most prone to technological innovation is 
characterised by two incumbents and a well-financed “challenger” that forces the established 
players to remain on the edge.442 An industry structure with many small players is not advisable 
either as R&D subsidies are spread too thin among too many companies, each of which is lacking 
the necessary “critical mass” to achieve major technological breakthroughs.443 
 
A key question is how the gains derived from A&D industry consolidation are divided between 
taxpayers (through cheaper, more capable weapons) and shareholders (through higher profits). One 
of the main arguments in favour of defence mergers is that they create efficiencies that will 
ultimately benefit the consumer, i.e. the government. This is the same yardstick applied by 
American anti-trust law, which puts the interests of consumers above those of producers by 
allowing for the creation of very efficient companies, even at the expense of reducing competition. 
US anti-trust officials have generally taken a benign view of mergers that drive out weaker and less 
competitive firms, provided that the efficiency gains ultimately benefit the customers. In principle, 
mergers are only blocked if they cause a “substantial lessening of competition” allowing the 
merging firms or post-merger market participants to exercise “market power” (either unilaterally or 
                                                      
438 DoJ = Department of Justice 
439 FTC = Federal Trade Commission 
440 (Markusen & Costigan, 1999) p. 29 
441 “During the Cold War, the high level of perceived threat placed a premium on military expertise, which checked the 
contractors’ political influence. Now, without the Soviet threat, contractors have too much influence over defence 
procurement decisions” (Gholz & Sapolsky, 1999/2000) pp. 16 
442 Pearlstein (1997) 
443 Ibid. 
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in coordination with each other) to increase prices; lower product quantity, quality or service levels, 
or to reduce technological innovation in the relevant product and / or geographical markets.444 
 
The objective of EU “competition policy” is to establish “a system ensuring that competition in the 
internal market is not distorted”.445 Regarding M&As, the aim is to block “a concentration which 
creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it is significantly impeded”.446 447 These transatlantic anti-trust law 
differences have repeatedly led to major economic and political tensions between Washington and 
Brussels, not least over the BMD merger. Americans view the EC’s restrictive anti-trust approach 
as an attempt to shield Europe’s companies from globalisation, particularly US competition. 
Europeans, in turn, charge that Washington is lax about anti-trust enforcement to allow US 
companies to become dominant global players, which, ultimately, would also threaten the survival 
of their European competitors. “Where Americans see tough competition, Europe sees unfair 
competition.”448 
 
LMC’s US$11.6 billion NGC take-over attempt, announced in July 1997, was an important turning 
point in the US government’s permissive A&D merger policy.449 The LMC bid was clearly driven 
by the BMD merger, which had just received US anti-trust approval.450 To allay DoJ fears of an 
even bigger LMC dominating the defence market, Norman Augustine argued that his company was 
a “merchant buyer and merchant supplier” that buys from and sells to its competitors.451 He also 
emphasised that “size alone is not a factor in anti-trust” and asked regulators to analyse LMC’s 
competitive position “market by market”.452 
 
In March 1998, DoJ and DoD decided against the LMC / NGC deal since it would reduce A&D 
competition to unacceptable levels. According to Jacques Gansler, the merger was blocked because 
of concerns about the anti-competitive effects of vertical integration – with NGC serving as a key 
subcontractor to Boeing and LMC – rather than horizontal integration.453 454 The Clinton 
                                                      
444 FTC (24 July 1997) 
445 Article 3(g), EC Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty repealed this provision. A new legally-binding Protocol on Internal 
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administration’s volte-face took many business leaders by surprise and brought the “merger mania” 
that had gripped the US A&D industry after the end of the Cold War to an abrupt end.455 
                                                      
455 “The ‘Last Supper’ in the early 1990s ushered in a period of industry consolidation, and the disapproval of the [LMC 
/ NGC] transaction in the late 1990s was accompanied by statements from senior [government] leaders that further top-
level consolidation would be more difficult. Since that time, however, DoD has not given any top-level guidance.” 
Bialos (2009) vol. II, p. 646 
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3.4 The race to scale: US aerospace and defence industry consolidation after the Cold War 
 
“[T]he most powerful DoD actions [in response to the post Cold-War downturn] by far were 
directed at supporting and subsidising merger and consolidation in the defence industry”456. Even 
before the Clinton administration began to promote A&D consolidation, US companies had already 
embarked on a path toward an ethnocentrically-concentrated defence industrial base.457 An analysis 
of key M&As in the American defence industry during 1989-1996 – after the end of the Cold War 
but before the BMD merger – demonstrates that “this merger movement, involving predominantly 
defence versus commercial acquisitions, did accelerate significantly through 1993 [the year of the 
Clinton administration’s first BUR] and culminated in a series of mega-mergers in 1994, 1995, and 
1996”458: In 1991, the total M&A volume in the US defence industry amounted to US$300 million; 
by 1993, that figure skyrocketed to US$14.2 billion; and in 1996, the value of defence M&As 
topped US$20 billion.459 It is important to emphasise that virtually all of these US transactions were 
based on ethnocentric consolidation, not international integration. 
 
The US A&D industrial consolidation process can be divided into several “waves”:460 1st wave: 
M&A activity involving top-tier manufacturers (Boeing, MDC, Lockheed, etc.) leading to the 
creation of mega-primes; 2nd wave: M&A activity involving lower-tier suppliers (Loral, Hughes 
Electronics, etc.); 3rd wave: post-merger integration / rationalisation within the “new”, bigger 
primes and suppliers, notably through restructuring, cost and job cuts, divestitures, etc. Many 
industry experts also anticipated a fourth “wave” involving major transatlantic M&As between US 
and European companies, though the exact timeline for such unprecedented moves was seen as very 
uncertain.461 
 
The first of the major “pure play” defence M&A deals that would eventually lead to the creation of 
several US mega-primes took place in 1994, just one year after the famous “Last Supper”.462 In 
April 1994, defence electronics maker Grumman accepted a US$2.17 billion hostile “market 
extension” takeover bid by rival Northrop. Having failed in two previous takeover attempts, 
Northrop CEO Kresa indicated that his company “was under pressure to make an acquisition or face 
being swallowed by another military contractor”463 – a clear reflection of the “conquer-or-perish 
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ethic”464 that dominated the thinking of A&D executives in the 1990s. The biggest “pure play” 
defence link-up was announced in August 1994, when Lockheed and Martin Marietta declared their 
intention to engineer a US$10 billion “merger of equals”. Lockheed and Martin Marietta were the 
second and third largest US defence contractors with 1993 sales of about US$13.2 billion and 
US$9.4 billion, respectively.465 LMC posted 1994 revenues of US$23.5 billion, replacing MDC 
(US$13.2 billion turnover) as the world’s #1 defence contractor. Boeing had 1994 sales of US$21.3 
billion and remained the world’s biggest (civilian) aerospace company.466 
 
There were four strategic implications of the LMC merger for the rest of the US A&D industry:467 
First, “consolidation is far from over and the LMC merger is graphic evidence of the direction in 
which the industry is headed”; second, “more mega-mergers could take place during the next year 
or two, with some industry officials convinced that they are inevitable”; third, “the more pro-active 
management’s strategy, the greater the potential rewards”; and fourth, “pressure to become active in 
the consolidation process will increase enormously, […] [and] companies that have remained on the 
sidelines will feel the increased competitive [cost] pressure most”.468 In retrospect, all of these 
predictions turned out to be true. The consolidation process intensified and weak, less competitive 
firms were generally either bought up or exited the market altogether. In that sense, the LMC deal 
was just a prelude to the industry’s biggest-ever merger involving Boeing and MDC. As to the 
“21st century “end game” – that is, the industry’s post-consolidation structure – Velocci made this 
remarkable statement: 
 
“[A]n image is emerging of an industry marked by the concentration of vast market and 
financial power in the hands of a relatively small number of companies. Their political clout 
will be enormous, given the breadth of their operations scattered among many states, 
including the most populous one”.469 
 
A&D consolidation in America was also bound to have an impact on other regions of the world, 
notably Europe. In sharp contrast to their fragmented and often government-controlled European 
competitors, the emerging US mega-primes were the industry’s dominant technology leaders and 
“clear cost leaders”470: 
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“This is crucial because new business will be won as much on costs as on technology 
differentiation. [American] companies will be more capable than they are now of competing 
against non-US firms, including those subsidised by governments, and of winning new 
business based on their ability to deliver high-quality products faster and cheaper.”471 
 
This quote sums up the fundamental competitive threat the LMC deal and previous as well as 
expected future US mergers posed to Europe’s A&D industries. As more and more US A&D 
companies were bought up by the emerging American mega-primes, it became clear that the only 
way these giants would be able to grow further was to boost their operations / exports abroad. 
Starting in early 1996, European political and corporate leaders became increasingly worried about 
the rapid pace of ethnocentric US A&D industrial consolidation, which was seen as a direct threat 
to the viability and independence of the European industry.472 Interestingly, it was the UK that first 
recognised the problem and began to push for more pan-European A&D industrial cooperation:473 
 
“[T]here is a much greater recognition among European governments that autarky in the 
defence industry is no longer a practical policy.” [...] 
“Although governments, and the companies they are so closely entwined with, can buck 
worldwide pressures for more efficient production for some time, they cannot do so 
forever.”474 
 
If the Old Continent failed to achieve cross-border A&D consolidation, “the risk is that Europe will 
obtain increasingly ineffective defence equipment at rising prices”475. Furthermore, protectionist 
“Buy European” instincts were awakened as European industry leaders pushed for a true “two-way 
street” in terms of transatlantic defence procurement and demanded better access to the US 
market.476 As one analyst commented in mid-1996: “Everyone, it seems, is talking to everyone else 
about deals, alliances, mergers and trades. Yet while the political manoeuvring is intense, few 
companies have signed firm deals.”477 
                                                      
471 Ibid., p. 36 
472 Gray (August 1996) 
473 Gray (1995) 
474 Ibid. 
475 Ibid. 
476 BAE only launched its buying spree in the American defence sector in April 2000, well after the BMD merger. 
477 Gray (August 1996) 
 
123 
3.5  Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and the “new” Boeing 
 
On 15 December 1996, Boeing and MDC announced the creation of the world’s largest A&D 
company, allowing the world’s biggest civilian aircraft manufacturer (Boeing) to join forces with 
the world’s largest military aircraft manufacturer (MDC). Both Boeing, founded in 1916, and 
MDC, which was the result of the 1967 merger between Douglas and McDonnell Aircraft, ranked 
among America’s best known companies, having manufactured aerospace flagship products such as 
the 747 “jumbo jet”, the B-52 (Boeing), and the Tomahawk cruise missile (MDC). Boeing’s break-
through came in WWII, when the company developed the B-17, the backbone of the US strategic 
bombing campaign. During the Cold War, Boeing was instrumental in building America’s nuclear 
deterrent through the Minuteman ICBMs478. Milestones in Boeing’s commercial aircraft operations 
include the 1958 jet-powered 707, which triggered massive growth in air travel, and the 747 – 
introduced in 1969 – which would ultimately become the world’s most profitable aircraft model. 
 
While Douglas was quite successful in the commercial aircraft business (DC-3, DC-8, DC-9 
models), its sales began to falter as Boeing expanded its market share in the 1960s. The 1967 MDC 
merger was designed to balance Douglas weakening commercial operations with McDonnell’s 
strong defence division (F-101, F-4 and, later on, F-15 and F-18 fighters). The market entry of 
Airbus in the early 1970s would lead to the gradual replacement of MDC as the world’s second 
largest commercial aircraft manufacturer by the late 1980s.479 Ultimately, as the BMD merger 
demonstrates, MDC opted to merge with an even bigger company to assure its own survival in the 
face of increasing competition and declining procurement budgets. 
 
The US$16.3 billion transaction, the biggest A&D deal ever recorded, was completed on 1 August 
1997. In 1997, the “new” Boeing, as the company was initially called, had revenues of US$45.8 
billion.480 This figure compares to a combined turnover of Boeing and MDC of US$35.5 billion the 
year before and of US$33.0 billion in 1995. In 1996, the last year before the BMD merger, the 
“old” Boeing had total revenues of US$22.7 billion and posted earnings of US$1.1 billion (4.8 
percent operating margin).481 The year before, Boeing had sales of US$19.5 billion and net earnings 
of US$393 million. In 1996, Boeing’s commercial aircraft division accounted for US$16.9 billion 
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(or 75 percent) of total sales. In that sense, Boeing was predominantly a commercial aerospace 
company. In contrast, defence and space operations – comprising the development and production 
of military aircraft, helicopters, space and missile systems, rocket engines, mainly through US 
government contracts482 – generated only US$5.8 billion (25 percent) in revenues. 
 
MDC posted total 1996 revenues of US$13.8 billion and earnings of US$788 million (5.7 percent 
operating margin).483 In 1996, MDC had sales of US$14.3 billion but suffered a loss of US$416 
million due to the discontinuation of the MD-11. That year, MDC’s revenues broke down as 
follows: military aircraft: US$8.0 billion (57 percent of sales); commercial aircraft: US$3.3 billion 
(24 percent); missiles, space, and electronic systems: US$2.2 billion (16 percent); and financial 
services: US$367 million (2 percent). As of 31 December 1996, Boeing and MDC accounted for 64 
percent and 36 percent, respectively, of the combined pro-forma revenues of the “new” Boeing. In 
terms of the “new” Boeing’s combined pro-forma assets, the Boeing and MDC shares were 72 
percent and 28 percent, respectively. 
 
The “new” Boeing’s dominant position was powerfully summarised in the opening paragraph of its 
(first post-merger) Annual Report 1997: 
 
“The Boeing Company, based in Seattle, Washington, is the largest aerospace company in 
the world, as measured by total sales, and the nation’s leading exporter. Boeing is the 
world’s largest manufacturer of commercial jetliners and military aircraft, and the nation’s 
largest NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] contractor. The company’s 
capabilities in aerospace also include helicopters, electronic and defence systems, missiles, 
rocket engines, launch vehicles, and advanced information and communication systems. The 
company has and extensive global reach with customers in 145 countries and operations in 
27 US states. Worldwide, Boeing and its subsidiaries employ more than 238,000 people.”484 
 
Due to the BMD merger, the commercial aircraft divison’s total revenue share dropped from 75 to 
60 percent, thus enabling Boeing to better balance its cyclical commercial aircraft activities with 
MDC’s more stable military aircraft business. As the “new” Boeing leaders Phil Condit and Harry 
Stonecipher put it, “We have the confidence of knowing that when one market is down, another is 
likely to be up.”485 It was this ability to balance commercial and military operations that – along 
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with Boeing’s sheer size and corresponding economies of scale – threatened to give the US giant a 
decisive competitive advantage over Europe’s fragmented A&D industry and its crown jewel 
Airbus: “We have created the world’s largest aerospace company. Now we must prove that this 
giant new bird will fly farther, faster, higher – and more efficiently – than anything else in the 
aerospace world. And we will.”486 
 
For Boeing, the MDC acquisition was a major strategic step designed to make the company less 
vulnerable to the volatile market conditions in the commercial aerospace sector. Indeed, Boeing’s 
mantra – “when one market is down, another is likely to be up” – is generally true. After 9/11, the 
commercial aircraft market collapsed as airlines struggling with falling demand for air transport 
slashed orders and / or went into chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Boeing’s commercial aircraft 
division was severely hit by the economic fall-out from the 9/11 attacks. The company’s defence 
division, however, received a major boost from the massive post-9/11 increases in the Pentagon’s 
procurement and operations budget as part of the Bush administration’s “global war on terror”, thus 
helping to stabilise the company at a time of weak commercial sales. In that sense, Boeing’s 
decision to acquire MDC and become a diversified commercial and military aerospace company 
was definitely a smart move. 
 
The sharp rise in Boeing’s 1997 revenues (+ US$10 billion) was due to its booming commercial 
aircraft and information / space / defence systems divisions, as well as Boeing’s US$3.1 billion 
acquisition of Rockwell’s A&D activities in 1996. Boeing’s Commercial Airplane Group – its 
biggest and most important division – had revenues of US$26.9 billion in 1997 (60 percent of total 
turnover), compared to US$19.9 billion (56 percent) the year before; a stunning increase of about 
US$7 billion (35 percent). The overall number of commercial aircraft delivered by Boeing rose 
even stronger, from 271 units in 1996 to 375 units in 1997 – an increase of 39 percent – although 
one must not forget that the 1996 delivery figures were exceptionally weak compared to surging 
archrival Airbus. As will be explained in more detail below, Airbus managed to gain crucial ground 
on Boeing during the 1990s and early 2000s, thus eventually overtaking it both in terms of 
commercial aircraft orders and deliveries. Also, while Boeing’s turnover increased sharply, the 
company’s profitability was disappointing. Due to a US$3 billion pre-tax charge in 1997 primarily 
related to production problems in Boeing’s (post-merger) commercial aircraft business, that 
division swung from a profit of US$956 million in 1996 to a loss of more than US$1.8 billion in 
1997, causing Boeing to suffer a net loss (-US$178 million) for the first time in 50 years. Boeing’s 
R&D expenditures amounted to US$1.9 billion (4.1 percent of turnover) in 1997 and US$1.6 billion 
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(4.5 percent of revenues) in 1996.487 In 1997, Boeing’s workforce amounted to about 238,000, 
compared to 211,000 in 1996 and 169,000 in 1995. 
 
In the three decades prior to the 1997 BMD merger, Boeing had established a commanding global 
leadership position in the commercial aircraft business. That being said, it also became clear that 
Boeing’s supremacy was increasingly challenged by Europe’s Airbus. During 1992-2004 in 
particular, Airbus was gaining ground on Boeing as it came closer to and finally exceeded its long-
term goal of capturing 50 percent of the world’s 100-seat-plus commercial aircraft market. The 
following statistics clearly illustrate the absolute and relative rise of Airbus vis-à-vis Boeing:488 
 
Year Aircraft Deliveries New Orders 
 Boeing Airbus Ratio Boeing Airbus Ratio 
1992 572 157 3.64:1 266 136 1.96:1 
1997 375 187 2:1 543 460 1.18:1 
1999 620 294 2.11:1 355 476 1:1.34 
2000 491 311 1.53:1 588 520 1.13:1 
2004 281 305 1:1.09 272 370 1:1.37 
 
In 1992, Boeing delivered 572 aircraft vs. 157 units for Airbus. That year, Boeing recorded 266 
orders compared to 136 for Airbus. Whereas in 1992 Boeing held an 3.64 : 1 lead over Airbus in 
terms of deliveries, the corresponding figure for incoming orders was merely 1.96 : 1. While in the 
short term, aircraft deliveries are a much better indicator of an aerospace company’s performance, it 
is incoming aircraft orders that are generally the best indicator of how that company will fare in the 
future. After all, today’s aircraft orders are tomorrow’s aircraft deliveries – various degrees of order 
“firmness” and escape clauses notwithstanding.489 In 1997, Boeing and Airbus delivered 375 and 
187 aircraft, respectively, yielding a 2 : 1 lead ratio for the Americans. That year, Boeing received 
543 orders vs. 460 for Airbus, translating into an even smaller lead ratio of just 1.18 : 1. 
 
In 1999, Boeing delivered 620 aircraft (a figure boosted by the MDC merger), while the Airbus 
figure stood at just 294. Boeing was temporarily able to slightly widen its lead over Airbus in terms 
of unit deliveries to 2.11 : 1. However, that same year, Airbus managed for the first time to secure 
more aircraft orders than Boeing, beating its archrival 476 vs. 355 units and giving the European 
challenger a 1.34 : 1 lead ratio. In 2000, Boeing delivered 491 aircraft vs. 311 for Airbus, a lead 
ratio reduced to 1.58 : 1. With 588 new orders that year, Boeing just narrowly managed to reclaim 
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its leadership position compared to 520 new aircraft orders for Airbus (1.13 : 1 lead ratio for 
Boeing). Finally, by 2004, Airbus had firmly secured its long-term goal of capturing 50 percent of 
the world’s large commercial aircraft market: Airbus delivered 305 aircraft vs. 281 for Boeing (a 
near-parity lead ratio of 1.09 : 1) and received orders for 370 planes vs. Boeing’s 272 (a lead ratio 
of 1.37 : 1). Since 2003 Airbus has persistently outperformed Boeing in terms of new aircraft 
deliveries. 
 
The rise of Airbus is also very impressive when one analyses the financial performance figures for 
the 1992-2004 period.490 In 1992, Airbus had an annual turnover of US$ 7.7 billion while new 
orders amounted to US$9.8 billion. By 1997, Airbus’s turnover had increased to US$11.6 billion 
while its incoming orders soared to US$ 29.6 billion. Boeing’s corresponding commercial aircraft 
turnover in 1997 was US$27.0 billion (giving it a 2.33 : 1 lead ratio) while new orders totalled 
US$39.1 billion (Boeing lead ratio of 1.32 : 1). In 1999, Airbus’s revenues reached US$16.7 billion 
while new orders totalled US$30.5 billion. The corresponding Boeing 1999 commercial aircraft 
revenue figure was US$38.5 billion (thus reducing Boeing’s lead ratio to 2.30 : 1). In 2000, the 
Airbus turnover amounted to US$17.2 billion, with new orders totalling US$41.3 billion. The 
corresponding 2000 commercial aircraft revenue figure for Boeing was US$31.2 billion, thus 
further eroding the American company’s lead ratio over Airbus to 1.81 : 1. By 2004, Airbus 
revenues had reached EUR20.2 billion (US$27.5 billion)491 while new orders totalled US$34.4 
billion. The corresponding turnover figure for Boeing’s commercial aircraft group that year was 
US$21.0 billion, giving Airbus a 1.31 : 1 lead ratio over its archrival. 
 
All of the metrics highlighted above paint the same picture of a rising European Airbus challenger 
gaining ground and eventually overtaking long-time US hegemon Boeing in the world’s 
commercial aircraft market during the 1992-2004 time frame; that is in the run-up to, during, and 
after the BMD merger: 
 
“Over the past ten years, the [Boeing] Company (including [MDC]) has maintained, on 
average, approximately a two-thirds share of the available commercial jet aircraft market. 
Airbus Industrie is an aggressive competitor seeking to increase market share. This market 
environment has resulted in intense pressures on pricing and other competitive factors.”492 
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To compensate for the rise of Airbus, “Boeing set out to build a position of leadership in 
information, space, and defence markets comparable to the one […] [it had] long held in 
commercial aircraft”493. The BMD merger was therefore an important milestone towards creating a 
“new” Boeing which would be more diversified and better able to weather the ups and downs of the 
commercial and defence aircraft businesses: 
 
“Based on 1997 results, it is clear that the new combined company has, indeed, achieved a 
position of enormous breadth and strength in the targeted areas […] [which promise a] 
tremendous future for Boeing in information, space and defence.”494 
 
Boeing’s Information, Space, and Defence Systems (ISDS) division comprises the development and 
production of fighter, bomber, and military transportation aircraft, helicopters, as well as missile 
systems. In 1997, ISDS had revenues of about US$18.1 billion – accounting for 40 percent of total 
turnover495 – and an operating profit of US$1.3 billion (7.3 percent margin). Key ISDS programmes 
include the F/A-18E/F and F-22 fighters, the C-17 Globemaster III airlifter, the Apache and 
Comanche helicopters, the V-22 Osprey, the AWACS-equipped496 Boeing 767, the Space Shuttle 
(in a joint venture with LMC). The ISDS group was highly diversified, with no single program 
accounting for more than 15 percent of total division revenues during the 1995-1997 timeframe. A 
high degree of diversification in its stable defence business provided the “new” Boeing with an 
additional hedge against its cyclical commercial aircraft business. 
 
A look at the evolution of Boeing’s revenue mix during 1996-2004 clearly illustrates the growing 
importance of the company’s defence activities. After the share of military sales had temporarily 
dropped to 33 percent (due to a strong increase in commercial aircraft sales), Boeing managed to 
bring that figure back to 40 percent in 2000. In 2002, as the Bush administration’s post-9-11 
defence spending began to kick in, the share of Boeing’s defence-related revenues rose to 46 
percent. In 2003, that share increased to 54 percent while in 2004 it even reached 58 percent.497 
Within eight years, Boeing had transformed itself from an aerospace company heavily dependent on 
commercial sales (75 percent in 1996) to one where defence operations constituted the majority of 
its revenues (58 percent in 2004). 
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Prior to Boeing’s take-over, MDC experienced major problems with its commercial aircraft division 
(DAC)498. By 1996, DAC’s share of new orders world-wide had dropped to only four percent.499 
Airlines who had previously been DAC customers were increasingly switching to Boeing and 
Airbus. Furthermore, DAC received no orders for its newly developed MD-95 aircraft. Three 
reasons accounted for DAC’s weak position:500 First, the “lack of a full family of aircraft”; second, 
“customer and marketplace uncertainty as to the future of DAC”; and three, “investment in product 
development at levels significantly below competition”: In sum, “[MDC] never really had a chance 
at survival. In an industry which increasingly favours consolidation, a niche player with inadequate 
new aircraft development plans was doomed for some time”.501 502 
 
MDC considered several options to improve DAC’s performance, including “strategic alliances” 
with non-US companies which could provide fresh capital and access to new markets; major 
internal investments (estimated cost: up to US$15 billion)503 in DAC’s infrastructure and product 
development enabling it to build a full family of aircraft which could then successfully compete 
against Boeing and Airbus; positioning DAC as a niche player in the commercial aircraft business; 
the sale of DAC; and, finally, shutting down DAC’s development and production unit while 
keeping the spares business.504 On the defence side, MDC had also lost out in the early stages of the 
Pentagon’s US$200 billion Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme, the largest military acquisition 
programme in history.505 MDC’s weak commercial and military aircraft market positions in 1996 
cast serious doubts on the firm’s longer-term ability to survive as an independent A&D company. 
While MDC considered the option of entering into “strategic alliances” with non-US partners to 
prop up its commercial aircraft division, there are no indications that the company contemplated a 
full-fledged merger with a European / foreign which would also include its sensitive defence 
operations. 
 
Boeing and MDC had held exploratory talks about a potential strategic alliance and even a full-
blown merger as early as 1994-1995.506 However, given the uncertain market outlook for both 
commercial and military aircraft at the time, the two firms failed to narrow their differences over 
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MDC’s precise valuation. MDC forecast strong sales and earnings growth and therefore demanded 
that Boeing pay a 30-percent premium on its share price. Since Boeing offered only a 10-percent 
premium the talks were terminated in December 1995. In mid-September 1996 – following DAC’s 
dismal performance in the commercial aircraft business – MDC CEO Stonecipher approached his 
Boeing counterpart Condit to see whether there was still interest in a full-scale merger. While 
Condit rejected new merger talks, the Boeing and MDC executives in charge of the commercial 
aircraft divisions started discussions on a collaborative agreement which would allow Boeing to 
utilise MDC engineers for the design and development of its planned future wide-body aircraft. The 
talks progressed very quickly and on 3 December 1996, the two companies announced their 
“strategic collaboration” on commercial aircraft to the public.507 
 
Just three days later, Condit called Stonecipher to tell him that Boeing was interested in a merger 
with MDC after all. Apart from the “strategic collaboration” agreement, it was the on-going 
consolidation in the US A&D industrial base in the fall of 1996 which played an important role in 
reversing Boeing’s initial rejection of a merger with MDC.508 Boeing offered a simple stock-for-
merger deal with a 21-percent premium to MDC’s closing share price on 13 December, the last 
trading day before the planned merger. This 21-percent premium compromise was roughly half-way 
between the 30-percent and 10-percent premiums demanded / offered by MDC and Boeing a year 
earlier. On 10 December, Condit and Stonecipher hammered out a preliminary merger agreement 
spelling out the key terms of their planned deal. Four days later, Boeing and MDC held special 
board meetings and approved the merger:509 
 
“The Boeing board believes that the merger represents a unique opportunity to create a 
stronger company with a broader base of defence and space product programs and 
international businesses opportunities, and that in the current environment of declining 
defence spending and industry consolidation, the deal was deemed to be of critical strategic 
importance to Boeing’s efforts to position itself as an effective competitor in the coming 
years. […] In addition, the merger would enable Boeing to achieve its strategic goal of 
balancing its commercial aviation business (which now represents almost three-fourths of 
its overall business) with a larger defence and space business.”510 
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Furthermore, Boeing hoped to leverage MDC’s military division for its JSF bid and anticipated 
synergies from the two companies’ space units. Boeing (like MDC), also took a variety of “material 
factors” into account when weighing the pros and cons of the BMD merger, including the industry, 
economic and market dynamics at the time, the due diligence reviews regarding, the ability to 
obtain regulatory approval for the merger, etc.511 
 
“The [MDC] Board believes the merger offers [MDC] and its shareholders an opportunity 
to participate in the creation of a leading [A&D] company which can provide the critical 
mass and economies of scale necessary to compete effectively in the current global business 
environment. The [MDC] Board believes that the combined revenues of [MDC] and Boeing, 
the potential for significant cost savings, the complementary nature of their respective 
businesses, and the increased geographic presence and expanded contribution to the US 
industrial base that would result from the merger are compelling reason for the 
combination of [MDC] and Boeing.”512 
 
MDC recognised that it was under severe pressure to respond to recent M&A deals by two of its 
competitors (LMC and Raytheon) that, “within the past two years, [had] consummated or entered 
into agreements to consummate transactions significantly increasing their size”513. On the 
commercial aircraft side, MDC reasoned that the BMD merger provided the best opportunity for its 
engineers to apply their know-how across the full range of the “new” Boeing’s commercial aircraft 
family. 
 
Following approval by the Boeing and MDC boards on 14 December 1996, the BMD merger was 
made public the following day. The only remaining obstacle to the creation of the world’s largest 
A&D company was the necessary regulatory anti-trust approval by the FTC and the EC514 As was 
already discussed in Chapter 1, the US and European governments have repeatedly accused each 
other of providing unfair direct and indirect government support (R&D launch aid in the case of 
Airbus, military to commercial spill-over benefits in the case of Boeing) to their respective 
commercial aerospace champions. While the EU-US Aircraft Agreement of July 1992 had provided 
a temporary fix and averted a transatlantic trade war, it became quite clear that the BMD merger 
reviews risked reviving the underlying tensions between Europe and America. 
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Boeing and MDC informed the FTC and the EC of their merger on 29 January and 18 February 
1997, respectively.515 The FTC – advised by DoD and DoJ – received millions of pages of 
documents from the two companies and conducted numerous interviews during its inquiry.516 The 
EC reviewed thousands of pages of documents and only conducted a small number of interviews.517 
Throughout the anti-trust investigations, FTC and EC officials exchanged views and information to 
keep each other abreast of their deliberations. On 21 May 1997, the EC released a statement 
highlighting its objections to the BMD merger with regard to, inter alia, increased concentration in 
the international commercial aircraft market, the combination of patent portfolios as well as the 
potential technological spin-off effects from MDC’s government-funded R&D and space programs 
on Boeing’s commercial activities.518 On 26 June, the EC informed the FTC about its concerns 
regarding the potential anti-competitive impact of the BMD merger on the large commercial aircraft 
market. 
 
The FTC announced on 1 July after a 4-1 vote that “no further action is warranted […] at this time” 
and that it would therefore approve the BMD merger without any conditions.519 The four FTC 
Commissioners who voted for the BMD merger gave two reasons for their decision. First, they 
believed that MDC’s commercial aircraft division DAC was no longer “a meaningful competitive 
force” due to its inability to match either of its rivals Boeing and Airbus in terms of “new product 
lines, production facilities, company infrastructure, or research and development”.520 Second, the 
FTC concluded that the BMD merger “does not threaten competition in military programs” since 
“there are no current or future procurements of fighter aircraft by the [DoD] in which the two 
companies would likely compete”.521 522 The only dissenter was Commissioner Azcuenaga: 
 
“The horizontal combination of two of the three firms in the [commercial aircraft] market 
appears to present a rather straightforward case for a challenge by the Commission. Absent 
action by the Commission, the merger will eliminate one of three firms in a highly 
concentrated market in which entry is difficult and unlikely.”523 524 
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After the Americans realised in late June that the EC was seriously considering either blocking or 
requiring substantial changes to the proposed BMD merger (i.e., forcing Boeing to shed DAC) 
high-level Clinton administration officials turned the heat on Brussels and disputed the EC’s legal 
basis for imposing certain anti-trust restrictions.525 526 US anti-trust czar Joel Klein confirmed that 
he met with EC representatives (including Competition Commissioner Karel van Miert) during the 
final stages of the review process “during which we [American government officials] explained 
how an EU prohibition of the merger could harm important US interests”.527 President Clinton 
threatened to retaliate against the EU through a formal WTO complaint or the imposition of 
unilateral US trade sanctions if Brussels were to block the merger.528 529 Vice President Gore vowed 
that Washington would take “whatever action is appropriate” to prevent the EU from impeding the 
BMD merger530 and also warned of direct retaliation against European firms.531 Finally, the House 
and Senate passed resolutions in July 1997 condemning the EU’s “unwarranted and unprecedented 
interference” in the merger of two American firms. Congress went on to charge that the EU’s 
potential blocking of the BMD merger was designed “to gain an unfair competitive advantage for 
Airbus” and that the related transatlantic tensions “could threaten to disrupt the overall relationship 
between the EU and the [US]”.532 
 
It was obvious that the BMD merger was not a “normal” business transaction, but that “EU and US 
government leaders [viewed it] as a sensitive adjustment in the political and economic order and 
were certain to follow its passage through the regulatory process attentively”.533 534 Boeing and 
MDC did recognise that they would need to comply with the EC’s anti-trust review before 
consummating the proposed BMD merger.535 However, “it seem[ed] equally clear that 
underpinning Boeing’s [EC] strategy was a wait-and-see approach in hopes that US government 
lobbying would win the day for the company without having to make more [anti-trust] concessions 
                                                      
525 Phil Condit refused to shed DAC, calling such a move “extremely disadvantageous”. The Clinton administration 
backed Boeing’s position, arguing that only the country with direct jurisdiction over the BMD merger (the US) could 
impose such important restrictions. Morocco (July 1997) 
526 Some American anti-trust law experts believed that “Action by the EC to block the merger or interfere with existing 
contracts between Boeing and US customers […] would be contrary to well-established principles of international 
comity”. This narrow US-centric anti-trust approach is mistaken. “Although EU approval is not a formal part of the US 
merger process, under a 1991 agreement the US recognizes the [EC]’s right to review such mergers owing to their 
potential impact on the European marketplace.” AWST (Aviation Week & Space Technology) (28 July 1997) p. 18 
527 Kovacic (2001) p. 826 
528 Coleman (1997) 
529 Washington considered imposing punitive tariffs on European airplanes and limiting the number of flights between 
the US and France. (Pearlstein & Swardson, 1997) 
530 (Skapinker & Tucker, 1997) 
531 Kovacic (2001) p. 826 
532 House (1997) and Senate (1997) 
533 Kovacic (2001) pp. 816-817 
534 “If the [FTC] says yes and the [EC] says no, or fines Boeing, it will no longer be a Boeing-EC issue. I think that 
would elevate it to a trade issue between the [US] and Europe.” Boeing spokesperson quoted in AFP (1997). 
535 (Boeing & MDC, 1997) p. 49 
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than were absolutely necessary.” The close ties and coordination between Boeing and the Clinton 
administration were not lost on the Europeans. As Commissioner Van Miert put it, “Boeing is a 
private company but it seems to behave as if it were a public one.”536 Airbus Managing Director 
Jean Pierson came out strongly against the BMD merger: 
 
“The proposed [BMD] merger agreement is a new attempt to force Europe, not only Airbus, 
to remain a marginal competitor and to monopolise the [commercial transport] market.” 
[…] “This is an undertaking whose aim it is to undo more than 25 years of joint European 
efforts against US hegemonic will, known as monopoly.”537 
 
On 30 July 1997, the EC approved the BMD merger under certain conditions, notably that Boeing 
abandon its existing 20-year exclusivity agreements with American, Delta, and Continental 
airlines.538 Key to the EC’s decision was the view that Boeing’s 60-plus-percent market share of the 
commercial aircraft business already constituted a “dominant market position”. An unrestricted 
BMD merger would have entrenched Boeing’s market dominance and threatened Airbus’s 
survival.539 While the FTC considered Boeing’s exclusivity deals “potentially troubling”, it argued 
that they concerned “only about 11 percent” of the world’s commercial aircraft market. Boeing 
agreed to comply with the EC’s anti-trust conditions.540 541 The EC acknowledged that it had taken 
into consideration concerns voiced by DoD and DoJ to the effect that a blocking of the BMD 
merger “could harm important US defence interests”.542 The EC ultimately decided to focus on the 
commercial aircraft market and dropped its concerns about potential technological spin-off effects 
from MDC’s government-funded R&D and space programs on Boeing’s commercial activities. 
Even though a transatlantic trade war was ultimately averted, the massive threats and accusations by 
political leaders in America and Europe during the BMD merger’s anti-trust review certainly left a 
bitter aftertaste on both sides of the Atlantic.543 On the one hand, many Americans believed that the 
EC decision was driven by “naked economic nationalism”544 to shield Europe’s heavily subsidised 
Airbus consortium from international competition.545 On the other hand, many Europeans saw the 
                                                      
536 Morocco (July 1997) 
537 Sparaco (June 1997) p. 20 
538 EC (1997) 
539 Kovacic (2001) pp. 832-833 
540 If Boeing had ignored the EC ruling and proceeded with the BMD merger, Brussels could have imposed a fine equal 
to 10 percent of the merged company’s annual turnover. 
541 See Morocco (July 1997) for Boeing’s other concessions to comply with the EC ruling. 
542 EC (1997) paragraph 12 
543 “This is not the first time that a foreign government has insisted upon adjustments in a merger involving US 
companies. It is the first time that you have so dramatic a difference in opinion about whether intervention was 
appropriate. That’s what made this one different.” Kovacic quoted in (Gavacs & Gee, 1997). 
544 Kovacic (2001) p. 808 
545 “Based on comments by [Commissioner Van Miert], it was clear from the outset that the [EU] viewed the proposed 
merger in a political as well as a competitive context. [...] At the centre of the controversy were the exclusive, long-term 
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FTC’s unconditional approval of the BMD merger as clear proof of a political fix by the Clinton 
administration and a brazen assault on key European economic interests.546 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
contracts that Boeing signed with American, Continental, and Delta airlines. They had nothing to do with unfair 
competition or anti-trust issues. [Airbus] fought for the same block of business. […] By forcing Boeing to compromise 
on the principle of tough but fair competition, the EU effectively penalised Boeing for the inability of Airbus to make 
greater inroads in the US market. Basically, the EU used anti-trust arguments as a blatant smoke screen for pursuing 
protectionist policies.” AWST (28 July 1997) p. 78 
546 President Chirac applauded the EC’s intervention in the BMD merger review and expressed concern that the 
proposed transaction “could be extremely dangerous for [Europe’s]” economic / strategic interests. (Ernsberger, Jr., 
Warner, & Theil, 1997). German Economics Minister Rexrodt also backed the EC. Reuters (1997) 
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Chapter 4: The EADS Merger 
4.1 Aerospace and defence industrial consolidation, collaboration, and competition in Europe 
 
The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, it puts the EADS merger in the wider historical 
context of A&D industrial consolidation, collaboration, and competition in Europe. Second, it 
provides an overview of EADS and its three founding companies at the time of the 1999 merger 
agreement. Finally, this chapter contrasts the different approaches adopted by Europe’s major 
powers – France, Germany, and the UK – in dealing with their respective A&D companies and 
analyses how the interplay with each country’s foreign and security policy has shaped this strategic 
industry sector. By the early 1990s, the A&D industries in France, Germany, and the UK had 
already gone through successive rounds of national consolidation in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s 
culminating in the creation of different “national champions”. These previous rounds of national 
consolidation as well as the various attempts at (European) cross-border mergers and collaborative 
schemes provide the relevant historical context for the EADS merger during the post-Cold War era. 
The shadow of the past was an important factor since those who occupied top positions in the 
aerospace sector in the 1990s had learned their jobs during the 1960s and 1970s.547 
 
The earlier national consolidations and international collaboration efforts were driven by the 
increased technological sophistication and exponentially rising development costs of both civil and 
military aircraft. In addition, strong US competition also demonstrated the limits of the fragmented 
and dispersed European aerospace industry. Given the significant control and influence exerted by 
national governments over their respective domestic A&D companies – through direct 
shareholdings, defence procurement decisions, anti-trust policies, export controls, etc. – M&As in 
this important sector were often initiated and had to be approved by the relevant government 
authorities. However, the creation of national A&D champions also had its downsides: 
 
“[T]he lack of competition between defence contractors, the cosy relationship between 
industrial managers, civil servants and military personnel, the weakness of cost control, and 
the inefficiency of much defence research and development and production”548. 
 
Governments had to make careful decisions about whether they believed that either increases in 
scale (consolidation) or the intensification of competition among different (national) A&D groups 
would eventually result in greater production and R&D cost savings. Government and business 
leaders also had to weigh the potential costs and benefits of pursuing national vs. international / 
                                                      
547 “Efforts by the European governments to shape the structure of their aeronautics industries have been aimed at 
consolidation and international collaboration since the end of [WW] II.” GAO (1994) p. 4 
548 (Walker & Gummett, 1989) p. 422 
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transnational R&D and production strategies. By the early 1990s, “the numerous aircraft and engine 
manufacturers that existed during the 1940s and 1950s in France, Germany, and the [UK] had been 
narrowed down to five major civil aircraft and engine manufacturers […] through mergers, 
takeovers, and bankruptcies”549. The UK and Germany ultimately chose scale over competition. 
After successive rounds of consolidations following WWII, both countries had only one (privatised) 
national A&D champion (in terms of aircraft makers) left by the early 1990s: BAe and DASA. 
France’s situation was more complex as Paris decided to maintain two A&D groups (in terms of 
aircraft makers): the bigger, government-owned Aérospatiale and the smaller, partly government-
owned but family-controlled Dassault Aviation. In the aircraft engine business, too, only two 
independent European manufacturers remained: France’s government-owned SNECMA550 and the 
UK’s Rolls Royce. 
 
The following section highlights the national consolidation as well as the international collaboration 
of the A&D industries in France, Germany, and the UK up to the early 1990s. Despite certain 
differences between their industrial policies – France’s was more dirigiste – both the British and 
French governments essentially agreed on the same overall strategic objectives following WWII: 
first, the aerospace industry should be under governmental control; second, the government should 
provide R&D grants to boost the technological sophistication and innovation capacity of their 
respective national aerospace companies; finally, Paris and London recognised that they would need 
to consolidate their national aerospace industrial bases to gain competitiveness vis-à-vis the 
dominant US rivals. 
 
After WWII, France’s aeronautics industry was highly fragmented, comprising several small, 
independent aircraft and engine manufacturers.551 Following a first round of industry consolidation 
during the 1950s, Paris encouraged the emerging regional, partially state-owned champions to 
pursue a sectoral aerospace industrial specialisation during the 1960s, ranging from civil and 
military transport aircraft to helicopters, ballistic missiles as well as business and combat aircraft. 
France’s “big bang” occurred in 1970, when the French government initiated the merger of three 
(partially) state-owned aerospace companies552 to create “national champion” Aérospatiale. While 
Paris subsequently made several attempts to merge Aérospatiale and Dassault, the latter has to this 
day maintained its corporate identity and managerial independence.553 In the aircraft engine 
business, France’s SNECMA, founded in 1945, did extremely well. By the 1990s, it had become a 
                                                      
549 GAO (1994) p. 4 
550 SNECMA = Société Nationale d’Étude et de Construction de Moteurs d’Aviation 
551 GAO (1974) pp. 18-21 
552 Sud Aviation, Nord Aviation, SEREB 
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major player on that highly concentrated and competitive market, along with America’s GE and 
P&W (Pratt & Whitney) as well as the UK’s Rolls-Royce. In sum, “France has a far more vertically 
integrated aerospace industry than any other European country has, with market leaders in civil and 
military engines and avionics, weaponry, aerostructures, and other subcomponents.”554 
 
While Germany had the world’s most advanced aeronautics industry at the end of WWII, West 
Germany was not allowed any aeronautics R&D and production capacities until 1955.555 Shortly 
afterwards, many of the often family-owned aeronautics companies re-entered the aircraft business. 
In the 1960s, the West German government pushed for aerospace industry consolidation, 
threatening to withhold any future federal defence procurement contracts from those companies 
opposed to industry consolidation. The strategy worked and by the end of the decade the number of 
major German aeronautics companies had been reduced to four: MBB (Messerschmitt-Boelkow-
Blohm), Germany’s dominant aircraft firm, VFW-Fokker, Dornier, and engine manufacturer MTU 
(Motoren und Turbinen Union). The “big bang” occurred in 1989, when Daimler-Benz AG, 
Germany’s biggest industrial company, set out to form “national champion” DASA by combining 
the activities of MBB, Dornier, MTU, and electronics company TST. DASA was now both 
Germany’s only large civil aircraft manufacturer, its only combat aircraft maker (in cooperation 
with international partners), as well as the country’s biggest aircraft engine manufacturer. 
 
In the UK, there existed about 70 different aircraft and aircraft engine manufacturers at the end of 
WWII.556 By the early 1960s, numerous M&As as well bankruptcies had consolidated the UK 
aerospace industry into just two major players: Hawker Siddeley and BAC. The UK’s “big bang” to 
create the country’s national A&D champion occurred in 1977, when London nationalised Hawker 
Siddeley and BAC to create BAe. In 1981, the Thatcher government partially privatised BAe and 
sold a 51.57 percent stake in the company, before shedding its remaining shares in 1985. To this 
day, however, London retains a £1 “Golden Share” in BAE to retain control over the company’s 
strategic decisions.557 On the aircraft engine side, Rolls-Royce was able to establish itself as the 
leading UK manufacturer by 1966. 
 
The A&D industry’s ethnocentric consolidation in France, Germany and the UK beginning in the 
1950s and 1960s was accompanied by numerous attempts to foster international collaboration on 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
553 Paris transferred its 45.76 percent stake in Dassault to Aérospatiale in 1998 and subsequently to EADS. 
554 Aboulafia (2001) 
555 GAO (1994) pp. 29-31 and Milosch (2006) pp. 132-135 
556 GAO (1994) pp. 40-41 
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civil and military aircraft manufacturing, involving both European countries and America, through 
NATO.558 At the time, US companies controlled 70 to 80 percent of the world’s non-Communist 
civilian and military aircraft sector. Given the fragmented nature of Europe’s aerospace markets and 
industries, European companies found it very hard to compete successfully against their bigger and 
more advanced US competitors. In civil aircraft manufacturing, international collaboration was 
largely driven by exponentially rising R&DP costs.559 The costs for launching a new large 
commercial aircraft (measured as the proportion between launching cost to the manufacturer’s 
equity)560 and the “average aircraft manufacturing costs per seat” rose dramatically between 1936 
and 1991, more than quadrupling from around US$65,000 to US$275,000 per seat between 1970 
and 1991 alone.561 
 
In contrast to US aircraft manufacturers, which could rely on their vast, largely protected domestic 
market to offset rising R&DP costs, “the list of unsuccessful commercial aircraft built by individual 
[European] countries grew to be a long one”562 (France’s Languedoc, the Dutch-German VFW-
Fokker 614, the UK’s de Havilland Comet, etc.). The few (relatively) successful European 
commercial aircraft included the Dassault Falcon and Sud Caravelle (France), the Vickers Viscount, 
and the Dutch Fokker F27 and F28.563 The associated significant increase in market and survival 
risks impelled Europe’s relatively weaker and more fragmented aerospace firms to (1) further 
consolidate nationally, and (2) to look for partners abroad to pool resources, lower R&DP costs, 
expand beyond protected (captive) national markets to increase exports, and to ultimately share / 
reduce risks. 
 
To gain access to the American civil aviation market, European aerospace companies made several 
attempts to collaborate with US companies in the 1950s and 1960s. However, all of these planned 
collaborative projects were abandoned by the American side before they reached fruition.564 The 
Europeans tried repeatedly to enter into production agreements with US partners to jointly 
manufacture particular European aircraft. For instance, Britain’s de Havilland Aircraft company 
attempted to convince Boeing to jointly manufacture the Trident, while France’s Sud Aviation 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
557 The Golden Shares give the British government important rights, including “UK citizenship requirements for the 
companies’ boards of directors; control over the percentage of foreign-owned shares [usually limited to 15 percent]; and 
approval requirements for the dissolution or disposal of any strategic assets.” Bialos (2009) vol. II, p. 612 
558 Hayward (1986) 
559 “[T]echnological advances have extended developmental lead time, increased launch costs, complicated marketing, 
and lengthened the time between initial research and revenue earning”. Golich (1992) p. 903 
560 For additional information on this sharp rise in R&DP costs, see Ibid., pp. 905-906 
561 Harold Shenton, AVMARK Inc., (Arlington, VA, 1991) cited in Ibid., p. 907 
562 Ibid., p. 915 
563 Even those relatively successful European aircraft rarely reached three-digit sales figures. Ibid., p. 915 
564 Ibid., pp. 914-918 
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reached out to Douglas to produce the Caravelle. However, Boeing and Douglas reasoned that they 
had more to gain from developing and manufacturing their own aircraft, thus allowing them to 
further consolidate their commercial and technological leadership position vis-à-vis Europe and the 
rest of the world. Cooperating with the Europeans was simply not in the interest of US companies, 
as such a move would not only have opened up America’s hitherto captive aircraft market to 
foreign products but also risked boosting the rise of European competitors who were bound to 
benefit from transatlantic cooperation in the form of increased sales, economies of scale as well as 
(informal) technology transfers and learning effects. 
 
This position of inferiority and weakness vis-à-vis America was very frustrating for the European 
aerospace companies. “[A]s US dominance of commercial-class manufacturing increased, 
Europeans sought to avoid a situation in which their manufacturers would be relegated to the 
production of components”565. European policymakers realised that it was high time to boost the 
relative competitiveness of their aerospace industries to take on “The American Challenge”566: 
 
“For high-cost, high-risk industries such as aircraft manufacturing, transnational 
[European] production was encouraged as the best way to reduce R&DP risks and to 
expand market access. Despite historical animosities among individual European states and 
lingering suspicions about joint ventures, officials in most states decided that intra-
European collaboration was preferable to trans-Atlantic or Pacific Rim arrangements 
because they were less suspicious about one another than they were about the [US] or 
Pacific Rim countries.”567 
 
Europeans were determined “to resist and to match American technological ‘imperialism’”568. 
European officials also wanted to prevent “an American monopoly in a major sector”569. In 1965, 
France and the UK – joined one year later by West Germany – began negotiations about 
collaborating on the development and production of a short-to-medium range, wide-bodied 
commercial aircraft. In December 1970, Airbus was formed with significant political and financial 
backing from France, Germany and the UK. Over the next decades, Airbus would successfully 
challenge America’s supremacy in commercial aircraft manufacturing. 
 
                                                      
565 Ibid, p. 915 
566 The title of a European bestseller published in 1967 by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber who argued in favour of 
transnational European cooperation to cope with “The American Challenge”, notably in the realm of business and 
technology. 
567 Golich (1992) pp. 915-916 
568 Nau (1974) p. 12 
569 Hayward (1986) p. 52 
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In the military aircraft domain, in contrast, America established the world’s most powerful and 
technologically advanced A&D industry after the end of WWII. A global leadership position that 
the country has (so far) successfully defended against all challengers. During the early stages of the 
Cold War, the US shipped large amounts of surplus military hardware – including aircraft, tanks, 
etc. – to its Western European allies to deter any further potential Soviet (military) expansionism. 
These arms transfers – based on the Mutual Defence Assistance Act (1949) and the Mutual Security 
Acts of the early 1950s – were either for free or sold at steep discounts. Total US military and 
economic aid amounted to about US$45 billion between 1946 and1966. By 1958, according to one 
estimate, about half of the heavy military equipment used by European NATO members was either 
from the US or Canada.570 The US-led NATO alliance also tried to promote the rationalisation571, 
standardisation, and inter-operability (RSI) of weapons systems among its members. For a long 
time, however, NATO’s RSI efforts were essentially a “one-way street”, leading from America to 
Europe. Deteriorating US balance of payments deficits, Europe’s resurgent economies, but also the 
Vietnam War and France’s military withdrawal from NATO led Congress and various US 
administrations to repeatedly push for a more balanced “burden-sharing” within NATO. To put it 
differently, “the view that geopolitics was more important than mere trade and economics matters 
was increasingly challenged from within the US government”572. In particular, Washington 
(Congress above all) sought to encourage the European alliance members to take on more 
responsibility for their own security by cutting back the generous US military and economic 
assistance provided to them during the early stages of the Cold War. “Congress, from the earliest 
year of the Atlantic Alliance, has attempted to control, where possible, the extent of the American 
commitment to the alliance while lobbying for increased European defence efforts.”573 Congress 
and US administrations were also the target of lobbying efforts by the US defence industry to 
exclusively reserve the country’s continuing financial assistance for those nations that bought or 
produced American weapons systems.574 From the perspective of Europe’s A&D industry, “the 
[US] changed its position from ‘patron saint’ in the 1950s to ‘most active competitor’ in the early 
1960s”575. 
 
                                                      
570 Beer (1969) p. 148 
571 “‘Rationalisation’ [encompasses] all actions taken to use equipment and perform common tasks more efficiently and 
cost-effectively”. ‘Standardization’ involves the adoption of common equipment, doctrine, and procedures by all 
members of the alliance. ‘Inter-operability’ refers to compatibility of equipment and inter-changeability of parts, fuel, 
and ammunition.” Taylor (1982) p. 95 
572 Larres (2000) pp. 127-145 
573 Sloan (1985) p. 397. Sloan analyses Congressional efforts to push for more European “burden sharing” and the 
resulting transatlantic tensions with various US administrations (as well as tensions between US administrations and 
Congress). US administrations were generally much more concerned about the negative geo-strategic consequences of a 
weakening NATO alliance than the Senators and Congressmen driven by constituent interests. 
574 Taylor (1982) p. 99 
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By the 1960s, Western European countries began insisting on co-producing US military aircraft 
under licensing agreements, thus breaking with their habit of simply importing finished products 
from America. One of the most prominent programmes was the co-production of the Lockheed F-
104G “star fighter” by a consortium of German, Italian, Belgian, and Dutch starting in the 1960s. 
Germany’s decision to order the Starfighter and not France’s competing Dassault aircraft was 
heavily influenced by the very attractive conditions proposed by F-104 manufacturer Lockheed, 
which offered “substantial technology transfers and, of course, joint production of the aircraft”576. 
Due to this aggressive US weapons sales campaign beginning in the early 1960s – aptly dubbed 
“Win the Game in Europe by Managing Problems, Organising Sales Effort” by then-US Defence 
Secretary McNamara – “US dominance in NATO weapons markets was maintained, even as the 
[US] was sharing technology and production techniques with potential competitors”577. 
 
By the mid-1960s and early 1970s, however, Western Europe’s major industrial powers decided to 
design and manufacture their own military aircraft instead of importing or co-producing US 
hardware. The rise of Europe’s aeronautics industry from the ashes of WWII illustrates how France, 
the UK and Germany were gradually able to climb up the “ladder of production”578 of weapons 
systems, moving from 1) simple maintenance and overhaul of imported weapons; 2) licensed 
foreign weapons assembly; 3) co-production; to 4) co-development; and, finally, 5) independent 
R&DP of sophisticated weapons systems.579 “Each country [France and the UK] continued to have 
independent strategic interests outside the NATO orbit, and both viewed a vibrant defence industry 
as critical to overall technological and industrial development.”580 Germany, too, had strong 
incentives to choose European over transatlantic defence collaboration: 
 
“Having cooperated with the [US] [throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s] to rebuild 
the German aircraft industry at a surprisingly high technical level, close to that of the 
French and British industries, […] it was [now] in German interest to turn away from 
America to cooperate with France or Britain. With either of these countries Germany could 
cooperate in a nearly equal partnership, pooling resources and gaining know-how to 
produce military aircraft to be purchased by both countries.”581 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
575 Ibid., p. 99 
576 Kapstein (1991-1992) pp. 661-662 
577 Ibid., p. 661 
578 For an overview of different “ladders of production” models see Blitzinger (2003) pp. 16-17, 35. 
579 Smaller countries like Belgium and the Netherlands preferred the (cheaper) co-production of US aircraft. (Lorell et 
al., 2003) pp. 50-55 
580 Ibid., pp. 662-663 
581 Milosch (2006) p. 152 
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Most of the defence projects were based on intra-European collaboration, including the British / 
French Jaguar Jet (1965) and Lynx helicopter (1967), the British / German / Italian Tornado bomber 
(1968), and the Franco / German Alpha Jet (1969). France (to demonstrate its independence from 
America / NATO) and Sweden (to preserve its neutrality), each decided to manufacture indigenous 
military aircraft. Even in those instances where France participated in transnational defence projects 
it was important for Paris to be in the driver’s seat (with regard to weapons design, etc.) to 
underline its political and military leadership role in Europe and because its leaders clung to the 
concept of sovereignty maintained through the subordinate assistance of others.582 While de Gaulle 
was the driving force behind France’s ambitions to take the technological lead in key strategic 
industries such as A&D or nuclear technology, the French President continued to put the main 
emphasis in those sectors on purely national programmes:583 
 
“In the aviation and space sectors, French and British industries share the lead, with 
France holding the advantage in airframes and the [UK] in engines […]. These [two] 
industries have developed a number of projects cooperatively, including the Concorde, 
Jaguar, Martel and three helicopter aircraft (Lynx, Puma, and Gazelle). In all but one 
(Lynx), France exercised design leadership [and sabotaged UK efforts in design 
leadership]. Although an even fifty-fifty division of workload has been observed in these 
projects, British industries have criticised the tendency to leave design leadership to 
[French] partner firms. Similarly, France sought to reduce dependency on British engine 
leadership by encouraging SNECMA […] to collaborate with [GE] […].”584 
 
The cooperation between SNECMA and GE on aircraft engines is an interesting point in case.585 It 
clearly illustrates how Paris at times preferred being in a junior partnership with the Americans 
(GE) rather than agreeing to a collaborative venture with a European partner (in this instance Rolls-
Royce) where France would not have been in the driver’s seat. In general, the French engaged in 
European collaboration when they were the accepted project leader. If France had no other choice 
but to be a junior partner, Paris opted for the deal that seemed to offer the greatest technology 
                                                      
582 “How could France hope to compete if scale and priority were critical in advanced technology? Many Europeans 
concluded that the appropriate response to the technology gap was more vigorous integration. Only by pooling their 
resources and talent might Europeans hope to forestall US hegemony. But this was not the Gaullist conception. France 
did not flee dependence on America only to become dependent on a European mélange. Rather, France’s cooperative 
[European] programmes in nuclear technology, space, and aviation (e.g., the SST) were fashioned so as to draw on the 
resources of other in the interest of her national programmes rather than to donate French expertise in the interest of 
multilateral progress.” McDougall (1985) p. 187 
583 “The wartime hero de Gaulle rose to power just eight months after Sputnik 1. His mission, brooded over for twelve 
years, was to save France. This meant military independence, without which no state was truly sovereign; economic 
independence, without which no state was master of its own house; and technological revolution, without which no 
modern society could maintain the first two conditions.” Ibid., p. 181 
584 Nau (1975) p. 643 
585 On the structure of the international aerospace engine sector, see (Skoens & Wulf, 1994) pp. 48-49 
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transfer. SNECMA started co-producing GE’s CF6-50 engine beginning in 1969, before both 
companies agreed on the co-development of a turbofan engine. In 1974, SNECMA and GE 
launched their 50-50 joint venture CFM International. The CFM-56 aircraft engines became a real 
international bestseller, powering a wide range of commercial aircraft, including different Boeing 
737 and various Airbus models. GE calls CFM “one of the great success stories in aviation history”. 
However, the success of CFM is also a symbol of Europe’s weakness: 
 
“When a national industry [in Europe] is weak relative to its European counterparts 
(France in nuclear power or aircraft engines, Germany in aviation, Britain recently in 
launcher technology, and France and Germany in computers) it regularly chooses to make 
up this disadvantage through assistance from vastly superior American partners rather than 
from more advanced, but less dominant European partners. As one writer observes, 
European firms ‘distrust each other more than they dislike being dependent on the USA.’586 
When firms are roughly equal in capability (French and British aviation industries), 
cooperation is possible only on the basis of careful balance in financing, management and 
work load. The net result of such cooperation is little specialisation and little gain in 
efficiency or cost (the case with Concorde). In addition to this rivalry among major 
industrial partners, a serious and, for the foreseeable future, continuing gap remains 
between French, German and British industries on the one hand, and Italian and Benelux 
countries on the other. Vertical and horizontal rivalries thus combine to leave Europe 
vulnerable to American industrial initiatives.”587 
 
In 1968, the UK launched “Eurogroup” – an informal gathering of defence ministers from ten 
European NATO members – in an effort to further advance European defence industrial 
collaboration within the framework of the Alliance. The impact of this initiative was rather limited, 
especially since France had left NATO’s integrated military command structure two years earlier 
and decided to keep out of Eurogroup. One of Eurogroup’s early accomplishments was the 
“Tornado” started by the UK, Germany and Italy that same year. However, it was not until 1976 
that France and the Eurogroup joined forces to create the Independent European Programme Group 
(IEPG), which was outside of NATO. Having just lost the “sale of the century” competition to the 
Americans a year earlier, the French recognised that they had to cooperate more. While Eurogroup 
“marked the real beginning of a European response to US dominance and the imbalance in 
transatlantic arms transfers […]”, it was only “French participation [in IEPG] since 1976 [that] […] 
                                                      
586 Pavitt (1972) p. 211 
587 Nau (1975) p. 645 
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greatly extended the range and scope of [European] collaborative programs”588. From its inception, 
IEPG’s main focus was the promotion of European collaboration on defence R&DP, including 
equipment standardisation. IEPG also hoped to increase European defence exports to America – 
something that it largely failed to accomplish. 
 
There were differing views within the US regarding Europe’s various attempts (Eurogroup, IEPG) 
to invest in its own weapons systems. On the one hand, there was an expectation that these 
European investments would expand NATO’s overall defence industrial base. On the other hand, 
however, there were also concerns that “the overlap in [US and European] weapon systems589 and 
the lack of NATO standardisation resulted in a tremendous waste of financial resources and military 
inefficiency that could prove fatal on the battlefield”590. There are two main schools of NATO 
standardisation. The first camp, dubbed “the bigger-savings group”, made an economic case for 
NATO standardisation, arguing that it would “save vast sums of money by eliminating duplicative 
[R&D] and achieving economies of scale in weapons production”.591 592 “Bigger-savings” 
advocates pushed for the creation of a transatlantic “two-way street”, something that would “entail 
[…] massive intra-alliance arms sales based on the economic concept of comparative advantage, 
meaning that each country would specialise in the manufacture of the item it produces best”.593 The 
second camp, called “the better defence school”594, made a military case for NATO standardisation, 
arguing that it reduces the Alliance’s vulnerabilities and improve its capabilities.595 “[N]on-
standardised armies require unique and separate supply lines, making wide-ranging manoeuvres 
difficult”. “Such armies must stock different types of spare parts: their logistics are therefore 
complicated and the number of support troops they require is wastefully large.”596 597 The “better-
defence” advocates were pushing for “joint US-European development and co-production of 
weapons systems”598. 
                                                      
588 Kapstein (1991-1992) p. 663 
589 By 1974, NATO already suffered from a high degree of duplication as the Alliance members operated 23 different 
fighter aircraft, seven different battle tanks, etc. Taylor (1982) p. 97 
590 Kapstein (1991-1992) p. 664 
591 Cohen (1978) p. 75 
592 Callaghan (1975) 
593 Cohen (1978) p. 75 
594 Ibid., p. 75 
595 “Even if the [US] has the best tank, the very best tank that we can buy, and even if that tank is produced at the very 
best price that anybody could envision, and even if we buy three times as many as they are talking about buying right 
now, and even if we put them all in NATO […] we are not going to have a strong conventional defence in NATO 
because our flanks are going to be exposed.” Senator Nunn’s statement during a 1976 Senate hearing on the Army’s 
XM-1 tank, quoted in Ibid., pp. 74-75 
596 Ibid., p. 75 
597 “One must not draw too great a distinction between the two main schools of NATO standardisation, the better-
defence people and the lower-costs group. They live symbiotically, and it is unclear which group has a greater influence 
on government policy.” Ibid., p. 75 
598 Ibid., p. 75 
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Europe’s resurgent defence industry also increasingly challenged US dominance in military exports 
to third (world) countries.599 Defence companies on both sides of the Atlantic had traditionally 
relied on exports to recoup rising R&DP costs, lengthen production runs, and drive down their 
systems’ unit costs. In 1975, US Defense Secretary Schlesinger launched the “two-way street” 
initiative: 
 
“[T]o enhance NATO standardisation; encourage American and European technological 
and industrial strength; encourage independent, competitive, national weapons programs, 
increase US purchases of European military hardware; and increase European purchases 
of US hardware on the basis of co-production”600. 
 
However, while Schlesinger pushed for a “two-way street” in transatlantic defence procurement, 
US aerospace companies were eager to maintain and even expand the established “one-way street” 
by convincing the European allies to co-produce US weapons systems rather than support 
competing independent European defence projects.601 602 The biggest symbol of this American 
“divide and conquer” strategy was the 1975 “deal of the century”, in which GD agreed with 
Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway on the co-production of F-16 fighters. To sweeten 
the deal, GD offered its European partners a technology-sharing programme, numerous offset 
arrangements, as well as the opening of two assembly lines in Belgium and the Netherlands. The F-
16 deal effectively divided NATO’s European fighter aircraft market into three distinct segments: 
1) the F-16 (Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway); 2) the Tornado (UK, Germany, Italy); 
and 3) the Mirage (France). As a result, “the F-16 came to be seen in the eyes of many European 
industrialists and public officials (particularly in France) as a Trojan horse wheeled in under the 
banner of the two-way street”. One must recognise that GD was not part of the US administration, 
nor controlled by Washington. In fact, GD’s actions in Europe cut across US administration policy. 
The Pentagon, however, could not control US aerospace companies, particularly given the support 
these firms had built in Congress. Schlesinger’s “two-way street” turned out to be a one-way street 
at best and a dead-end at worst. Eliot Cohen bluntly dismissed the viability of a “two-way street” 
approach for NATO in 1978: “Historically, standardisation has occurred only in an emergency and 
on the basis of a one-way street.”603 
                                                      
599 Between 1967 and 1976, UK defence exports tripled and French arms sales increased eightfold. In contrast, US arms 
exports “only” increased by about 40 percent (from a much higher baseline, of course). Taylor (1992) p. 99 
600 Kapstein (1991-1992) pp. 664-665 
601 Washington refused to buy the French-designed ROLAND air defence missile system. 
602 “Many Europeans have merely sneered at standardisation, which they see as an American ploy to sell more weapons 
to Europe”. Cohen (1978) p. 88 
603 Cohen (1978) p. 85 
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In 1983, UK Defence Minister Heseltine became IEPG chairman and successfully pushed for joint 
technology programmes and harmonised European staff targets.604 In 1988, the IEPG launched an 
“Action Plan on a stepwise development of a European Armaments Market”, designed to open 
European defence markets to cross-border competition and to facilitate technology transfers. This 
initiative was again driven by the UK, where the Thatcher government tried a “commercial 
approach” to defence procurement, an ambitious goal that ultimately proved elusive given that 
defence procurement is “the most nationalistic of all economic activities”605. So why has there been 
so little success in NATO standardisation? 
 
“The fundamental explanation is that economic competition among the NATO member 
states, and related domestic economic concerns, have thwarted most RSI collaborative 
security initiatives. While weapons standardisation can improve military effectiveness in the 
[A]lliance and save billions of dollars in R&D costs and systems redundancy, it can also 
mean loss of sales (particularly in third-country transfers) and of control of military high 
technology for members of the [A]lliance. This is perceived frequently by government and 
business elites as causing balance of payments deficits, loss of commercial transactions 
between arms recipient and arms supplier, increases in unemployment in certain sectors of 
the defence industry, and higher unit-production costs”.606 
 
Cohen identified the following US obstacles to a “two-way street”: 
 
“On the purely political level, the representative nature of American government and the 
geographic location of the defence industry guarantee opposition to the purchase of any 
major weapon abroad. Particularly in a period of high unemployment, congressmen and 
senators will protest vigorously against large defence procurements that help a foreign, 
rather than a domestic, industry. […] 
The doctrine of comparative advantage is not valid for US arms procurement. In any event, 
the intrusion of politics will prevent free trade in weapons. Above all, it is unlikely that 
Congress and the defence establishment will consent to large-scale imports of foreign 
weaponry rather than co-production.”607 
                                                      
604 (Walker & Gummett, 1989) p. 430 
605 Ibid., p. 419 
606 Taylor (1982) pp. 97-98 
607 Cohen (1978) p. 78 
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“Any outright purchase [of foreign weapons] will have a dramatic effect on a nation’s 
balance of payments and its arms industry, with obvious domestic political 
consequences.”608 609 610 
 
After the end of the Cold War, the aggressive, and ultimately successful, lobbying efforts of US 
mega-primes to tie up the military aircraft markets of Central and Eastern Europe came to 
symbolise the enduring nature of the transatlantic “one-way street” as well as America’s dominant 
political position within NATO. With world-wide military spending in a dramatic post-Cold-War 
slump, Western defence firms (LMC, MDC, BAE / Saab, and Dassault) were eager to secure 
lucrative export deals with prospective NATO members like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Romania, and Slovenia. A February 1997 DoS report estimated the total cost of NATO enlargement 
(to new and existing NATO members alike) – based on the assumption that “a small group of non-
specified Central European countries” would join NATO in the first tranche of enlargement [in 
1999] – to be somewhere between US$27-US$35 billion during the 1997-2009 period.611 Of this 
sum, about US$10–US$13 billion would be spent on the future NATO member countries’ military 
modernization and restructuring.612 As one report critical of “this unnecessary and irresponsible 
militarization” put it: 
 
“NATO expansion has secured CEE613 as a market for Western manufacturers by claiming 
that NATO standards of interoperability should be met.”614 
“Despite statements by NATO officials that a military build-up will not secure membership, 
[CEE] elites are being pressured into buying these weapons and weapons systems to 
improve their chances of [NATO] membership.”615 
 
Most of these political pressures exerted on CEE countries have been tied to the aggressive 
lobbying efforts by LMC and MDC vis-à-vis political decision-makers in Europe and America. In 
particular, Bruce Jackson, LMC’s Director of Global and Corporate Development during 1993-
2002, came under a lot of scrutiny for his role in setting up the “US Committee to Expand 
                                                      
608 Ibid., p. 76 
609 Even when America cooperated with Europe, “the DoD often simultaneously funded a competing programme to 
meet the same military requirement. Moreover, the competing US national programme was typically in the [classified] 
part of the DoD budget, meaning that the allies were unaware of its existence”. Grant (1997) p. 118 
610 However, the failure of transatlantic “two-way street” / RSI efforts cannot be entirely blamed on Washington: 
“European countries used multinational projects as a means of obtaining access to new defence technologies; they 
simply added national requirements together rather than harmonising them, pre-selected ‘national champions’ for 
project participation rather than allowing any competition among contractors, and rigidly applied the principle of ‘juste 
retour’ […].” Ibid., p. 118 
611 DoS (1997) p. 17 
612 Ibid., pp. 16-20 
613 CEE = Central and Eastern Europe 
614 Ruecker (1997) p. 2 
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NATO”616, a not-for-profit organisation established in 1996. The Committee included a bipartisan 
board of prominent political and business leaders617 and targeted most of its lobbying efforts at the 
US Senate, which ultimately had to approve any expansion of NATO. Critics charged that 
Jackson’s dual role at LMC and the Committee constituted a clear conflict of interest: 
 
Jackson’s advocacy work in the expansion of NATO and Lockheed’s arms deal with Poland 
highlight the political and corporate linkages that make the NATO expansion both a matter 
of strategic significance for the [US] and economic advantage for its arms 
manufacturers.618 
 
Poland’s US$3.8 billion acquisition of 48 F-16s, a deal which was not finalised until early 2003,619 
620 proved to be particularly controversial as it pitted LMC against Dassault and the BAE-Saab 
consortium. One argument repeatedly made by LMC and the US government vis-à-vis Warsaw was 
that the F-16 acquisition would allow the Polish and US Air Force to develop common doctrine, 
tactics and training procedures. The Bush administration and Congress played a key role in securing 
the deal for Lockheed by providing Warsaw with an attractive US$3.8 billion loan through the 
Foreign Military Financing fund. Poland’s F-16 purchase was sweetened with offset agreements 
totalling US$6-US$8 billion.621 622 623 Apparently, Washington and LMC also used Warsaw’s 
interest in the future acquisition of the JSF fighter as a “carrot” during the F-16 competition.624 
LMC and Jackson strongly rejected any linkage between the F-16 sale and his Congressional 
lobbying for NATO. They claimed that LMC never funded the Committee and that Jackson never 
served as a registered LMC lobbyist.625 Unnamed US and Polish government officials indicated that 
Jackson “was always careful about avoiding conflicts of interests in his dual roles”.626 627 628 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
615 Ibid., p. 1 
616 The US Committee to Expand NATO” was subsequently renamed “US Committee on NATO”. 
617 Robert Zoellick, Stephen Hadley, Peter Rodman, Sally Painter, etc. 
618 Sennott (2003) 
619 The F-16 deal coincided with the US-led Iraq War, which strongly opposed by France and Germany. When the F-16 
accord was signed during a televised ceremony in April 2003, “top US and Polish officials described it as a precursor to 
a strategic partnership, spanning the political, military and economic spheres”. Khadige (2003) 
620 The production facility for the Polish F-16s was located in President Bush’s home state of Texas. 
621 Poland required offsets covering at least 100 percent of the contract’s value. Wall (2003) 
622 “The smaller profit margins that manufacturers are accepting due to no-cost leasing and offset agreements are 
perceived as part of long-term strategies designed to secure product loyalty and establish market presence.” Ruecker 
(1997) p. 4 
623 LMC offered 17 different offset programmes totalling US$6 billion by 2013: 10 percent of the offsets were in 
technology transfers; 20 percent in investments, and 70 percent were linked to purchases of Polish-manufactured goods. 
IISS (2003) p. 246 
624 According to a senior Pentagon official, US negotiators indicated that the F-16 acquisition would constitute “a 
perfect first step to [Poland] eventually becoming an owner and operator of the [JSF].” Also, LMC’s offset manager for 
the F-16 deal was quoted as follows: “What we told [Polish officials] is that it is not up to us to invite them to join JSF 
[but it’s the prerogative of the US government]. However, with the F-16 you have developed a relationship with the 
contractor and the industrial base building JSF.” Wall (2003) 
625 Jackson (2009) and Sennott (2003) 
626 Ibid. 
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France’s political and defence industrial circles as well as EC President Romano Prodi strongly 
criticised Warsaw’s F-16 acquisition.629 As Serge Dassault put it: 
 
“Pourquoi chacun [en Europe] conserve-t-il le droit d’acheter n’importe quel matériel 
militaire américain? Pourquoi pas d’obligation de ‘préférence européenne’ pour les 
matériels d’armement? [...] 
En réalité, les Américains cherchent par tous les moyens à supprimer toute concurrence en 
matière d’armement et à affaiblir l’Europe. [...] 
Ils ont des moyens de pression politiques, financiers, diplomatiques, militaires bien 
supérieurs aux nôtres et lorsque nos avions sont choisis par les états-majors, les Américains 
arrivent par des pressions politiques à faire basculer les décisions en leur faveur. A 
continuer ce jeu de division, l’industrie européenne d'armement tout entière va devenir un 
sous-traitant des Américains. [...] Seul tient encore tête le bastion français avec une 
industrie aéronautique remarquable mais pour combien de temps encore? 
Il serait indispensable que les pays européens se ressaisissent et imposent aux nouveaux et 
aux anciens la préférence européenne.”630 
 
Romano Prodi: 
 
“Certainly it’s displeasing that the day after the EU integration ceremony Poland signs a 
mega-contract for the purchase of American fighters. […] Let it be clear that if one enters 
the [EU] they enter a family. One cannot entrust his purse to Europe and his security to 
America.”631 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
627 The DoS claims that “The [US] and NATO discouraged most of [the CEE] requests [for assistance in acquiring US 
combat aircraft] and counselled that [NATO] membership would depend more on political, military and economic 
reforms than military acquisitions […]. DoS (1998) p. 20 
628 One Hungarian official stated that „[Jackson] was never primarily a sales man but more of a strategic thinker”. 
Dragsdahl (1998) p. 1. This statement implies that Jackson was a sales man, but not “primarily.” 
629 Jakubyszyn (2003) provides a French perspective criticising the US export offensive. 
630 Dassault (2003) 
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4.2 The failed EADC632 and BAe / DASA consolidation talks 
 
Despite increased European collaboration in civil and military aircraft manufacturing starting in the 
1960s and 1970s, Europe’s A&D industry remained “a jumble of national champions” well into the 
1990s.633 By moving from international cooperation to transnational integration, the EADS merger 
marked a historical breakthrough for Europe’s A&D industry. In a way, EADS was the next logical 
step, both from a political and business perspective. At the political level, the 1998 Franco-British 
St. Malo summit’s goal of creating a European security and defence policy independent from the 
US (and NATO) required the maintenance of a competitive defence industrial base. At the business 
level, declining European defence budgets and skyrocketing R&DP costs made it imperative to pool 
resources and achieve significant economies of scale.634 Commenting about this “twin movement 
toward greater Europeanisation of defence matters”, Nicole Gnesotto sees a reversal of roles: 
 
“[I]t is no longer governments that are steering European cooperation on armaments but 
industry itself that is moving ahead of political constraints and adapting them, precipitating 
change and now acting as a driving force in the implementation of common defence.”635 
 
To be sure, important sectoral differences continue to exist. Land systems manufacturers and 
shipbuilders remain predominantly organised along national borders. In contrast, the A&D industry 
(EADS in particular) and the defence electronics industry have really advanced the farthest in the 
drive towards European transnational integration. According to Gnesotto, “the creation of EADS 
heralds a revolution in European industrial affairs whose political repercussions are also potentially 
revolutionary”.636 It should be noted, however, that EADS was just the “second-best” if not “third-
best” solution in the effort to achieve transnational consolidation in the European A&D industry. 
EADS included only two of Europe’s big three players (France and Germany), but not the UK. 
Initially, the “grand vision” was the creation of EADC comprising the four Airbus partners, 
Finmeccanica, and Saab.637 
 
Since early 1997, Aérospatiale, DASA, BAe, and CASA had negotiated about the transformation of 
their loose Airbus consortium into AIC (Airbus Integrated Company). Two events, however, led 
these four companies to look beyond Airbus and consider not only merging their civilian but also 
                                                      
632 EADC = European Aerospace and Defence Company 
633 The Economist (1997) 
634 “In Europe, […] the major producers came to perceive intra-European cooperation as the only way to maintain 
national capabilities, as it became economically imperative to share the rocketing costs of defence R&D. Given these 
costs, intra-European cooperation gradually evolved into the only alternative to buying US equipment, and hence into 
the only means of resisting US defence industrial and technological domination.” Grant (1997) p. 117 
635 Gnesotto (July 2002) p. v 
636 Ibid., p. v 
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their military assets into one company. First, the announcement of the BMD merger posed a serious 
competitive threat to Airbus as it would enable Boeing to balance its highly cyclical civil aviation 
business with MDC’s less cyclical defence operations. Second, on 9 December 1997, Prime 
Minister Blair, Chancellor Kohl, and Prime Minister Jospin issued a trilateral declaration stressing 
“the urgent need to restructure Europe’s A&D electronics industries”638. This consolidation process, 
“expected to embrace major civil and military programs, should lead to European integration based 
on balanced partnership”639. Over time, the consolidation would “help to improve Europe’s share in 
the global market, promote European security and ensure that Europe plays a full role in its own 
defence”640. The three leaders called on their respective “national champions” to develop “a clear 
plan and timetable for action” by 31 March 1998. 
 
Four days before the end of this ambitious deadline, Aérospatiale, DASA, BAe, and CASA 
submitted a report outlining the founding principles for a potential future EADC. The report was 
also shared with the Italian and Swedish governments and their “national champions”, 
Finmeccanica and Saab. While this first report was received quite positively, the ministers of 
industry from the six governments involved met in July 1998 and asked for a second, more detailed 
report to be submitted as soon as possible. In mid-November 1998, the four Airbus partners along 
with Finmeccanica and Saab put forward a second report and agreed on the following principles:641 
 
 First, the ultimate goal of the restructuring and consolidation process would be the creation 
of one, fully integrated A&D company: EADC; 
 Second, EADC should have the following core business lines: civil and military transport 
aircraft; combat and military mission aircraft; helicopters; space launchers and orbital 
infrastructure; satellites and satellites operation; guided weapons and defence and aerospace 
systems; 
 Third, EADC’s corporate strategy should be guided, above all, by economic and financial 
objectives – i.e., the maximisation of shareholder value. With this provision, privatised 
companies such as BAe and DASA sought to limit potential political interference by 
European governments through their respective (state-controlled) national champions;642 
 Fourth, EADC should be run as one entity by one management structure responsible for all 
of the company’s operations; 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
637 For an analysis of the EADC discussions, see Schmitt (2000) pp. 29-32 
638 Sparaco (December 1997) 
639 Ibid., p. 22 
640 Ibid., p. 22 
641 Schmitt (2000) pp. 30-32 
642 Decisions concerning EADC’s allocation of R&DP facilities were to be made according to objective, competition-
based performance criteria rather than the “principle of just return”. 
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 Finally, EADC’s shareholder interests were to be protected by three principles. (1) No single 
EADC shareholder should be able to gain control over the entire company; (2) EADC 
should be protected against hostile takeovers (by third parties); (3) EADC’s dispersed 
shareholders should not be at a disadvantage compared to the company’s large so-called 
“block shareholders”, be they institutional or sovereign. 
 
Ultimately, “the [EADC] discussions never reached the stage of real negotiations. They were 
essentially an exchange of ideas and a general discussion of possible avenues to explore”643. While 
the outlined points of agreement seemed pretty comprehensive, the six companies failed to come to 
a consensus in three crucial areas. First and foremost, there was disagreement over how to merge 
these six companies into one corporate entity, that is, through the “Airbus plus” option, an EADC 
empty shell / holding company or via a “big bang” / “come as you are” merger.644 Second, there 
were differences over the potential EADC shareholder structure, pitting the fully privatised firms 
BAe, DASA, and Saab against Aérospatiale, CASA, and Finmeccanica who were on track for 
privatisation but, at the time of the EADC discussions, were still fully or at least partly state-owned. 
In particular, there was no agreement over what, if any, equity stake the French, Spanish, or Italian 
government would have in EADC.645 Third, there were differences over whether or not to integrate 
ballistic missiles (manufactured only by Aérospatiale) or regional aircraft (a business completely 
abandoned earlier by DASA and Saab) into EADC. Finally, it was not clear how to potentially 
include France’s Dassault into this consolidation process.646 
 
Despite all professions about the necessity of a comprehensive consolidation of Europe’s A&D 
industry – and even the broad agreement on the basic structure and operating principles of the 
future EADC outlined above – the “big bang” EADC consolidation & restructuring project proved 
to be far too complex to implement to be more than just the subject of relatively theoretic corporate 
strategy discussions in board rooms across Europe. 
 
“The real question was who would get married first, and to whom. The stakes were very 
high: for the small companies it was a matter of not being sidelined by a merger of the 
large. For each of the large companies, it was essential not to allow itself to be isolated by a 
merger of two of the others.”647 
 
                                                      
643 Schmitt (2000) p. 30 
644 For a detailed discussion of these merger options, see Ibid., p. 31 
645 Ibid., p. 31 
646 Ibid., p. 31. Dassault followed the EADC discussions but did not actively participate. 
647 Ibid., p. 32 
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After the failure of EADC, France’s A&D industry was most at risk of being marginalized in the 
European consolidation end game ahead. A bilateral link-up involving Germany’s DASA and the 
UK’s BAe seemed now even more plausible, given that both defence groups were fully privatised 
whereas France’s AM remained under partial state control. BAe and DASA had already been in 
merger talks since early 1998, in parallel to the EADC discussions.648 Both companies participated 
in the Airbus and Eurofighter and also shared “the same business philosophy: shareholder value as 
the absolute priority, and no state participation in the firm’s capital”.649 However, BAe and DASA 
also faced considerable obstacles in their efforts to join forces. First, with an annual turnover of 
$11.6 billion in 1998, BAe was a third bigger than DASA, which had revenues of EUR8.7 billion. 
Nonetheless, DASA firmly insisted on a “merger of equals” with BAe.650 Second, there were 
differences in the two companies’ shareholder structure. While BAe had a very fragmented 
shareholder base, DASA was controlled by a single block shareholder (DCX). Many BAe 
shareholders therefore feared that DCX would dominate a merged BAe/DASA company. 
 
While the BAe/DASA negotiations reached an advanced stage and seemed to be close to a 
successful conclusion in late 1998, the UK-German merger failed at the last minute when BAe got 
the opportunity to become Britain’s undisputed “national champion” through the acquisition of the 
UK defence electronics firm GEC-Marconi. Several factors explain this decision. First, the 
acquisition of GEC-Marconi made BAE Systems the dominant player in the domestic UK defence 
market, allowing it to capture 60 to 80 percent of the nation’s procurement business. Second, BAe 
also hoped that by consolidating at the national level – as opposed to the European level – it would 
increase or at least preserve its potential chance for a transatlantic merger with a US mega-prime. 
Finally, given the pronounced disparities in size between the two companies, “DASA turned out to 
be too powerful to be absorbed but also too weak for a merger as an equal partner with BAE.”651 
For DASA, BAe’s last-minute change of heart came as a big surprise and permanently damaged the 
trust between the senior management of the two companies.652 653 While BAe thought that the 
acquisition of Marconi would just temporarily delay its merger talks with DASA, the Germans 
expressed their strong opposition to the BAe-Marconi deal, which had resulted in vertical rather 
than horizontal integration. 
                                                      
648 Ibid., p. 35 
649 Ibid., pp. 34-35 
650 The equity in the merged company would have been split 60-40 percent in favour of BAe. The Independent (1998) 
651 Vlachos-Dengler (2004) p. 13 
652 BAe chairman Evans called DCX CEO Schrempp to convince him to abandon the 1999 EADS merger, Evans was 
reportedly told “We’re not interested. You have had your chance.” Industry watchers dubbed the EADS deal 
“Schrempp’s revenge”. (Lorenz & Woodhead, 1999) 
653 DASA knew that BAe wanted to acquire Marconi, but believed that such a deal would happen after the planned 
DASA-BAe merger. Willcock (1998) 
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With combined annual revenues in 1998 of about EUR17.4 billion, the “New BAe” as it was first 
called before being re-branded “BAE Systems” in December 1999, was far bigger than either 
DASA (EUR8.7 billion) or AM (EUR11.6 billion). A transnational European merger between or 
among equals involving BAe was therefore no longer politically feasible as it would have amounted 
to a UK takeover of Germany’s and / or France’s “national champions”.654 DASA wanted to be an 
“equal partner” even though it was a smaller company. The Marconi purchase made BAe a 
significantly bigger company, so DASA would clearly have been the junior in a merger. In deciding 
to become the UK’s “national champion”, BAe had foregone the possibility to become a co-founder 
of the first “European champion” in the A&D industry. However, the creation of BAE did raise the 
spectre of privileged access to the American defence market and a potential merger with a US 
mega-prime.655 656 With the failure of the “second best” BAe-DASA merger solution, the way was 
now paved for the “third best” solution in Europe’s desire to restructure and consolidate its A&D 
industry: the Franco-German-led EADS. 
                                                      
654 In January 1999, DASA declared that the BAe-Marconi link-up “will make balanced European horizontal mergers 
such as DASA-BAe impossible and create an obstacle to European integration”. Jones (1999) 
655 Deputy Defense Secretary Hamre apparently told BAE CEO Weston in the fall of 1999 that the Pentagon would 
treat his company like an American firm and that it would like to see large-scale transatlantic aerospace industrial 
consolidation to boost competition in the highly oligopolistic US defence sector. Gow (1999) 
656 LMC was best positioned to be part of a potential transatlantic merger deal because unlike Boeing, it was not 
competing with the Europeans in commercial aircraft: “In essence, the key focus of LMC’s corporate strategy 
discussions in the mid-to-late 1990s was about how we could potentially join forces with a major European firm in a 
full-fledged transatlantic merger deal.” Jackson (1999). DASA also approached LMC for informal merger talks. 
However, LMC refused to give DCX a 50-percent stake in the merged company. LMC (1999 revuenues: USD25.5 
billion) was far bigger than DASA, making a “merger between equals” impossible. (Lorenz & Woodhead, 1999) 
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4.3 EADS and its founding companies: Aérospatiale Matra, DASA, and CASA 
 
The EADS merger, announced in mid-October 1999, marks a historic breakthrough. For the first 
time, three sovereign countries – France, Germany, and later Spain – decided to allow their leading 
A&D companies – AM, DASA, and CASA, respectively – to merge into one fully integrated 
company: EADS.657 For sure, international cooperation on select defence projects was already quite 
common during the Cold War. But prior to the EADS link-up, this cooperation had never taken the 
form of full-scale transnational mergers involving core elements of the countries’ national defence 
industrial base.658 On 14 October 1999, Chancellor Schroeder and Prime Minister Jospin – flanked 
by DASA CEO Bischoff and AM Chairman Lagardère – declared in Strasbourg that DASA and 
AM would merge their operations to form EADS, the first pan-European A&D company. The 
EADS merger “is good for France, good for Germany, and good for Europe”, argued Schroeder. 
Prime Minister Jospin echoed the Chancellor and said that EADS would be “a powerful tool for 
building a strong and unifying Europe who is the master of its own future”.659 660 
 
On December 2, 1999, Spain’s state-owned CASA decided to join forces with EADS. For one 
thing, DASA had already been in advanced take-over talks with CASA for several months when the 
Franco-German EADS merger was announced in October. Furthermore, AM, DASA, and CASA 
were long-standing collaborators on several major A&D projects, including Airbus, Eurocopter, 
Eurofighter, and Arianespace, which together accounted for 70 percent of EADS revenues.661 Most 
importantly, AM and DASA each held a 37.9 percent stake in the highly profitable Airbus 
consortium. With the addition of CASA (4.2 percent stake), EADS controlled 80 percent of Airbus. 
 
In 1999, EADS had pro-forma combined annual revenues of about EUR22.5 billion, making it 
Europe’s biggest A&D group. Globally, EADS was the third largest A&D company, after Boeing 
(US$55.4 billion) and LMC (US$26 billion), but before Raytheon (US$17.5 billion). In terms of 
market share, EADS ranked among the world’s top two A&D companies in all of the following 
business lines: commercial aircraft (#2), civil helicopters (#1), commercial space launch vehicles 
                                                      
657 The 1992 creation of Eurocopter, involving the merger of Aérospatiale’s and DASA’s helicopter activities, had 
already resulted in a smaller and limited case of pan-European defence consolidation. Nevertheless, “Eurocopter 
represents the first time that aeronautics companies from different European countries combined R&D and production 
capabilities”. GAO (1994) p. 6 
658 “[T]he essential security interests of member states referred to in [Art. 296 (ex Art. 223) of the EC Treaty] have 
often been broadly interpreted in order to override the disciplines of Community policies”. Schmitt (April 2003) p. 10 
659 China Business Information Network (1999) 
660 The EADS press conference “was peppered with references to ‘our British friends’, although given the political spin 
put on the deal it was unclear if that meant BAe or Blair’s government. In any case, the phrase hung in the air halfway 
between a threat and an invitation.” French finance minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn declared: “This [EADS merger] 
shows that Europe does not stop with a currency project. […] This is a day our British friends should take note of.” 
(Lorenz & Woodhead, 1999) 
661 EADS ( 2000) p. 9 
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(#1), and missiles (#2). Furthermore, EADS was one of the leading manufacturers of military 
aircraft as well as of satellites and defence electronics. 76 percent of EADS revenues in 1999 
derived from the civil sector, with 24 percent coming from military sales.662 At the time of the 
merger, EADS decided to divide its far-flung operations into five business lines: (1) Airbus, (2) 
Military Transport Aircraft, (3) Aeronautics (other than Airbus and Military Transport Aircraft), (4) 
Space, and (5) Defence and Civil Systems. 
 
In 1999, Airbus accounted for pro-forma revenues of EUR12.6 billion, approximately 54 percent of 
EADS’s EUR22.5 billion total turnover. At the time of the EADS merger, Airbus had already taken 
off commercially and was on the verge of a major boost that would propel it ahead of Boeing, the 
dominant force on the global market for large commercial aircraft. Between 1999 and 2004, Airbus 
outsold Boeing in five out of six years. And in 2003, Airbus outperformed Boeing for the first time 
in terms of actual deliveries. EADS’s Military Transport Aircraft Division (MTA Division) 
manufactures light and medium military transport aircraft and is also responsible for the A400M 
project designed to give European countries much-needed heavy strategic airlift capabilities. In 
terms of revenue, MTA ranked as the smallest EADS division, with pro forma sales of about 
EUR200 million in 1999. With the A400M, EADS hoped to be able to compete across the full 
range of military transport aircraft, including the rapidly growing market for heavy transport 
aircraft.663 US competitors like Boeing’s C-17 Globemaster III or LMC’s C-5 Galaxy Starlifter 
already play a crucial role in allowing a quick response to military crises or humanitarian disasters 
world-wide.664 The A400M has long been dogged by cost overruns and production delays, thus 
raising serious political and financial questions about the overall viability of this defence 
contract.665 British scepticism over the A400M has risen as its costs have spiralled and delays 
lengthened, while Germany, Spain, and Italy leased Ukrainian Antonov planes to transport troops 
outside Europe. As for the UK RAF, it flies C-17s. 
 
The EADS Aeronautics Division includes all of the company’s aeronautics activities outside of 
Airbus and MTA, such as Eurocopter, Eurofighter666, military aircraft, regional aircraft, general 
aviation aircraft, and aircraft maintenance and conversion. In total, the Aeronautics Division had 
                                                      
662 Ibid., pp. 7-8 
663 “No single country, other than the US and the former Soviet Union, has ever built its own strategic military 
transports or wide-body jetliners. Essentially, France has succeeded in creating this capability for itself by giving 
programme shares to the rest of Europe.” Aboulafia (2001) 
664 In principle, the A400M will also be equipped to serve as a tactical tanker aircraft, allowing its customers to 
significantly increase the effective combat range of their bomber and fighter aircraft within a given theatre of 
operations. 
665 Most of the A400M’s problems are due to the fact that the plane is overweight and that the turboprop engines do not 
provide sufficient thrust. 
666 EADS has a 46 percent share of Eurofighter (BAE: 33 percent; Finmeccanica: 21 percent). 
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pro-forma sales of EUR4.3 billion in 1999, equivalent to 18.2 percent of total EADS revenues.667 
Eurocopter was created in 1992, when Aérospatiale and DASA merged their helicopter divisions.668 
With sales of EUR1.8 billion, Eurocopter ranked as the world’s #1 producer of commercial 
helicopters and Europe’s #1 manufacturer of military helicopters.669 Apart from Eurocopter, the 
Eurofighter670 is the other major part of the EADS Aeronautics Division. Launched in 1988 by 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK, the Eurofighter was designed to deliver a high performance 
multi-role aircraft optimised for air superiority in complex air combat scenarios. Eurofighter 
production began in 1998 and was scheduled to end by 2015.671 According to EADS estimates in 
1999, the Eurofighter consortium was expected (yet subsequently failed) to capture about 50 
percent of the world’s total export market for fighter aircraft, then valued at 800 units worth more 
than EUR50 billion over the next 30 years.672 
 
The EADS Space Division is the world’s #3 producer of space systems – such as satellites, space 
launchers, and orbital infrastructures – after Boeing and LMC. In 1999, revenues of the EADS 
Space Division were EUR2.5 billion (11 percent of total turnover).673 At the time of the 1999 
merger, EADS forecast substantial growth in the commercial satellite market as a result of projected 
increased future demand for telecommunications services.674 EADS also expected growing demand 
for military communications and observations satellites in the wake of the Kosovo War, which 
exposed Europe’s serious reconnaissance shortcomings. In navigation satellites, too, EADS forecast 
substantial future growth, especially with regard to the “Galileo” navigation system. The AML675 
unit of EADS’s Space Division manufactures commercial space launchers and ballistic missiles.676 
677 678 
 
                                                      
667 EADS (2000) pp. 80-92 
668 Ibid., pp. 81-84 
669 During 1995-1999, 60 percent of Eurocopter’s revenues were generated by exports outside of France and Germany. 
Ibid., p. 83 
670 For more information on the Eurofighter, see EADS (2000) pp. 84-87. 
671 By the time of the EADS merger, the Eurofighter consortium had already received 620 order commitments from the 
four founding countries as well as Greece. Due to budgetary constraints, Eurofighter orders (and their weapons 
equipment) would be scaled down significantly in subsequent years. 
672 EADS (2000) p. 86 
673 Ibid., pp. 93-99 
674 Ibid., pp. 95-96 
675 AML = Aérospatiale Matra Lanceurs 
676 Through its stake in Arianespace, EADS is the lead architect of ESA’s Ariane space launcher programme. With a 50 
percent market share of commercial space launches worldwide, Arianespace occupied the global top spot in 1999, with 
a total of over 120 commercial launches since 1984. EADS (2000) p. 97 
677 In general, the commercial space launch business is characterised by very high financial and technological “barriers 
of entry”, which explains why the number of corporate players is limited to a small group of “national champions” such 
as EADS in Europe, Boeing and LMC in the US, as well as select Russian and Chinese companies. The development 
and production of space launchers require considerable technological expertise and up-front investments that are usually 
conditional upon public funding, either from civilian or military sources. 
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Finally, EADS’s Defence and Civil Systems (DCS) Division comprises missiles and missile 
systems, defence electronics, telecommunications, and services.679 In 1999, the DCS had revenues 
of EUR3.8 billion (16.3 percent of EADS turnover), making EADS Europe’s biggest missile 
manufacturer and the #2 globally after Raytheon.680 In terms of defence electronics, the DCS 
division focuses on C4I capabilities, which provide military commanders with accurate, reliable, 
real-time information about the positions and actions of enemy forces, both at the tactical and 
strategic level.681 682 Looking at DCS’s cutting-edge product portfolio and economic weight, it is 
clear that this unit (along with Airbus) was critical to the future success of EADS.683 
 
EADS aimed to achieve cost savings of US$428 million a year by 2004 and to boost its operating 
margin to 8 percent, up from 6.4 percent in 1999.684 685 “Half of this will come from lower 
purchasing costs, 30 percent will come from a reduction in the overall cost base – [R&DP] and so 
on – 15 percent from new sales opportunities, and 5 percent from better financial engineering.”686 In 
this context, one must not forget that European aerospace companies made significant gains vis-à-
vis their US competitors in terms of operating efficiency, labour costs, and productivity during the 
second half of the 1990s.687 688 Furthermore, the sharp weakening of the Euro against the US dollar 
in 1999 / 2000 provided European companies with additional competitive benefits over American 
companies.689 690 On the downside, aerospace experts pointed to costly long-term dollar hedging as 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
678 AML manufactures France’s nuclear tipped, submarine-based M4/M45 missiles. 
679 EADS combined the missile activities of Aérospatiale Matra Missiles, Matra Défense, Matra BAe Dynamics (a 50-
50 joint venture BAE-EADS), and DASA’s LFK-Lenkflugkörpersysteme division. 
680 In 1999, EADS forecast the global market for missiles and missile systems to grow from EUR12 billion in 2000 to 
EUR14.5 billion in 2005 (20 percent growth rate). EADS (2000) p. 101 
681 C4I capabilities are also crucial for maximising interoperability among allied and coalition forces through the 
exchange of real-time data. 
682 Major defence electronics competitors are: Thomson-CSF, BAE, Raytheon, LMC. 
683 Prior to EADS, many of the missile activities of AMM, MD, MBD, and LFK were organized in various JVs, thus 
promising future synergies derived from successful post-merger integration. Ibid., p. 103 
684 Butterworth-Hayes (2000) 
685 In 1999, Europe’s A&D companies averaged a 7-percent operating margin (like their US rivals). In 1998, the 
European score was significantly lower (5 percent). AECMA statistics cited in Dowell (2000). 
686 EADS spokesman quoted in Butterworth-Hayes (2000). The annual savings of US$428 million were to be broken 
down as follows: Airbus: 50 percent; DCS: 15 percent; Space: 12 percent; EADS headquarters: 11 percent; 
Aeronautics: 10 percent; Military Transport Aircraft: 2 percent. See Ibid. 
687 By the third quarter 2000, unit labour costs in the US relative to the 11 Euro members were 38.5 percent above their 
1987-99 average. Between the launch of Euro in January 1999 and the third quarter 2000, the depreciation of the 
common currency alone had boosted the competitiveness of Euro zone producers vis-à-vis their international rivals by 
18 percent (other factors include relatively moderate price and cost increases in the Eurozone, etc.). EC (2000) 
688 “A closer analysis of the figures suggests that there have been three main reasons for the strong growth figures: a 
dramatic improvement in overall productivity levels, the success of Airbus, and the start of the production phase of 
large European military programs such as Eurofighter, EH101, Rafale, NH90, and Tiger.” Dowell (2000) 
689 In 1999, the Euro depreciated 26 percent against the US dollar. 
690 “The rapid recent decline in the value of the euro and the pound against the [US] dollar creates an opportunity for the 
European aerospace industry to improve its competitiveness in the marketplace. […] If this currency exchange 
advantage can be combined with a fast, cost-effective integration of the partners into EADS, the results could cause real 
problems for its US competitors.” Butterworth-Hayes (2000) 
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well as “the expense and sheer complexity of integration” involved in the EADS and BAE mergers 
as factors playing against the Europeans.691 692 
                                                      
691 European A&D companies usually “hedge” against euro-dollar currency swings for an extended period of time (1-2 
years) and do not fully benefit from a strong dollar until these hedging arrangements have expired. Ibid. 
692 Analysts point to the poor stock market performance of EADS and BAE shortly after their respective mergers as 
proof that “these integration complexities are proving tough to overcome”. Ibid. 
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4.3.1 Aérospatiale Matra (AM) 
 
AM was created on June 14, 1999, when two French A&D companies – state-owned Aérospatiale 
and privately-controlled Matra Hautes Technologies (MHT)693 – decided to join forces. On the one 
hand, the AM link-up was driven by the desire to create an internationally competitive French 
“national champion”. On the other hand, in the words of AM Chairman Lagardère, the AM merger 
was also designed to “signal a start to the restructuring of the European A&D industry – a 
development in which we were determined to play the leading role.”694 The French government’s 
decision in December 1998 to transfer its 45.76 percent stake in Dassault – the highly profitable 
manufacturer of the Rafale and Mirage fighters – to Aérospatiale had already led to a significant 
“rapprochement” between the country’s leading aircraft manufacturers.695 With the addition of 
MHT, AM became a horizontally integrated company active in civilian and military aircraft, 
helicopters, space, and telecommunications. By bringing its national A&D industry consolidation to 
a logical conclusion, France wanted to make sure that AM would be a crucial player in any possible 
European consolidation end-game: “un acteur incontournable sur la scene européenne”.696 
 
With 1999 sales of EUR12.9 billion, AM was the largest French A&D company and the biggest 
EADS founder. Globally, AM ranked as the fifth largest A&D company, after Boeing, LMC, 
Raytheon, and BAE. With an operating income of only EUR480 million, however, AM’s 
profitability and operating margin of 3.7 percent (4 percent in 1998) was disappointing and clearly 
lagged behind DASA and CASA. AM’s bloated workforce of more than 52,000 – most of it 
unionised – accounted for the company’s high cost structure and its difficulties in adapting to the 
post-Cold War slash in defence spending and weapons procurement. AM’s 1999 sales broke down 
as follows: Airbus: EUR5.5 billion (42 percent of revenues); Other Aviation Operations: EUR0.85 
billion (7 percent);697 Dassault Aviation (AM held a 45.76 percent stake): EUR1.4 billion (10 
percent); Eurocopter: EUR1.8 billion (14 percent)698; Space: EUR1.5 billion (11 percent); Missile 
systems: EUR1.2 billion (9 percent); and the Systems, Services, and Telecoms division: EUR0.86 
billion (7 percent). The weight of civil and military sales in AM’s 1999 turnover was 76 percent and 
24 percent, respectively. 
 
                                                      
693 MHT had three business lines: space, defence, telecommunications 
694 AM (2000) p. 2 
695 Dassault’s strategic decisions require a two-thirds majority vote by a steering committee where AM and Dassault 
have equal representation. 
696 Cambon (1997) 
697 This division included the ATR regional aircraft JV with Finmeccanica. 
698 Since AM held a 60-percent majority stake in Eurocopter, it was able to count the subsidiary’s full turnover towards 
its annual revenues. DASA only counted 40 percent of Eurocopter’s sales towards its turnover. 
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On 13 January 1999, the French government issued a decree allowing for the privatisation of 
Aérospatiale. Just two days later, the government signed an agreement with Jean-Luc Lagardère to 
merge Aérospatiale with MHT to create AM.699 AM’s official date of birth is 14 June 1999, ten 
days after the company’s listing on the Paris stock exchange. While the French state’s stake in AM 
was below 50 percent, the government retained a final say over AM’s strategic decisions like 
potential M&As, spin-offs, etc.700 701 In principle, AM was well positioned for the coming phase of 
European A&D industrial consolidation, especially given its size and strong track record of 
successfully participating in collaborative projects like Airbus, Eurocopter, and Ariane. That being 
said, the French government’s 48 percent stake in AM would prove to be a major obstacle in future 
merger talks with privately-controlled European companies such as DASA or BAE whose 
management feared that political pressure from Paris could unduly interfere with AM’s corporate 
strategy.702 The close links between AM and the French government, particularly through the DGA, 
meant that AM was likely to behave as a vehicle for French state and political interests as much as 
or more than a profit-seeking corporation. 
                                                      
699 AM’s shareholder structure was as follows: French government: 48 percent; Lagardère Group: 33 percent; AM 
employees: two percent; the remaining 17 percent of AM shares was distributed among institutional and retail investors. 
700 “The [AM] Golden Share gave the government the right to: name a non-voting member to the board; approve any 
new shareholding of 10 percent or more; approve any increase in an existing stake by 10 percent or more of the total 
capital; and block the sale of any part of the shares if it would threaten [AM]’s control in ballistic missiles, laser, 
nuclear, and armaments units.” Bialos (2009) vol. II, p. 344 
701 “France must know on whom it can rely (both strategic and economic) and refuses to risk its national security by 
allowing firms motivated solely by financial considerations, or foreign firms with different security interests, to steward 
its major defence companies.” Ibid., p. 308 
702 From an economic perspective, AM’s bloated workforce and low profitability made rationalisation / job cuts 
inevitable. However, from a political perspective – especially against the backdrop of a newly elected Socialist 
government – the implementation of such reforms seemed far too costly. 
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4.3.2 DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG (DASA) 
 
Prior to the EADS merger, DASA was the 100-percent-owned A&D subsidiary of DCX – itself the 
creation of a major transatlantic merger between Daimler-Benz AG and Chrysler Corporation in 
1999. DASA was founded in 1989, when Daimler-Benz took the lead in creating a German 
“national champion” by consolidating the country’s key A&D firms into one single company, 
DASA. The Cartel Office initially opposed the DASA merger plans, but dropped its most serious 
anti-trust objections after Chancellor Kohl’s government provided strong political backing for the 
deal.703 The German government, along with key state governments such as Bavaria, facilitated the 
creation of DASA by selling their remaining major A&D assets to Daimler-Benz AG. As early as 
1990, then-DASA Chairman Juergen E. Schrempp – who would become CEO of Daimler-Benz AG 
in 1995 and play a key role in the 1999 EADS merger – made it clear that his strategy was to make 
the company “an equal partner in Europe, not a junior partner”704. When asked about DASA’s 
longer-term future beyond Europe, Schrempp also expressed his desire to enter into “extended 
partnerships”705. 
 
1999 was the most successful year in DASA’s history. Revenues increased by five percent from 
EUR8.7 billion to EUR9.2 billion, primarily driven by booming Airbus deliveries and a favourable 
US dollar exchange rate. At the same time, DASA’s operating income rose by EUR107 million to 
EUR730 million, an increase of more than 17 percent due to continuing efficiency and productivity 
gains.706 In 1999, DASA’s operating margin stood at 7.9 percent, more than twice as high as AM’s 
comparatively low 3.7 percent margin. That year, DASA’s annual sales broke down as follows: 
Commercial Aircraft (essentially Airbus): EUR3.3 billion (36 percent of total turnover);707 
Eurocopter: EUR705 million (8 percent);708 Military Aircraft (Eurofighter, Tornado): EUR1.1 
billion (12 percent); Space Infrastructure: EUR592 million (7 percent); Satellites: EUR458 million 
(5 percent); Defence and Civil Systems: EUR1.7 billion (19 percent); and Aero Engines: EUR1.7 
billion (19 percent). With annual R&D expenses of EUR2 billion (21.8 percent of turnover), DASA 
ranked as one of the world’s most technology-intensive A&D companies. DASA had 46,000 
employees in 1999. 
                                                      
703 Taylor (1990) p. 60 
704 Mecham (1999) 
705 Ibid. 
706 DASA (2000) p. 4 
707 Airbus accounted for more than 90 percent of DASA’s total commercial aircraft turnover prior to the EADS merger. 
The remaining ten percent derived primarily from aircraft conversion (i.e., turning used passenger jets into freighters). 
708 This figure reflects the consolidated DASA turnover figure according to its 40 percent stake in Eurocopter. 
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4.3.3 Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA (CASA) 
 
While CASA was by far the smallest EADS co-founder, Spain’s state-owned aerospace company 
was more profitable and efficient than DASA or AM. Like in the case of DASA, 1999 marked the 
most successful year in CASA history.709 Turnover rose to EUR1.2 billion (+ 20 percent), and 
CASA’s operating income increased by 24 percent to EUR130 million in 1999, delivering a margin 
of 10.7 percent. 90 percent of CASA’s 1999 revenues derived from aircraft sales; three percent 
from its space activities; and seven percent from maintenance services. 70 percent of CASA’s sales 
came from commercial clients; 30 percent from military customers. Prior to EADS, much of 
CASA’s turnover derived from its stake in the Airbus (4.2 percent) and Eurofighter (14 percent) 
consortia. CASA had 7,500 employees in 1999. 
                                                      
709 CASA (2000) 
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4.4 The Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System 
 
The Galileo GNSS710 marks an important milestone in Europe’s growing space ambitions and 
clearly illustrates the French-led desire to cut its dependence on the existing American GPS 
system.711712 While Galileo’s origins date back to 1998-1999, it was not until November 2001 and 
March 2002, respectively, that ESA and the EU joined forces and decided to each provide EUR550 
million in funding for the development phase of the 30-satellite navigation system – now scheduled 
to be operational in 2013.713 While two-thirds of Galileo’s deployment costs (EUR2.4 billion)714 
were supposed to come from the European Galileo Industries consortium715, these plans fell through 
in 2007, when the aerospace companies pulled out of the project, thus prompting the EC to step in 
and save the struggling navigation system. Galileo is the largest technology project funded and 
managed by the EU.716 
 
The motivations behind Galileo include a mix of political, economic, and technological factors. 
Officially, the EC has described Galileo as “the first [GNSS] designed specifically for civilian use 
worldwide”.717 718 And for sure, given the rapid growth in GNSS-related (commercial) 
applications,719 Galileo’s business case appeared to be rather strong.720 721 The UK, in particular, 
insisted that all official Galileo-related publications stress the system’s commercial focus.722 
However, it is clear that military / geostrategic and technological motives loomed large when the 
EU – pushed by France – decided to go ahead with Galileo. The EC compared Galileo to Airbus 
                                                      
710 GNSS = Global Navigation Satellite System 
711 GPS = Global Positioning System 
712 For up-to-date information about Galileo: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/galileo/index_en.htm and 
http://www.esa.int/esaNA/galileo.html 
713 Initially, Galileo was set to be operational by 2008. However, the start date was subsequently postponed to 2013. 
714 Galileo’s total cost of EUR3.5 billion breaks down as follows: EUR1.1 billion for the development phase + EUR 2.4 
billion for the deployment phase. The original plan was for the EU to pay for the first four satellites, and industry to pay 
for two thirds of the costs for the next 26 satellites. 
715 Galileo Industries involved Alcatel Alenia Space, Thales, Finmeccanica, EADS Astrium (UK / Germany), and 
several Spanish companies. After Galileo Industries pulled out in mid-2007, France lobbied hard to keep the satellite 
system alive and managed to convince its fellow EU members to cover the EUR2.4 billion shortfall by using EUR1.6 
billion from unused EU farm subsidies and funds from the EC’s technology budget. Taverna (2001) 
716 Ibid. 
717 EC (Space Cooperation EU-Russia) 
718 This statement implied that Galileo would not be shut down during military crises. 
719 Potential Galileo applications include public transport, aviation, energy, fishery, environment / science, law 
enforcement, border patrol, etc. 
720 According to a 2001 study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Galileo is expected to generate direct revenues of EUR 515 
million per year (EC estimated annual operating costs of EUR 200 million). Together with Galileo’s broader economic 
gains and positive externalities, the cost-benefit ratio reached 4.6 – an impressive benchmark for a public-private 
partnership. The Economist (June 2002) 
721 Galileo is not only attractive because it provides greater accuracy than GPS, but also because it features an integrity 
signal that constantly informs users of Galileo’s continuity and reliability, making new commercial applications 
possible. Taverna (2003) 
722 London was trying to allay US fears about Galileo’s potential military / security applications and the challenge it 
could pose to the US-controlled system – and thus to America’s GNSS hegemony. The Blair government was divided 
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and Ariane, both of which successfully broke US dominance in the commercial airliner and space 
launch businesses. In that sense, Galileo is about organizing an effective EU-wide effort to allow 
Europe to compete with the American hegemon in a crucial technology sector.723 From the start, 
Paris has been the key driving force behind Galileo, with most of the funding coming from 
Germany. This has been precisely the French method for European collaboration since de Gaulle 
and the 1960s: the French lead, and the Germans pay. In 2001 President Chirac sternly warned that 
the abandonment of Galileo “would lead our country inevitably to a vassal status [vis-à-vis 
America], first scientific and technical and then industrial and economic.”724 France argued that the 
Europeans should no longer rely on GPS as that navigation network was controlled by the Pentagon 
and provided the foreign / non-military GPS users only with less accurate positioning data than 
those used by the US military.725 Furthermore, Paris was concerned that Washington could jam or 
shut down certain parts of the publicly accessible GPS system during a military crisis in an effort to 
deny its adversaries GNSS benefits.726 Such a crisis-related GPS disruption could also have a 
serious economic impact on legitimate third-party users in Europe and elsewhere. American 
officials “have denied that the US government has ever turned off civilian GPS signals during any 
conflict and underline that they do not intend to do so in the future”.727 These assurances have done 
little to allay European concerns. “The fundamental reason for creating Galileo was political and, at 
some level, a distrust of the [US].”728 France along with Italy, the third key Galileo backer, 
therefore demanded that the system have an encrypted PRS729 signal for use by European law 
enforcement and security services.730 731 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
over Galileo. The defence and finance ministries were skeptical whereas the industry ministry backed Galileo. The 
Economist (June 2002) 
723 “In technological terms: Galileo will enable Europe to acquire the technological independence that it wants in this 
area, as it did with other initiatives such as Ariane and Airbus. It is vital that it should not be excluded from what is 
already looking like being one of the main industrial sectors of the 21st century, which is how the Americans consider 
it. Without Galileo, the development and even the survival of European new technology sectors would be under very 
serious threat; with Galileo, the technological advance that the participating European industries will obtain will give 
them a considerable competitive advantage in this sector […].” EC (2002) p. 4 
724 James (2001) 
725 “Select Availability” (SA) limited the public GPS signal’s accuracy to 300 feet. In 2000, Washington decided to 
increase the public GPS system’s accuracy to 40 feet. The military GPS is much more precise, with a margin of error of 
only several centimetres. “This decision was part of a larger effort to make GPS more responsive to civil and 
commercial users around the globe. In good measure, this decision was driven by a fear that continuation of [SA] 
created doubts about the willingness of the US to provide what had become a critical global infrastructure and acted as 
an incentive for other nations to build their own satellite navigation systems.” Lewis (2004) p. 1 
726 European media claim that Washington jammed the public GPS signal on a regional basis during the 1999 Kosovo 
War. The denial of GPS to the enemy is an “asymmetric use” of GNSS. Giegerich (2007) p. 495. In recent years, the 
US military had to strengthen its GPS signals to prevent enemy jamming. 
727 Ibid., p. 495. “While this may perhaps be true, a distinction has to be made between turning off the civilian GPS 
signals, on the one hand, and degrading them, on the other. The former is highly unlikely given that such a decision 
would incur enormous costs to the US economy and would – at this stage of GPS’s development – also undermine US 
military operations. The latter, however, is more likely, especially since improvements in GPS will offer a better 
separation between military and civilian signals, thereby reducing the impact on US operations further.” Ibid., p. 495 
728 Lewis (2004) p. 1 
729 PRS = Public Regulated Service 
730 The Economist (June 2002) 
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[T]he military implications of Galileo bring out significant divisions among EU member 
states. France and the [UK] represent the opposite poles of the spectrum, with the former 
strongly pushing for a military role for Galileo and the latter resisting such moves […]. 
Reports have suggested that France, with tacit support of the other main bankroller of 
Galileo, Germany, has adopted a strategy for gradually expanding military use of Galileo 
beginning in 2010 […].732 
 
Despite its commercial applications, Galileo has been driven from the outset by strategic and 
military motivations; i.e., the desire to provide Europe with strategic independence and greater 
flexibility / autonomy from Washington in security and defence matters: 
 
“It is crucial for Europe and the world as a whole to have a choice and not remain 
dependent on the current monopoly of the American GPS system which is less advanced, 
less efficient and less reliable. […] 
[T]he EU wishes to develop, with Galileo, a system over which it has control and which 
meets the need for accuracy, reliability and security. […] 
Galileo will underpin the common European defence policy […]. There is no question of 
coming into conflict with the [US], which is and will remain our ally, but simply a question 
of putting an end to a situation of dependence. If the EU finds it necessary to undertake a 
security mission that the US does not consider in its interest, it [the EU] will be impotent 
unless it has satellite navigation that is now indispensable. Although designed primarily for 
civilian applications, Galileo will also give the EU a military capability.”733 
 
America viewed Europe’s efforts to launch Galileo “with something between contempt and outright 
hostility”734. For starters, Washington had serious doubts as to whether the EU would be able to 
marshal the political will and financial resources necessary to implement such an ambitious 
technological project. Furthermore, US officials saw no compelling need for Galileo given that GPS 
system was free and would be modernised in the near future.735 It was not until 2003 that US 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
731 Galileo will have 10 navigation signal channels: six will be open and free to the public; two are fee-based and 
reserved for commercial users in need of more accurate signals; two PRS channels are encrypted and reserved for EU 
governments. 
732 Giegerich (2007) pp. 497-498. Giegerich also references Beidleman (2005) p. 130 and EUPolitix.com (2004). 
733 EC (2002) pp. 1, 2, 4 
734 John Pike from GlobalSecurity.org quoted in The Economist (June 2002). 
735 Washington viewed Galileo as an unnecessary, wasteful duplication of GPS that would only divert already scarce 
resources from Europe’s pressing military modernisation needs. 
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policymakers recognised that they could no longer prevent Galileo even if they wanted to do so.736 
At that stage, “Galileo seemed to US observers to combine the commercial competition seen in 
earlier European initiatives, like Airbus or [Ariane], with an unexpected risk to a key US military 
resource [GNSS].”737 Washington had serious concerns that Galileo could fundamentally challenge 
America’s GPS monopoly738, making it easier for potential adversaries like China to gain access to 
advanced GNSS technology.739 Above all, the Pentagon worried about the so-called M-code 
overlay; i.e., the fact that Galileo’s encrypted PRS signal as well as parts of the open channels had 
been assigned a frequency similar to the restricted M-code GPS III signal planned by the Pentagon 
for future use by the US military and during NATO operations. This spectrum overlay would make 
potential US jamming of Galileo’s signal much more difficult and even risked interfering with the 
GPS M-code. 
 
Washington regarded Galileo’s M-code overlay as a major national security threat and exerted 
significant political pressure on its EU allies to make them back down and change their GNSS 
frequency. In late 2001, then-Deputy US Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz sent a letter to all EU 
defence ministers who were also part of NATO warning that Galileo’s M-code overlay with GPS 
“will significantly complicate our ability to ensure availability of critical GPS services in time of 
crisis or conflict and at the same time assure that adversary forces are denied similar capabilities”. 
Wolfowitz went on to state that “it is in the interest of NATO to preclude future Galileo signal 
development in spectrum to be used by the GPS M-code” and asked his European counterparts to 
find out whether the EU intended to integrate “military features” into Galileo. “[I]f so, we must 
examine […] the security implications […].”740 Wolfowitz assumed that he could leverage Europe’s 
top military establishment (many of which had long-standing ties to NATO and were part of the 
same security community) to influence Galileo through the backdoor. However, rather than forcing 
the EU to back down, the letter backfired and gave a boost to those countries which, like France, 
had argued all along that Galileo was indispensable to guarantee Europe’s strategic independence 
vis-à-vis America.741 In 2003, a senior DoS official declared that “Overlay of M-code signals is not 
                                                      
736 Lewis (2004) p. 1. Prior to 2003, Washington proved “unwilling to accept the changes occurring in its European 
partners” and failed to recognise that voices within the EU were calling “for an increasingly competitive transatlantic 
relationship”. Ibid., p. 2 
737 Ibid., p. 1 
738 Russia’s GLONASS is a military GNSS which is currently not fully operational due to funding problems. 
739 China’s EUR200 million investment agreed in 2003 proved particularly worrisome to Washington as Beijing could 
potentially use Galileo to improve the accuracy of its ballistic missiles. Beijing is currently trying to build its own 
“Compass” GNSS. 
740 AFP (2001) referenced in Lewis (2004) p. 5 
741 (Braunschvig, Garwin, & Marwell, 2003) 
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compatible with national security, weakens NATO capability, and is unacceptable to the [US].”742 
743 
 
In June 2004, following months of tough negotiations taking place in the wake of the divisive 2003 
Iraq War, the US and the EU finally reached a compromise agreement to resolve their 
differences.744 745 Most importantly, the EU agreed to switch Galileo’s open signals to a different 
frequency – known as BOC (1,1) – which would also be shared with the civilian part of the future 
GPS III. Earlier on, Brussels and Washington had already struck an informal agreement on the 
separation of the M-code and Galileo PRS signal frequencies.746 The EU also pledged to allow US 
companies to build GNSS receivers that are compatible with Galileo. The US agreed not to jam 
Galileo’s signals unilaterally, to share classified information747 about the lessons learned from its 
GPS programme so far, and to allow the EU to continue to optimise Galileo’s signals moving 
forward. “The fundamental compromise behind the US-EU agreement is US acceptance of Galileo 
as an independent satellite navigation system in exchange for EU acceptance of US security and 
commercial concerns.”748 
 
While the compromise was hailed by both sides as a win-win outcome, it is fair to say that 
Washington obtained more important concessions from Brussels than the other way around. The EC 
did accommodate Washington’s key concern about the potential M-code overlap by changing 
Galileo’s open signal frequency and, in return, received little more than conditional US blessings 
for a project that Washington was no longer able unilaterally to prevent from going ahead 
anyway.749 Of course, the fact that the EC was legally empowered to negotiate with the US on 
behalf of all EU members “severely limited [Washington’s] ability […] to rely on tested negotiation 
techniques such as divide and rule and venue-shifting (i.e., conducting negotiations through 
[NATO])”.750 751 However, for the EC to maintain support for Galileo among Atlanticist members 
                                                      
742 Giegerich (2007) p. 501 
743 For an analysis of the key Galileo issues that threatened US interests (i.e., spectrum overlap, mandatory use 
requirements / market access, potential military use, and European defence spending priorities), see Lewis (2004) pp. 4-
7. 
744 (Wall & Taverna, 2004) and “Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS Satellite-based 
Navigation Systems and Related Applications”: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/galileo/doc/2004/2004_06_21_eu_us_agreement.pdf  
745 Giegerich (2007) 
746 (Wall & Taverna, 2004) 
747 “The specific areas of American knowledge that were open to Europeans included the hardening of satellites to make 
them resistant to high levels of radiation in space, software and operating procedures relating to ground control of 
satellite constellation, as well as the lessons learnt over the operation of atomic clocks in space. The carrot, in short, was 
that European time and money could be saved through learning from the US experience.” Giegerich (2007) p. 502 
748 Lewis (2004) p. 8 
749 A technological breakthrough by German and French scientists in late 2003 made it possible to keep Galileo’s 
original encrypted PRS frequency while avoiding any M-code interference. 
750 Giegerich (2007) p. 492 
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like the UK it was important to avoid a full-fledged clash with Washington and to make a good-
faith effort to find a compromise solution acceptable to everyone: 
 
“Europe and the US are at a decision point for activity in space. The evolution of a common 
European security and defence identity creates both challenges and opportunities. Absent a 
clear vision on how to move ahead, a diminution in transatlantic cooperation is possible. 
This outcome would not serve the interest of either Europe or the US. It is still unclear if the 
agreement on Galileo / GPS compatibility was a last gesture of a declining transatlantic 
partnership or the beginning of a new model for cooperation […].”752 
 
According to Michael Gleason, “the Galileo programme has survived because of subtle changes of 
emphasis among the motives driving it”.753 Accordingly, the 1999 EU decision to back Galileo’s 
“definition phase” was primarily driven by “liberal factors at the international level”:754 in 
particular, Gleason identifies the anticipated GNSS benefits for EU communications and 
transportation networks as the primary motivating factors behind Galileo. In contrast, the EU’s 
2002 decision to approve Galileo’s “development phase” was above all driven by realist 
motivations. ESDP, the Euro, and the 9/11 attacks are important factors explaining “that European 
decision-makers were beginning to see the EU as responsible for independently protecting its self-
interest in the anarchic global environment”.755 756 The June 2004 EU-US accord was again 
primarily motivated by “liberal factors at the international level”.757 Specifically, European and US 
decision-makers decided that international cooperation, leading to better for efficiency for both 
GNSS projects, was the best strategy for all actors involved. Finally, the all-important June 2007 
EU decision to keep Galileo alive by funding it exclusively through EU public funds was again 
dominated by realist factors: 
 
“Growing insecurity in the world, as a weakened [US] became bogged down in Iraq, NATO 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
751 Washington treated the Pentagon-run GPS network as a vital national security matter. In Brussels, Galileo was 
“handled by transport ministers and [EC] bureaucrats with no mandate for, or experience of, dealing with the life-or-
death issues of geopolitics and war”. The Economist (June 2002) 
752 Lewis (2004) p. 11 
753 Gleason (2009) 
754 Ibid., p. 13 
755 Ibid., p. 14 
756 “Between 1999 and 2002, the EU took a number of steps which make it more valid to consider the EU analytically 
“as if” it were a state actor in the international arena. The development of [ESDP] along with the development of an 
[ERRF], the Lisbon Strategy to make the EU the most competitive knowledge-based information economy in the world, 
and the economic integration of Europe with the euro are some of the factors which indicate that European decision-
makers were beginning to see the EU as responsible for independently protecting its self-interest in the anarchic global 
environment.  The terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001 and European discomfort with the unilateralist 
Bush administration also contributed to European decision-makers’ desire to develop independent PNT [Positioning, 
Navigation, and Timing] capabilities in order to bolster Europe’s political autonomy, security, and economic 
competitiveness.” Ibid., pp. 14-15 
757 Ibid., p. 15 
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lost ground in Afghanistan, Russia demonstrated the ability to squeeze European energy 
supplies, and the Chinese successfully tested an anti-satellite weapon, insured that 
European decision-makers’ assessments of the need for Galileo were heavily influenced by 
realist factors.” 758 759 
 
The fact that France was (again) the decisive force behind Galileo at its most critical decision point 
in June 2007 thus lends credence to the nation that Paris, more than any other European 
government, pursued a strongly realist and national-interest based foreign and security as well as 
aerospace industrial policy. The Galileo / GPS episode strongly supports the realist approach and 
interpretation embraced by this thesis. For Washington, GPS was a national security issue: US 
control over the only operating GNSS reinforced American hegemony in NATO. The French, in 
contrast, who at the time still remained outside of the Alliance’s IMS, were determined not to 
accept this position of strategic dependency long-term.760 While Gleason argues that during the 
1999 “definition phase” Galileo was primarily driven by commercial motivations, there can be no 
doubt that for France, military and strategic considerations topped the Galileo agenda – though the 
civilian GNSS applications were used to get Germany and the UK on board as both countries were 
concerned about Galileo’s impact on relations with Washington. 
                                                      
758 Ibid., p. 15 
759 “Indicators that realist factors were exerting strong influence in European decision-makers’ assessment of the global 
environment include the EU adoption of the “European Security Strategy in 2003, the founding of the [EDA] in 2004, 
the announcement that two 60,000 strong EU Battle Groups had become fully operational in January 2007, the 
activation of the EU Operations Center in June 2007, and the conduct of ten EU operations outside of Europe ranging 
from purely military missions, to policing, to security institution building, and involving roughly 10,000 EU personnel 
in 2006 alone.” Ibid. p. 16 
760 There is anecdotal evidence that a US intelligence team went to brief French President Mitterand on Saddam 
Hussein’s WMD programmes and handed him satellite photos of suspected sites. At the end of the briefing, the US 
team asked for them all back, packed them away and left. Mitterrand was said to have been furious at this kind of 
humiliating treatment by the Americans. 
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4.5 France’s unique approach to the aerospace and defence industry 
 
“More than any other country, France has a holistic view of its national identity. The 
government, the people, the language, and even the wine are inextricably linked. The 
country’s aerospace industries are part of that holistic image. They represent an investment 
by the state, on behalf of the people, designed to enhance their national security, economic 
gain, and national prestige.”761 
 
This section contrasts the different approaches adopted by Europe’s major powers – France, 
Germany, and the UK – in dealing with their respective A&D companies and analyses how the 
interplay with each country’s foreign and security policy has shaped this strategic industry sector. 
Paris, driven by Gaullist and neo-Gaullist ambitions, made it a priority throughout the Cold War to 
maximise its national autonomy in military and security matters. Therefore, France pulled out of 
NATO’s integrated command structure in 1966, a highly symbolic move that would not be reversed 
until the Alliance’s 60th anniversary summit in 2009. France also refused to succumb to the 
“American temptation” and simply import or co-produce (generally cheaper) US-made aircraft and 
other advanced weapons systems for fear of becoming militarily and politically dependent on the 
American hegemon. Paris was ready to commit considerable resources to develop and maintain an 
advanced, autonomous indigenous defence industrial base backed by strong export promotion 
policies supporting France’s foreign and security policy objectives.762 763 764 And even when France 
did engage in cross-border defence cooperation with countries like Germany or the UK to share 
costs and benefit from an enlarged home market base, etc. it was clear from that Paris would insist 
on overall design leadership. While exponentially rising R&DP costs of advanced weapons systems 
pushed France towards closer collaboration with its European neighbours, Paris nonetheless did not 
want to give up its long-standing claim to a leadership role in the creation of “Europe puissance”: a 
politically strong Europe capable of autonomously defining and protecting its interests vis-à-vis 
other relevant players in the international system, including the US. 
                                                      
761 Aboulafia (2001) 
762 To defray the skyrocketing R&DP costs for advanced French-made weapons systems, Paris has pursued an 
aggressive export promotion and political lobbying campaign vis-à-vis potential foreign customers. “In France, […] 
export revenues are far higher than domestic sales […] [and] the military has expressed concern that export demand, 
rather than the needs of the armed forces, drives arms production.” Neuman (2006), p. 431 
763 “[I]t becomes clear that few activities permeate and penetrate French political and economic life more than the sale 
of military technology and arms – and few are more important. Distinguishing between foreign and domestic policy as 
the primary source of French [defence sales] conduct, therefore, has little or no relevance. Moreover, the guns or butter 
dichotomy normally used by analyst to explain or condemn arms sales has been transformed in the French context into 
an imperative of guns and butter. For most French within the government and bureaucracy concerned with arms sales, 
and many within the opposition, the security and foreign-policy functions of the government, on the one hand, and 
popular expectations of its responsibilities for welfare, on the other, are more joined than at odds. Kolodziej (1980) pp. 
54-55 
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France – backed by German financing and technological know-how – also played a decisive role in 
the launch of Airbus, which occurred not long after “Le défi américain” had alarmed Europe’s 
political leaders about the growing economic, political, military, and technological power 
imbalances between America and its allies on the Old Continent. However, France could also be 
quite selective when it came to promoting defence industrial collaboration in Europe. Paris refused 
to join Eurogroup / IEPG until 1976; eight years after the launch of this UK-led initiative. Once 
France had joined IEPG, European cross-border defence industrial collaboration did receive a major 
boost. For the strategically minded French government, GD’s 1975 F-16 “sale of the century” 
certainly served as an important reminder that closer intra-European collaboration was the only 
answer to confront the American hegemon and its aggressive defence export offensive. 
 
While France has traditionally put a premium on pursuing an independent security and defence 
policy and tried to foster European autonomy in strategic affairs, Paris was eager to avoid being 
isolated within the EU, specifically in relation to the possibility of a potential German-British 
defence industrial “axis” emerging in the mid-1990s.765 BAe and DASA were known for following 
an “Anglo-American business model […] putting profit ahead of market share and business 
volume”.766 “From the standpoint of France, countries and companies that followed the Anglo-
American way of thinking were encircling France, trying to convince them of the error of their 
French ways.”767 When the planned DASA-BAe merger risked leaving the French A&D industry 
out in the cold, Paris dropped its opposition to the privatisation of Aérospatiale, engineered a 
merger with MHT to build AM, and agreed to limit the government’s stake in EADS to 15 percent 
in a concession to the Germans. Once France realised that its “maximising-national-autonomy” 
approach was no longer viable, the government changed course and adapted to the new defence 
industrial realities and necessities.768 This adjustment in France’s A&D industrial strategy was 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
764 “Since France relies on arms exports not only to sustain its domestic industrial base but also as an instrument of 
foreign policy, it also seeks to maintain export flexibility and avoid the need to get permission from another nation to 
modify, deploy or export systems and / or technologies.” Bialos (2009) vol. II, p. 308 
765 “We would regret [the impact] of a bilateral [BAe-DASA] consolidation move. France’s political leaders and 
industrialists clearly have a preference for a 3-company [Aérospatiale-BAe-DASA] merger. […] The current discord is 
injurious but the latent situation is worse. Exclusive of combat aircraft, we share most of our businesses [with the UK 
and Germany] and I don’t understand the logic that could lead to a 2-player-only merger. […] If it happened, we would 
react. The turmoil of the last 6 months impedes sound decision making.” Aérospatiale executive quoted in Sparaco 
(December 1998) 
766 Aboulafia (2001) 
767 Ibid. 
768 France’s defence-industrial establishment had already realised in mid-1997 that the country’s A&D electronics 
players risked falling behind their European and US competitors unless Paris abandoned its goal of creating a super 
national champion by merging Aerospatiale, Dassault, and Thomson-CSF. First, Dassault rejected such a big-bang 
merger. Seond, Paris recognised that a French state-controlled super national champion would scare away other 
European partners and push Germany and the UK towards a BAe-DASA merger. French A&D industrial leaders feared 
the country’s encirclement at the hands of rapidly-consolidating foreign competitors. Ultimately, Paris decided to 
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initiated by Socialist Prime Minister Jospin after his election in 1997. Unlike their conservative 
predecessors, Jospin and finance minister Strauss-Kahn were willing to go beyond the confines of 
Paris’ long-standing neo-Gaullist approach and opted for the (partial) privatisation of key state-
controlled assets like AM to pave the way for pan-European A&D industrial consolidation. 
 
“Ironically, the left-wing coalition of French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, which came to 
power in 1997, rapidly formulated a more realistic industrial policy than its right-wing 
predecessors. Jospin and then-Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn devised 
pragmatic guidelines including subtle compromises such as the partial privatisation of 
state-controlled companies. In July 1998, they readily endorsed the surprise Aérospatiale / 
[MHT] merger set to combine the state-owned aerospace company and the Lagardère 
group’s defence arm into a shareholder-value-driven enterprise. This milestone, which 
reconciled market forces with the ‘new left’, radically changed the course of events and 
installed new actors on the aerospace stage.”769 
 
“In short, France’s aerospace policy consists of preserving industrial assets from the 
ravages of market capitalism. But globalisation, the end of the Cold War, and numerous 
other factors have forced the country to retrench and reconsider the extent of its aviation 
industry commitments.”770 
 
France’s goal to avoid a bilateral German-British link-up and its decision to throw its weight behind 
a Franco-German AM-DASA merger instead stands in stark contrast to the strategic industrial 
policies – or weakness thereof – pursued by either London or Berlin. Prime Minister Blair was 
furious about the BAe-Marconi link-up as he feared that this “UK first” deal could antagonise 
DASA and permanently dash Britain’s prospects of being part of any future pan-European defence 
industrial consolidation.771 772 Blair’s preference for a cross-border European A&D merger was part 
of his desire to keep the UK actively engaged in EU affairs – in spite of London’s refusal to adopt 
the “Euro”. At the same time, however, a government pursuing a realist, national-interest based 
A&D industrial strategy would probably have opposed the BAe-DASA merger and pushed for the 
creation of a BAe-Marconi British “national champion” instead. After all, the “UK first” deal 
brought Britain’s “two prime contractors together in an alliance spanning both military platforms 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
pursue a dual-track strategy by promoting AM and Thomson-CSF / Thales as separate French A&D champions. Le 
Boucher (1997) 
769 Sparaco (July 2000) 
770 Aboulafia (2001) 
771 Harrison (January 1999) 
772 London made it very clear to BAe and Marconi that their merger would not escape a thorough anti-trust review. 
Walters (1999) 
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and the combat systems that go on them”773. BAe strongly emphasised that the Marconi merger 
served Britain’s national interests: “Up until now, foreign defence contractors have been able to 
play BAe off against GEC [Marconi] to their advantage. This [merger] stops that game.”774 
 
Ultimately, the UK government did accept the BAe-Marconi deal as none of the other potential 
alternatives under consideration at the time – i.e., a BAe-DASA link-up or a Marconi merger with 
Thomson-CSF, LMC or NGC – came to fruition.775 While Paris failed to secure a Thomson-CSF 
merger with Marconi, London allowed the French to take over UK defence electronics company 
Racal in a GBP1.3 billion all-cash deal.776 The Blair government had actively encouraged 
Thomson-CSF to bid for Racal to boost competition in the UK defence procurement market. 
Furthermore, in a move that sparked a domestic political backlash, the Blair government even 
seconded the deputy head of the UK defence procurement agency to Thomson-CSF to help 
integrate Racal, boost the French firm’s competitive position vis-à-vis BAE, and increase the 
company’s profile in the US.777 These examples clearly demonstrate the lack of French-style realist, 
national-interest-based strategic thinking in London’s A&D policy. The UK government adopted a 
hands-off, laissez-faire approach which deliberately minimised state interventions in the A&D 
industry based on the belief that the private sector and competitive market forces were ultimately 
the most effective drivers of technological innovation and economic dynamism. For sure, the 
British MoD imposed security restrictions to protect Racal’s classified information and retain a say 
over the company’s future strategic orientation.778 However, it is doubtful that Paris – unlike 
London – would have ever authorised a foreign firm to take-over of a cutting-edge, Racal-type 
French defence company. The Racal take-over was a major boost for Thomson-CSF / Thales as it 
bolstered France’s attempt to create a global player in defence electronics.779 780 781 That being said, 
                                                      
773 Harrison, “‘UK first’ deal that could set Europe at war; News Analysis: France doesn’t like it, and Germany is 
simply livid” (January 1999) 
774 BAe Vice-Chairman Lapthorne quoted in Ibid. 
775 For more details on the merger options (BAe, Thomson-CSF, LMC, NGC) considered by Marconi, see Fluendy 
1999) and Jones (1998). 
776 Gow (2000) 
777 Little (2000) and Abrams (2000) 
778 The Independent (2000) 
779 France’s realist, national-interest-based A&D industrial approach is illustrated by the fact that Thomson-CSF, 
rebranded “Thales” in 2000, has in recent years pursued a “multi-domestic” defence market strategy focusing first on 
Europe and later on expanding into South Africa, Australia, South Korea, and Singapore. This strategy involves 
acquiring full control of A&D subsidiaries abroad initially held through JVs. 
780 One of the reasons that Paris picked Denis Ranque as Thomson-CSF CEO in 1997 was that he had previously 
managed a Franco-British JV with Marconi. As “Le Monde” put it: “Qualité supplémentaire [de Denis Ranque]: il 
dirige une société franco-britannique, ce qui constitue un signal positif en direction de l’Europe. Cette dimension 
internationale paraît particulièrement importante alors que l’une des missions du nouveau patron de Thomson-CSF sera 
de participer à la restructuration des industries de défense en Europe.” (Le Coeur & Rocco, 2000) 
781 For France, the Racal deal had the added benefit of preventing the company from being acquired by an American 
competitor. The take-over also served as a tangible example of the new post-St. Malo “rapprochement” in Anglo-
French relations. 
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British A&D companies (BAE in particular) have benefited from London’s “special relationship” 
with Washington and gained privileged access to the US defence market. 
 
As for the German A&D industrial approach, Europe’s biggest economy was somehow caught 
between France and the UK. On the one hand, DASA pursued a corporate strategy focused on 
maximising profits and eliminating inefficiencies. While it recognised the importance of political 
leadership to create the appropriate pro-merger regulatory framework, DASA firmly believed that 
the process of European A&D industrial consolidation process should be driven by private sector 
executives, not by government bureaucrats.782 783 This shared Anglo-Saxon free-market mentality 
was also the main reason why DASA and its parent DCX were so eager to pursue a merger with 
fully privatised BAe. It was only after BAe had abandoned their bilateral merger talks in favour of 
Marconi and after Paris signalled its willingness to reduce its stake in EADS to an absolute 
minimum that the German executives’ deep-seated fears and distrust of French state interference in 
the A&D sector were (at least partially) overcome. France’s policy of claiming design and project 
leadership in joint Franco-German / European A&D programmes (treating DASA as a junior 
partner ) also explains why DASA preferred to merge with BAe.784 
 
The German government “aggressively promoted pan-European mergers and the need to achieve 
major economies of scale […] but it firmly rejected dogmas such as state ownership785 that 
prevailed in France, Italy and Spain.”786 As the world’s export champion, Germany was a strong 
proponent of free trade and displayed an instinctive scepticism about government interference in the 
economy through direct shareholdings in “strategic” companies or the pursuit of a mercantilist trade 
and industrial policy. At the same time, there can be no doubt that the historic symbolism of 
Franco-German reconciliation served as a powerful backdrop for the EADS merger. Since the 
signing of the 1963 “German-French Friendship Treaty”, the two countries had continuously 
intensified their A&D industrial collaboration (Alpha Jet, Transall, etc.). While – during the second 
half of the 1990s – political differences over the pace and desired end state of pan-European 
                                                      
782 A DASA board member expressed his company’s frustration at the lack of political backing by Europe’s 
governments for large-scale pan-European industry consolidation: “We have had hardly any progress in the past three 
years, just a lot of lip service. […] As industrialists, we could move as fast as the Americans. We could merge 
industries, but we cannot merge markets and government policies.” Morrocco (October 1997) 
783 An unnamed senior DASA executive responded to the Franco-British-German trilateral declaration of 9 December 
1997 on “the urgent need to restructure Europe’s A&D electronics industries” as follows: “[DASA] welcomes [the 
governments’] statement. Although we think the European industry’s restructuring is an assignment for the companies 
involved, it is the politicians’ task to create the right framework.” Sparaco (December 1997) 
784 “French government officials today regret the German aerospace industry’s inclination to favour stronger links with 
the UK. ‘Maybe France went wrong in not forging more opportunities for German leadership in industrial programs,’ a 
French [aerospace] executive acknowledged.” Sparaco (December 1998) 
785 “Länder” governments like Bavaria and Hamburg initially owned important stakes in key A&D companies like 
MBB but decided to privatise their holdings to help build German “national champion” DASA in 1989. 
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industry restructuring caused certain tensions between Paris and Berlin, the French government was 
eager to leverage its “special relationship” with Germany to prevent a BAe-DASA link-up and to 
foster, at a minimum, a bilateral Franco-German merger instead. 
 
Unlike Paris, the German government did not own controlling stakes or Golden Shares in the 
country’s A&D base and was therefore not in a position to directly shape the corporate strategy of 
companies such as DASA.787 788 Even if Berlin had pushed for a bilateral DASA-Aérospatiale link-
up from the beginning, it is fair to say that DCX CEO Schrempp would have pursued a BAe-DASA 
merger anyways. The British government was in a similar position as it failed to engineer the 
desired BAe-DASA merger and had to put up with the creation of BAE instead. Paris, however, 
considered itself as the ultimate arbiter of the French A&D industry and saw it as a means to 
enhance France’s “national security, economic gain, and national prestige”.789 According to defence 
minister Alain Richard, the A&D industry’s restructuring remains “the sole way to preserve 
Europe’s independence and ensure it does not become the US industry’s subcontractor.”790 Paris 
would not approve alliances or mergers that fail to give French companies a prominent role:791 “We 
consider France’s position, due to its vast technological expertise, should be the top ranked in 
Europe.”792 This statement demonstrates France’s ambition to vigorously defend its A&D industrial 
leadership role during the anticipated European consolidation end game and, ultimately, to 
challenge the US mega-primes.793 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
786 Sparaco (July 2000) 
787 Paris negotiated a “Golden Share” arrangement and additional French national security-related safeguards with the 
principal private shareholders of EADS, primarily Germany’s DCX: “[L]’accord d’actionnaires accorde de nombreux 
privilèges à l’actionnaire français. Outre le droit de veto en matière d’acquisition, d’alliance stratégique, et 
d’augmentation de capital, la France, puissance nucléaire, gardera un droit de contrôle sur les opérations concernant la 
capacité de maîtrise d’oeuvre, de conception et d'intégration des missiles balistiques du groupe ainsi que sur quatre 
filiales au coeur du dispositif nucléaire militaire français.” Jakubyszyn (1999) 
788 Paris has a veto over EADS investments above EUR500 million and capital injections affecting the voting rights 
distribution. 
789 Aboulafia (2001) 
790 Sparaco (December 1998) 
791 Ibid. 
792 Ibid. 
793 “In recent years, France has shifted from its traditional Gaullist policy of ‘National Autonomy’ to a neo-Gaullist 
policy of ‘Strategic Autonomy’ centred on building a stronger European defence capability. Under ‘Strategic 
Autonomy’, France seeks to ensure its ability to choose where and when to operate militarily and its ability to operate 
independently if necessary. But this policy does not mean that all industry sources must be French; only a few select 
areas must remain national (e.g., nuclear weapons capability). Strategic Autonomy is supported by an industrial policy 
of ‘Competitive Autonomy’ wherein France establishes formal agreements of mutual interdependence and supply 
security with European partner states for certain defence capabilities, and will allow competitive bidding by other 
European firms within this framework. Consistent with this Euro-strategic thrust, French officials assert that it is time 
for the EU to strengthen its own technology and industrial base in order to stand on a more equal footing with the US. 
To implement this goal, France will increasingly share its armaments acquisition resources, programmes, and industrial 
base with European partners.” Bialos (2009) vol. II, pp. 307-308 
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Minister Richard’s statement is indicative of how Paris has tried to leverage Europe’s collective 
technological and financial capabilities in pursuit of policy objectives that France could no longer 
achieve acting purely on its own: Airbus, Ariane, and Galileo are prime examples. The Galileo case 
is particularly instructive as it demonstrates how French political manoeuvring managed to transfer 
Galileo’s control and budgeting authority from ESA – which operates on the principle of “just 
return” – to the EU: an institution which has a much bigger and politically more opaque financing 
mechanism, provides multi-billion euro subsidies to France’s highly protected agricultural sector 
and counts Germany as the biggest financial contributor.794 While France was generally hostile to 
the idea of sharing design and technology leadership with its Western neighbour and deliberately 
tried to keep German industry in a junior role, Paris was eager to get German financial backing for 
joint bilateral / European A&D projects like Galileo.795 
 
After a multinational industry consortium (including EADS, Deutsche Telekom, etc.) pulled out of 
Galileo in mid-2007, France lobbied hard to keep the project alive and ultimately managed to 
convince its fellow EU members to cover the EUR2.4 billion shortfall by using EUR 1.6 billion 
from unused EU farm subsidies and by taking the remainder from the EC’s technology budget.796 
While Germany failed in its attempt to implement Galileo (partly) within ESA, Berlin nonetheless 
managed to extract concessions improving the participation of German industry in this project.797 
“What sounds like a petty bureaucratic matter in fact decides on who will be the paymaster and who 
will be the beneficiary of Galileo.”798 Germany served again as the paymaster for a French-designed 
plan to develop an ambitious European A&D project designed to benefit France’s national security 
and economic interests on the global stage. As a result of this successful French power-play to shift 
Galileo on to the EC budget, the entire project has suffered from much less effective management 
and cost-control. This chapter has also demonstrated that for the US and French governments, 
security considerations (framed in realist terms) shaped aerospace decisions, whereas British and 
German decision-makers were more confused and ambivalent. The French have arguably been the 
most realist / mercantilist / sovereignty / security-oriented of these four states. The larger size of the 
US economy and federal budget have allowed American policy-makers not to define their (A&D) 
choices so explicitly. 
                                                      
794 French senior EU civil servant François Lamoureux – who served at the Transport Directorate-General during 1999-
2005 – played an important role in the EC’s taking control of Galileo. 
795 BBC (2007) 
796 Taverna (2007) 
797 The EC “[divided the Galileo] purchases into a half dozen work packages, no more than two of which could be led 
by the same company, and to mandate that at least 40 percent of each work package be allocated for subcontractors – an 
arrangement designed to favour German suppliers”. See Ibid. 
798 BBC (2007) 
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Chapter 5: Going American: Explaining the Boeing / McDonnell Douglas Merger 
5.1 The A&D industry: caught between two worlds 
 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that realist arguments about international relations, even among 
allies, were crucial in motivating governments to support the BMD and EADS mergers. It is 
important to emphasise that realism is not only a prominent school of IR theory but also a set of 
core policy assumptions and recommendations designed to help government leaders navigate the 
treacherous waters of international relations.799 Chapter 5 details how America’s attempt to preserve 
and advance its international hegemonic position – or, to put it differently, to try to prevent the 
country’s (relative) decline during the post-Cold War period – explains why the US consolidated its 
aerospace industry at a purely national level with virtually no involvement from their Western 
allies. In addition, Chapter 5 will also examine several transatlantic corporate mergers that did take 
place after the end of the Cold War and which were not blocked by the US government. By 
contrasting big transatlantic mergers in three industries – automotive, banking, and 
telecommunications – with the striking absence of major transatlantic M&A activities (at the prime 
contractor level) in the A&D industry, this chapter provides further insights into what separates the 
EADS and BMD mergers from M&A transactions in “normal” industries. 
 
The A&D industry is caught between two worlds. In the realist world, national security concerns 
dictate that a country should strive to attain maximum autonomy and independence for its own 
A&D sector. To [realist] national security analysts, “where [critical A&D] production takes place 
and who controls the process are of crucial importance.”800 In a globalised world economy, in 
contrast, many goods and services are often traded (almost) freely across borders, FDI and capital 
flow from one country into the other, and key goods, services, and technologies are sourced in the 
“global marketplace”. 
 
“[This aerospace industry] debate has revealed two camps: one that draws on the standard 
liberal prescriptions of easy access and free choice as a means of bringing efficiency and 
dynamism to the industry; and a second that draws on so-called neo-mercantilist 
recommendations, entailing use of the state to strengthen national firms and keep control 
over the industry.”801 
 
                                                      
799 Realism addresses the key question of how political leaders can maximise the relative power position of their 
respective state while, at a minimum, ensuring its survival as an independent entity in the context of an anarchic 
international self-help system. 
800 Moran (1990) p. 58 
801 (Moran & Mowery, 1991) p. 135 
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In essence, this thesis argues that, when it comes to the BMD and EADS mergers, realist arguments 
won against liberal institutionalist arguments, both in Washington and in Paris. For reasons of 
realism / national security, neither the US nor the French government were willing to simply 
“retreat” after the end of the Cold War and to allow their respective A&D champions to pursue 
laissez-faire corporate strategies based on the principles of liberalism, international cooperation, 
unbridled globalisation, and open markets. While, during the 1990s, Washington responded to the 
new post-Cold War realities by promoting greater economic efficiency and economies of scale 
through massive national A&D industrial consolidation, the American hegemon continued to have 
serious reservations about full-fledged transatlantic M&A deals – especially at the prime contractor 
level – for fear of losing control over sensitive US technologies and of fostering foreign dependence 
in the “strategic, high-technology, high value-added industr[y]”802 par excellence, with enormous 
implications for international military and economic competition.803 From a mercantilist 
perspective, large-scale transatlantic M&A deals risked the gradual erosion of America’s aerospace 
industrial base and a further deterioration in the yawning US trade deficit as well as the national 
balance of payments. As two neo-mercantilist analysts observed in 2007: 
 
“[The A&D] industry has been the top US export sector for more than 50 years and many of 
the advanced engineering procedures have been successfully adopted by other US 
industries, e.g., automotive, electronics, and metal fabricating. For more than four decades, 
aerospace products and parts have accounted for 7-10 percent of US merchandise 
exports.”804  
 
For Washington, the health and success of the nation’s aerospace industry was thus of vital strategic 
importance, especially since America was losing export share in many other sectors.805 The growing 
competitive threat posed by Europe’s Airbus consortium became a particular concern to US 
policymakers, who feared that an increasing loss of export markets and the growth of import 
penetration could seriously weaken the American A&D sector. From a mercantilist perspective, 
                                                      
802 OTA (1991) p. 9 
803 In general, neo-mercantilists attach much more economic / strategic importance to the manufacturing sector than to 
the service industry: “Manufacturing matters for three key reasons: 1. Manufacturing jobs generally provide better 
wages than equivalent service jobs because worker productivity is generally leveraged by more capital and more 
proprietary know-how. 2. Manufacturing provides an abundance of jobs for people of ordinary ability as opposed to the 
PhD types who get many of the jobs at, say, Microsoft. It thus closely matches the job-creation needs of society. 3. 
Manufacturing companies are big exporters.” In my book, ‘In Praise of Hard Industries’, I calculated that per unit of 
output American manufacturing businesses export about eleven times as much as service businesses. Few 
manufacturing businesses score better on these three criteria than the airliner industry. Even if it were not so closely 
intertwined with America’s national defence, the industry would still be of pivotal geopolitical importance. The point is 
that it has long been America’s biggest export earner.” Fingleton (2005) p. 9 
804 (MacPherson & Pritchard, 2007) pp. 552-553 
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Washington embraced the ethnocentric industry consolidation approach underpinning the BMD 
merger because the creation of US-based “national champions” was seen as the best way of keeping 
the rising European / foreign competitors at bay while trying to make sure that the aerospace 
industry’s unique positive strategic / economic externalities continued to benefit Washington and 
the US economy.806 If US policymakers had viewed the aerospace sector as just another “normal” 
industry, one would have expected the same large-scale transatlantic M&A deals that became so 
prominent in many other businesses during the 1990s. 
 
Washington’s opposition to transatlantic M&A deals involving prime contractors is particularly 
important as this was the last area where policymakers still felt that the A&D companies had a 
distinct “nationality”. By the 1990s, however, even “national” prime contractors – due to the ever-
increasing complexities of state-of-the-art military and commercial aircraft – required millions of 
sub-components manufactured by thousands of sub-contractors both at home and abroad: 
 
“[B]ecause military and commercial aircraft involve the integration of so many complex 
sub-systems, and because many of them are sourced internationally, the ‘nationality’ of the 
final product has been increasingly difficult to establish, creating complex implications for 
policy.”807 
“In 1960, [US] imports of aircraft and parts amounted only to 5 percent of [US] aircraft 
exports by value. Today [2007], that figure is 44 percent. The foreign content of a Boeing 
727 in the 1960s was only 2 percent. For the 777 in the 1990s, foreign content was nearly 
30 percent. In the case of the 787 ‘Dreamliner’, […] foreign content might run as high as 
70 percent.”808 
 
Given the unprecedented internationalisation of the aerospace industry’s supplier base, realist and / 
or mercantilist-inspired demands that all of the relevant sub-components and sub-contractors for 
“American” aircraft should come from the US would be virtually impossible to satisfy.809 Since the 
1970s, American A&D companies have entered into offset agreements with foreign suppliers to 
help secure major military and commercial aircraft exports. To seal the F-16 “sale of the century” in 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
805 “It is difficult to exaggerate [Boeing’s]’s importance […]. [A]t a time when the US trade deficit reached a record 
[US]$489 billion in 2003, [Boeing] is one of the country’s most reliable export machines, accounting for close to 
[US]$20 billion in overseas sales.” Gantenbein (2004) p. 58 
806 “Advanced capitalist states promote and regulate production globalisation using state-created international 
organisations and trade agreements and intra-national policies and legislation that assist indigenous economic actors to 
execute transactions with competitive advantage over foreign counterparts.” Gritsch (2005) p. 8 
807 (Moran & Mowery, 1991) p. 144 
808 (MacPherson & Pritchard, 2007) pp. 552-553 
809 In 2006, Congressman Duncan Hunter tried to pass a law requiring that all specialty metals used in US military 
hardware be smelted domestically (including all bolts, nuts, etc.). This initiative – opposed by the Bush administration 
and the AIA (Aerospace Industries Association) – failed. Anselmo (2006) 
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1975, GD offered its prospective European customer countries not only a 40-percent stake in the 
sourcing / production of components for “their” F-16s, but also a 10-percent sourcing / production 
share for those fighters delivered to the USAF. GD’s far-ranging and unprecedented concessions 
involving strategically important American military matériel clearly required Washington’s 
consent:810 
 
“For the US government and aerospace industry, offset agreements have always evoked a 
mixed reaction. Their desire to penetrate foreign markets for both political and economic 
reasons has struggled with a desire to limit foreign access to some of the technologies 
contained in military and civilian high-technology products like aircraft. Before 1978, offset 
agreements in military aircraft sales were largely negotiated on a government-to-
government basis, indicating the mix of political and economic motives underpinning them. 
By the 1990s, they had become a mainstay in sales of both military and commercial aircraft 
to foreign governments and foreign firms and in sales to both industrialised and 
industrialising countries. As foreign producers have improved their technological 
capabilities, the products and technologies subject to offset agreements have increasingly 
involved highly advanced US technologies in both military and civil applications.”811 
 
The rise of A&D offset agreements reflects the sector’s technological sophistication and the 
internationalisation of its supplier base. In the highly competitive commercial aircraft sector, 
exploding R&DP costs have prompted Airbus and Boeing to increasingly rely on multi-national 
networks of sub-contractors / suppliers located in key export markets abroad (Japan, China812, 
India, etc.).813 The two rivals have embraced this outsourcing / offshoring strategy not only to 
obtain the best technology at the best price, but also to help secure lucrative export contracts in the 
countries concerned. “In the manufacture of the A300, for example, Airbus procured over 50 
percent of the plane’s components from US manufacturers, thereby capturing both their technology 
and their political support.”814 In contrast, “the participation of Japanese firms in the manufacture of 
the 767815 has helped Boeing to maintain its domination of the Japanese commercial aircraft 
market”;816 817 a situation which endures until today.818 
                                                      
810 Washington and GD also agreed to the F-16 offsets to discourage European governments from developing a rival 
European fighter aircraft. 
811 (Moran & Mowery, 1991) p. 142 
812 In 2008, Airbus agreed on an offset deal with China involving an A319/A320 assembly line and a composite 
materials and components JV. Stumbaum (2003) pp. 27-30 
813 “[Boeing] has become the nation’s largest corporation in terms of offset-related commitments.” (MacPherson & 
Pritchard, 2007) p. 554 
814 (Moran & Mowery, 1991) p. 142 
815 “The Boeing 767 was the first US aircraft programme that entailed substantial international cooperation in 
developing commercial transport. It can be inferred that there were four major reasons for cooperation between Boeing 
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More recently, EADS / Airbus teamed up with NGC to compete for the Pentagon’s KC-X tanker. 
To stand any chance of beating out Boeing for the first US$40 billion tranche of this contract – 
valued at US$100 billion over 40 years – the NGC-EADS consortium offered huge sub-contracting 
opportunities to suppliers across the US. In its lobbying and PR campaign focusing on Congress 
and the US media, the transatlantic consortium always emphasised the associated employment and 
investment benefits for the US economy. The tanker deal would also provide Airbus with its first 
assembly and manufacturing presence in America – an important move boosting the company’s 
competitiveness by providing a natural hedge against Euro-Dollar exchange rate fluctuations. 
 
There is another important driver of international cooperation and multi-national teaming 
arrangements in the global aerospace industry, especially when it comes to launching ultra-
expensive next generation aircraft like the A380 or the Dreamliner: 
 
“Prime contractors in civil airframes and engines have been driven not only by a desire to 
penetrate foreign markets but also by an interest in expanding the array of suppliers that 
compete for contracts and in sharing the development costs and risks. Higher development 
costs create higher incentives for risk-sharing; broad corporate alliances reduce the need to 
‘bet the company’ on each generation of new products.”819 
 
Boeing has in recent years adopted a “systems-integration mode of production” in which “key 
components and sub-assemblies are designed and manufactured by external suppliers”.820 821 As the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
and companies in Japan at this time, including risk-sharing, enhanced capabilities through cooperation, participation in 
development and market entry, and mutual profit-taking.” (MacPherson & Pritchard, 2007) p. 556 
816 (Moran & Mowery, 1991) p. 143 
817 In 1974, Boeing gave Mitsubishi a small early offset contract for the 747. Subsequently, Boeing was able to score 
“major sales” of jumbo jets to Japan. (MacPherson & Pritchard, 2007) p. 554 
818 Boeing was able to leverage Tokyo’s dependence on strong military and security ties with the US to establish a 
dominant position on the Japanese commercial aircraft market, the world’s second largest. Bilateral A&D industrial 
cooperation was also given a boost by the joint development of the FSX fighter. However, neo-mercantilists concerned 
about Boeing’s outsourcing of advanced aerospace components to Japan argue that the US giant “has often wasted the 
considerable geopolitical leverage it enjoys”. […] “Boeing has rarely needed to give away jobs to secure orders from 
Japan. Quite the contrary, Japan has been more or less a captive market. […] US-Japan trade imbalances have long been 
so large that Tokyo has felt obligated to find ways to boost its purchases of American goods. In the absence of 
compelling technical reasons to buy European, therefore, Japan’s highly regulated airlines surely had little choice but to 
buy American. After all, by dint of scale economies, Boeing enjoyed a commercial edge over Airbus well into the 
1990s. Certainly, while the transfer of jobs to secure orders has been merely lamentable, the transfer of advanced 
technology has been utterly inexcusable. Given that Boeing was safe from under-cutting by Airbus, it could easily have 
resisted the more outrageous technology requests, particularly those from Japan.” Fingleton (2005) pp. 10-11 
819 (Moran & Mowery, 1991) p. 144 
820 (MacPherson & Pritchard, 2007) p. 553 
821 “To those who can’t see through business jargon, a ‘systems integrator’ may sound more impressive than a mere 
manufacturer. In reality, it is a cop-out, as a glance at some of the industry’s other systems integrators makes clear. 
Embraer of Brazil is a systems integrator. So is Aviation Industries of China. Like the new Boeing, these companies 
lack the advanced know-how and machinery to make key components in a modern first-world plane. Instead they must 
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787 Dreamliner illustrates, Japan’s aerospace companies have been the prime beneficiaries of a 
rapidly expanding US outsourcing strategy, which allows them to build the entire wing of 
America’s principal next-generation commercial aircraft:822 823 
 
“The Japanese heavy firms Mitsubishi, Fuji, and Kawasaki are slated to build 35 percent of 
the 787 aircraft structure, which will include the design and manufacturing specifications in 
comparison to a build-to-print relationship on previous Boeing programmes.”824 825 […] 
“[The] three Japanese companies are slated to create the manufacturing processes for final 
assembly of the wing. Boeing has never considered subcontracting wing production to 
external suppliers before.”826 
“For the first time in US commercial aviation history, a new aircraft launch has been 
structured so that foreign partners have full control over sub-assembly design, 
manufacturing, sub-tier supplier selection and, ultimately, the financial muscle to challenge 
what little remains of the US commercial aircraft industry.”827 828 829 
 
Neo-mercantilists are greatly concerned about Boeing’s “orgy of indiscriminate outsourcing”830 and 
the decision to hand the 787’s wing production831 to Japan, a move that entails the transfer of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
import such components from more advanced manufacturers in Japan and Europe.” […] “The key to the new Boeing is 
a Faustian bargain with Japan. In a rerun of earlier American industrial implosions, Boeing has come to rely more and 
more on Japanese contractors for its most advanced engineering and manufacturing.” Fingleton (2005) pp. 10; 7 
822 In 2004, Boeing and the Japanese Aircraft Development Corporation – Japan’s state-sponsored aerospace 
consortium involving Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (40 percent), Kawasaki Heavy Industries (30 percent), Fuji Heavy 
Industries (20 percent), Nippi (5 percent), and ShinMaywa Industries (5 percent) and is in charge of coordinating the 
country’s participation in international collaborative aerospace projects supported by the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry – agreed to jointly develop the 787 “Dreamliner”. See (MacPherson & Pritchard, 2007) p. 555 
823 See Annex I, “Outsourcing trends for Boeing airframes”, Ibid., p. 556 
824 Ibid., p. 556 
825 The Japanese government, through its “International Aircraft Development Fund, has provided a US$3 billion low-
interest loan to heavy firms Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Fuji to allow their participation in the 787 project. Ibid., p. 555 
826 Ibid., p. 554 
827 Ibid., p. 557 
828 The selection of second-tier and third-tier suppliers for the “Dreamliner” is important as it determines which 
companies will benefit from the anticipated economic “multiplier effects”. “The economic impact for the Japanese 
aircraft industry will include major multiplier effects, with the three Japanese ‘heavies’ in control of second- and third-
tier supplier selection. The spread of subcontracts for the Japanese airframe manufacturers might add as many as 75 
Japanese sub-tier suppliers. This does not include the estimated 60 second-tier Japanese engine, equipment, and 
material suppliers, which could add a further 100 third-tier Japanese suppliers. Prior to the 777, almost all of these 
multiplier effects rippled through the US economy.” Ibid., p. 560. See also interview with Bill Lewandowski “on the 
future of the US aerospace supplier base” referenced in Ibid., p. 557 
829 “Powered by a complex mix of political expediency, logistical need, and commercial self-interest, important strands 
of US aerospace technology have been transferred to Japan since the early 1950s. […] Historically speaking, then, there 
is nothing intrinsically new about Boeing’s evolving technological relationship with its Japanese risk-sharing partners.” 
Ibid., p. 555 
830 Fingleton (2005) p. 7 
831 “Wing-making is one of the most advanced sub-sectors of one of the world’s most advanced manufacturing 
industries. […] It is […] hardly overstating things to say that the wings are to a plane what the sound box is to a violin – 
its defining feature. Just as a violin is not a Stradivarius without a sound box made in Cremona by Antonio Stradivari, a 
plane can hardly be considered a Boeing without wings made in the [US] by the Boeing company. […] Perhaps the best 
indicator of the challenges involved in making wings for large passenger jets is that, apart from the [US], only one 
 
185 
sensitive US technologies832 and eventually gives Tokyo “total production competence”833 in 
commercial airframes. Mercantilists / realists are not only worried that Boeing “has become so 
hollowed out that the impact is clearly visible in America’s rapidly worsening trade deficits”,834 but 
also that the proliferation of cutting-edge US technology will help Japan to “soon create its own 
standalone [commercial] aircraft program while simultaneously developing a low-cost Asian 
supplier network”.835 836 Charles Wessner, Director of Technology and Innovation at the National 
Academy Sciences, has warned that the outsourcing of the 787 wing technology and larger 
composite structures to Japan could ultimately curtail US innovation capability and compromise US 
security interests.837 
 
Even mercantilists acknowledge that Boeing’s “launch of the 787 programme based on systems-
integration makes good sense in terms of risk reduction, the containment of development costs, the 
acquisition of advanced composites, and the maximization of shareholder value”.838 This statement 
is a clear indication of how the industry’s changing economic and technological dynamics are 
undermining mercantilist / realist arguments (in the US and elsewhere) by strongly pushing 
aerospace companies towards cross-border collaboration / cooperation / integration in an effort to 
remain competitive and cope with growing business risks. This new pattern of cross-border 
aerospace collaboration highlighted by the Boeing 787 reflects the enormous difficulties of relying 
on private finance to develop major next-generation aircraft projects. Boeing hesitated to “bet the 
company” on new airplane developments – so risk-sharing (indirectly with the Japanese 
government) was a form of insurance. 
 
Yet while a systems-integrator approach may well be attractive for an individual company 
like Boeing for a certain period of time, mercantilists / realists are by definition focused on 
“broader economic and strategic concerns, including the rapid erosion of the US supplier 
base, the possibility that Japan might eventually become a global competitor […], and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
nation, Britain, boasts a serious record in the field. [BAE’s] wing-making capability is one of Britain’s few remaining 
world-class manufacturing businesses. Its technology, in turn, has been a key driver of the success of Airbus […].” 
Ibid., p. 560 
832 “Japanese risk-sharing partners must receive infusions of tacit scientific knowledge from Boeing – otherwise the 
strategy would not be effective. This technology transfer raises an important question for trade policy analysts who are 
concerned with national industrial competitiveness. Specifically, does technology transfer to Japanese companies 
portend a long-run threat to the commercial prospects of US aerospace firms?” (MacPherson & Pritchard, 2007) p. 553 
833 Ibid., p. 554 
834 Fingleton (2005) p. 7 
835 (MacPherson & Pritchard, 2007) pp. 553-554 
836 “The current Boeing/Airbus duopoly may soon give way to a triopoly (add Japan to the mix), largely as a result of 
Boeing’s industrial offset and technology transfer relationships with Japan’s aerospace companies.” Ibid., p. 564. China 
and India are the two other key countries with the ambition to become major global A&D industry players. 
837 Interview with Charles Wessner “on the leakage of US commercial aircraft technology to overseas sources” 
referenced in Ibid., p. 559. 
838 Ibid., p. 564 
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fact that rising levels of foreign content ultimately contravene the interests of US workers in 
skilled occupations”.839 840 
 
Some mercantilists even believe that these outsourcing / offshoring trends – coupled with the 
continuing rise of Airbus – could force Boeing to completely abandon the manufacturing side of the 
aerospace business within the next decade. Instead, the US “national champion” would focus on 
final aircraft assembly, sales and marketing, and aviation-related services.841 Given the significant 
overlap and synergies between the civilian and military aircraft sector, Boeing’s abandoning of 
crucial aircraft manufacturing competencies “would [inevitably] undermine its defence business, 
with distinctly ominous implications for America’s long-term security”.842 Finally, while decrying 
Europe’s government subsidies for Airbus, US mercantilists argue that Boeing should emulate the 
European aerospace company by relying more on “indirect offsets” and keeping foreign 
subcontractors at arms length.843 844 
                                                      
839 Ibid., p. 564 
840 Mercantilists believe globalisation’s financial and competitive pressures make (aerospace) companies pursue 
corporate strategies like outsourcing and offshoring that – while delivering certain short-term financial / operational 
benefits – ultimately put longer-term national economic / strategic / industrial base interests at serious risk. 
841 “Looking to the future, Boeing will likely exit the manufacturing side of the commercial aircraft industry by the time 
a post-787 program is conceived (probably less than 10 years). If the 787 series is financially successful, there is a 
strong possibility that a 797 might be developed under total systems integration (i.e., design, develop, and build abroad 
– but assemble at home).” (MacPherson & Pritchard, 2007) pp. 564-565 
842 Fingleton (2007) p. 7 
843 “Although Airbus also employs offset agreements to secure international orders, Airbus differs from Boeing in that 
the former more typically operates with “indirect offsets” (e.g., granting landing rights to major EU airports such as 
Heathrow or Gatwick). In addition, Airbus tends to subcontract internationally on an arms-length basis (build-to-print) 
– rarely allocating full design responsibilities to foreign subcontractors […].” (MacPherson & Pritchard, 2007) pp. 554 
844 “[…] Airbus has generally sourced components for each new model initially from within Europe. Only at a later 
stage in the cycle does it contemplate sourcing from non-European suppliers. By that time, Airbus’s European suppliers 
will have moved on to more advanced work on newer Airbus models. To be sure, in resisting offset requests, Airbus has 
enjoyed powerful support from European governments. Rather than countenance the transfer abroad of advanced 
manufacturing jobs, Airbus’s government backers have often dangled landing rights at key European airports. They 
have also used geopolitics to their advantage, particularly in the Middle East, where they capitalize on anti-American 
feeling.” Fingleton (2005) p. 10 
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5.2 Growing foreign dependence of the US aerospace and defence industrial base  
 
In the case of the US, foreign sourcing is “the use of supply, manufacture, or technology that are 
located outside the United States or Canada”845. There are several reasons why realist / neo-
mercantilist proponents – from a national security perspective – consider suppliers located outside 
North America846 as less reliable: these factors include geographical distance from the US, 
proximity to potential combat theatres abroad, and / or political or economic instability in the 
foreign supplier’s respective home country.847 848 In contrast, when business leaders decide where to 
source goods, services, and technology, they are also taking into account factors other than 
geographical location, such as cost, quality, performance, and delivery time.849 As a result, a 
domestic A&D manufacturer may well determine that foreign suppliers offer the best “deal” 
compared to domestic competitors. The national origin / geographical location of a supplier is 
therefore not necessarily of decisive importance, and may only become relevant with regard to its 
impact on the anticipated transaction costs, that is, both in terms of transportation costs as well as 
the level of “trust” involved. Business leaders and liberal economists are focused on the financial / 
efficiency gains that can be derived from leveraging existing “international comparative 
advantages”. Realists / “defence industrial strategist”850 are concerned about “foreign dependence” 
and its impact on a country’s “capacity to build or to replace critical force structures independently 
of economic and political decisions of other sovereign powers”851.852 Globalisation is perceived as a 
potential threat which raises the spectre of “foreign influence, foreign control, and foreign 
domination”853 of America’s A&D industrial base. While the US had already been dependent on 
foreign imports of key raw materials for both civilian and military applications (oil, titanium, etc.) 
                                                      
845 GAO (1991) p. 3 
846 Washington considers Canadian A&D companies as part of the US national defence industrial base. This assumption 
indicates two things. First, the US government views Canada as a rock-solid ally that will never become an adversary; 
second, even if Canada were to turn hostile vis-à-vis the US, to the extent that the lack of access to Canadian suppliers 
constitutes a US national security threat, the US could easily invade Canada as virtually all of the country’s industrial 
assets and about 50 percent of the population are located within a 100-kilometre stretch north of the US-Canadian 
border. 
847 GAO (1991) p. 14 
848 Technology transfers from the outsourcing country to third countries also risk having a negative impact on 
America’s national security and defence industrial base. Cable (1995) p. 318 
849 GAO (1991) p. 4 
850 “Defence industrial strategists are trained in both economics and defence analysis […] to define exactly what is the 
nature of the peacetime threat from globalisation, and to confront exactly what does, and what does not, help to meet 
that threat.” Moran (1990) pp. 58-59 
851 Ibid., p. 58 
852 Advocates of free trade / cooperation / globalisation / open markets are much more risk-prone than proponents of 
realism who believe in the paramount importance of national security: “In a liberal international economic system, 
vulnerability to external economic events and dependence on foreigners are a necessary consequence of immersion in 
global markets. They are the source of opportunities for improved living standards, not threats to be avoided. […] 
Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of liberal capitalism is uncertainty and risk. That is the basis for economic 
freedom and choice. One necessary corollary is a sense of insecurity for individuals, firms, and nations. Yet the idea 
that economic policy should have a security dimension will not go away. It repeatedly surfaces whenever defence 
procurement involves dependence on foreign suppliers […].” Cable (1995) pp. 305-306 
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for quite some time, the new foreign dependence that began to emerge in the 1970s / 1980s was 
qualitatively very different since it also extended to manufactured (high-tech) goods where 
Washington had enjoyed a high degree of autonomy since WWII.854 
 
Realists fear that foreign source procurement could result in 1) dependencies on foreign suppliers 
that are less reliable (supply interruptions due to foreign sanctions, transportation problems, etc.) 
than domestic companies;855 2) reduced domestic production capacities of certain goods as 
manufacturers at home do not have enough demand to keep production lines “hot”; and 3) 
questionable (future) access to state-of-the-art technologies as domestic R&D capabilities are 
increasingly ramped down along with production sites.856 It is important to note, however, that not 
all forms of foreign defence sourcing result in foreign dependence, and that not all forms of foreign 
dependence create a national security threat or vulnerability. US dependence on “multiple, open 
foreign sources that possess multinational perspectives”857 is far less worrisome than American 
dependence on a “single, closed, and centralised foreign source that maintains a national 
perspective”858: The crucial variable to determine if a certain level of foreign dependence creates a 
threat / vulnerability or not is “whether the lack of available alternatives jeopardises national 
security by significantly reducing the capability of a critical weapon system”859.860 “[D]ependence 
becomes vulnerability and affects a relationship when the opportunity costs of foregoing the 
relationship are high or intolerable”861. 
 
The national security implications of foreign sourcing can be analysed from two perspectives:862 863 
first, the impact on the surge and mobilisation capacity of America’s defence industrial base; 
second, the impact on the country’s technology base. “Surge” and “mobilisation” refer to 
“production of [increased] quantities under time constraints”864. While “surge”865 capacities usually 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
853 Moran (1990) p. 58 
854 Pages (1996) p. 11 
855 “In practice, the ‘security of supply’ issue involves two separate problems, though they are often confused (and often 
exist together). The first is that interruptions in import supply – caused by war, revolution, foreign sanctions or accident 
– could severely disrupt the national economy, or parts of it. The second is that overseas suppliers could acquire a 
monopoly position through unique ownership or cartel action, turning the terms of trade against the importer. This latter 
concern is exemplified by the price of oil but is also relevant to new technologies (a major element in strategic trade 
theory is the advantage in terms of monopoly ‘rent’ which accrues to a technological leader). These two preoccupations 
may coincide but are analytically different and have different policy implications.” Cable (1995) p. 313 
856 GAO (1991) p. 4 
857 Ibid., p. 14 
858 Ibid., p. 14 
859 Ibid., p. 3 
860 [W]here alternative suppliers are few, and the difficulties of developing substitutes great, the potential for delay, 
denial, manipulation, or blackmail on the part of outsiders is ever-present.” Moran (1993) p. 214 
861 Pages (1996) p. 8 
862 NDU (1987) 
863 Ibid., pp. 12-15 
864 GAO (1991) p. 12 
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need to be achieved during a relatively short time frame (that is, up to a few weeks or months), 
“mobilisation” is a much more comprehensive process that can take up to several years. The key 
question is how quickly defence material imported from foreign suppliers can be replaced or 
augmented by deliveries from domestic companies.866 However, one can also argue that the concept 
of “surge capacity” is no longer relevant in today’s security and defence industrial environment. 
After all, it is virtually impossible to double the production of modern military aircraft in, let’s say, 
six months. Furthermore, Western governments do not really hope or expect to conduct high-
intensity military operations for more than 2-3 months any longer.867 
 
Potential threats and vulnerabilities to the (US) technology base are more diffuse and long-term in 
nature and can in turn be assessed from two perspectives. The first national security concern is to 
ensure US access to state-of-the art technologies for the continued research, development, 
production, and maintenance of crucial A&D systems during times of peace and war. The second 
concern is to ensure that America remains the world’s technology leader and to control or prevent 
the transfer / diffusion of sensitive technological innovations and secrets to other countries. The 
availability or denial of technology access is often a function of the level of market concentration in 
a given industry. The higher the market share of foreign companies that provide America with 
access to crucial goods, services, or technologies, the higher the risk that “a tight network of foreign 
industries and supporting institutions that dominates key technologies could exercise global power 
by setting the terms on which technology [as well as related goods and services] are traded”868. 
American export controls are designed to manage or prevent the spread of sensitive US 
technologies to other countries. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
865 “Surge is the accelerated production, maintenance, and repair of selected items and the expansion of logistics support 
services to meet contingencies short of a declared national emergency utilising existing facilities and equipment”. 
Mobilisation is the act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organising national resources, 
and the process by which the Armed Forces, or part of them, are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national 
emergency.” US Joint Chiefs of Staff quoted in Ibid., p. 12 
866 If substitution problems do occur, they are generally the result of a lack of alternative, qualified suppliers, a lack of 
suitable substitutes, insufficient production capacities from domestic suppliers, or the need for rather long production 
lead times which make it impossible to quickly replace foreign-sourced supplies. 
867 “Barring the now unlikely resurgence of major conventional war between great powers, the need for the defence 
industry to be able to surge production to accommodate large-scale mobilization will probably remain remote. […] 
Moreover, given the far greater complexity of modern weaponry, surge would be considerably slower today than it was 
during [WWII].” Watts (2008) p. 75. However, that being said, US industry analysts have also defined the issue of 
“surge capacity” more broadly (including the development of new systems, etc.) and continue to describe it as a “salient 
concern” to this very day. “In the case of surge capacity, changes in the defence industry since the early 1990s have 
accentuated earlier concerns that the industry lacks the capacity to develop new systems very quickly, or to surge 
production in response to high levels of combat attrition or sudden shifts in the international security environment. 
Studies indicate that this surge problem has existed for decades. Maintaining excess production capacity is expensive, 
and the government has generally been unwilling to bear the cost of doing so (with the notable exception of 
shipbuilding). […] Absent government support, both modern management practices and shareholder demands for 
profitability dictate that firms should eliminate excess capacity and avoid stockpiling.” Watts (2008) pp. 54-55 
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“Buy American” restrictions “focus on protecting segments of the DoD contract market from 
foreign-source competition to address trade and structural problems of certain industries”869. These 
restrictions may block access of foreign suppliers to certain DoD programmes or, alternatively, may 
only allow access based on certain requirements. “Each Buy American restriction is different in 
terms of its impact and effectiveness and the particular industrial sector, class, or commodity it 
affects.”870 There are several reasons why Buy American restrictions have not proven to be very 
effective when it comes to reducing the foreign dependence of the US defence industrial base. First, 
the “Buy American Act” applies only to final products and does not generally cover components or 
subcontracted items.871 This exemption is important as the number and complexity of aerospace 
components and subcontracted items have increased exponentially with each generation of new 
aircraft over the past 30-50 years. The assembly of modern commercial and military aircraft 
generally requires millions of sub-components supplied by thousands of sub-contractors. Realist / 
mercantilist demands that all of these sub-contractors should be American would therefore be very 
demanding, cumbersome, and extremely expensive. Furthermore, the question which sub-
assemblies represent “critical” technologies is not always easy to answer. Second, existing 
restrictions are frequently waived to pursue other US policy goals (NATO rationalisation, 
standardisation, and interoperability, etc.).872 873 Third, the (partial) sourcing of US A&D products 
from abroad increasingly occurs through offset agreements already discussed above. Fourth, “in 
many instances, even when the total demand for a given item is reserved for domestic sources, the 
demand is insufficient to stabilise a failing domestic industry or to preserve a healthy one”.874 Fifth, 
there are also instances – like the M1 Abrams tank – where DoD procurement officials give 
preference to foreign suppliers due to availability, quality, and cost factors.875 Finally, the R&DP of 
advanced weapons systems is increasingly dependent on technological innovations taking place in 
the civilian / commercial sector, which, over the past two decades, has pushed ahead to become the 
true technology leader vis-à-vis the military / defence sector. 
 
The US Congressional Office of Technology Assessments (OTA) already recognised this trend 
early on and published a report titled “Arming Our Allies: Cooperation and Competition in Defence 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
868 Ibid., p. 14 
869 GAO (1991) p. 6 
870 Ibid., p. 6 
871 Ibid., p. 3 
872 “’Rationalisation’ is a term used to encompass all actions taken to use equipment and perform common tasks more 
efficiently and cost-effectively”. ‘Standardization’ involves the adoption of common equipment, doctrine, and 
procedures by all members of the alliance. ‘Inter-operability’ refers to compatibility of equipment and inter-
changeability of parts, fuel, and ammunition.” Taylor (1982) p. 95 
873 Most NATO members enjoy exemptions from the “Buy America” restrictions, which were first waived back in the 
1970s through a number of bilateral MoUs to promote a two-way street in transatlantic defence procurement. 
874 GAO (1991) p. 6 
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Technology” in 1990 to analyse “the changes in the environment of defence technology and 
reduced East-West tensions will exert on defence industrial cooperation and associated alliance 
relations”: 
 
In view of the rising “spin-on” effects from commercial to military applications, OTA came 
to the conclusion that […] “defence developments and production will depend increasingly 
on the health of the domestic civilian sector and the ability of DoD and its contractors to 
develop and gain access to the products and technologies needed for both our defence and 
the civilian sector.”876 
 
Concerns about the increased foreign dependence of the US defence industrial base were first raised 
in the early 1980s. Previously, in contrast to its European and Asian allies, America had relied 
almost exclusively on domestic military technologies and production assets to meet the Cold War’s 
defence needs. “This period of military self-sufficiency ended in the 1980s, as rising dependence 
triggered a major outcry both within and outside the US government”877: 
 
“There has been a serious decline in the nation’s defence industrial capability that places 
our national security in jeopardy. An alarming erosion of crucial industrial elements, 
coupled with mushrooming dependence on foreign sources for critical materials is 
endangering our defence posture at its very foundation.”878 
 
In 1984, the Pentagon concluded that it was necessary to launch “an investigation into the nature 
and scope of foreign dependency”. A report titled “A Study of the Effect of Foreign Dependency” – 
was issued in 1986 and made “recommendations on how DoD could reduce the damage to the US 
defence industrial base due to existing foreign dependencies and help identify and prevent future 
foreign dependencies”.879 The report recommended that 1) the Pentagon develop an information 
system to track foreign dependencies throughout the entire defence procurement process, including 
lower-tier suppliers; and 2) that weapons programme and procurement officers constantly evaluate 
the potential impact of foreign dependencies on critical US weapons systems.880 Ultimately, 
however, “this report received limited attention […] its contents and recommendations, therefore, 
were not fully considered or addressed”881. The Pentagon’s 1988 report “Bolstering Defence 
Industrial Competitiveness” also warned against the consequences of foreign dependence: 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
875 Ibid., pp. 1-2 
876 Ibid., pp. 13-14. See OTA (1989) and OTA (1990) 
877 Pages (1996) p. 2 
878 House (1980) 
879 GAO (1991) p. 3 
880 Ibid., p. 5 
881 Ibid., p. 5 
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“From the national security perspective, foreign dependencies in technologies essential to 
defence production are inherently risky, and minimizing them should be a [DoD] and 
national priority. […] In a national emergency, the consequences of extensive dependence 
on foreign sources could be extreme.”882 
 
Potential national security implications of foreign dependence in the US A&D sector have proven 
difficult to assess. DoD efforts to identify and minimise current and future foreign dependencies 
have been hampered by insufficient data, especially at the subcontractor levels. During the 1980s 
and 1990s the Pentagon was criticised by the GAO for its inability to keep track of comprehensive 
data on existing foreign dependencies – information deemed indispensable “to take appropriate 
action regarding the domestic industrial base, including the economic, trade, and technology 
security implications of procuring major weapons systems from foreign sources”883.884 
 
“Technology denial” to the US due to foreign dependence and technology proliferation / technology 
exodus (to hostile third countries) are seen as the greatest risks to American national security in 
connection with transatlantic / transnational defence mergers. Even during the Cold War, when 
America and Western Europe were confronting the Warsaw Pact, foreign economic dependence and 
technology denial tactics were leveraged by the US to exert pressure on France, Germany, and the 
UK. In the 1956 Suez crisis, Washington threatened to order American oil companies to cut off 
deliveries unless French and UK forces withdraw from the Canal. During 1964-1966, Washington 
refused to sell US “supercomputers” to France, a move that delayed the French hydrogen bomb 
programme and contributed to Paris leaving NATO’s IMS in June 1966.885 
 
During the 1982 Soviet pipeline dispute, Washington tried to force German, French, British, and 
Italian licensees of relevant US technologies and European subsidiaries of US companies to refrain 
from selling oil and gas equipment to Mosow.886 President Reagan’s unilateral, extraterritorial, 
retroactive sanctions to protest martial law in Poland were designed to block the delivery of 
European compressors for the Urengoy pipeline from Siberia to Ukraine. European governments 
rejected Reagan’s actions and decided to fulfil their pre-existing contractual obligations vis-à-vis 
the USSR, mainly because they were eager to diversify their energy supplies after the 1973 and 
1979 oil shocks. The UK, Germany, and Italy – “who saw US sanctions as a challenge not only to 
                                                      
882 DoD (1988) p. 47 
883 GAO (1991) p. 24 
884 GAO (1989) 
885 The Economist (1966) 
886 (Hufbauer & Schott, 1985) chapter 11 
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their sovereignty but also to vital national interests, such as domestic employment, energy security, 
and détente”887 – instructed their “own” companies operating under US licenses to deliver the 
turbines to Moscow while France ordered the French subsidiaries of a US company to do the same. 
The companies “were quite literally caught in the middle, facing severe sanctions no matter whose 
directive they followed”888. In the end, Reagan backed down and lifted the sanctions.889 890 891 
Technology proliferation concerns again rose to prominence with the 1991 Iraq War, as Baghdad 
was equipped with European weapons imported during the 1980-1988 Gulf War. These examples 
of technology denial / economic coercion and technology proliferation / technology exodus to 
hostile third countries did involve NATO members during the Cold War, at a time when close 
relations between the Western allies were of paramount importance to confront the Soviet threat. 
 
The Soviet pipeline dispute taught “European authorities […] the hard way […] that a 
strong bargaining position and ultimate protection [against extra-territorial interference] 
came not from some legal capability to exercise sovereign jurisdiction over activity within 
their own borders [home soil requirements], but rather from arranging alternative suppliers 
[…], diversifying purchasers, becoming [in the words of a German company] ‘very cautious 
about any new contracts that would bind us so totally to a single source of technology and 
equipment’”892. 
 
The end of the Cold War rendered relations between Europe and America even more complex. 
Without a common enemy, the relationship between Europe and America within NATO has 
increasingly been shaped by diverging political and military interests, and growing economic 
competition. The Suez crisis, the US supercomputer embargo, and the Soviet pipeline dispute have 
highlighted the political, economic, and military vulnerabilities of Europe resulting from “foreign 
dependence” in strategic industries, even among allies. 
 
The threat of globalisation to America’s A&D industry began to emerge in the 1980s. The 
conventional neo-mercantilist response advocated by national security strategists to deal with the 
A&D industry’s globalisation has framed the threat in terms of the nationality of the firm and the 
location of critical R&DP sites. Technologically advanced, autarkic “national champions” and the 
                                                      
887 Rodman (1995) p. 136 
888 Moran (1990) p. 65 
889 Reagan’s decision to back down and Washington’s inability to get even all US companies to support the 
extraterritorial sanctions imposed on their foreign subsidiaries is a direct consequence of America’s declining 
“structural hegemony” and “ideological hegemony”. Rodman (1995) p. 110 
890 “The ensuing crisis in the [A]lliance dissuaded the Reagan administration from applying extraterritorial controls to 
subsequent sanctions, although it continued to claim broad extraterritorial discretion in principle.” Ibid., p. 111 
891 “[S]anctions are futile in an environment where US business is global and other states do not share US preferences.” 
Ibid., p. 106 
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requirement that foreign suppliers establish R&DP facilities on US soil are viewed as the best 
hedge against foreign manipulation and coercion. Strategic Trade Policy (STP) also calls for the 
creation of “national champions” through import restrictions and export subsidies: 
 
The ultimate goal is to “propel a country’s own entrants into a leading position, bolstering 
their prospects for world predominance while denying the opportunity to rivals. This might 
eliminate or drastically cut back the problem of foreign control, replacing dependency with 
supremacy”893. 
 
FDI in America’s A&D industry is often referred to as “penetration”, while acquisitions of US 
companies by foreigners – regardless of the required “special security arrangements”894 – viewed as 
a “loss” to the US defence industrial base. The 1988 Exon-Florio amendment has given the 
American president the authority to block foreign take-overs if they endanger “national security, 
essential commerce and economic welfare”.895 The provision also revitalised CFIUS, the 
government’s screening mechanism to approve or block potentially sensitive foreign investments in 
US companies. During the twelve years preceding Exon-Florio, CFIUS reviewed less than 30 cases; 
in the first year after the amendment’s passage, CFIUS reviewed more than 50 cases.896 President 
Reagan publicly opposed the Exon-Florio amendment, but did not veto the 1988 trade bill to which 
it was attached. Just three years earlier, Reagan had declared that “A world with strong foreign 
investment flows is the opposite of a zero-sum game. […] We believe there are only winners, no 
losers, and all participants gain from it.”897 This episode betrays a deep underlying confusion within 
US elites about the costs and benefits of open markets / globalisation vs. protectionism / neo-
mercantilism.898 Traditionally, Washington has championed laissez-faire policy to promote an open 
post-WWII international trade and investment regime: 
 
“[FDI] has been considered a major instrument through which the [US] could maintain its 
relative position in world markets, and the overseas expansion of [MNCs] has been 
regarded as a means to maintain America’s dominant world economic position in other 
expanding economies.”899 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
892 Moran (1990) pp. 65-66 and (Hufbauer & Schott, 1985) p. 238 
893 Moran (1990) p. 92 
894 SSA include the creation of a separate US trust for the foreign parent company, where the top management and the 
board of directors of the American subsidiary must all be US citizens, as well as restrictions on the access of foreigners 
to classified information held by the US subsidiary. 
895 Quote from Exon-Florio amendment in Omestad (1989) p. 130 
896 Moran (1990) p. 95; Tolchin (1989) 
897 Omestad (1989) p. 121 
898 Earlier assumptions were that the US would remain the dominant economic player and technology leader, so such 
contradictions would not arise. 
899 Quote from Gilpin, “The Political Economy of International Relations”, in Omestad (1989) p. 122 
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However, with the deterioration of America’s macro-economic situation starting in the 1970s – 
marked by high inflation, a weak dollar, rising unemployment, growing trade deficits, etc. – 
Washington changed course and embraced neo-mercantilist policies to protect certain industries 
such as semiconductors or automotive from foreign competitors through a combination of import 
restrictions, public subsidies, etc. As the US consumed more than it produced – making up the 
difference by borrowing money from abroad – American mercantilists decried the “continuing 
erosion of [US] control over decision-making and technologies that are crucial to the creation of 
national wealth and power”900.901 While President George H.W. Bush pursued very internationalist, 
pro-market policies, US public opinion data were already pointing towards the strong appeal of 
protectionist / neo-mercantilist policies. 902 
 
“The gulf between current policy and public attitudes means that the Bush administration 
will come under intensifying pressure to consider controls on foreign ownership, 
particularly as foreign takeovers continue or even accelerate in the 1990s.”903 
 
From a national security perspective, the “Gaullist nightmare of total foreign dependency”904 in 
A&D matters is clearly not desirable as it would make the country vulnerable to foreign 
manipulation and coercion. However, there are also major potential pitfalls associated with the 
government-supported creation of autarkic “national champions” called for by protectionist-minded 
STP advocates; namely economic inefficiencies, a lack of competition and technological 
innovation, as well as reduced economies of scale. The first problem is that the government-
supported creation of “national champions” makes it necessary to pick winners and losers, 
champions and non-champions. Having political leaders and governments decide which companies 
or technologies are worthy of a country’s targeted financial and political support raises the spectre 
of costly misallocations of public funds that could result in “national champions” that are, in 
essence, nothing else than “monopolists whose principal impact will be to collect rents from the 
country’s own citizens”905.906 The second problem is that protectionist measures to prevent foreign 
                                                      
900 Ibid., p. 119 
901 “The debate on foreign investment may not bring out the best in the American people. Politicising foreign 
investment appeals to the insular, nativist streak in US politics. Foreign purchases offer highly visible signs of 
America’s declining position in the world economy and of the increasing penetration of its economic and political 
system by foreign interests.” Ibid., pp. 119-120 
902 “A 1988 opinion survey […] revealed that 74 per cent of Americans believe foreign investment has lessened US 
economic independence, 78 per cent favour a law restricting foreign ownership of businesses and real estate, and 89 per 
cent want foreign investors to register with the government.” Ibid., p. 119 
903 Ibid., p. 119 
904 Moran (1990) pp. 70-71 
905 Ibid., p. 92 
906 “[T]hose in the [US] who resist the idea of formulating an industrial policy for the industry will point to what they 
regard as a costly and dismal record of the governments that have attempted it. They will emphasise that government 
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A&D companies from competing in the domestic market often backfire. “For any given level of 
defence spending there is less sophisticated, deliverable, reliable bang for the buck with 
protection[ism] than without.”907 While total foreign dependency (the “Gaullist nightmare”) is 
scary, the opposite situation (total autarky) can also be frightening if a country is “being tied to a 
product of such high price, long delays, and inferior technological performance that the user finds 
his own security compromised”908. 
 
“It is precisely for this reason that defence procurement controversies can pitch service 
chiefs – who are employed to be good judges of security in the narrow sense – on the side of 
foreign suppliers against coalitions of politicians and domestic industrialists. Rational 
considerations of cost, quality, and technological superiority may well lead to a sourcing of 
defence-related equipments, systems, or components with foreign suppliers or foreign-
owned companies.”909 910 
 
STP advocates argue that countries should pay a “national security premium” to prevent their 
strategic industries from getting wiped out by foreign competition. Moran counters that such 
protectionist measures should only be used when the foreign-based competitors / suppliers are so 
heavily concentrated that they can use “coordinated denial” and manipulation tactics to hurt key 
national interests. After all, there is always the possibility of a protectionist / STP backlash from 
abroad. “Strategic trade logic has an inherent beggar-thy-neighbour dynamic that an only lead to 
provocation, escalation, and retaliation among the major industrial nations.”911 The “threat of 
globalisation” to America’s A&D industry should therefore be understood not as a function of “the 
extent of dependence on foreign suppliers” but rather “the concentration of dependence on foreign 
suppliers”912. Finally, international A&D collaboration allows the countries involved to draw on a 
wider technology base and makes it possible to cement political and commercial alliances that, in 
turn, reduce the risk of neo-mercantilist backlashes.913 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
interventions for economic and national security reasons in other industries, including steel, machine tools, and 
semiconductors, has burdened the US aerospace industry with much heavier costs than those borne by European and 
Japanese competitors.” (Moran & Mowery, 1991) p. 141 
907 Moran (1990) p. 84 
908 Ibid., p.67 
909 Cable (1995) p. 318 
910 The massive political protests sparked by the Pentagon’s February 2008 decision to award the KC-X tanker 
competition to NGC-EADS is the example par excellence of a situation where the relevant service (USAF) selected a 
foreign bidder / platform (Airbus) only to encounter the fierce resistance by Boeing and its allies in Congress, who 
disparaged Airbus as “the French tanker”. 
911 Moran (1993) p. 214 
912 Moran (1990) p. 85 
913 The Nimrod vs. AWACS competition highlights the risks of a neo-mercantilist “national champion” approach and 
the benefits of a transnational production strategy providing “insurance against a wider outbreak of economic 
nationalism that could inhibit overseas sales”. Kraar (1990). While Boeing’s AWACS offered subcontracting 
opportunities to European allies, the UK-only Nimrod consortium was a technological and financial disaster. 
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5.3 The rise of economic rivalries among Western allies in the post-Cold War world 
 
A government’s response to defence dependence is shaped by its military and economic threat 
perceptions and its position in the international system.914 During the Cold War, America had a 
vital interest in promoting the indigenous defence industrial capabilities of its European and Asian 
allies to create a counterweight to the Warsaw Pact. Military and economic aid, the co-production / 
licensing of American weapons, Boeing’s AWACS programme and other US-led joint NATO 
procurement initiatives illustrate Washington’s commitment in that regard. Apart from the unifying 
Soviet threat, it was America’s hegemonic power position in the West that made the country 
“especially immune to relative gains concerns”915. The roots of America’s growing foreign 
(inter)dependence in economic and military affairs vis-à-vis its allies can be traced back to the early 
1970s and first appeared on the radar screen of national security strategists in the early 1980s. 
However, it was not until the late 1980s that Paul Kennedy’s “The Rise and Fall of the Great 
Powers”916 – against the backdrop of record US budget deficits and the 1987 stock market crash – 
sparked a wider debate about the consequences of American “imperial overstretch”917. Kennedy and 
his fellow “declinists”918 were criticised by those who predicted that only America – despite its 
undeniable decline in relative economic – had the necessary military, economic, political, social 
resources in terms of both “hard” and “soft” power to remain a global superpower.919 
 
The sudden demise of the Soviet Union, which revealed the US to be the world’s only superpower, 
dramatically improved America’s security situation and seemed to prove the “declinists” wrong. 
However, analysts also began to debate how long America’s “unipolar moment”920 would last and 
what strategies should be employed to defend the country’s hegemonic role in the world against 
potential challengers like Europe, Japan, China, and Russia.921 According to Huntington, 
international primacy – defined as a government’s ability “to exercise more influence on the 
behaviour of more actors on more issues than any other government can” – does “matter” and 
remains of “central importance” in post-Cold War international politics, both for the United States 
and the other (major) powers.922 From a realist perspective, America’s alliance with Western 
                                                      
914 “The level of threat facing a state is a function not only of the distribution of power but also of the geographic 
proximity, offensive capabilities, and, in particular, the perceived intentions of others.” Snyder (1991) p. 126 
915 Pages (1996) p. 7 
916 Kennedy (1987) 
917 Kupchan (1989) 
918 Calleo (1987) 
919 Nye (1990); Huntington (1988/89) 
920 Krauthammer (1990/91) 
921 An internal 1992 Pentagon document defined America’s post-Cold War grand strategy in very clear terms: “Our first 
objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival […] that poses a threat on the order of that previously posed by 
the Soviet Union. […] Our strategy must now focus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global 
competitor.” Quoted in Mearsheimer (2001) p. 46 
922 Huntington (1993) p. 68 
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Europe during the Cold War (institutionalised through NATO) can be interpreted as a direct 
response to the military threat posed by Soviet expansionism.923 Huntington and other realists 
predicted that the absence of this unifying threat would lead to the re-emergence of conflicting 
(transatlantic) interests which then trigger “intense conflicts” and struggles for political and 
economic primacy between America and its former European allies.924 925 “The end of a significant 
war or conflict, whether among individuals, groups, or states, creates the basis for the generation of 
new conflicts”926. 
 
Huntington argued that future clashes of interests among America and other major powers would be 
“over the distribution of the benefits and costs of economic growth and the distribution of the costs 
of economic stagnation or decline”927.928 He rejects the notion that international economic 
competition is a positive-sum game where the (governmental) actors involved are concerned about 
maximising absolute rather than relative gains.929 930 Huntington derives classic mercantilist 
arguments and policy prescriptions from his background as a hard-core IR realist. Economic power 
and technological prowess are the ultimate source and foundation of military might. “All of the 
major shifts in the world’s military-power balances have followed alterations in the productive 
balances.”931 
 
“Economists are blind to the fact that economic activity is a source of power as well as 
well-being. It is, indeed, probably the most important source of power, and in a world in 
                                                      
923 “[T]he [Cold War] partnership between Europe and the [US] was held together by three unifying forces. The first 
and most important was the Soviet threat. The second was America’s economic stake in Europe, which reinforced its 
strategic interest in European prosperity. The third was the existence of a generation of European and American elites 
whose personal backgrounds and life experiences left them strongly committed to the idea of an Atlantic community. 
All three unifying forces are now gone or eroding, and there is little hope of resurrecting them. Walt (1998) pp. 3-11 
924 Huntington (1993) p. 71 
925 “There is considerable evidence […] that the [US] and its Cold War allies are drifting apart. This trend is most 
apparent in Europe, where NATO’s 1999 war against Serbia and its messy aftermath have damaged transatlantic 
relations and prompted the [EU] to begin building a force that can operate independently of NATO – meaning the [US]. 
[…] The [UK], France, Germany, and Italy are slowly but inexorable realising that they want to provide for their own 
security and control their own destiny. They are less willing to take orders from the [US] than they were during the 
Cold War. Japan, too, is showing signs of independent behaviour.” Mearsheimer (2001) pp. 48-49 
926 Huntington, (1993) p. 71 
927 Ibid., p. 71 
928 “American realists simply see the emerging threat of a new economic hegemon, either Germany alone or France and 
Germany together […].”(Wallace & Zielonka, 1998) p. 67 
929 Mastanduno (1991) pp. 73-74 
930 “Drawing upon historical and empirical evidence, and employing a realist conceptualisation of states as rational 
power-maximisers in zero-sum pursuit of their individual interests, [this neo-marxist essay] interprets economic 
globalisation as competitive international relations, wherein states employ economic means to attain international geo-
political power. […] ‘Soft’ geo-politics represents states’ competitive and coercive interactions, using political-
economic tactics to exercise and increase their political clout and maximise their individual economic gain. Economic 
globalisation constitutes a foremost example.” Gritsch (2005) p. 2 
931 Kennedy (1987) p. 439 
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which military conflict between major states is unlikely, economic power will be 
increasingly important in determining the primacy or subordination of states”932. 
 
This emphasis on preserving and advancing America’s economic power and technological prowess 
conforms to a neo-realist approach, which argues that Washington should respond to the post-Cold 
War era – characterised by reduced military threats, growing “foreign dependence” on potential 
challengers like Europe, Japan, or China, and the corresponding (relative) decline in US economic 
might – by pursuing industrial / economic policies designed to defend America’s international 
hegemonic position. Edward Luttwak defined “the pursuit of adversarial goals through economic 
means” as “geo-economics”933. “As the power of the hegemonic state [i.e., America] declines and 
the importance of military threats recedes, [neo-]realists expect the [hegemon] to become more 
attuned to relative gains considerations and begin to act more like a “normal” country”934.935 The 
transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era is thus marked by a shift from military 
competition to economic competition as the primary theatre of great-power rivalry. 
 
“In the realm of military competition, the instruments of power are missiles, planes, 
warships, bombs, tanks, divisions”. In the realm of economic competition, the instruments of 
power are productive efficiency, market control, trade surplus, strong currency, foreign 
exchange reserves, ownership of foreign companies, factories and technology.”936 
 
However, great-power rivalries are never exclusively driven by either military or economic 
competition. In theory, one might be able to draw a clear distinction between these two dimensions 
of a country’s national power base. In reality though, military and economic factors are inextricably 
intertwined as both co-determine a state’s power and influence in the international system. It was 
only the combination of superior military and economic-technological resources that – coupled with 
the “soft power” appeal of US values like freedom and democracy – laid the foundations for 
America’s rise to global superpower status in the post-Cold War era. At the time, all of the other 
(potential) competitors for global primacy were lacking either military or economic resources to 
rival America. While Russia boasted the world’s largest WMD stockpiles, its economy was in 
tatters; Japan commanded impressive economic-technological might but had only a small Self 
Defence Force. 
 
                                                      
932 Huntington (1993) p. 72 
933 Luttwak (1990) quoted in Cable (1995) p. 308 
934 Pages (1996) p. 7 
935 “The model which is implicit in this view is a kind of zero-sum game in which the gains of one country (primacy) 
are seen as cancelling out the losses of another (subordination) even if both achieve growing prosperity.” Cable (1995) 
p. 308 
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What makes the BMD and EADS merger cases selected for this thesis so interesting is that the 
A&D sector is the “strategic, high-technology, high value-added industr[y]”937 par excellence, with 
enormous importance for international military and geo-economic security.938 In 1991, Huntington 
warned his countrymen “to be concerned by the current challenge to American economic primacy 
posed by Japan and the possible future challenge that could come from Europe”939:940 While 
Huntington focuses on Japan as the immediate threat, it is obvious that a reunified Europe and a 
bigger, more powerful EU are viewed as potential (economic) challengers to America’s superpower 
status. 
 
“Japanese strategy, behaviour, and declarations all posit the existence of an economic cold 
war between Japan and the [US].”941 […] 
“The Japanese government […] has targeted aerospace for rapid development with 
government ‘subsidies, loans, and political support’942. If Japan is successful, the future of 
Seattle can be seen in Detroit.”943 
 
Huntington’s comparison between Seattle (home of Boeing) and Detroit (home of the Big Three 
carmakers) underscores his mercantilist agenda derived from a hard-core IR realist background. 
Only die-hard protectionists would argue that Detroit’s automotive industry should be protected as 
a national asset.944 The competitive threat posed by European A&D companies (Airbus) and the rise 
of Japan, China, India, etc. raised the spectre of long-term US decline and loss of national wealth in 
a “strategic, high-technology, high value-added industry” critical to bolstering America’s economic, 
political, military leadership position in the world. Realists believe that sovereign states – even 
those that enjoy strong political, economic, social, and military ties – can never fully trust each 
other. Today’s allies can be tomorrow’s enemy. Huntington and Mearsheimer reject the notion that 
the “Atlantic Community” had fundamentally transformed the context of international relations, 
including international economic relations. It was therefore a full dismissal of liberal 
institutionalism as a concept. This hard realist argument has made for a deep ambiguity in US-
                                                                                                                                                                                 
936 Huntington (1993) p. 73 
937 OTA (1991) p. 9; Huntington (1993) p. 74 
938 “In the geo-economic view of the world, a trade deficit is intrinsically undesirable, not merely for its own sake 
(imports ‘destroy’ jobs) but because it is balanced by capital inflows – foreign investment or the acquisition of claims 
on the federal government so that the ‘US becomes dependent on imports or money from Japan’ and ‘vulnerable to 
Japanese threats’.” Cable (1995) p. 309 
939 Huntington (1993) p. 72 
940 This was the reverse argument to that of Servan-Schreiber’s “Le défi américain”. 
941 Huntington (1993) p. 76 
942 Stevenson (1992) 
943 Huntington (1993) p. 76 
944 America’s carmakers have consistently failed to anticipate changes in consumer preferences or in technology and 
thus rendered themselves vulnerable to foreign competition. By relying on SUVs sales for too long, Detroit missed the 
boat on investing in alternative fuels / engine technologies and the necessity to build smaller, more fuel-efficient cars. 
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European relations, especially in defence industrial cooperation, with some US policymakers 
arguing for a balanced “two-way street” and others pushing for the maintenance of unilateral 
dominance. This tension has been an underlying ambiguity through successive US administrations. 
 
US and European policymakers have long regarded commercial aircraft exports as semi-political in 
nature; not only due to the major revenues and jobs at stake but also because of the growing 
technological overlaps between civil and military aerospace. Washington, Paris, and the other 
European capitals concerned have repeatedly tried to use their political leverage to help secure 
major export deals for Boeing and Airbus, respectively. In 2005, President Bush and Secretary Rice 
– lobbied their counterparts in New Delhi to make sure Air India’s US$7 billion purchase of new 
commercial aircraft would go to Boeing.945 Despite French lobbying efforts to promote Airbus, the 
Indian government opted for the US firm, prompting European diplomats and business leaders to 
complain that Airbus was not given “fair and equal treatment”946 and that “factors other than 
commercial”947 clinched the deal for Boeing.948 Similar lobbying efforts involving senior US / 
European policymakers have accompanied major aircraft purchases in many other countries (China, 
Saudi Arabia, etc.). 
 
The Boeing deal took place in the context of Washington’s strategic rapprochement with India, “a 
major Asian democratic power with the potential economic and military strength to counter the 
adverse effects of China’s rise as a regional and world power”949. It was closed shortly before the 
signing of a “New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship”950 and the landmark US-
India nuclear deal in June and July 2005, respectively. Washington and New Delhi agreed to 
“expand two-way defence trade between our countries […] as a means to strengthen our countries’ 
security, reinforce our strategic partnership, achieve greater interaction between our armed forces, 
and build greater understanding between our defence establishments”951. India plans to spend 
US$10-12 billion to purchase at least 126 fighter jets by 2011. “[S]ix aerospace companies, backed 
by their respective governments, are in intense competition […] for what may be one of the world’s 
last great defence contracts”952. 
                                                      
945 Cherian (2005) 
946 Ibid. 
947 Ibid. 
948 India might also have selected Boeing to gain US backing for its attempt to become permanent UNSC member and 
to ease Washington’s concerns about the widening bilateral trade deficit. Ibid. 
949 Richardson (2002) p. 20 
950 “New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship” 
951 Ibid. 
952 Srivastava (2009). The competitors are: LMC, Boeing, Saab, MIG, EADS-BAE, Dassault. 
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5.4 Major transatlantic M&As after the end of the Cold War 
 
By contrasting large-scale transatlantic M&As in a variety of industries (automotive, banking, 
telecommunications) with the absence of transatlantic mergers between A&D primes, this chapter 
provides analyses what separates EADS and BMD from M&A transactions in less strategic or even 
non-strategic industries.953 All three selected cases involved successful acquisitions of American 
firms by European companies. The term “successful” means that these transactions received 
shareholder approval and were not blocked by Washington. It does not imply that these acquisitions 
were successful from a financial or corporate strategy point of view. 
                                                      
953 In fact, compared to the automotive or banking businesses, the telecommunications industry is certainly a more 
strategic sector of the economy since it raises potential national security concerns related to eavesdropping and 
espionage operations conducted by foreign powers. In addition, terrorists might be tempted to attack critical elements of 
the US telecommunications infrastructure in an effort to magnify the effects of a terrorist strike (by hampering the 
coordination of first responders and other ensuing rescue / counter-terrorism operations). 
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5.4.1 The DaimlerChrysler merger: “a marriage made in heaven”? 
 
When the link-up between Germany’s Daimler-Benz AG and America’s Chrysler Corporation was 
completed on 18 November 1998, it ranked as the biggest transatlantic merger and the biggest 
industrial merger ever recorded. The deal’s architects, Daimler-Benz CEO Schrempp and Chrysler 
CEO Eaton, hailed the US$92 billion merger as a “marriage made in heaven”. In 1998, 
DaimlerChrysler (DCX) had a turnover of US$154 billion, an operating profit of US$8.6 billion, 
sold 4.4 million vehicles, employed 442,000 people, and had a market capitalisation approaching 
US$100 billion. Schrempp hailed DCX as “a merger of equals, a merger of growth, and a merger of 
unprecedented strength”954. Only ten months passed between first exploratory talks in January 1998 
and the merger’s completion in November. The EC and the FTC approved the transaction in July 
1998, and in mid-September close to 100 percent of Chrysler and Daimler-Benz shareholders voted 
in favour of the merger, thus paving the way for the launch of DCX on 18 November 1998. 
 
Both Daimler-Benz and Chrysler were looking for a suitable partner to attain the size and 
economies of scale necessary to survive in a competitive global marketplace. In the US auto 
industry, high R&D, labour, healthcare and pension “legacy” costs, increased competition from 
cheaper and more efficient Asian carmakers, and incentive programmes were eating into profit 
margins. In the mid-1990s, Chrysler ranked as the world’s most profitable car company on a per-
vehicle basis – US$1,076 followed by Toyota (US$540) and Ford (US$534)955 – driven by SUV, 
minivan, and pick-up truck sales.956 957 That being said, Chrysler had teetered on the brink of 
bankruptcy four times since WWII. In each instance, the firm only managed to survive with the 
help of massive government bailouts and / or large-scale cutbacks in R&D. It was against this long 
shadow of history that Robert Eaton addressed his employees in July 1997 and sternly warned that 
Chrysler’s very survival would be at stake in the years to come. “I think there may be a perfect 
storm brewing around the industry today. I see a cold front, a nor’easter, and a hurricane converging 
on us all at once”958. “The cold front was chronic overcapacity, the nor’eastern was a retail 
revolution that empowered buyers, and the hurricane was a wave of environmental concerns that 
threatened the very existence of the internal combustion engine”959. The DCX merger offered 
Chrysler an opportunity to weather “the perfect storm” ahead by joining forces with one of the 
world’s leading automotive companies. The alternative would have been to remain independent and 
                                                      
954 Graesslin (2000) p. 155 
955 “The Harbour Report 1996” 
956 Finkelstein (2002) p. 2 
957 In the conventional passenger car segment, Chrysler had been losing market share for a long time and its export 
record was poor. 
958 (Vlasic & Stertz, 2001) p. 174 
959 Finkelstein (2002) p. 2 
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risk being swept away by a wave of consolidations which was soon expected to hit an industry 
notorious for its overcapacities.960 
 
Schrempp saw the DCX merger as the crowning moment of his attempt to create a “Welt AG”: a 
globally integrated automotive company with strong brands in all key international markets. He 
realised that, “as competition became tougher, even Mercedes [the world’s leading luxury brand] 
needed greater volume to support the increasingly expensive technological development required to 
stay ahead”961.962 Schrempp was careful to present DCX as a “merger of equals”:963 DCX 
established two headquarters (Stuttgart and Detroit), made English the official language, and 
appointed Schrempp and Eaton as equal “Co-Chairmen” (Co-CEOs) presiding over 15 board 
members (nine Germans and six Americans). 
 
However, the gradual “Germanisation” of DCX’s Managing Board would soon begin. In March 
2000, Eaton was handed a golden parachute and sent into early retirement. The head of Chrysler 
was asked to leave the company, too.964 The German take-over was completed in November 2000, 
when Dieter Zetsche and Wolfgang Bernhard were installed as top Chrysler managers. Under the 
terms of the merger agreement, each Daimler-Benz share was converted into one DCX share while 
each Chrysler share was only exchanged for 0.6235 DCX shares. These different “conversion 
factors” reflect the different weight of the respective financial assets that the two companies 
contributed to DCX. In that sense, the creation of DCX was no real “merger of equals”. In October 
2000, Schrempp declared that “Me being a chess player, I don’t normally talk about the second or 
third move.” “The structure we have now with Chrysler (as a standalone division) was always the 
structure I wanted,” he added. “We had to go a roundabout way but it had to be done for 
psychological reasons. If I had gone and said Chrysler would be a division, everybody on their side 
would have said: ‘There is no way we’ll do a deal’.”965 966 
 
There are several reasons why Chrysler and the US government agreed to the DCX merger. First, 
CEO Eaton feared that his company would soon be hit by “a perfect storm” threatening Chrysler’s 
survival. It seemed only a question of time before Chrysler would be pushed to the brink of 
                                                      
960 Graesslin (2005) p. 24 
961 The Economist (2006) 
962 “With US$2.8 billion in annual profits, remarkable efficiency, low design costs, and an extensive American 
dealership network, Chrysler appeared to be the perfect match.” Finkelstein (2002) p. 2 
963 Europeans and Americans shareholders each held 44 percent of DCX. 
964 The DCX Supervisory Board subcommittee members in charge of Managing Board appointments were all German. 
965 (Burt & Lambert, 2000) 
966 Kirk Kerkorian, Chrysler’s largest shareholder prior to the merger, sued DCX for US$3 billion, arguing that the 
German take-over bid disguised as a “merger of equals” had denied Chrysler shareholders the higher premiums usually 
paid in acquisitions. The lawsuit was dismissed in 2005. 
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bankruptcy or swallowed by one of its competitors. Second, a merger with Daimler-Benz and its 
flagship brand Mercedes-Benz – “the epitome of European automotive aristocracy, brimming with 
confidence, cash and technology”967 – promised to provide Chrysler with the necessary financial 
and technological clout needed to survive in a competitive international auto industry. For Chrysler, 
the timing of the DCX merger was fortuitous. While Chrysler had posted record annual operating 
profits of more than US$5 billion during 1998-1999, that figure dropped to US$499 million in 
2000. In 2001, Chrysler even swung to a US$2.2 billion loss. DCX’s market capitalisation fell from 
US$100 billion in 1998 to US$44 billion in 2001. Three years after the merger, DCX had a market 
valuation similar to that of Daimler-Benz prior to the link-up with Chrysler. 
 
Eaton rightly believed that Chrysler only had a narrow window of opportunity to find a merger 
partner. During 1998-2006, Chrysler’s share of the US car and light truck market fell from 16 to 13 
percent as Asian rivals made further inroads in the American automotive market. In 2006, DCX 
earned US$7.3 billion, while Chrysler lost US$1.48 billion. In August 2007, DCX sold 80.1 percent 
of Chrysler to US private equity firm Cerberus, and pulled out completely in April 2009. In 1998, 
DCX was “the harbinger of a new age of transnational industrialism”.968 In 2007, the picture was 
very different: 
 
“Whether the marriage of [Daimler-Benz] and [Chrysler] was a flawed idea based on 
phantom synergies, or whether it was a brilliant concept whose execution was horribly 
botched, will be debated within the auto industry and in business schools for years to come. 
It’s likely that both are true: The synergies were overestimated and the clash of cultures 
made things much worse.”969 
 
The DCX merger promised Chrysler to gain access to cash, automotive technology, and managerial 
expertise from Daimler-Benz. It can therefore be interpreted as an American attempt to “marry up”, 
to adopt best managerial / engineering practices, and to allow the US auto industry to boost its 
competitiveness to international levels. Since Daimler-Benz – clearly much bigger and stronger 
than Chrysler – presented DCX as a “merger of equals”, it is evident that from a business and 
national industrial policy perspective, Chrysler and America stood to benefit disproportionately 
from this biggest industrial merger ever. 
                                                      
967 The Economist (2001) 
968 Ingrassia (2007) analyses why DCX went “so wrong, so quickly”. 
969 Ibid. 
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5.4.2 Deutsche Bank’s take-over of Bankers Trust 
 
In June 1999, Deutsche Bank AG (DB), Germany’s biggest bank (US$734 billion in assets), 
completed its US$10.1 billion acquisition of Bankers Trust (BT), the eight-largest American bank 
(US$133 billion in assets).970 The DB-BT deal was the biggest foreign take-over of a US bank and 
(temporarily) turned DB into the world’s largest commercial banking group. The rationale behind 
the acquisition of BT – a bank serving corporate clients – was DB’s desire to join the ranks of Wall 
Street’s investment banking powerhouses. As European financial markets were shifting from 
corporate lending – DB’s traditional business – to stock underwriting in the 1990s, DB feared that 
banks like Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley would soon establish a commanding presence on its 
home turf. The DB-BT take-over took place against the backdrop of major consolidation in the US 
and European financial industry. In January 1998, Union Bank of Switzerland and the Swiss 
Banking Corporation engineered a US$24.7 billion merger to form UBS. In April 1998, Citicorp 
and Travelers Group created “Citigroup Inc.”, the world’s largest financial services concern.971 
These mergers underscored DB’s need to find a suitable (US) investment banking partner.972 
 
After DB’s initial talks with J.P. Morgan had failed, it set its sights on BT which, despite its smaller 
size, offered the German bank an attractive opportunity to enter the investment banking market. 
Following several scandals in the early 1990s that had hurt its reputation and bottom-line, BT 
transformed itself from a commercial bank into an “investment banker to the world’s smallest, 
faster-growing companies” while at the same time carving out “a niche underwriting and trading 
high-yield debt, so-called junk bonds”973. In early 1998, BT CEO Newman – a former Deputy 
Treasury Secretary in the Clinton administration – had made it clear that his company wished to 
remain independent. However, following BT’s loss of almost US$500 million in connection with 
the Russian financial crisis in August 1998 and a sharp drop of the company’s stock, the BT board 
urged Newman to explore merging with a bigger bank to ensure the company’s survival. Between 
20 October 1998 – when the FT first reported “preliminary” DB-BT take-over talks – and the end of 
November 1998, BT’s share price increased from US$55 to US$87. This was still below DB’s 
US$93-per-share offer finalised on 30 November 1998. DB CEO Breuer made it clear from the start 
that this transaction was a German-led take-over and no transatlantic “merger of equals”: “We don’t 
believe in autonomy as an instrument of management and leadership. […] [W]e want a centralized 
management of the business.”974 
                                                      
970 Fed (1999) p. 2 
971 (O’Brien & Treaster, 1998) 
972 Financial Times (1998) and Corrigan (1998) 
973 (O’Brien & Holson, 1998) 
974 Andrews (1998) 
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Regulatory approval for the deal was thrown into doubt in February 1999, when an internal DB 
investigation unearthed documents suggesting it had lent money to construction companies that 
built the Auschwitz camp. This revelation caused a massive backlash from leaders of New York’s 
influential Jewish community, including the city’s comptroller Alan Hevesi, who had himself lost 
relatives in the Holocaust. There were also allegations that DB had “before and during [WWII], 
collaborated with the Nazi regime to confiscate and liquidate Jewish assets, and that the bank 
financed or controlled other companies that used slave or forced labour”975. Finally, there were 
concerns that DB “may have handled gold stolen by the Nazis”976. Hevesi asked the Federal 
Reserve (Fed) not to approve the DT-BT take-over “until all interested parties agreed on a structure 
to settle all Holocaust-era claims”977. Just a year earlier, Hevesi helped coordinate a boycott against 
Swiss banks that had illegally seized the unclaimed deposits of thousands of Holocaust victims.978 
 
Jewish groups like the World Jewish Congress (WJC) were not only threatening to block the DB-
BT take-over. The WJC also considered making DB the target of an international disinvestment 
campaign – similar to the sanctions imposed on South African companies during Apartheid. In May 
1999, Berlin announced that 13 of the country’s major German banks, insurers, and industrial 
companies had agreed on the creation of the “Foundation Initiative of German Enterprises: 
Remembrance, Responsibility, and Future” to help the victims (and their surviving heirs and family 
members) of Nazi-era confiscation of (Jewish) assets and slave / forced labour.979 The companies 
(including DB) recognised that the risks of current and future lawsuits made it imperative to reach a 
Swiss-style “global” settlement of all Nazi-era claims. Due to Germany’s multi-billion dollar 
compensation fund and pressure from the DoS, the WJC and influential Jewish individuals like 
Hevesi (who had no jurisdiction over the DB-BT deal) had dropped their opposition to the DB-BT 
take-over by May 1999. Hevesi recommended that the Fed base its M&A review “exclusively on 
the […] [transaction’s] impact on the banks, the public, and the financial community”980. 
Furthermore, “a [DoS] official had warned [the Fed] that opposition to the merger on political 
grounds could chill the [US] economy”981. The DoS stressed that “sanctions against German banks 
are not justified and would only retard progress on Holocaust-related issues”982. 
                                                      
975 Fed (1999) p. 16 
976 Ibid., p. 16 
977 Ibid., p. 18 
978 Swiss banks offered US $1.25 billion as a global Holocaust claims settlement in order to end all legal and diplomatic 
sanctions. 
979 Sanger (1999) 
980 Fed (1999) p. 18 
981 AP (1999) 
982 Fed (1999) p. 18 
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The DB-BT transaction was unanimously approved by the Fed governors on 20 May 1999. The Fed 
concluded that the take-over “would not result in any significantly adverse effects on competition or 
on the concentration of banking resources in the New York banking market or any other relevant 
banking market”983. Regarding the Holocaust-related objections to the deal, the Fed made it clear 
that many of these concerns were not within the “limited jurisdiction” of its DB-BT regulatory 
review. To the extent that some of the Holocaust-related concerns had legal relevance for the anti-
trust review, the Fed “considered, in particular, the past efforts of [DB] to investigate and address 
its Holocaust involvement, and the forthcoming and ongoing efforts of current management to 
resolve these matters”984. In sum, the Holocaust-related objections did not “warrant denial of the 
[DB-BT] proposal”985. 
                                                      
983 Ibid., p. 6 
984 Ibid., p. 18 
985 Ibid., p. 19 
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5.4.3 Deutsche Telekom’s take-over of VoiceStream 
 
After overcoming massive opposition by protectionist-minded Congressional lawmakers, Deutsche 
Telekom’s (DT) US$26 billion acquisition of US wireless carrier VoiceStream (VS) was completed 
in May 2001. Given VS’s size and financial performance – 2.3 million customers; 1999 turnover of 
US$665.7 million with a US$580 million loss – the company was an expensive acquisition 
target.986 987 DT viewed the deal as an entry to the lucrative US market and announced the “creation 
of the world’s only global GSM operator”988. VS CEO Stanton hailed the DT link-up as “a 
compelling strategic opportunity for [VS] to partner with one of the world’s leading 
telecommunications companies”989. He also praised the deal “as an extremely attractive opportunity 
for both sets of shareholders and for our employees”. Finally, Stanton pointed to the “enormous 
benefits for US consumers, as [VS] becomes an even more competitive national operator that can 
accelerate the introduction of next-generation wireless voice and data services such as mobile 
Internet and multimedia applications”990. 
 
What drew the ire of US lawmakers was the fact that at the time of the merger announcement, 
former German monopolist DT was still majority-owned by the government. While the VS 
acquisition would reduce Berlin’s stake to 45.7 percent991, this was well above the 25-percent 
foreign government ownership limit imposed by US law. In theory, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) could waive that restriction if the proposed transaction was in the public 
interest.992 Congressional opposition formed quickly after the DT-VS deal was announced. On 21 
July 2000, 30 Republican and Democratic lawmakers – led by Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) 
circulated a “Dear Colleague” letter stating that they were “not opposed to private foreign 
investment in the telecommunications industry”, but that “we did not deregulate US 
telecommunications to permit the regulated foreign government-owned telecommunications 
companies to take over the US market”993. If the US allowed such take-overs, they could reduce 
free competition since government-owned firms “can raise staggering amounts of capital and the 
financial markets assume that their governments will not allow them to fail”994. Senator Hollings 
also invoked national security and privacy concerns, noting that American telecommunication firms 
                                                      
986 On a per-subscriber basis, DT-VS was the most expensive acquisition of a wireless carrier to date. (Sorkin & 
Romero, 2000) 
987 Schmid 2000) 
988 DT (2000) p. 18 
989 Ibid., p. 3 
990 Ibid., p. 3 
991 Ibid., p. 9 
992 However, as Senator Hollings pointed out, “the FCC has never waived, in any significant fashion, the law for foreign 
government ownership”. Hollings (2000) 
993 (Sorkin & Romero, 2000) 
994 Ibid. 
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owned by foreign government-controlled companies could eavesdrop on their customers and 
possibly track their whereabouts. 
 
Hollings – initially backed by Senate Majority Leader Lott (R-MS) – attached two amendments to a 
Senate appropriations bill to derail the DT-VS deal. The first amendment would have prevented the 
FCC from transferring any American telecommunications license to DT for one year. The second 
amendment would have permanently banned any transfer of US telecommunications licenses to any 
company owned at least 25 percent by a foreign government – thus removing the FCC’s 
corresponding waiver authority. In response to the concerns voiced by 30 Senators, FCC Chairman 
Kennard indicating that “I believe, as you do, that the commission’s approach must promote 
competition and maintain a secure telecommunication system for our national security”995. The DT-
VS bid would therefore face “close scrutiny”996. While Kennard left open the possibility of 
approving the DT-VS deal, it became clear that the German telecommunications giant was facing a 
long regulatory battle with an uncertain outcome. 
 
However, Senator Holling’s opposition to the DT-VS deal was neither shared by all of his 
colleagues in the Senate, nor by many other powerful players in the nation’s capital. Senator 
McCain (R-AZ) circulated his own “Dear Colleague” letter warning of the potential backlash 
abroad against the new protectionism at home: 
 
“Although it would be easy to envision new foreign restrictions on US programming, 
satellite launches and the like, foreign governments’ retaliation would not necessarily be 
confined to the telecom sector. Any foreign market in which American companies are 
vigorous participants could be fair game.”997 
 
The White House called Senator Hollings’s initiative “unnecessary”, arguing that the mandatory 
DT-VS merger reviews by the FCC, DoJ, USTR, and CFIUS would safeguard American economic 
and national security interests.998 999 The EU, too, moved quickly to defend DT against protectionist 
sentiments on Capitol Hill. On 26 July 2000, Trade Commissioner Lamy sent a strongly-worded 
letter to the USTR, urging Washington to oppose the Hollings bill: “This would clearly violate 
                                                      
995 FCC (2000) 
996 Ibid. 
997 Labaton (21 July 2000) 
998 Labaton (24 July 2000) 
999 For more information on the inter-agency DT-VS transaction review process, see Goodman (2000). 
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commitments in the WTO and would affect very substantial interests of European companies.”1000 
The EU threatened to refer the case to the WTO if the measure were to pass. 
 
On 7 September, Congress held its first hearing on the issue. That same day, the DT-VS acquisition 
also cleared its first hurdle when the DoJ’s merger review deadline passed without objections.1001 
Furthermore, Senate Majority Leader Lott had abandoned his opposition to the merger, following 
lobbying efforts by Republican Senator Gorton from VS home state Washington. To further turn 
the heat on Hollings, DT and VS hired several top lobbyists over the summer who forged a high-
profile alliance of “strange bedfellows” in favour of the proposed merger: trade union AFL-CIO1002 
and the Chamber of Commerce.1003 The two powerful organizations – strong adversaries on 
virtually all other trade issues – joined forces “to defeat a bill they see as a threat to foreign 
investment and union jobs in telecommunications”1004. The White House, too, reiterated its strong 
opposition to Senator Hollings’s initiative in early September, pointing out that it had already 
threatened to veto the relevant appropriations bill because of a different amendment opposed by 
President Clinton. 
 
On the regulatory front, FCC Chairman Kennard made it clear in early October that his agency was 
not yet ready to clear the DT-VS deal, raising the spectre of a prolonged merger review.1005 On the 
political front, in contrast, DT and VS scored a major breakthrough on 26 October 2000, when 
Senator Hollings and his allies decided to drop their proposed protectionist DT-related 
amendments.1006 In view of the White House’s credible veto threat, the defection of Senate Majority 
Leader Lott, as well as the vocal support for DT-VS from influential trade unions and business 
groups, it had become clear that the Hollings amendment would not go anywhere before the US 
Presidential / Congressional elections on 7 November. In December 2000, the FBI, the DoJ, and 
DT-VS filed a joint petition asking the FCC to delay approval of the proposed merger to allow the 
four players involved to resolve any related US national security issues. According to the FBI: 
 
“Granting the authority requested by the parties [DT and VS] in this transaction could 
present significant impediments to the ability of our government to meet its obligations to 
                                                      
1000 Reuters (July 2000) 
1001 (Srinivasan & AP, 2000) 
1002 AFL-CIO = American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
1003 Reuters (October 2000) 
1004 Ibid. 
1005 Spiegel (2000) 
1006 Ibid. 
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the citizens to preserve the national security, enforce the laws and protect the public 
safety.”1007 
 
The FBI and the DoJ wanted to ensure that they retained the ability to tap any VS calls originating / 
ending in America and to detect any foreign eavesdropping on such calls. In January 2001, DT and 
VS reached an agreement with the FBI that guaranteed US law enforcement officials’ access to the 
VS network.1008 In April 2001, the FCC finally approved the DT-VS deal, arguing that it would 
provide “public interest benefits for US consumers” warranting a waiver of the existing 25-percent 
limit on direct / indirect foreign government control of American phone licenses.1009 
                                                      
1007 Spiegel (11 January 2001) 
1008 Spiegel (18 January 2001); FCC (2001) pp. 43-45 
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5.5 Moving both towards and away from aerospace and defence industrial globalisation 
 
Free-market advocates are probably tempted to interpret the massive rise of cross-border A&D 
industrial collaboration in recent decades as a clear indicator that changing industry dynamics, the 
continuing push for trade liberalisation, and the intense competitive pressures of an increasingly 
integrated global economy have created the necessary conditions to gradually transform this 
“strategic” industry into a “normal” economic sector. However, realist / neo-mercantilist concerns 
about the potential national security / economic risks associated with foreign dependence, 
unauthorised technology transfers / proliferation, and the implications of foreign ownership, 
control, and influence vis-à-vis the US domestic A&D industrial base continue to resonate with 
relevant American policymakers. These concerns largely explain why Washington preferred the 
kind of post-Cold War ethnocentric A&D industrial consolidation that resulted in the BMD merger. 
 
It is important to recognise that the dominant international position of the American defence 
industry provides Washington with considerable political influence vis-à-vis friends and foes alike: 
 
“The global defence industrial sector is a remarkably accurate indicator of the stratification 
of power in the post-Cold War international system. As in the overall system, the [US] plays 
the dominant role in this sector, and US policymakers use their comparative advantage to 
influence foreign affairs. [This sector] provides the [US] with the ability to encourage states 
to cooperate, reward compliance, and punish non-cooperation.”1010 1011 
 “Arms-producing countries, regardless of their former position in the defence industrial 
hierarchy, have become increasingly dependent upon the [US] for sales, technological 
innovation, and the advanced technologies needed to modernise their own militaries and 
defence industries. This growing dependency has granted the [US] considerable direct and 
indirect political leverage. From the perspective of non-US governments, the price of 
entering the US market is increasing US influence over the direction of their technological 
development, the stability of their military industries, and the autonomy of their foreign 
policy decisions.”1012 
 
Any full-scale mergers of equals between US mega-primes and their European competitors would 
have almost inevitably eroded America’s technological leadership position in this strategic industry 
                                                      
1010 Neuman (2006) p. 429 
1011 “The array of incentives and rewards the [US] has to offer for cooperation is quite broad. It includes the offer of 
military credits, offset arrangements, technology transfers, loans, economic aid, joint ventures, different forms of 
military assistance, and the removal of penalties—whether they are arms embargoes, technology transfer restrictions, 
onerous export regulations, or high transaction costs.” Ibid., p. 447 
1012 Ibid., p. 451 
 
214 
and thus have significantly reduced Washington’s ability to enjoy the direct and indirect political 
leverage derived from it. Such transatlantic mergers would have made the unauthorised transfer of 
sensitive US technologies much more likely; they would also have given the US government far 
less influence and leverage than is the case under the constraints of an ethnocentric consolidation of 
the American A&D industry. MNCs active in many different jurisdictions are far less vulnerable to 
political / governmental interference than companies with an easily identifiable “home country”. If 
most of a firm’s R&DP facilities, top management, and revenue base are in a single country, that 
government invariably enjoys more direct and indirect influence over corporate decisions. The 
recurring haggling between Paris and Berlin over control of EADS is a prime example of the 
problems resulting from an A&D company that is subject to the political pressures and interferences 
of more than one “home government”. 
 
While the importance of privileged access to the US market and the sheer size of the Pentagon 
acquisition budget would have ensured that Washington still enjoys unparalleled political leverage 
over any transatlantic mega-primes, one must realise that a European government allowing its 
national champion to merge with an American firm would have insisted on certain national security 
safeguards (“golden shares” with veto power over strategic M&A decisions, sensitive arms exports, 
etc.). Any such European influence / veto power over transatlantic mega-primes would have led to a 
corresponding decline in Washington’s ability to leverage the A&D sector in pursuit of its own 
national interests. 
 
US policymakers and business executives are clearly struggling with the fact that the A&D industry 
is caught between two worlds: realism / neo-mercantilism vs. liberalism / globalisation: 
 
“[SIPRI]1013 contends that the US defence industrial sector has opted for certain kinds of 
global and transnational initiatives while avoiding others. Whereas the [US] is eager to 
exploit foreign sources of technology, it simultaneously seeks to protect itself from becoming 
too dependent upon foreign suppliers. Only about 4 percent (US$7 billion) of total Pentagon 
procurement during FY02 was for overseas contracts, and of that less than 1 percent was 
for military hardware. It is, SIPRI contends, a policy of moving both towards and away from 
defence industrial globalisation.”1014 
 
America is both the world’s leading arms exporter and the country least dependent on defence 
imports. In 1999, US weapons imports amounted to less than 5 percent of its defence exports. For 
                                                      
1013 SIPRI = Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
1014 Neuman (2006) p. 430 
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the UK, France, Germany, and Russia, that figure stood at 50, 28, 68, and 16 percent 
respectively.1015 As the world’s only superpower, Washington is the biggest promoter and economic 
/ political benefactor of defence exports while, at the same time, it is also the country most 
concerned that the forces of globalisation will erode the international leadership position of its 
A&D industry. On the one hand, the post-Cold War internationalisation of the defence industry as 
well as the launch of major weapons procurement programmes in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, 
etc. has been a boon to US mega-primes, which were able to capture more than two-thirds of global 
arms export contracts in 2008.1016 1017 On the other hand, American mercantilists and realists fear 
that the growing internationalisation of the US megaprimes’ underlying supplier networks in 
commercial (Boeing’s “Dreamliner” cooperation with Japan, etc.) and military aerospace (LMC’s 
JSF subcontracting agreement with BAE1018 1019) poses direct risks for America’s national security 
and economic competitiveness.1020 Since 1997, Washington has registered a sharp increase in 
foreign collection efforts targeted at critical US defence / dual-use technologies such as information 
systems and aeronautics. 
 
Repeated US policy statements in favour of a genuine “two-way street” in transatlantic defence 
trade notwithstanding, the Pentagon has continued to procure just a very small percentage of its 
military hardware from Europe, thus demonstrating that national security concerns / American 
distrust of NATO allies, neo-mercantilist economic considerations, and the effectiveness of 
Congressional defence of US industrial lobbies are powerful factors in an otherwise “broken” US 
defence acquisition system.1021 1022 1023 “[T]he US military services greatly dislike foreign 
                                                      
1015 Table 2, Arms Imports as Percentage of Arms Exports for the 35 Largest Arms-Producing Countries, Ibid., p. 437 
1016 During 2001-2008, weapons exports to the developing world accounted for an average of 65 percent of all such 
deals globally. In 2008, America accounted for 70 percent (US$29.6 billion) of all new arms transfer agreements with 
the developing world. In terms of global arms transfer agreements, Washington also ranked first with US$37.8 billion 
worth of transactions (68 percent of all such deals sealed last year). In 2008, US arms deliveries world-wide totalled 
US$12.2 billion (38 percent market share). All figures are expressed in constant (2008) dollars. CRS (2009) p. II; 33 
1017 The huge difference between the 2008 US share of global arms transfer agreements (68 percent) and actual arms 
deliveries (38 percent) indicates that American defence companies have in recent years gained significant competitive 
advantages over their foreign rivals and are bound to strengthen their dominant position in the coming years. Ibid., pp. 
32-33 
1018 According to a 2008 DoD report, “advanced aviation and weapons technology in the [JSF] programme may have 
been compromised by unauthorised access at facilities and in computers at [BAE]” – LMC’s most important foreign 
subcontractor on this biggest defence acquisition project in US history. That same report also accused BAE that it had 
failed to provide the Pentagon with security audits for the 2001-2003 period on the grounds that “all information 
contained in the internal audits was privileged and not available to the [US] government”. Sevastopulo (2008) 
1019 The JSF programme has also benefited from substantial technology transfers from the UK to the US (primarily 
vertical take-off and landing techniques and technology). 
1020 The DoD report warned that “incomplete [BAE] contractor oversight may have increased the risk of unintended or 
deliberate release of [classified] information to foreign competitors. [BAE] has a prominent role in providing 
technologies to other countries for the JSF programme while it is also under contract to develop a competing aircraft.” 
DoD (2008) p. 12 
1021 GAO (March 2009) 
1022 (Cordesman & Kaeser, 2008) 
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dependence, an attitude that arguably presents a more formidable barrier to European company 
market access than the […] [relevant] laws and regulations.”1024 In view of these realist / neo-
mercantilist concerns, the prevention of “merger of equals” between US and foreign / European 
A&D primes coupled with the pursuit of an ethnocentric consolidation approach in this strategic 
sector has been a key element in Washington’s attempt to preserve and defend its post-Cold War 
hegemonic status against all challengers, friends and foes alike. 
 
US policymakers were much more open to M&A transactions in “normal” industries like 
telecommunications, banking or automotive. Germany’s partly state-owned DT was able to 
overcome protectionist / national security concerns in Congress to acquire VS, the first foreign take-
over of a major US telecommunications carrier. The White House and leading Democratic and 
Republican Senators specifically backed DT’s bid for fear that a blocking of this transaction could 
provoke retaliatory action by Germany, the EU, and other allies. In the case of the DB-BT deal, the 
biggest foreign take-over of a US bank, the German company was able to overcome strong 
opposition by New York’s influential Jewish community related to DB dealings in Nazi Germany. 
While DB’s financial support for the launch of a multi-billion dollar German industry foundation to 
compensate Nazi-era victims certainly helped its BT bid, the US government was again lobbying 
for the deal to go through for fear that its blocking could threaten bilateral relations with Europe’s 
biggest economy. Against the backdrop of the many other high-profile transatlantic mergers that 
took place during the second half of the 1990s, one can convincingly argue that the globalisation / 
free market narrative was very compelling for business leaders and policymakers on both sides of 
the Atlantic. However, when it came to the US A&D industry, realist / neo-mercantilist arguments 
prevailed and ensured that Washington pursued an ethnocentric rather than transnational 
consolidation approach. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1023 “These problems have roots in not only the acquisition process, but also in the requirements and funding processes. 
Collectively, these processes create pressures to demand high performance, keep cost estimates low, and proceed with 
calendar-driven versus knowledge-driven schedules.” GAO (April 2009) p. ii 
1024 Grant (1997) p. 115 
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Chapter 6: Building Europe and Balancing the American Hegemon 
6.1 The emergence of CFSP and ESDI1025 
 
This chapter analyses the EADS merger in its wider European and transatlantic political context. 
EADS was fostered by the culmination of two inter-connected geopolitical trends in the 1990s: the 
first trend pertained to the EU’s drive to create an “ever closer Union” at the political, economic, 
and military level; the second trend related to growing transatlantic tensions with America and 
Europe’s corresponding desire to chart its own course in world affairs, with only minimal 
interference from Washington. Viewed from these perspectives, the EADS merger can be explained 
by neo-liberal institutionalist and realist approaches. The functionalist / interdependence school 
promoted by neo-liberals argues that by the late 1990s, political and economic integration between 
the EU’s core member states – France and Germany in particular – had reached such a high level 
that the governments concerned were willing to allow a full-fledged merger of their respective 
A&D “national champions”. Realists claim that the attempt by key EU member states “to balance 
against the American hegemon” – i.e., to create an effective counter weight to Washington’s vast 
power and influence, and the anticipated dominance of the “new Boeing” in the A&D industry – 
played a decisive role in bringing the EADS founding nations together. At the time of the EADS 
merger, France and Germany’s left-wing Red-Green government were the key drivers behind the 
attempt to give the EU a more independent and less Atlanticist posture. The major transatlantic 
clashes in the run up to the 2003 Iraq War would subsequently further cement the Paris-Berlin 
partnership, embodied at its climax by the close personal and political ties between President Chirac 
and Chancellor Schroeder. 
 
From its inception, the process of European integration, led by France and Germany, served both an 
economic and a political purpose. In economic terms, the European Economic Community (EEC) 
“was essentially a compromise between German interest in market liberalisation, and the French 
interest in support for agriculture”1026. 1027 Until German reunification in 1990, the process of 
European integration was based on this informal Franco-German “grand bargain”: Germany served 
as Europe’s economic powerhouse and assumed only a very limited role in foreign and security 
policy.1028 France, in turn, tried to harness Europe’s collective political, economic, and military 
resources to increase its standing and prestige in the world, which was built on the “force de 
frappe”, membership of the P5 in the UNSC, and “les relations privilégiées” with francophone 
                                                      
1025 ESDI = European Security and Defence Identity 
1026 Pedersen (1998) quoted in Cole (2000) p. 9 
1027 Washington played an indispensable role in fostering Franco-German reconciliation and Western European 
integration after WWII. “The integration of Western Europe began in the post-war period under US leadership and US 
protection.” (Menon, Forster, & Wallace, 1992) p. 100 
1028 Germany had no nuclear weapons, long-range ballistic missiles or strategic bombers. 
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states around the globe. From the end of WWII to the present day, France’s great-power ambitions 
have been driven by the concept of “Gaullism”1029, a grand strategy defined as follows: 
 
“A cultural attachment to European values and civilisation, notably as embodied by 
France; a Europe prepared to protect its industry and agriculture; the promotion of 
common European policies where these do not endanger French interests; a marked anti-
Americanism and advocacy of a more independent security and defence identity; a tight 
Community based on a Franco-German directorate, rather than a looser, more nebulous, 
grouping of nations; and a preference for intergovernmental over supranational 
institutions.” 1030 
 
From a Gaullist perspective, the EADS merger advanced several of France’s key objectives, 
including the protection of Europe’s A&D industry and the creation of an independent EU security 
and defence policy, both of which would help counter US dominance in the post-Cold War era. For 
de Gaulle and subsequent French leaders, a strong Franco-German partnership led by Paris was the 
conditio sine qua non of a strong Europe that could chart its own course in world affairs, fending 
off the immediate Soviet threat while preventing America from dominating the West through 
NATO. During the Cold War, French leaders tried repeatedly to make West Germany choose 
between Paris and Washington (and between the EU and NATO) and challenged US / Anglo-Saxon 
dominance of the Alliance by pushing for a more equal European-US partnership and more intra-
European political / military cooperation instead.1031 West German leaders tried to avoid making 
that difficult choice, stressing their commitment to both a strong Europe and a strong transatlantic 
partnership embodied by NATO. However, “when forced to choose, Germany preferred the security 
offered by the US nuclear umbrella over the dubious French alternative, especially because de 
Gaulle refused to extend nuclear protection to the Germans”.1032 1033 While the 1963 Elysée Treaty 
included important provisions concerning bilateral defence collaboration, the Bundestag – in 
response to active US political lobbying beyond the capacities of the French leadership – adopted 
such a strongly pro-Atlanticist preamble1034 that Paris “saw no point in implementing the defence 
clauses of the Treaty”1035. De Gaulle pulled France out of NATO’s integrated military structure in 
                                                      
1029 For an analysis of how Gaullism shaped French and European space policy see McDougall (1985) pp. 179-203 
1030 Cole (2000) pp. 58-59 
1031 (Menon et al., 1992) pp. 100-102 
1032 Cole (2000) p. 13. France’s Hades missiles strained Franco-German relations during the 1980s / 1990s as these 
short-range nuclear weapons were designed to strike (East) Germany in the case of a Soviet attack. 
1033 There are also other assessments: “If a decision was forced, Paris was more important to Bonn than London, the 
preferred (if difficult) partner with which German governments had worked closely for more than 30 years. However, 
Washington was as important as Paris, because the [US] offered a special relationship for global economic co-
operation, as well as for European security.” (Menon et al., 1992) p. 105 
1034 The Bundestag reaffirmed its commitment to “the common defence in the framework of [NATO]”. 
1035 (Menon et al., 1992) p. 101 
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1966.1036 1037 It was not until the early 1980s that Franco-German security and defence co-operation 
received a major boost under President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, who activated the Elysée 
Treaty’s dormant defence provisions. In 1987, Kohl and Mitterrand agreed to launch the 4,200-
strong Franco-German Brigade1038, a unit expanded into “Eurocorps” four years later before being 
merged into the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).1039 
 
The end of the Cold War and German reunification in 1990 were watershed events, both in terms of 
Franco-German / intra-European and transatlantic relations. For France, Germany’s unexpected 
reunification was a rude awakening. President Mitterrand, like much of the rest of the French 
political elite, feared that a stronger, reunified Germany would no longer be a compliant partner and 
could feel tempted challenge France’s political leadership position within the EC.1040 In terms of 
transatlantic relations, the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union provided France 
and Germany with much more strategic leeway to chart their own course in world affairs; 
independent from America and NATO if necessary.1041 The Alliance, under US leadership, was also 
embarking on its own transformation process. In July 1990, shortly before German reunification, 
Alliance leaders gathered in London “to transform NATO from a Cold War to a post-Cold War 
alliance”, notably by becoming “less military and more political in nature”.1042 “The London 
Declaration”1043 launched four new political initiatives:1044 first, NATO vowed to “enhance the 
political component” of the Alliance, second, it called on the Warsaw Pact to issue a joint 
declaration in which the two would “solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries”, three, 
NATO proposed that the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact members “establish regular 
diplomatic liaison with NATO”; finally, the Alliance suggested that the upcoming CSCE1045 
Summit in November 1990 “decide how the CSCE can be institutionalized to provide a forum for 
                                                      
1036 “[F]rom 1966, […] a policy of membership of the Atlantic Alliance without participation within NATO became a 
central plank of French foreign and security policies”. Menon (2000) p. 2 
1037 “[N]on-integration served to reinforce France’s quest for wider foreign policy aims: military autonomy, along with 
a certain standing on the world stage, or grandeur.” Ibid., p. 3 
1038 The Franco-German Brigade was very much a symbolic exercise as there was no common basis for rules of 
engagement or deployment. During the late 1980s, the Brigade was one of the least wanted postings in the French army, 
because soldiers were least likely to do anything interesting while attached to that unit. 
1039 While Eurocorps was “[i]mportant as a symbol of closer Franco-German collaboration, in practice [it] performed a 
marginal role in security debate in the 1990s”. Cole, (2000) p. 115 
1040 Fears of a resurgent Germany also arose in the UK, where Prime Minister Thatcher strongly opposed German 
reunification. 
1041 “In short, to France, the end of the Cold War allowed NATO to move towards eliminating the [integrated military 
structure], removed the military need for the [US] and NATO to be the central players in West European security, and 
created a real possibility for Western Europe to construct a serious defence entity.” However, “France’s immediate 
post-Cold War vision of European security autonomy was too radical for Washington and most of the other allies.” 
Grant (1996) pp. 59-60 
1042 Art (1996) p. 12 
1043 NATO (1990) 
1044 Art (1996) pp. 12-13 
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wider political dialogue in a more united Europe”.1046 “Together with the decision to institute a 
fundamental review of NATO’s military strategy, the Bush administration succeeded in launching 
NATO’s transformation so as to maintain it as the ‘new’ Europe’s central security institution.”1047 
1048 
 
The launch of “Operation Desert Storm” in January 1991 to liberate Kuwait put security and 
defence issues on top of Europe’s nascent CFSP agenda. However, different European countries 
drew different conclusions from the war.1049 For Britain, this successful US-led UN intervention 
underscored the importance of maintaining close security and defence ties with America since 
Europe was simply too weak to project its military power abroad. For France, which needed US 
logistical support to deploy to Kuwait, the Gulf War illustrated the urgent need to beef up Europe’s 
defence capabilities – independent of NATO and the US. Germany, due to its pacifistic post-WWII 
Basic Law, stayed out of any direct military involvement and engaged in “chequebook diplomacy” 
instead. “[L]ooking for ways of overcoming this handicap, [Bonn] kept a low profile and supported 
the French when it was safe to do so.”1050 
 
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty launched the EU and declared as one of its objectives “the 
implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a 
common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”. The Treaty also “requests 
the [WEU], which is an integral part of the development of the Union […] to elaborate and 
implement decisions on actions of the Union which have defence implications”. Furthermore, the 
nine WEU members1051 (all of which were part of the EC) vowed “to develop WEU as the defence 
component of the [EU] and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance”. 
The other key Maastricht provision – the creation of the Euro – was “a stratagem to end Germany’s 
exclusive power to set Europe’s interest rates”1052 by disempowering the Bundesbank. While 
Germany was reluctant to abandon the Deutschmark, Kohl realised that this was the price to pay for 
French support for German reunification. By firmly anchoring reunified Germany in a closely 
integrated EU, Kohl wanted to allay fears about another German “Sonderweg”. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1045 CSCE = Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
1046 NATO (1990) 
1047 Art (1996) p. 13 
1048 “In the early 1990s, Mitterrand’s ambitious European initiatives were an almost complete failure. Europe failed to 
equip itself with a security organisation capable of rivalling a NATO which, despite France’s best efforts, succeeded in 
reforming itself and expanding its tasks.” Menon (2000) p. 4 
1049 Nuttall (2000) pp. 9-10 
1050 Ibid., p. 9 
1051 UK, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain. 
1052 Art (1996) p. 15 
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Going into the Maastricht negotiations, a familiar pattern emerged. Britain was strongly committed 
to NATO as Europe’s premier security and defence organisation.1053 London, however, was not 
determinedly sceptical about closer European defence, as demonstrated by the Eurogroup and St. 
Malo initiatives. Ultimately, Britain wanted to build real military capabilities rather than pass lofty 
declarations with empty promises.1054 Paris, in contrast, viewed WEU as “the crucible of a 
European defence rooted in the Community and the second pillar of the Atlantic Alliance”.1055 “The 
French retained their traditional suspicion towards NATO, the [IMS], and the institutionalized US 
leadership within it.”1056 France also insisted that the EU required a robust defence component. 
Germany was caught in the middle, torn between its strong bilateral ties with France and the long-
standing commitment to NATO / the US. Despite their close relationship, Kohl and Mitterrand had 
major differences over how to achieve “political union”. Germany favoured a supranational 
approach characterised by a strong Commission / Parliament, and qualified majority voting, even in 
CFSP matters.1057 France staunchly defended its national sovereignty and favoured an EU driven by 
intergovernmental politics. The contradiction of the French position was that Paris wanted a strong 
CFSP, but without yielding any more authority to the supranational institutions. “France’s tendency 
to seek leadership, to distrust integration, and to resort to Europe only when it could not achieve its 
ends alone […] served to alienate its partners.”1058 
 
Washington feared that a CFSP that was “too big, robust, and capable would marginalise the [US] 
and gut NATO”1059 by draining scarce resources away from the Alliance and fostering the 
emergence of a “European caucus” within the organisation.1060 1061 1062 The CFSP discussion was, 
                                                      
1053 However, it was Prime Minister Thatcher’s idea to revive WEU, which she saw as “a forum for co-operation among 
European countries and a bridge to NATO”. Nuttall (2000) p. 154 
1054 “The British style in the negotiations stressed ‘practical’ measures rather than ‘rhetorical’ declarations; its aims 
were minimalist and incremental. British negotiators characteristically wanted to discuss details and implications before 
they agreed to accept principles.” (Menon et al., 1992) p. 104 
1055 Nuttall (2000) p. 154 
1056 (Menon et al., 1992) p. 104 
1057 “French rhetoric concerning the need for Europe sat uneasily in German eyes with continued emphasis on a military 
strategy that seemed to protect France alone and was even for many years based in part on the deployment of nuclear 
weapons [Hades missiles] targeted on German soil.” Menon (2000) p. 5 
1058 Ibid., p. 5 
1059 Art (1996) p. 19 
1060 Washington was concerned that the European allies would first reach agreement among themselves at the EC / EU 
level, before then dealing with America en bloc. 
1061 “[E]fforts to construct a European pillar by redefining and limiting NATO’s rule, by weakening its structure, or by 
creating a monolithic bloc of certain members would be misguided. […] [W]e are concerned over the proposals that the 
WEU should be subordinated to the European Council, thereby developing a European security component – solely 
within the EC – that could lead to NATO’s marginalisation”. Excerpts from the DoS’s 20 February 1991 “Bartholomew 
/ Dobbins telegramme” to 11 European NATO members. 
1062 “The French tendency to equate France’s international influence with its ability to stand up to the [US] increasingly 
irritated Washington, which came to oppose the creation of the kind of European defence structures desired by Paris on 
the grounds that France’s hidden agenda was to drive the US out of Europe.” Menon (2000) p. 5 
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behind the scenes, very much a Franco-US clash, as the two countries represented opposite poles in 
this debate.1063 1064 Ultimately, Washington decided “that it was wiser to roll with the fall”1065 and 
provided at least rhetorical backing for the idea of a “European Security Identity and Defence Role” 
as well as a “European pillar within the Alliance”1066. The British, Dutch and Germans did not 
agree to the Maastricht text until the NATO negotiations were concluded (with a commitment to a 
new alliance strategy); even then, the language of the EU Treaty was highly conditional.1067 
Nonetheless, the Maastricht Treaty negotiations marked an important first step towards defining 
Europe’s role on security and defence matters in the post-Cold War era. 
 
“The impression outside observers gained in the summer of 1992 was of a shift of attitude in 
all major European capitals, away from the rhetoric that had characterized so many 
previous West European defence initiatives towards a concern to build an effective structure 
for defence policy co-ordination, with at least some elements of military integration.”1068 
1069 
 
Europe’s faltering efforts to get its security and defence act together (Yugoslav Wars) coincided 
with President Clinton’s 1994 call on the Alliance’s European members to assume more 
responsibility and “burden-sharing”.1070 Washington wanted the allies to transform themselves from 
Cold-War net security consumers into post-Cold-War net security providers without threatening 
American / NATO primacy on the Old Continent. Fostering Europe’s military capabilities while 
making sure it does not turn into a strategic competitor has been a key post-Cold War challenge in 
US foreign and security. While there was a certain Franco-American NATO rapprochement during 
1992-1995 – exemplified by enhanced military coordination between France and NATO in Bosnia, 
French participation in NATO defence minister meetings, etc. – President Mitterrand refused to 
bring France any closer to NATO.1071 
 
                                                      
1063 “The [US] sought to undermine French [CFSP initiatives] even as it was formally acknowledging in NATO 
declarations that European defence cooperation could reinforce both European security and the Alliance. […] The 
inflexibility in both US and French positions was mutually reinforcing, and led to open competition between European 
and transatlantic approaches to security. […] The overall tone of the period […] was one of intense competition 
between French and US security policies.” Grant (1996) p. 60 
1064 Menon (2000) pp. 39-44; 44-48 
1065 Heisbourg (1992) p. 672 
1066 NATO (1991) 
1067 The NATO and EU negotiations were in parallel. European governments could (or would) not agree with France 
unless / until the relevant Maastricht provisions concerning CFSP had been first reconciled within the NATO 
framework (and thus with Washington). 
1068 (Menon et al., 1992) p. 117 
1069 In 1992, the WEU adopted its “Petersberg tasks”: “humanitarian and rescue tasks”, “peacekeeping tasks” as well as 
“tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”. WEU (1992) 
1070 Heisbourg referred to the transatlantic burden-sharing debate as “the old chestnut of Cold War days”. Heisbourg 
(1992) p. 677 
1071 Menon (2000) p. 48 
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The 1995 election of President Chirac provided fresh impetus for France’s “creeping 
reintegration”1072 into the Alliance, especially as French leaders recognised their own military limits 
and the fact that they could only built a stronger Europe within, but not against NATO / 
Washington.1073 1074 1075 “In both political and military terms, France’s ability to play a significant 
unilateral international role decreased markedly.”1076 Chirac signalled France’s willingness to rejoin 
NATO’s integrated military structure under certain conditions and was thus was ready to break “the 
last taboos of Gaullism”1077. Paris specifically pushed for the “Europeanisation” of NATO 
commands and demanded that Alliance assets be available for EU-led military operations. The 1996 
NATO Berlin Summit translated the Alliance’s previous ESDI commitments into concrete 
actions:1078 European allies, operating through WEU, were given the possibility to use NATO assets 
(command & control systems, intelligence and reconnaissance information, AWACS, etc.)1079 for 
WEU-led operations where the US, Canada, Turkey, etc. were not involved. The Clinton 
administration hailed this decision as a “major foreign policy shift”1080 since it allowed for the 
establishment of WEU military capabilities which were “separable but not separate”1081 from those 
of NATO.1082 Furthermore, Washington agreed to the appointment of a European Deputy SACEUR 
to lead future (WEU-led) CJTF1083 operations. However, decisions about the potential use of 
Alliance “assets and capabilities” in WEU-led operations would be made on a case-by-case basis, 
each time requiring a consensus vote in the NAC (North Atlantic Council).1084 As a result, 
Washington or Ankara enjoyed effective veto powers over core European security and defence 
matters. In recent years, the Turkish government – angered by the EU accession of Cyprus (a 
country not recognised by Ankara) and the slow progress and uncertain outcome of its own EU 
membership talks – has used its seat on the NAC to block closer NATO-EU cooperation. This 
                                                      
1072 (Ghez & Larrabee, 2009) p. 78 
1073 “Europe’s failure to do more than contain the conflict in former Yugoslavia; the extreme difficulties in obtaining 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in France as well as in a number of other European countries; and the sharp decline 
in military spending and manpower in virtually all NATO countries combined to frustrate French hopes that there 
would be relatively rapid, significant progress on ESDI.” Ibid., p. 63 
1074 “While during the initial post-Cold War period France saw NATO as, at best, irrelevant to the development of ESDI 
and, at worst, as a major obstacle to it, the French view shifted towards recognising NATO as a necessary instrument in 
the building of ESDI.” Ibid., p. 63 
1075 Menon (2000) pp. 49-55 
1076 Ibid., p. 3 
1077 Cole (2000) p. 118 
1078 Ibid., p. 117 
1079 NATO has only few truly collective assets as most of its military capabilities are composed of national forces 
earmarked to the Alliance. 
1080 Gardner (1996) p. 31 
1081 “What this means is that there would be two chains of political decision-making (a NATO chain and a European 
chain), but only one set of military assets that each would utilise, not two political chains and two sets of military 
assets.” Art (1996) p. 31 
1082 For an analysis of the CJTF concept, see Cragg (1996) pp. 7-10. 
1083 CJTF = Combined Joint Task Force 
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Turkish veto concerns not only the use of NATO assets through CJTFs in EU-led operations but 
also the sharing of classified information between the two institutions.1085 
 
For Paris, the Berlin Summit was just the beginning, and not the end, of its attempt to negotiate a 
full return to NATO. Specifically, Chirac argued that a European should take over the 
AFSOUTH1086 command with responsibility for the important Mediterranean / Middle East 
regions.1087 The issue came to a head in August 1996, when Clinton told Chirac that Washington 
would not give AFSOUTH to the Europeans. While Chirac responded in October with a 
handwritten note in English underlining the “capital importance of the southern command for 
France”, it soon became clear that Washington would not budge. Relations between Paris and 
Washington soured noticeably in late 1996 / early 1997, despite German attempts to mediate. In the 
campaign running up to the May 1997 elections that defeated conservative Prime Minister Juppé (a 
close Chirac ally), the Socialists decried the controversial NATO negotiations as a sell-out of 
France’s core national interests to America. The acrimonious French debate over NATO reform put 
the “decades-long tug-of-war between Gaullist pride and Cartesian logic”1088 on full display. In July 
1997, President Chirac and newly elected Socialist Prime Minister Jospin declared that the 
circumstances were not right for France’s full return to NATO. Chirac had clearly overbid his hand 
by demanding Naples. US forces were by far the strongest AFSOUTH component and Washington 
was not prepared to put these important military assets under French command.1089 At NATO’s July 
8-9 Madrid Summit, Washington rejected another French demand, namely that Romania and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1084 Malcolm Rifkind, UK Foreign Secretary during 1995-1997, commented that the CJTF concept provided for Europe 
“as much autonomy as that enjoyed by an adolescent borrowing the family car to go out on Saturday night”. Menon 
(2000) p. 136 
1085 Michel (April 2007) p. 1. Paris, too, has been working behind the scenes to prevent closer EU-NATO collaboration, 
information sharing, etc. France’s primary motivation seems to be the fear that the US-dominated NATO could hijack 
CFSP, thus putting the Europeans in a position of inferiority and dependency vis-à-vis Washington. 
1086 AFSOUTH = Allied Forces Southern Europe 
1087 “The French […] had reasons to complain about imbalances in the distribution of military commands. This was 
reflected in the situation in the Mediterranean prior to the withdrawal of the French fleet in 1959. [Allied Forces 
Mediterranean] was under the command of a British officer, under whom were placed all national fleets in the 
Mediterranean except the American Sixth Fleet. Of the six subordinate sectors, France had command of only the 
western Mediterranean sector. This remained the case even after, at the end of the 1950s, the British naval presence was 
sharply reduced, leaving the French Mediterranean fleet as the largest allied naval presence after the American Sixth 
Fleet.” Menon (2000) p. 30 
1088 Michel (April 2007) p. 1 
1089 “Chirac came very close to achieving France’s full reintegration into the Alliance in 1996-1997. Indeed, had he 
been a bit more modest in formulating his conditions for France’s return, his efforts might well have succeeded. 
However, Chirac’s price for agreeing to full reintegration was regarded by the Clinton administration as too high and 
the deal ultimately collapsed.” (Ghez & Larrabee, 2009) p. 78 
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Bulgaria be part of NATO’s first round of enlargement.1090 As Ron Asmus concludes, the failure to 
bring France back into NATO caused Chirac to “[retreat] back into Gaullist anti-Americanism”.1091 
 
In June 1997, EU members had finalised the Amsterdam Treaty, which incorporated the WEU’s 
“Petersberg tasks” and created the post of “High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy”.1092 The Treaty also declared that “The progressive framing of a common defence policy 
will be supported, as [m]ember [s]tates consider appropriate, by co-operation between them in the 
field of armaments.”1093 By 1997, however, it had become clear that years of negotiations, summits, 
and lofty NATO / EU declarations had done little to achieve what the French commonly refer to as 
“l’Europe politique” – an EU that can muster the political will and military resources necessary to 
defend its foreign policy and security interests in the world. The major transatlantic compromises of 
the “Eurodefence debate” about Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture favoured a prominent 
role for America / NATO and seemed to marginalise the EU’s nascent CFSP: “Paris found itself 
faced to face with a NATO that had taken over European security and now carried out all manner of 
military and politico-military tasks, without having reformed itself in a manner that satisfied 
Paris.”1094 
                                                      
1090 Washington was only willing to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. However, given the limited 
transformation of Romanian and Bulgarian armed forces, intelligence services, and political elites from the pre-1989 
era, most other European NATO members did not support France’s position either. 
1091 Asmus (2007) 
1092 In September 1999, Javier Solana became the first “High Representative” and was also appointed WEU Secretary-
General in anticipation of a WEU-EU merger. 
1093 Art. J.7.1 of the Amsterdam Treaty 
1094 Menon (2000) p. 60 
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6.2 The ESDP breakthrough: from St. Malo to Helsinki and beyond 
 
“Put into perspective, the development of a common EU security and defence policy 
between December 1998 and December 2000 was almost revolutionary compared with the 
slow progress made during the preceding half century, at least in terms of political 
commitments and policy guidelines.”1095 
 
The origins of this revolution can be traced back to the autumn of 1998, when Britain’s new Labour 
Prime Minister Tony Blair made a historic political U-turn and began pushing for a stronger EU 
security and defence role. Blair first used an EU gathering in Austria1096 in late October and a 
policy address in Edinburgh in early November to road-test his ideas. In a clear departure from the 
UK’s traditional Atlanticist outlook, the prime minister expressed disappointment about the EU’s 
limited ability to undertake autonomous military action and called on his EU counterparts to 
undertake the necessary changes in terms of institutional reforms and resource allocations to make 
the EU a more equal partner of the US within NATO.1097 The big breakthrough happened at the 
British-French Summit at St. Malo on 4 December 1998, which “effectively launched ESDP”1098. In 
their landmark “Joint Declaration on European Defence”, Blair and Chirac agreed that “the [EU] 
needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage” and that “it will be important 
to achieve full and rapid implementation” of Amsterdam provisions on CFSP”:1099 1100 
 
“To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order 
to respond to international crises. […] 
In order for the [EU] to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a 
whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for 
analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic 
planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU 
and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the [EU] will also need to have 
recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO’s 
European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO 
framework). […] 
                                                      
1095 Rutten (2001) p. ix. 
1096 Rutten (2001) pp. 1-3 
1097 Ibid., p. 14 
1098 Michel (November 2007) 
1099 (Blair & Chirac, 1998) 
1100 “The biggest single stumbling block to both a […] CFSP and an ESDP has been the inability of France and Britain 
to agree on fundamentals.” Howorth (2000) p. 33 
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Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which 
are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.”1101 
1102 
 
Blair wanted to show the UK’s commitment in an area where it had much to contribute1103 as well 
as to challenge other EU governments to improve defence spending and force modernisation. 
Underlying this approach was “the British government’s conviction that the US will no longer 
underwrite European security in the same way as during the Cold War” and that “enhanced 
European military capability is […] the most effective means of silencing the voices of isolationism 
or, more importantly, the advocates of ‘burden sharing’ on Capitol Hill”1104.1105 Chirac, who 
recognised that building ESDP against NATO was not feasible1106, had two St. Malo objectives. 
First, he tried to regain the initiative on defence issues following his failed AFSOUTH gambit; 
second, Chirac wanted to challenge Germany to restructure its forces and equipment programmes 
on the French model (which was inspired by Britain’s 1998 SDR)1107 1108: reduce forces geared to 
territorial defence, prioritise expeditionary units; abolish conscription; improve military lift 
capabilities, increase defence equipment spending, particularly on satellites, airborne surveillance, 
“smart weapons”, etc.1109 Sadly, St. Malo failed to shift the German position very much. The 
rapprochement between France and Britain – two countries that have been described as “mirror 
images”1110 1111 in their approach to foreign and security policy – was brought about through 
                                                      
1101 (Blair & Chirac, 1998) 
1102 Blair’s 1997 election platform accused the Tory government of having neglected the British defence industrial base, 
with corresponding adverse effects on national security and the country’s high-technology sector. Blair also vowed to 
develop a new UK defence industrial strategy. McInnes (1998) p. 828 
1103 Blair’s St. Malo / ESDP initiative was “a major expression of political will in an area where firm policy initiatives 
and robust executive actions are less dependent on building a constituency of public support than may be the case in 
other areas of policy [monetary union, etc.].” Howorth (2000) p. 34 
1104 Ibid., p. 35 
1105 “For the UK, the starting-point is of the best means of maintaining [NATO], and the solution has been identified as 
the creation of [ESDP].” Ibid., p. 36 
1106 “For France, ESDP is first and foremost a European project, which nevertheless assumes readiness, when necessary, 
to make use of an Atlanticist instrument, NATO.” Ibid., p. 36 
1107 UK MoD (1998) 
1108 “Britain’s [SDR] is a good model for rethinking priorities and redesigning forces that are more sustainable, mobile, 
deployable, and flexible.” (Schake, Bloch-Lainé, & Grant, 1999) p. 26 
1109 Ibid. pp. 25-27 
1110 “French diplomacy and security policy-making is known for its awareness of strategic vision; a clear understanding 
driven from the very top of what it wants to achieve in a medium- to long-term time frame, based around a shared sense 
of its own identity and purpose, imbued with confidence in the national role France should play. […] This can make it 
long on political rhetoric and short on practical implementation. British policy-making, by contrast, is known instead 
for its short-term practicality. A concern to get the details right, a natural suspicion of strategic visions; based on a 
pervading uncertainty that goes back at least to the 1930s about the role Britain should play in the world, and now in 
Europe.” Clarke (2000) p. 729 
1111 “Issues such as state versus market / civil society; territorial defence versus force projection; conscription versus 
professionalism; deepening versus enlargement; institutional priorities versus capabilities; strategy versus tactics; 
political will versus pragmatism; and, above all, Europeanism versus Atlanticism (in which France has traditionally 
epitomised the former and Britain the latter) still complicate the finer details of Franco-British cooperation.” Howorth 
(2000) p. 35 
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effective cooperation in Bosnia, after initial hesitation.1112 The UK and France alone accounted for 
50 percent of Europe’s defence procurement expenditures and had the largest forces deployable 
outside Europe.1113 1114 
 
St. Malo took the Clinton administration by surprise and raised concerns that London could be led 
off its pro-transatlantic track by France’s neo-Gaullist agenda.1115 Like Chancellor Kohl before, 
Blair tried to reassure Washington that his liaison with the French would reinforce NATO by 
improving Europe’s military burden-sharing with America. While US policymakers initially 
seemed to give Blair the benefit of the doubt, Secretary Albright published an op-ed three days after 
St. Malo to express Washington’s ESDP concerns through the famous “Three Ds”1116: no 
decoupling, no duplication, no discrimination. First, ESDP should not undermine NATO by de-
linking America from its European allies. Second, ESDP should not duplicate the Alliance’s efforts 
as “defence resources are too scarce for allies to conduct force planning, operate command 
structures, and make procurement decisions twice – once at NATO and once more at the EU”.1117 
The St. Malo declaration ran counter to that as it only referenced avoiding “unnecessary” 
duplication. Third, ESDP should not discriminate against non-EU NATO members. 
 
NATO’s 1999 “Operation Allied Force” against Serbia revealed sharp quantitative and qualitative 
disparities in American and European military capabilities, especially in areas like secure 
communications, reconnaissance, precision-guided ammunitions, and all-weather aircraft1118 1119 
                                                      
1112 “The reasons why the UK, in 1998, crossed the Rubicon are entirely compatible with realism – as indeed is the 
explanation for France’s 1995 rapprochement with NATO. Both France and Britain came to the conclusion that 
cooperation with each country’s former bête noire (NATO and European defence) was, henceforth, in their own 
national interests.” Ibid., p. 34 
1113 In 1999, the UK and France accounted for 24.6 percent (US$33.3 billion) and 21.0 percent (US$28.4 billion), 
respectively, of the total defence expenditures (US$135.2 billion) by the “old” European NATO allies. Germany’s share 
was 17.6 percent (US$23.8 billion). The Pentagon budget that same year amounted to US$252.4 billion (64.0 percent of 
all defence spending by all “old” NATO members). In terms of defence R&D, the UK and France accounted for 43.7 
percent (US$3.9 billion) and 35.2 percent (US$3.1 billion), respectively, of all such spending by the “old” European 
Alliance members in 1999. Germany spent US$1.3 billion (14.1 percent). That same year, US defence R&D spending 
was US$35.3 billion (79.9 percent NATO share). Finally, in terms of military procurement, the UK and France 
accounted for US$8.3 billion (30.4 percent) and US$5.2 billion (19.3 percent), respectively, of all such spending by the 
“old” European NATO members. Germany spent US$3.7 billion (13.7 percent). The US spent US$47.1 billion on 
defence procurement that year (62.4 percent NATO share). All figures (in constant 1997 US$) calculated by author 
based on IISS (1999), Table 8, p. 37. 
1114 “Since the end of the Cold War, the UK has provided the largest and most effective non-American contingent in 
three US-led extra-European conflicts: the first Gulf War in 1991; the intervention in Afghanistan since 2001; and the 
second Gulf war of 2003 and the subsequent occupation of Iraq.” (Wallace & Phillips, 2009) p. 267 
1115 Sloan (2000) pp. 15-16 
1116 Albright (1998) p. 22 
1117 Ibid., p. 22 
1118 IISS (1999), pp. 30-31 
1119 In response to the NATO imbalances exposed in Kosovo, Alliance leaders seized on the occasion of NATO’s 50th 
anniversary summit in Washington in April 1999 to launch the “Defence Capabilities Initiative” (DCI), which focused 
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While the Americans dominated the aerial bombing campaign, it was French and UK forces that 
took the lead in deploying to Kosovo after Serbia had backed down, thus overcoming President 
Clinton’s long-time reluctance to commit US ground troops.1120 1121 The Summit Communiqué and 
the new Strategic Concept1122 adopted by NATO leaders in Washington affirmed, for the first time 
ever, Europe’s need “to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and 
approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged”.1123 NATO also emphasised 
the need to make this strengthened European role compatible with the “Three Ds” earlier outlined 
by Secretary Albright. While Washington was happy with NATO’s handling of St. Malo, the 
initiative’s implementation at the EU-level became increasingly a source of concern. 
 
“[…] American disappointment at Europe’s unwillingness to accept US leadership 
unconditionally has fluctuated between despair over European political incoherence and 
fear that the European allies might agree on a framework for integration different from 
what Washington had prescribed.”1124 
 
At the EU’s 1999 Cologne Summit – which coincided with the final phase of the Kosovo War and 
was hosted by Germany’s new Red-Green government – European leaders declared that the EU 
requires “a capacity for autonomous action backed by credible military forces” and that “the EU 
will need a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capacity for relevant 
strategic planning”.1125 Furthermore, the leaders agreed “to further develop more effective European 
military capabilities from the basis of existing national, bi-national, and multinational capabilities 
and to strengthen our own capabilities for that purpose”.1126 
 
“We also recognise the need to undertake sustained efforts to strengthen the industrial and 
technological defence base, which we want to be competitive and dynamic. We are 
determined to foster the restructuring of the European defence industries amongst those 
States involved. With industry we will therefore work towards closer and more efficient 
defence industry collaboration. We will seek further progress in the harmonisation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
on mobility and deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability, and interoperable communications. 
Robertson (2001) pp. 50-51 
1120 “NATO […] experienced tensions due to the fact that the US supplied about 85 percent of the effective power in the 
bombing campaign, a figure which demands reflection about European readiness for independent security policies. 
Only with the entry of KFOR (Kosovo Force) into Kosovo in June was the imbalance in military burden-sharing visibly 
redressed.” Roberts (1999) p. 119 
1121 US troops constituted 15 percent of KFOR and were primarily deployed in the relatively safe Eastern part of 
Kosovo. 
1122 NATO (1999) 
1123 Ibid. 
1124 (Wallace & Zielonka, 1998) pp. 65-66 
1125 European Council (June 1999) 
1126 Ibid. 
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military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms, as Member States 
consider appropriate.”1127 1128 
 
This reference to defence industry restructuring was certainly the result of French lobbying. Prior to 
Cologne, France and Germany held two bilateral meetings and vowed to strengthen Europe’s 
defence industrial base: 
 
“A l’heure de la globalisation, nous favoriserons les projects industriels ou technologiques 
communs dans la perspective de pôles européens, notamment dans le domaine des 
industries aéronautiques et de défense, de l’intégration des marches financiers et du 
développement de la société de l’information.”1129 
 
“A Toulouse, la ville qui symbolise la coopération franco-allemande dans le domaine 
aéronautique, nous affirmons que la construction d’une Europe de la sécurité et de la 
défense exige le développement d’une base industrielle et technologique forte, dynamique et 
performante. La restructuration des industries d’armement et le renforcement de notre 
coopération en ce domaine contribueront à la réalisation de cet objectif.”1130 
 
Washington followed the EU’s post-St. Malo steps with growing unease. “[F]ollowing St. Malo 
[…] and […] Cologne, it appeared that something different was being created – something that 
might not in the long run serve Alliance interests.”1131 1132 In October 1999, Deputy Secretary of 
State Talbott expressed concerns that the EU had strayed from ESDI’s CJTF and “European pillar” 
concept in an effort to achieve more political-military [ESDP] autonomy from the Alliance in 
defence matters than was either necessary or conducive to stronger transatlantic relations.1133 
Talbott also discussed the “vexatious issue of defence industry collaboration” and promised to 
“explore new ways to promote technology-sharing, streamline licensing production, and encourage 
appropriate joint ventures.”1134. However, he emphasised that Washington would “[guard] against 
                                                      
1127 Ibid. 
1128 “If this [Cologne Declaration] is to become a reality, increases in defence spending, or at least a radical reallocation 
of resources, along with genuine collaboration in defence procurement, are necessary.” IISS (1999) p. 290 
1129 Final Declaration of the Franco-German Summit in Potsdam on 1 December 1998. Rutten (2001) p. 4 
1130 Declaration of the Franco-German Defence and Security Council in Toulouse on 29 May 1999. Ibid., p. 40 
1131 Sloan (2000) p. 24 
1132 “Alliance interests” should be interpreted as code for “US interests”. American officials tend to elide Alliance and 
American interests, just as French officials elided French and European interests. 
1133 “We do not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally 
grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually 
compete with NATO.” […] [T]he EU leaders’ declaration at Cologne in June […] could be read to imply that Europe’s 
default position would be to act outside the Alliance whenever possible, rather than through the Alliance.” Talbott 
(1999) 
1134 Ibid. 
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illicit and dangerous transfers of sensitive know-how and equipment”.1135 To this day, national 
security concerns are being used by Washington as powerful arguments against closer transatlantic 
defence industrial cooperation. 
 
In November 1999, two weeks after the EADS agreement, French foreign minister Védrine 
famously stated that “We cannot accept a world that is politically unipolar or culturally uniform. 
Nor can we accept the unilateralism of the single hyperpower. This is why we are fighting for a 
multipolar, diversified, and multilateral world.”1136 The British-Franco Summit in London later that 
month made the strengthening of Europe’s collective military capabilities a top priority. 
Foreshadowing decisions subsequently confirmed at the EU Summit in Helsinki on 10-11 
December 1999, London and Paris called on the EU to be able to deploy up to 50,000-60,000 
soldiers and relevant air / naval combat forces for “the most demanding crisis management 
operations”1137 within 60 days and sustain them in operations for at least one year. They also 
affirmed that the strengthening of Europe’s military capabilities will “need the support of a strong 
and competitive European defence industry”:1138 
 
“We want European strategic airlift capabilities to be strengthened substantially. […]. We 
note the common European need for new transport aircraft.” […] 
“The restructuring of the European [A&D] industry is a major step which will help improve 
competition in the global market. We welcome this recent consolidation and restructuring of 
European defence companies […]. The strengthening of our armaments will foster the 
development of European technological capabilities and will allow transatlantic 
cooperation to develop in a spirit of balanced partnership. We look forward to early 
progress toward the establishment of Airbus as a single commercial business and a fully 
united management.”1139 
 
The Franco-German Summit a few days later hailed EADS as “a major step forward” in making 
“substantial progress” on ESDP.1140 
 
“Conscients de l’importance d’une base industrielle technologique forte et compétitive, nos 
deux pays se félicitent vivement de l’avancée majeure que constitute le rapprochement de 
                                                      
1135 Ibid., p. 57 
1136 Védrine (1999) 
1137 (Blair & Chirac, 1999) 
1138 Ibid. 
1139 Ibid. 
1140 (Chirac & Schroeder, 1999) 
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nos industries d’armement au sein de la nouvelle EADS. La fusion [AM] / DASA facilitera 
notre coopération autour de programmes communs.”1141 
 
With the lessons of Kosovo fresh on their minds1142 1143, EU leaders gathered in Helsinki in 
December 1999 to make the creation of a 60,000-strong ERRF1144 that can be deployed within 60 
days and be sustained for one year for EU-led operations across “the full range of Petersberg tasks” 
their joint – albeit voluntary – Headline Goal to be accomplished by 2003.1145 While EU leaders 
agreed “to develop an autonomous capacity” to decide and conduct their own crisis management 
operations independent of the US-led alliance if necessary, they also affirmed that (1) “NATO 
remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members”1146, that (2) the realisation of the 
Headline Goal would avoid “unnecessary duplication” of NATO assets, and that (3) it did “not 
imply the creation of a European army”.1147 The Helsinki Summit also established three new 
political-military bodies to give the EU the necessary institutional capacity to conduct crisis 
management operations.1148 
 
“Decades of failure to make progress on common defence, coupled with declining defence 
expenditures, do indeed provide cause for scepticism as to whether the EU will finally back 
up its rhetoric with action.”[…] 
“The central issue at hand is capability. As long as Europe delivers on capability, the 
necessary institutional changes [within NATO] will be forthcoming.”1149 
 
Ultimately, ESDP’s success hinged on capabilities. If the EU members were not able to match their 
ambitious rhetoric with smarter, more efficient defence procurement and a fundamental 
restructuring of their militaries, it would be impossible to achieve the Headline Goal. 
 
                                                      
1141 Ibid. 
1142 „Whatever the arguments surrounding the decision to use force in Kosovo, and its consequences, what mattered for 
both analysts of European security capabilities and institutions, and for European leaders was the widespread sense of 
disappointment, frustration and even failure over the scale of the effort mounted by European forces compared to that of 
the [US]. […] Once again, as earlier in the 1990s, Europeans appeared weak and incapable when responding to a 
security challenge in their own ‘backyard’ – the Balkans.” (Cornish & Edwards, 2001) p. 588 
1143 “In the aftermath of the Kosovo War, Europe is forging ahead on the defence front with an unprecedented 
seriousness of purpose and collective will.” Kupchan (2000) p. 16 
1144 Given the rotational schedules of expeditionary forces, the 60,000-strong ERRF will require a total of 180,000 
soldiers to sustain an operation for at least a year: 1/3 of the force is deployed in the field; 1/3 is recovering; 1/3 is in 
training. 
1145 European Council (December 1999) 
1146 Ibid. 
1147 Ibid. 
1148 (1) Political and Security Committee (PSC); (2) Military Committee (MC); (3) Military Staff (MS). The EU also 
agreed that (1) “modalities will be developed for consultation, cooperation, and transparency between the EU and 
NATO […]”; and (2) appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union’s decision-
making autonomy, non-European NATO members and other interested states to contribute to EU military crisis 
management”; Ibid. 
1149 Kupchan (2000) pp. 26; 28 
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“This is not fundamentally a problem of gross resources – European allies spend two-thirds 
to three-quarters as much on defence as the [US] and have nearly half-again as many 
troops under arms. The central task is more efficient, more focused, better-planned and 
coordinated use of such resources.”1150 
“[W]hatever the level of defence spending, moreover, the fielding of advanced European 
military systems is delayed by the inability or unwillingness of European governments to co-
operate among themselves more closely on R&D, including the definition of R&D priorities, 
the consolidation of laboratories and testing facilities across national boundaries, and the 
integration of national development and purchasing offices. [...] The transatlantic gap is not 
at the level of basic technologies; rather it is at the level of integrating these technologies 
into suitable defence applications.”1151 
 
In the 1990s / 2000s, European countries launched several initiatives outside and inside the EU 
framework to address key obstacles to the creation of stronger European military capabilities: 
“Europe’s armament sector has remained fragmented into national markets, with costly duplication 
in all armaments-related areas (procurement bureaucracies, research activities, industrial capacities 
and defence programmes).”1152 The 1992 WEAG (Western European Armaments Group)1153 and 
the 1996 WEAO (Western European Armaments Organisation) shared the same overall objectives: 
“more efficient use of resources, in particular through better harmonisation of requirements, 
opening up of national defence markets to cross-border competition; strengthening of the European 
defence technological and industrial base; and cooperation in [R&D].”1154 Ultimately, however, 
these WEU-affiliated institutions “suffered from a lack of both interest and political support from 
national authorities”1155 and were closed down. European armaments cooperation was also 
hampered by continuing differences over the “juste retour” principle. In November 1996, France, 
Germany, Britain, and Italy established OCCAR1156 in an effort “to provide more effective and 
efficient arrangements for the management of existing and future collaborative [European] 
armament programmes”. OCCAR tried to develop “a more flexible calculation of industrial ‘juste 
retour’, replacing the strict application of ‘cost-share equals work-share’ on a project-by-project 
basis by a multi-year / multi-programme balance”1157: “global juste retour”. However, given the 
significant delays and cost overruns of the A400M – which is seen as OCCAR’s key test – and the 
                                                      
1150 Kramer (2000) p. 5 
1151 CSIS (2003) pp. IX-X 
1152 Schmitt (August 2003) p. 10 
1153 WEAG was created in 1992, when IEPG’s activities were transferred to WEU. 
1154 Schmitt (August 2003) p. 20 
1155 Ibid., p. 22 
1156 OCCAR = Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement 
1157 Schmitt (August 2003) p. 24 
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fact that the Organisation’s other armaments programmes are rather limited in scope, OCCAR has 
established at best a mixed track record so far. 
 
European NATO defence spending (as a percentage of GDP) continued to decline after Helsinki. 
That benchmark reached 2.09 percent in 1999; 2.02 percent in 2000; 1.97 percent in 2001; and 1.93 
percent in 2002.1158 “The weakness of Europe’s economies, together with the constraints imposed 
by the EU Stability and Growth Pact and the absence of any increase in the public’s threat 
perception, suggest that the current constraints on European NATO defence budgets will 
persist.”1159 The UK did restructure its armed forces and augmented the defence budget to 
implement the 1998 SDR. Military expenditures reached GBP23.5 billion in 2001, and increased to 
GBP24.2 billion and GBP25.6 billion in 2002 and 2003, respectively.1160 France, too, boosted its 
defence spending – especially on procurement and R&D – following the election of a conservative 
government in 2002. The MoD budget reached EUR28.4 billion in 2001, before increasing to 
EUR28.9 billion, EUR31.3 billion, and EUR32.4 billion in 2002, 2003, and 2004 respectively. 
Defence procurement reached EUR12.5 billion1161 and EUR13.6 billion in 2002 and 2003, 
respectively.1162 That figure increased 9.5 percent to reach EUR14.9 billion in 2004, which was 
partly used to buy new Rafales and “to restock the military with spare parts so that fighter, 
helicopter, transport, and tanker fleets can return to full strength”1163. Germany, in contrast, cut its 
defence budget from EUR23.9 billion in 2001 to EUR23.6 billion in 2002, before spending 
EUR24.4 billion and EUR24.1 billion in 2003 and 2004, respectively.1164 Germany’s low 
equipment expenditures increased from EUR3.5 billion in 2002 to EUR3.88 billion and EUR3.99 
billion in 2003 and 2004, respectively. However, the Bundeswehr was forced to slash key 
acquisition programmes to cut costs “as the 2008 procurement bow head approache[d]”1165. 
Ultimately, the EU did not match its ambitions with the necessary defence spending to address the 
Headline Goal’s capability shortfalls. 
 
                                                      
1158 IISS (2003) p. 245 
1159 Ibid., p. 242 
1160 Ibid., p. 250 
1161 IISS (2002) p. 248 
1162 IISS (2004) p. 272 
1163 IISS (2003) p. 243 
1164 In 2004, Germany spent 51.2 percent of its defence budget on personnel expenditures. That figure is even higher if 
one also takes into account military pensions, which are paid from a different budget. IISS (2004) p. 273. In contrast, 
Germany spent very little on military equipment, which made it a weak partner for France in weapons system 
development (A400M, etc.). 
1165 IISS (2003) p. 243 
 
235 
In July 2004, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established to better coordinate Europe’s 
defence activities and to achieve greater efficiencies in procurement programmes.1166 1167 As part of 
ESDP, EDA1168 embraced the identification and redressing of Headline Goal shortfalls in the EU’s 
military and defence capabilities as its “fundamental agenda” 1169. EDA also “[promotes] European 
cooperation on defence equipment, both to contribute to defence capabilities and as a catalyst for 
further restructuring the European defence industry”1170. In November 2005, the 26 EDA defence 
ministers agreed to a voluntary, non-binding Code of Conduct (CoC) for defence procurement 
contracts valued at least EUR1 million beginning in July 2006.1171 1172 1173 While EDA specifically 
conceived the CoC to encourage competition in the areas previously exempt from the Common 
Market under Art. 296 TEU1174, the fact that the CoC has no formal enforcement powers constitutes 
a major structural weakness.1175 
 
With about 80 permanent staff and a first-year budget of EUR20 million, EDA was initially greeted 
with disappointment by Europe’s defence industry, which had hoped for a much more ambitious 
                                                      
1166 “The [EDA], which should be subject to the Council’s authority and open to participation by all Member States, 
will aim at developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, promoting and enhancing European 
armaments cooperation, strengthening the European defence industrial and technological base (EDITB) and creating a 
competitive European defence equipment market, as well as promoting, in liaison with the Community’s research 
activities where appropriate, research aimed at leadership in strategic technologies for future defence and security 
capabilities, thereby strengthening Europe’s industrial potential in this domain.” European Council (2004) 
1167 In June 2003, the European Council requested “the appropriate bodies of the Council to undertake the necessary 
actions towards creating, in the course of 2004, an intergovernmental agency in the field of defence capabilities 
development, research, acquisition, and armaments”. European Council (2003) 
1168 Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, “[EU High Representative] Solana [chaired] the Steering Board, the principal decision-
making body of the Agency, made up of Defence Ministers from 26 participating Member States (all EU members 
except Denmark) and a member of the European Commission. In addition to ministerial meetings at least twice a year, 
the Steering Board also meets at the level of national armaments directors, national research directors, national 
capability planners and policy directors.” Baroness Ashton, the new EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, succeeded Javier Solana as EDA Steering Board chair in December 2009. See EDA’s organisational 
chart: http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Organisation&id=119 
1169 IISS (2005) pp. 46-47 
1170 EDA background description: http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Background&id=122 
1171 EDA (2005) and EDA Code of Conduct (2005) 
1172 The CoC is based on five principles: (1) a voluntary, non-binding approach; (2) fair and equal treatment of suppliers 
(a competition process based on objective and transparent selection criteria; specifications and statements of 
requirements, preferably defined in terms of function and performance; clear and transparent award criteria; and 
debriefings for all unsuccessful bidders); (3) mutual transparency and accountability; (4) mutual support; (5) mutual 
benefit. EDA has created a website to post to post defence procurement opportunities with a net contract value of at 
least EUR1 million (excluding VAT): http://www.eda.europa.eu/ebbweb/Default.aspx 
1173 The CoC exempts “procurement of research and technology; collaborative procurements; and procurements of 
nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsion systems, chemical, bacteriological and radiological goods and services, and 
cryptographic equipment” from its purview. 
1174 TEU = Treaty on European Union 
1175 The first key principle of the CoC, enshrining the regime’s “voluntary, non-binding approach”, is defined as 
follows: “No legal commitment is involved or implied. The regime will operate on the basis of sovereign Member 
States [sMS] voluntarily choosing to align their policies and practices, on a reciprocal basis, in this area. Those who 
elect to join the regime, and follow this Code, will be free to cancel their participation in the regime at any time. No 
sanction is envisaged for any non-observance of this Code by any sMS, beyond the requirement to account to the other 
members of the regime. In all cases, the final authority for contract award remains with sMS national authorities.” 
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EU undertaking.1176 However, EDA’s first CEO, Nick Witney, strongly defended the agency, 
emphasising that Javier Solana is a “strong advocate of this enterprise” and that EDA’s regular 
Steering Board meetings allow for “a lot of contact with the highest decision-making levels”.1177 
Witney described OCCAR as EDA’s “complementary sister organisation”1178 that operates in a 
different market section: 
 
“My vision of the future is that we keep OCCAR’s project management pipeline full with 
projects we have had a hand in generating. It is perfectly possible [that OCCAR will 
become part of EDA], but I don’t think it is going to happen in the three years I will be 
here.” 1179 
 
Witney conceded that there were fundamental differences within EDA between those who “believe 
in European-preference” and those who “believe equally strongly that ‘Fortress Europe’ would be a 
bad idea”1180. This on-going debate is particularly relevant for Europe’s defence industrial relations 
with America. The EDA deliberately avoided this thorny issue and created “a regime that governs 
the conduct of European member states toward each other in matters of defence procurement”.1181 
Speaking in 2005, Witney described as one of his top priorities to boost European defence research 
and testing (R&T) budgets, if necessary by moving money over from other budget areas. Apart 
from spending more, the EDA CEO specifically urged his members to boost the share of 
collaborative R&T defence projects that they undertake beyond the current 5 percent mark, directly 
tied to the jointly-defined capabilities needed for the future.1182 Finally, Witney defined EDA’s 
future success or failure as follows: 
 
“One of the things that is going to matter – this is a rather informal indicator but it is 
hugely important – is to look around those meetings and see if the minister is actually 
present. Our ability to succeed or fail depends on our ability to retain interest at the highest 
levels. There are also some very specific things: If I can look back in two and a half years 
and see cross-border competition in defence procurement in Europe, that in itself would be 
a huge step forward. I would like to think there will be at least half a dozen significant 
collaborative projects that might not have happened without the Agency’s influence. I would 
like to see a significant increase in the amount of money we are spending on defence R&D 
                                                      
1176 Witney (2005) 
1177 Ibid. 
1178 Ibid. 
1179 Ibid. 
1180 Ibid. 
1181 Ibid. 
1182 Ibid. 
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collectively. And, of course, [we must make] real progress in increasing the pool of 
European forces fit and ready for crisis-management operations.”1183 
 
                                                      
1183 Ibid. 
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6.3 The US reaction to ESDP: “Yes, but…” 
 
The EU’s unprecedented momentum at the political-military level since the St. Malo, Cologne, and 
Helsinki Summits hardly looked reassuring for Washington and raised serious questions about 
ESDP’s ultimate impact in terms of duplicating Alliance assets, fostering the creation of an EU 
caucus in NATO, etc.1184 After it had become obvious that Secretary Albright’s harsh “Three Ds” 
response towards ESDP had failed to rein in the EU’s defence effort, her deputy used the NATO 
Ministerial in mid-December 1999 to express the US thinking about ESDP in more positive terms. 
Adopting language first publicly employed by the new British NATO Secretary-General Lord 
Robertson a month earlier, Talbott stressed that ESDI / [ESDP] 1185 should rather be based on the 
“Three Is” principles: “improvement in European defence capabilities; inclusiveness and 
transparency for all Allies; and the indivisibility of [transatlantic] security, based on our shared 
values”1186. Washington insiders viewed the State Department as most sceptical / hostile towards 
ESDP, while the NSC tended to be more EU-friendly.1187 At the Pentagon, interestingly, there was 
a clear disconnect between the civilian and military leadership. The former adopted an “alert-but-
relaxed” approach characterised by “attempting to downplay the negative [US] reactions to ESDP 
while emphasising how important it is for the European allies to produce real military 
capabilities”1188. The Joint Chiefs, in contrast, seemed to harbour “apparently residual suspicion of 
the whole [ESDP] operation and of French motivations behind it”1189. 
 
While the Clinton administration changed its official rhetoric in mid-December 1999 and appeared 
to view ESDP in less confrontational terms, a majority of Democrats and Republicans in Congress 
remained concerned about ESDI / ESDP. Two Congressional resolutions as well as individual 
member statements and committee hearings reflected that sentiment. The first resolution, passed by 
the House on 2 November 1999 by a 278-133 margin, made a strong commitment to NATO and 
supported ESDI on the condition that it resulted in more European capabilities and transatlantic 
burden-sharing.1190 At the same time, the measure also expressed concerns about ESDI / ESDP 
                                                      
1184 Kupchan (2000) pp. 18-21 
1185 “Already there is an initial strategic disconnect indicated by the American reactions. Most American commentators 
refer to ESDI as their source of concern when they should be talking about ESDP. ESDI did not give rise to much alarm 
in the [US] because it was defined fully within the framework of the Alliance. ESDP, defined as autonomous from 
NATO and within the EU framework, is what most US commentators find alarming even if they refer to it as ‘ESDI’.” 
Sloan (2000) p. 23 
1186 Robertson (1999) 
1187 Sloan (2000) p. 25 
1188 Ibid., p. 25 
1189 Ibid., p. 26 
1190 The burden-sharing argument was particularly appealing to the Republicans’ small-government-and-lower-taxes 
fiscal hawks in charge of the House at the time. 
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using the “Three Ds” language.1191 On 8 November 1999, the Senate passed a similar NATO-ESDP 
resolution introduced by Republican William Roth, Jr. and backed by influential Senators Helms, 
Lugar, Biden, Kyl, Hagel, Lieberman, etc. The resolution called on the EU to (1) “undertake an 
autonomous mission through [ESDI] only after [NATO] had declined to undertake that mission” 
when “matters of transatlantic concern” were at stake; and (2) not to implement the Cologne 
Summit decisions in a way that “promote[s] a strategic perspective on transatlantic security issues 
that conflicts with that promoted by [NATO]”1192.1193 1194 
 
Hearings held by the House International Relations Committee also exposed deep-seated US 
reservations about ESDP among neoconservatives like John Bolton, who warned Congress that on-
going efforts by EU members to align their “foreign and defence policies […] into one shared and 
uniform policy is at times motivated either by a desire to distance themselves from US influence, or 
in some cases by openly anti-American intentions”1195. Ultimately, ESDP could spell “the end of 
NATO as we know it as a military organisation, a fragmentation of transatlantic political 
cooperation, and could quite possibly spill over into harmful economic conflict as well”.1196 
Bolton’s testimony was echoed by Peter Rodman, who charged that the Europeans, “rather than 
joyfully falling in step behind our global leadership […] are looking for ways to counter our 
predominance”.1197 Kim Holmes from the conservative Heritage Foundation warned that 
“hamstringing and weakening US global leadership by insisting on UN mandates for every overseas 
military operation or other multilateral action could undermine the will of the [US] to lead”1198. As 
William Wallace and Jan Zielonka observed: 
 
“Eurobashing is back in fashion in the [US].” […] 
“Just as European anti-Americanism damaged Western solidarity during the Cold War, so 
American Eurobashing threatens to unravel transatlantic cooperation in the post-Cold War 
era. If the [US] expects Europe to shoulder a larger burden of global leadership, a decent 
                                                      
1191 Conservatives opposed to the resolution criticised that America was subsidising security for its rich European allies 
through NATO and therefore questioned the fundamental utility of NATO as an instrument of US foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War era. Liberal Congressmen voted against the resolution for fear that NATO expansion could antagonise 
Russia or that the US President could use the Alliance as a vehicle to weaken / circumvent the constraints imposed by 
the 1973 War Powers Act. Sloan (2000) pp. 29-30 
1192 Senate (1998) 
1193 This resolution was “softer” than the initial version introduced by Senator Roth, in which he had used very 
controversial language such as that Washington would “assign” to Europe those military and security tasks where the 
US did not want to get involved. Sloan (2000) p. 31 
1194 At their Helsinki Summit in December 1999, EU leaders refused to give NATO a droit de regard over future ESDP 
operations. 
1195 Bolton (1999) 
1196 Ibid. 
1197 Rodman (1999) 
1198 Holmes (1998) 
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respect for Europe’s opinions is in the American interest. The current approach, combining 
demands for greater burden-sharing with knee-jerk dismissals of European policies, risks 
alienating America’s most important allies.”1199 
 
Beginning in 1997-1998, against the backdrop of rising transatlantic tensions, key EU leaders 
embraced a political rhetoric that was increasingly critical of America and talked openly about the 
need to balance against the US hegemon.1200 One should not forget though that former senior 
Clinton officials like Bob Hunter, NATO Ambassador during 1993-1998, and NSC Europe Director 
Ivo Daalder, now President Obama’s NATO Ambassador, held a much more benign view of ESDP. 
At the same House hearing, Hunter affirmed that “a functioning [ESDI] […] will indeed promote 
our interests in Europe [and] strengthen the bonds of alliance”1201 by providing for more equitable 
burden-sharing. And as Daalder, now President Obama’s NATO Ambassador, stated: “Europe’s 
problem today is not its potential future strength. On the contrary, it is Europe’s actual political and 
military weakness [that is the problem].”1202 Similarly, Kupchan argued that “French rhetoric 
notwithstanding, the EU is anything but an instrument for amassing or projecting power. […] The 
EU is fundamentally about binding and pooling power, not projecting it. In that sense, the realistic 
risk is still of too little Europe, not too much of it.”1203 
 
Extremely critical or very positive assessments of ESDP by US politicians and defence analysts 
across the political spectrum notwithstanding, the Clinton administration ultimately adopted an 
approach towards ESDP that Stanley Sloan dubbed the “‘Yes, but…’ policy, supporting the 
European effort but warning of its potential negative consequences”.1204 1205 1206 However, the deep-
seated distrust, hostility, and protectionist mindset displayed by the Republican-dominated 
Congress (and some Democrats) vis-à-vis France and ESDP further constrained the Clinton 
                                                      
1199 (Wallace & Zielonka, 1998) pp. 65 ; 68 
1200 On 3 December 1999, Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations, stated that it was the objective of 
ESDP “to make sure the European voice is heard at the same strong decibel level as when the [EU] speaks as the 
world’s biggest trade bloc and the biggest foreign aid donor.” On 28 December 1999, Chancellor Schroeder said that 
Washington “lacked consideration for its allies” [and that] [w]hining about US dominance doesn’t help. We have to 
act.” In June 2001, Swedish Prime Minister Persson remarked that the EU “is one of the few institutions we can 
develop as a balance to US world domination”. Mowle (2004) p. 131 
1201 Hunter (1999) 
1202 Daalder (1999) 
1203 Kupchan (2000) p. 23 
1204 Sloan (2000) p. viii 
1205 “[The American ‘yes, but…’ attitude is one] in which there nearly always coexist the sacrosanct nature of NATO, a 
large dose of historical suspicion of France, a deep-seated aversion to the very term European ‘autonomy’ and a certain 
uneasiness – which is new – regarding recent British and German policies.” Gnesotto (April 2000) p. vi 
1206 “After 1945, the American prescription for Europe was to make it ‘more like us’: to build a United States of Europe 
that would become America's loyal partner within a broader Western alliance. In the years since, American 
disappointment at Europe’s unwillingness to accept US leadership unconditionally has fluctuated between despair over 
European political incoherence and fear that the European allies might agree on a framework for integration different 
from what Washington had prescribed.” (Wallace & Zielonka, 1998) pp. 65-66 
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administration’s freedom of movement and made it impossible to envision any transatlantic A&D 
industry “merger of equals”. 
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6.4 Growing US unilateralism and the rise of transatlantic political clashes 
 
The launch of ESDI / ESDP and the creation of EADS in the 1990s coincided with growing 
transatlantic tensions in a number of areas, ranging from arms control, the environment, trade policy 
/ sanctions to human rights and military cooperation. Thomas Mowle captured the essence of the 
emerging “transatlantic rift” debate: “Why, despite their professed similarity of goals, do the policy 
preferences of the [EU] and the [US] diverge on so many multilateral issues?”1207 Mowle analyses 
four major EU-US clashes in four distinct issue areas where America and Europe had clear political 
differences during the December 1997-December 1998 timeframe: Mine Ban Treaty (MBT); Kyoto 
Protocol; International Criminal Court (ICC), and St. Malo. The first three of these transatlantic 
clashes were triggered by Washington’s opposition to the establishment or strengthening of 
multilateral institutions.1208 As the world’s last superpower, America was particularly sensitive to 
any (perceived) attempt by other countries – including its allies in Europe – to leverage multilateral 
institutions to restrain US capabilities or freedom of action. From Europe’s perspective, the clear 
shift in mood within US policy-makers in the 1990s against acceptance of international law and 
multilateral institutions – evidenced by the conservative Republican take-over of Congress in 1994 
– made Washington increasingly appear as an arrogant, unilateral, and trigger-happy superpower. 
The subsequent change to the George W. Bush administration, the impact of 9/11, and the 2003 Iraq 
War led to a dramatic deterioration in US relations with key European allies like France and 
Germany. 
 
The transatlantic clash over MBT1209 was significant because “for the first time since its rise to 
superpower status at the beginning of the Cold War, the [US] made non-negotiable demands at an 
international security conference – and saw its demands set aside.”1210 In June 1997, after four years 
of high-profile NGO lobbying efforts, more than 90 countries – including virtually all EU members 
– declared their unconditional support for a complete landmine ban world-wide. Washington, in 
contrast, pushed for five treaty changes (three of which were deemed “non-negotiable”), including 
an exemption for the heavily fortified DMZ1211 on the Korean Peninsula.1212 When all these 
demands were rejected by a two-third majority vote, Washington pulled out of the MBT conference 
in September 1997. The following month, the ICBL1213 was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, a 
                                                      
1207 Mowle (2004) p. 1 
1208 Ibid., p. 26 
1209 The MBT was signed in December 1997 and entered into force in March 1999. 
1210 Mowle (2004) p. 12 
1211 DMZ = Demilitarised Zone 
1212 Mowle claims that Washington’s opposition to the MBT “merely derived from the official position of the DoD, 
which did not represent a monopoly opinion within the security community”. Mowle (2004) p. 72 
1213 ICBL = International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
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decision that made America – especially among European publics – look even more like an 
arrogant, unilateralist superpower that throws its weight around and refuses to be bound by 
international regimes and institutions. 
 
The second transatlantic political clash was triggered by the Kyoto Protocol signed in December 
1997. For Republican and Democratic opponents of Kyoto, the main problem was that key 
developing countries – in particular rapidly-growing major CO2 emitters like China and India – 
were exempt from any binding emission reduction targets.1214 While Washington was able to 
extract some concessions1215 during the Kyoto negotiations, these changes did not satisfy the 
Senate, which had specifically insisted on the inclusion of countries like China and India in the 
Kyoto regime. While President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol in November 1998, he never 
submitted it to the Senate for ratification.1216 The long-time refusal by prominent, mainly 
Republican US policymakers to accept the notion that man-made climate change is for real further 
fostered the impression that America and Europe did no longer share the same value system. As the 
globe’s largest CO2 emitter, the US was seen by the rest of the world, and Europeans in particular, 
as the biggest and most intractable problem in the global climate change equation. After the end of 
the Cold War, Europeans began to rank environmental challenges such as climate change among 
their top global security concerns. It is therefore no surprise that Washington’s opposition to Kyoto 
created the perception of a “transatlantic rift”, especially when measured in terms of America’s 
poor image and reputation abroad. Over the past decade, Washington’s steadfast rejection of 
legally-binding international CO2 emission reductions has widely been viewed as one of the most 
egregious symbols of American arrogance and unilateralism.1217 1218 
 
The third transatlantic clash was triggered by the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, which opened 
for signature in the Italian capital in July 1998. Here again, the underlying source of (transatlantic) 
conflict was the extent to which the American hegemon would allow itself to be bound by 
multilateral rules and institutions. In particular, the controversy erupted over whether US military 
                                                      
1214 In 1997, the Senate voted 95-0 for resolution S. 98 calling on President Clinton not to sign the Kyoto Protocol 
unless it contained “specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing 
Country Parties within the same compliance period”. 
1215 These concessions concerned the way CO2 emission targets were calculated or how the relevant reduction 
timetables were to be structured. Mowle (2004) pp. 73-74 
1216 In March 2001, President Bush made it clear that the US would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol as it would seriously 
harm US economic growth and destroy American jobs. 
1217 Virtually all major European countries – with the exception of Germany – were themselves lagging behind their 
Kyoto commitments. 
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personnel and government official serving abroad should be subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction, which 
includes genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression. Washington, fearing that 
politically motivated ICC charges could be brought against its troops, lobbied hard to weaken the 
Court’s reach.1219 1220 In the end, the US was left isolated as all other EU / NATO members, backed 
by many African and Latin American countries as well as Russia, India, Japan, etc. supported the 
ICC despite US objections.1221 President Clinton signed the Rome Statute on 31 December 2000, 
the last possible day, to ensure that Washington could “influence the evolution of the court”.1222 
When it became obvious that the ICC was on track to enter into force, the new Bush administration 
tried aggressively to secure bilateral non-surrender “Article 98” waiver agreements with ICC 
members to exempt US soldiers and officials from the Court’s jurisdiction, using economic and 
military aid as well as the provision or withholding of political support as carrots and sticks in the 
negotiating process.1223 Washington’s push for “Article 98” agreements created serious tensions 
with the Europeans, who once again seemed to be on the receiving end of an arrogant, unilateral 
American superpower that was not willing to play by the rules and worked “against the object and 
purpose of the statute”.1224 
 
When discussing US unilateralism vis-à-vis Europe in the 1990s, one also needs to mention the 
transatlantic trade disputes during that period: bananas, hormone beef, GMOs, the Iran-Libya 
Sanction Act (ILSA), and the Helms-Burton Act.1225 While these trade disputes created 
considerable resentment on both sides of the Atlantic (particularly in Europe), it is fair to say that 
“[transatlantic] disputes over trade are not very puzzling: the [US] and the [EU] compete in trade, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1218 US President Obama has promised to fight climate change through the introduction of a cap-and-trade system and a 
strong push for energy conservation / renewable energy. However, given the economic costs involved, the cap-and-
trade measure is highly controversial among Republicans and Democrats in Congress. 
1219 The Clinton administration tried to give the P5 UNSC members veto powers over future ICC prosecutions. Paris did 
support Washington on some counts during the ICC negotiations, including the possibility to grant ICC members the 
right to opt out of crimes other than genocide. Mowle (2004) p. 91 
1220 Interestingly, the ICC was also opposed by Democrats like Senator Feinstein (D-CA), who feared that an ICC 
provision prohibiting “the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population 
into the territory it occupies” could be potentially used against the Israeli government and its citizens. Ibid., p. 90 
1221 The following seven countries are believed to have rejected the Rome Statute: America, China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, 
Qatar and Yemen. Ibid. p. 91 
1222 President Clinton emphasised that the Rome Statute had “significant flaws” and that he did “not recommend that 
my successor submit the Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are satisfied”. 
Statement by the President on the Signature of the [ICC] Treaty, 31 December 2000, quoted in Ibid., p. 91 
1223 The American Service-Members’ Protection Act, passed by Congress in August 2002, was designed “to protect 
[US] military personnel and other elected and appointed officials of the [US] government against criminal prosecution 
by an international criminal court to which the United States is not party”. 
1224 Dempsey (2002) quoted in Mowle (2004) p. 8. According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a 
signatory state to an international treaty that has not yet ratified the agreement must not act in ways that undermine the 
“object and purpose” of the treaty. A signatory can therefore decide to “un-sign” the treaty to be free from that 
restriction. Mowle (2004) pp. 90-91 
1225 The “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act” is commonly referred to as the Helms-Burton Act, 
named after its two original sponsors, Senator Helms (R-NC) and Congressman Burton (R-IN). 
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so one expects to find conflict”1226. That being said, transatlantic conflicts over unilateral, extra-
territorial US trade sanctions targeted at Iran and Cuba are clearly more political in nature than 
“normal” market-access trade disputes over tariffs or quotas. The ILSA and Helms-Burton Act 
clashes reflect not only very different US-EU views regarding the constraints imposed by 
international laws and institutions on the exercise of American power; they are also indicative of 
diverging geopolitical threat perceptions as well as different transatlantic capabilities and 
preferences along the “engagement vs. confrontation” policy toolbox spectrum. 
                                                      
1226 Mowle (2004) p. 14 
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Chapter 7: Action and reaction: the BMD vs. the EADS merger 
7.1. Ethnocentric vs. regiocentric aerospace and defence consolidation 
 
The BMD merger, like virtually all the other major elements of the American A&D industry 
structure, was driven by what Keith Hayward has termed an ethnocentric approach: one that regards 
the retention of American control and ownership over Boeing and MDC as paramount due to 
relevant national security considerations. The Clinton administration’s mercantilist agenda – 
defined as the attempt “to assure that the aeronautical capabilities (technological, industrial, and 
commercial) of the respective countries are nurtured and protected and given every advantage over 
their rivals”1227 – also played a role in shaping US A&D industrial policy. In comparison, the EADS 
merger involving three European “national champions” conformed to the model of a regiocentric 
company “blending strategic interests with regional integration / national sensitivity”. Hayward 
coined these terms during the crucial 1997 / 1998 period: after the BMD merger but before the 
creation of EADS. At the time, he was only beginning to see the contours of Europe’s future 
industry consolidation process. Hayward identified Eurocopter and Airbus Integrated Company 
(AIC) as existing or potential examples of regiocentric firms in Europe.1228 Subsequently, EADS 
would become the example par excellence of a region-centric company, both in Europe and the rest 
of the world. 
 
Despite the pressures of globalisation and the progress towards more open international trade and 
investment regimes that could be observed during the 1990s, governments on both sides of the 
Atlantic remained heavily involved in “their” respective A&D industries; be it as customers, 
shapers of industrial policy and R&D aid providers, regulators, political / executive-level backers 
for export sales, or owners and shareholders. While the founding of EADS certainly marked a 
historic milestone in the (transnational) integration of the European A&D industry, one must not 
forget that the governments of France, Germany and Spain continued to be the ultimately decisive 
factors weighing on EADS’ internal structure and overall strategic orientation. In particular, France 
and Spain made sure to retain significant direct and indirect state-controlled EADS shareholdings, 
thus adding further economic weight to their already considerable political influence.1229 In 2007, 
for example, when EADS embarked on a major internal restructuring programme dubbed 
“Power8”, all the key elements of this highly controversial cost-cutting package involving plant 
closures, thousands of job losses, and a top-level management shake-up were ultimately decided by 
the three governments concerned, primarily Germany and France. In 2007, then-French presidential 
                                                      
1227 Thornton (1999) p. 72 
1228 Ibid., p. 9 
1229 It is fair to say that the French and Spanish governments are explicitly mercantilist. The German government, in 
contrast, is rhetorically liberal market, but in practice has mercantilist instincts in strategic industries. 
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candidate Nicolas Sarkozy even made the EADS restructuring plan part of his rather populist 
campaign platform, declaring boldly that “If I’m elected President of the Republic, I’ll renegotiate 
with the Germans.”1230 
 
In the US, in contrast, direct state holdings in the American A&D industry are virtually unheard of. 
However, there is a web of long-standing relationships linking the executive branch (notably the 
Pentagon, but also the White House) and Congress (Senators and Congressmen care a lot about jobs 
in their districts) to the country’s major A&D companies. Sometimes relations are even too close, 
as evidenced by various high-profile procurement corruption scandals. In 2003, for example, senior 
Boeing and USAF officials attempted to secure an improper multi-billion dollar Pentagon deal to 
lease and buy 100 KC-767 Boeing aerial refuelling tankers to the detriment of US taxpayers and, 
indirectly, its European rival Airbus. Cases of outright corruption left aside, US national security 
concerns as well as parochial, often mercantilist-inspired thinking in Congress – which is an 
integral element of the “iron triangle” connecting the legislative branch, the government 
bureaucracy, and outside interest groups / business players as part of the military-industrial complex 
– have been the key obstacles to full-fledged transatlantic A&D industrial integration at the prime 
contractor level. Another important factor has been Washington’s “revolving door” tradition 
allowing senior government officials (primarily political appointees) to move to A&D companies 
and then back into the public sector.1231 
 
For sure, similar parochial motivations can be found on the other side of the Atlantic as well. 
However, apart from Gaullist France, the other major European A&D companies and the 
governments behind them have, in principle, shared a strong interest in entering into (roughly 
balanced) mergers with suitable American counterparts; primarily to gain access to the vast US 
military procurement business, to leverage state-of-the art US technologies, and to better tap into 
America’s deep capital markets. At least in the defence sector, European aerospace companies have 
been the underdogs since 1945. This state of affairs explains why British and German firms in 
particular were so eager to “marry up” and join forces with suitable US partners in the 1990s 
provided that there would be “merger of equals”. Conversely, in the commercial aerospace sector, 
Airbus had effectively used the last few decades to establish itself as a formidable force in the 
                                                      
1230 Gartzke (2007) 
1231 Current US Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III, who took office on 12 February 2009, previously served 
as senior vice president of government operations and strategy at Raytheon during 2002-2009. Prior to that, he worked 
as executive vice president of management consulting firm DFI International. In the second Clinton administration, 
William Lynn served as Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) during 1997-2001. Lynn’s appointment was very 
controversial because President Obama had to waive his administration’s new ethic rules that impose a two-year 
waiting period between registered lobbying activities and working for the administration on the same issues. 
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global market for large-scale aircraft, driving Lockheed and MDC out of the civil aviation business, 
and successfully breaking Boeing’s long-standing market hegemony. 
 
Writing during the crucial 1997-1998 period, Keith Hayward commented about the impact of 
globalisation on the traditionally close ties between national governments and their respective A&D 
industries: 
 
“[…] [E]thnocentricity remains the most powerful force determining [A&D] industrial 
development and […] any assumption of reduced state intervention would be somewhat 
heroic.” 
“[T]he links between aerospace and the nation-state remain strong and definite. There has 
been change [due to globalisation], but not fundamental change. One might even assert a 
more ambitious argument, that while the nation state remains the pre-eminent actor in 
international relations with all of the security overtones that implies, such a de-coupling 
will be impossible.”1232 
 
Apart from political / national security realism one can also point to mercantilism as a powerful 
force behind the continuing strong links between nation states and their respective A&D industries. 
As the economic variant of realism, mercantilism can also serve as an effective analytical bridge 
connecting the military and the civilian side of the aerospace business. The two industry areas are 
crucially important for virtually all governments concerned; both from a strategic / national security 
perspective and in terms of the aerospace sector’s economic-technological weight, its ability to 
generate crucial export earnings, secure cutting-edge jobs, etc. For these reasons, governments care 
about how their country’s military and civilian aerospace companies are doing, especially relative 
to foreign competitors. For example, Boeing’s economic importance is highlighted by the fact that 
the company has long been ranked as America’s single biggest exporter.1233 At the same time, 
Airbus and the EC have accused the US government of effectively subsidising Boeing’s 
commercial aircraft operations through the Pentagon’s huge military aircraft procurement and 
defence R&D programmes.1234 
 
Furthermore, top US and European political leaders have repeatedly engaged in competitive, 
aggressive lobbying efforts vis-à-vis third-country governments to make sure that “their” aerospace 
                                                      
1232 Hayward (1999) pp. 13-14 
1233 Boeing (2007) 
1234 “[W]hile the spin-off from military to civilian applications may not be as strong in the past, the American defence 
budget will continue to be the world’s most significant industrial policy for many dual-use technologies.” Moran (1993) 
p. 213 
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companies win crucial multi-billion civil and / or military aircraft orders. “Civil aeronautics exports 
have been closely linked to security issues and on occasion have arisen on the back of defence 
sales”.1235 Countries from around the world (Europe, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, etc.) have 
repeatedly leveraged commercial and military aircraft orders as an effective way to curry favour 
with the United States or relevant Airbus / European governments concerned and to obtain their 
political and sometimes even (tacit) military backing on issues of mutual concern. As the world’s 
sole superpower – and to the envy of Europe’s Airbus backers – America was in the position “to 
offer a unique package of security-for-trade deals with overseas customers”.1236 During the 1990s, 
the Clinton administration was particularly bent on pursuing neo-mercantilist strategies in the 
aerospace industry to counter the Europeans: 
 
“[T]he more overt mercantilist policy of the Clinton era is related precisely to the 
competitive challenge mounted by Europe in civil aeronautics in the last 20 years and the 
high levels of unemployment experienced in the US industry after the end of the Cold 
War.”1237 1238 
 
Looking at the big-picture relations between the US and European civil aerospace industries since 
WWII, one can identify a pattern of government-sponsored actions and reactions on both sides of 
the Atlantic which were inspired by national security as well as neo-mercantilist considerations. In 
each instance, the respective governments’ interventions were driven by the perceived need to shore 
up the (declining) fortunes of their national aerospace companies and / or to foster the creation of 
“national champions”. As one analyst put it succinctly: “The aeronautics industry in 1970, 
including both the military and commercial side of the business, embodied and powerfully 
reinforced American political and economic hegemony in the Cold War era.”1239 
                                                      
1235 Lawrence (1999) p. 28 
1236 Braddon (1999) p. 87 
1237 Lawrence (1999) p. 28 
1238 The Clinton administration paid particular attention to the A&D industry because of the significant impact of “big 
ticket” commercial and military aircraft sales on the US trade balance. 
1239 Thornton (1999) p. 72 
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7.2 Safeguarding Europe’s aerospace and defence industrial base vis-à-vis the United States 
 
The launch of the Airbus consortium in the late 1960s was Europe’s successful response to the 
crushing American dominance of the world’s commercial airliner market at the time. France, in 
particular, played a crucial role in Airbus, mainly because the “[French] political elite had a 
coherent and integrated framework for industrial policy and a matching foreign policy”.1240 The 
French were determined to play the lead in Airbus from the start, relying on the DGA to coordinate 
government policy on this from the highest level.1241 The British, in contrast, “had neither [policy]”; 
in essence, they were caught in the middle, “facing simultaneously across the Channel and the 
Atlantic”1242: 
 
“Airbus did emerge and prosper, but in the early days this was despite rather than because 
of any British contribution. Not surprisingly, dominance on the first Airbus project went to 
the French, ‘[…] consistent French support for and commitment to a truly European 
response to the American challenge in civil aerospace was translated into project 
leadership on the A300B’.1243 As a result, Toulouse became the emotional as well as the 
physical home of the European aircraft industry.”1244 
 
The dilemma confronted by the British aerospace industry – that is, the (perceived) need of having 
to choose between closer industrial cooperation with mainland Europe or with America – also 
became apparent during the events preceding the EADS merger in the 1990s. In December 1998 / 
January 1999, BAe decided that it was more important to acquire GEC-Marconi to become the 
UK’s undisputed national champion and gain privileged access to the lucrative US defence market 
than to join forces with Germany’s DASA and build the first European A&D champion. As a result 
of its decidedly Atlanticist strategic outlook, BAE subsequently did not join EADS. BAE’s decision 
in October 2006 to sell its 20 percent stake in Airbus to EADS was further proof of its orientation 
away from mainland Europe and towards the US (defence) market. It is important to emphasise that 
BAe pursued the GEC-Marconi merger and sold its Airbus stake against the express wishes of the 
Blair government – something completely unthinkable in France’s state-dominated A&D industry. 
 
Despite some launch hiccups, Airbus took off commercially and rapidly gained market share at the 
expense of its US competitors MDC and Lockheed, which was forced to abandon the commercial 
                                                      
1240 Lawrence (1999) p. 37 
1241 For additional information on the DGA and its important role in French armaments policy, see Chapter 1.3 of this 
thesis. 
1242 Lawrence (1999) p. 37 
1243 Thornton (1995) quoted in Lawrence (1999) p. 37 
1244 Lawrence (1999) p. 37 
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aircraft business in the early 1980s. “[Arguably the most important development in commercial 
aeronautics during the 1970s and 1980s was the re-emergence of a European capability in large 
airframe manufacturing in the form of Airbus Industrie”.1245 By the late 1980s / early 1990s, it was 
clear that Airbus had “thoroughly and permanently altered the very structure of the [aerospace] 
industry”:1246 
 
“Even as Boeing remains the market leader and is the single most significant force in the 
industry, American hegemony in the civil airliner market has been […] thoroughly 
challenged if not broken decisively.”1247 
 
It is interesting to note that Airbus’s successful assault on Boeing’s hegemonic position in the 
commercial aircraft business coincided with America’s rise to sole superpower status after the end 
of the Cold War. In this context, one must not forget that America’s macroeconomic situation also 
improved dramatically beginning in 1992-1993, allowing newly elected President Clinton to take 
credit for stronger economic growth, record low unemployment, a shrinking budget deficit, low 
interest rates, and a booming stock market fuelled by the nascent Internet economy. 
 
“[The Clinton administrations] […] most assuredly deserve recognition for their 
determined and concerted efforts to marry these developments in the realms of security and 
economics [that is, America’s rise to sole superpower status and the resurgent US economy] 
into a coherent, ‘geo-economic’ strategy designed to extend US commercial and political 
influence abroad.”1248 
 
Against the backdrop of Washington’s geoeconomic strategy, Thornton also emphasised that the 
“on-going consolidation [in A&D] is occurring in a technological and industrial context in which 
the lines between the civilian and military sectors are becoming increasingly blurred”.1249 This 
growing linkage between the commercial and the military side of the aerospace business is crucially 
important, since it made the fate of MDC and Boeing an even bigger matter of concern for the US 
government and Members of Congress. 
 
At various points in the 1990s, America like Europe had the perception that their aerospace 
industries were under serious competitive attack from the other side, threatening to cause a decline 
over the long-term. For the US, that threat concerned primarily Airbus’s surge in the commercial 
                                                      
1245 Thornton (1999) p. 73 
1246 Ibid., p. 75 
1247 Ibid., p. 75 
1248 Ibid., p. 77 
1249 Ibid., p. 77 
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aerospace business. According to an Airbus executive, “The commercial success of Airbus has 
infuriated the Americans who consider the domination of the LCA [Large Commercial Aircraft] 
market by US industry is the normal state of the world”.1250 On the military front, in contrast, US 
defence contractors (especially after their successive rounds of consolidation), enjoyed not only a 
commanding lead over their European competitors in terms of size and technology, but also 
successfully leveraged Washington’s position as the world’s hegemon to launch successful export 
offensives in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. America, after all, had no (military) peer competitor. 
In FY1996-1997, the US defence budget amounted to US$270 billion. In contrast, the combined 
defence budgets of six major EU military powers1251 only totalled US$120 billion during that same 
period. Furthermore, given the highly fragmented state of the European A&D industry, senior 
executives from these companies repeatedly lamented the fact that “[i]n Europe we are trying to 
support three times the number of contractors on less than half the budget”1252 compared to the 
Americans. 
 
While US mega-primes like Boeing, LMC, and NGC clearly dominated the defence business, the 
stunning success of Airbus on the global civil aviation market was of growing concern to American 
executives and policymakers. The importance of spin-on effects from civil to military aerospace 
meant that a loss of market share and lagging technological innovation for US companies risked 
weakening America’s industrial base and causing national security vulnerabilities.1253 The rise of 
Airbus and the corresponding decline in Boeing’s technological capabilities and sales constituted a 
clear threat to US national and geo-economic security. 
 
“[US] attention has been focused on the idea of national ‘competitiveness’ and on the 
persistent US trade and current account imbalances which are seen as leading to the 
accumulation of external debt and inward foreign investment and ownership (leading to 
‘dependence’ on foreigners, especially the Japanese, for ‘strategic’ technologies).”1254 1255 
                                                      
1250 Bieler (1999) p. 113. Mr. Bieler served as Director of International Affairs at Airbus Industrie. 
1251 UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden 
1252 Whitfield (1999) p. 105 
1253 In 1997, David Thornton defined the growing civilian-defence linkage as follows: “As military strategy, tactics, 
operations, and equipment come to rely more and more heavily on so-called information technologies (IT, especially 
data processing and microelectronics), the ‘defence industry is gradually dissolving into civilian high-technology 
industries’.” Thornton (1999) p. 77, who quotes van Scherpenberg (1997) p. 103. “In the US, following the end of the 
Cold War, the defence industry has gradually dissolved into a range of high technology industries where global 
competitiveness is the over-riding goal. As a result, the most promising route to commercial success in the aerospace 
industry now resides in the greater integration of civil and defence sectors. New over-arching systems integration skills 
and new integrated production technologies allow civil users enhanced access to leading edge defence research and 
development while providing the military sector with access to path-breaking civil advances in information technology 
and microelectronics to drive forward the trend towards ‘information-based warfare’.” Braddon (1999) pp. 82-83 
1254 Cable (1995) p. 309 
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Mercantilists, by definition, are greatly concerned about trade deficits and try to avoid or minimise 
them at all costs.1256 “From a geo-economic point of view, the US external deficit originates in an 
uneven playing field for trade. The solution is to be found in forcing open foreign markets (or 
restricting imports) so as to balance trade.”1257 It is easy to see this geo-economic approach at play 
when Washington is accusing Airbus of benefiting from illegal European government subsidies. 
Mainstream economists, in contrast, would argue that US trade deficits are inevitable as long as the 
country consumes more than it produces and needs to rely on imports and capital inflows from 
abroad to make up the difference.1258 Therefore, “Japan-bashing or EC-bashing in trade, or Exon-
Florio regulations for investment can affect the composition of the imbalances, but not their 
magnitude.”1259 
 
“The fact that the greatest threat to US power in the international system is ‘made in the 
USA’ should in now way detract from its importance to neorealists. Since 1980 the [US] has 
consumed almost US$1.5 trillion more than it produced, while two of the prospective 
‘challengers’ alone, the Germans and the Japanese, have accumulated more than US$1 
trillion in demands on our assets. Reversing this Paul Kennedy-esque trend would 
strengthen US freedom of action (present and future) in comparison to an America 
becoming more indebted to or owned by foreigners. It would foster external respect, rather 
than creeping contempt.”1260 
 
European firms, in turn, felt fundamentally threatened by the rapidly consolidating US A&D giants, 
especially after the BMD merger, which was perceived as an all-out assault on Airbus and its four 
partner nations. In this context, one must not forget that fundamental European concerns about 
losing the economic and technology race against America (or Japan for that matter) were nothing 
new: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1255 “The popular notion of competitiveness – that, in the words of President Clinton, ‘each nation is like a big 
corporation competing in the global marketplace’ – has been widely used to create a sense that the US and Europe are 
‘losing’ (to each other, Japan or everyone else) in some kind of knock-out competition. […] [M]any […] publications of 
recent vintage leave their readers in little doubt as to what the ‘competitiveness’ debate is all about: an economic 
equivalent of the Cold War.” Ibid., p. 310 
1256 “In the geo-economic view of the world, a trade deficit is intrinsically undesirable, not merely for its own sake 
(imports ‘destroy’ jobs), but because it is balanced by capital inflows – foreign investment or the acquisition of claims 
on the US federal government – so that the ‘US becomes dependent imports of goods and money from Japan’ and 
‘vulnerable to Japanese threats’.” Ibid., p. 310 
1257 Ibid., p. 309 
1258 “[T]he mainstream economic interpretation of the US deficit […] is that the external deficit is a mirror image, and 
consequence, of the internal imbalance between savings and investments and should be addressed not by trade policy 
but by government deficit reduction and, where possible, encouraging private savings.” Ibid., p. 310 
1259 Moran (1993) p. 212 
1260 Ibid., p. 212 
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“Since the creation of the European Communities in the 1950s, the issue of Europe’s 
technological and economic competitiveness in relation to the [US] has been on the 
political agenda. Three waves of technology-gap fever can be identified. The first occurred 
in the mid-1960s, the second in the early 1980s [this time also vis-à-vis Japan], and the 
third during the 1990s.”1261 
 
The 1997-1999 period between the BMD and EADS mergers is particularly relevant as it promises 
valuable insights into the strategic perceptions of European aerospace executives and senior 
government officials pondering their next moves. In 1997, Robert Whitfield, strategy and external 
affairs director of BAe Airbus, summed up Boeing’s dominant post-BMD merger position in the 
civil aircraft business as follows: 
 
“It now has over 70 percent of the world’s civil aircraft market by value. In terms of market 
penetration, 84 percent of fleets of aircraft are Boeing’s, including military conversions, a 
total 87 percent share of all jet aircraft with civil origins are Boeing – and in terms of seats 
the figure is around 93 percent. The statistics here speak for themselves.”1262 1263 
 
To counter Boeing’s dominance, Whitfield strongly urged his fellow Europeans to get their act 
together, notably by transforming Airbus into a single company: “in our view, it is the way forward 
and the first step to the ultimate goal of total [A&D] consolidation within Europe. […] [Airbus] 
SCE1264 will create a benchmark company forming a bridge for the rest of the industry to 
follow.”1265 1266 Whitfield also laid out Europe’s two existing strategic options in rather blunt terms: 
“Governments will face a choice, either to relinquish some control or watch their defence industries 
                                                      
1261 Moerth (2003) p. 60. With regard to the “three waves of technology-gap fever”, the author also references 
Sandholtz (1992). The EU’s 2000 Lisbon Agenda can be seen as another European attempt to formulate a coordinated 
strategic response to the new economic and technological challenges posed by the US and, increasingly, China as well 
as the Asia-Pacific region. At its European Council meeting in Lisbon in March 2000, the EU leaders agreed on a “new 
strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.” European 
Council (2000) 
1261 Moerth (2003) p. 60 
1262 Whitfield (1999) p. 107 
1263 “Despite a 30 percent market share, Airbus still only has 13 percent of the fleet of civil airliners flying and less than 
10 percent of the seats, making it effectively a market entrant still for decades to come. The recently approved [BMD 
merger] illustrates the competitive threat: [1] Airbus has half the throughput to recover its costs against; [2] it also has 
more investments to make than Boeing to extend its product range; [3] aircraft prices are currently 30 [percent] lower 
than [five] years ago; [4] Airbus gets far less funding from governments than the US gives its industry and Airbus has 
to pay most of it back!” Bruce (1999) pp. 127-128 
1264 SCE = Single Corporate Entity 
1265 Whitfield (1999) p. 103 
1266 The governments of the four Airbus partner countries met in June 1997 to express their support for the January 
1997 industry shareholders’ Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which established concrete dates and deliverable to 
transform Airbus into a fully integrated company with the kind of single, streamlined management structure necessary 
to compete effectively with arch rival Boeing. 
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slowly wither and die in the face of superior US competition.”1267 Looking back at the launch of 
Airbus in the late 1960s and early 1970s, this common European approach worked extremely well 
in the large-scale commercial aircraft business. Whitfield’s conclusion illustrates the high-stakes 
transatlantic rivalry in the A&D industry in the 1990s, both at the bilateral and the global level: 
 
“Now is the time for a strong drive to sort out Europe to ensure we can work with the rest of 
the world from a position of strength – both in civil and ultimately in defence markets. If 
not, we will be reduced to a niche player with an increasingly limited technology base. 
Europe must get its act together to compete with the US and negotiate as equals, not as 
junior partners.”1268 
 
For Michel Bieler, Airbus Industrie’s Director of International Affairs, the ultimate goal of the 
BMD merger was obvious: 
 
“[T]here is no doubt that the [BMD] merger is the last concerted and finely engineered 
move to create in the wake of defence consolidation, a globally dominant national champion 
in the civil aircraft sector. Even if it is at the price of some compromise with antitrust law, 
this newly created champion has, in the US view, the muscles needed for restoring US 
dominance on the LCA market by marginalising Airbus, the only remaining challenger. The 
politicisation by the US administration with threats of a trade war and the personal 
intervention of President Clinton against the EC when speaking in opposition to the merger, 
is the mere proof of the [US government’s] commitment to get the merger through 
according to its strategic views.”1269 
 
To respond to the American challenge, in Bieler’s assessment, Airbus had no choice but to go on 
the offensive and try to increase its global commercial aircraft market share to 50 percent – “the 
only long term sustainable position in a duopoly situation with a competitor like the new 
Boeing”.1270 Bieler also recommended that Airbus focus on building the A3XX to attack the 
existing B747-400 monopoly in the 400+ passenger segment and to thereby “kill” Boeing’s crucial 
cross-subsidisation capabilities.1271 In contrast, a defensive posture would “inevitably […] 
marginalise Airbus sooner or later as a niche player ‘à la Douglas’”.1272 To be sure, streamlining 
Airbus by transforming it from a GIE into a SCE / AIC would be much easier to achieve than 
                                                      
1267 Whitfield (1999) p. 107 
1268 Ibid., p. 112 
1269 Bieler (1999) p. 115 
1270 Ibid., p. 119 
1271 Ibid., p. 119 
1272 Ibid., p. 119 
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creating a fully integrated European A&D champion: “[A]n Airbus [SCE] can show what is 
possible in efficiency, allay some of the fears of losing control by individual nations and act as an 
example to facilitate wider European aerospace [and defence] restructuring at the earliest time”.1273 
 
The potential creation of Airbus Military Company as a subsidiary majority-owned by the four 
Airbus partners with the participation of other interested (European) aerospace companies to build 
the Future Large Aircraft (FLA) military transport aircraft (later dubbed A400M) was seen as a 
crucial step towards “breaking the US monopoly in the military transport business”.1274 Allowing 
Airbus to branch into the military business would therefore also weaken Boeing’s ability to cross-
subsidise its commercial aircraft sales with the proceeds from military transport deals.1275 Writing 
in 1997, the BAe Airbus executive in charge of the FLA programme put it bluntly: 
 
“It is recognised that if we don’t do something to change this [existing US monopoly in the 
military transport business] we will be placing ourselves at the mercy of the US in the 
future, allowing them to control the market, control prices to Europe, and control 
technology.”1276 
 
A March 1997 research report presented to the EC Directorate-General (DG) for Industrial Affairs 
warned sternly of a “real [US] threat to the survival of a European defence industrial base that is 
able to provide European forces with state-of-the art equipment”.1277 
 
“Under these circumstances the big challenge for European defence industrial policy is to 
avoid a situation where there are only two policy options left: either to buy less capable but 
national or European equipment with security of supply assured but military superiority 
undermined, or to buy highly capable US equipment providing military superiority over 
potential opponents but with security of supply being dependent on US willingness and 
capability to support European forces in specific scenarios. If decision-makers want to 
avoid this choice and thus improve the prospects of a globally competitive European 
DITB1278, European arms and defence industrial cooperation has to be improved 
dramatically and quickly.”1279 
 
                                                      
1273 Bruce (1999) p. 132 
1274 Ian Gray (1999) p. 153. At the time, the US A&D industry enjoyed a near-complete monopoly in military transport 
aircraft; only minor players such as Spain’s CASA still competed in the small military transport plane segment. 
1275 Ibid., p. 154 
1276 Ibid., p. 154 
1277 (Rohde, Taylor, & Schmidt, 1997) p. 8, quoted in Moerth (2003) p. 43 
1278 DITB = Defence Industrial and Technological Base 
1279 (Rohde, Taylor, & Schmidt, 1997) pp 48-49, quoted in Moerth (2003) p. 43 
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Despite these rather dramatic industry assessments, the EU’s 1997 Amsterdam Treaty made only a 
brief reference to the issue of armaments policy, stating simply that “the progressive framing of a 
common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation 
between them in the field of armaments”.1280 At the 1999 Cologne Summit, the issue of European 
armaments cooperation figured much more prominently on the agenda: 
 
Specifically, EU members agreed to“[…] undertake sustained efforts to strengthen the 
industrial and technological defence base, which we want to be competitive and dynamic. 
We are determined to foster the restructuring of the European defence industries among 
those States involved. With industry we will therefore work towards closer and more 
efficient defence industry collaboration. We will seek further progress in the harmonisation 
of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms, as Member States 
consider appropriate.”1281 
 
In her fascinating study of the EU’s armaments policy (covering primarily the 1990s), Swedish 
analyst Ulrike Moerth notes: 
 
[The A&D industry] “has been conceptualised within two different projects of European 
integration: the political economy project [“market field”] – developed through the EC – 
and the defence and security project [“defence field”] – organised through NATO, the 
WEU, and recently through the EU.”1282 
 
In the market field, the restructuring of the European A&D industry was seen through the prism of 
having to safeguard Europe’s economic and technological competitiveness vis-à-vis America. 
During the 1990s, the EC was the first European political institution that was gripped by this 
transatlantic “technology-gap fever” and that tried to do something about it – both with regard to 
defence items as well as civilian / dual-use products and technologies.1283 In January 1996, the EC 
                                                      
1280 Article 17 (formerly J.7) of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
1281 European Council (1999) 
1282 See back cover description of Moerth (2003). 
1283 Back in the early 1980s, during the “second wave of technology-gap fever”, Europe had launched three different 
major European RTD programmes. The first two EC initiatives – dubbed ESPRIT (European Strategic Programme for 
Research and Development in Information Technology) and RACE (Research and Development in Advanced 
Communications Technologies for Europe) – were initiated by Industry Commissioner Davignon, who worked closely 
with the leaders of Europe’s twelve biggest information technology companies in defining and implementing the RTD 
programmes. The third initiative, called EUREKA (European Research Coordination Agency), was initiated outside the 
EC framework by French President Mitterrand, who saw EUREKA as a first response to Reagan’s proposed space-
based Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Ibid., pp. 62-63. Despite their differing institutional set-ups, all three RTD 
programs “responded to the same fears about the status of high technology [in Europe]”. Sandholtz (1992) p. 5 quoted 
in Moerth (2003) p. 63 
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issued a communication1284 aimed at fostering increased civil-defence synergies in the EU’s official 
RTD1285 programmes in an effort to counter America’s perceived assault on Europe’s 
competitiveness. The EC proposed to formally integrate dual-use technologies in the EC’s RTD 
programmes, a move that would have yielded direct benefits for Europe’s A&D industry. By the 
1990s, it was already evident that traditional military-to-commercial spin-off effects were 
increasingly being replaced by commercial-to-military spin-on effects. In 1996, the EC also 
declared that “It has been estimated that technology areas of potential dual-use account for as much 
as one third of the overall Community research budget.”1286 These increased inter-linkages between 
commercial and military technologies were particularly pronounced in the aerospace sector. 
However, when the EC formally presented its fifth framework RTD programme in April 1997, 
there was no explicit reference to dual-use RTD programmes. In the end, it seemed that some 
Commissioners and most EU member states were simply too afraid to open the dual-use items 
“Pandora’s Box” by “putting into question the civilian objectives of the [RTD] framework 
programme and the traditional framing of civil and defence-related issues”.1287 At the same time, 
however, the maintenance of the status quo also meant that defence companies were still able to 
participate in EU-funded RTD initiatives as long as they “compl[ied] with the civilian objectives 
and rules of the programmes”.1288 To sum things up: 
 
“The communication from January 1996 showed the Commission’s ambition to pursue a 
more comprehensive industrial policy – an action plan – that included not only Europe’s 
civilian industry, but also its defence-related industry. Although the future of the defence 
industry had been discussed earlier, the communication was the first comprehensive 
document from the Commission on the problems of the European defence industry. This was 
a rather bold initiative due to the fact that this sector has been regarded as an area of 
exclusive national prerogative. Article 296 (formerly Article 223) in the [TEU] allows 
governments to exempt defence firms from EU rules on mergers, monopolies, and 
procurement.”1289 
 
According to the EC, an excessively broad (protectionist) interpretation of Article 296 by EU 
member states had resulted in a highly fragmented European DITB. In 1996, the EC declared that 
“On an overall industry level the […] trade figures give a strong indication that the European 
                                                      
1284 The 1996 EC communication was also dubbed “Bangemann report”, named after the Commissioner for Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs, Martin Bangemann. 
1285 RTD = Research and Technology Development 
1286 1996 Bangemann report [(COM (96) 10, 20)] quoted in Moerth (2003) p. 67 
1287 Ibid., p. 68 
1288 Ibid. p. 68 
1289 Ibid., p. 69 
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defence-related industry has experienced a worsening of its competitive position vis-à-vis the US 
industry since the 1980s.”1290 Back in 1990, the EC had already tried “to bring armaments 
production and trade fully under the discipline of the common market, which would involve, inter 
alia, the removal of [Article] 223”.1291 By weakening and ultimately removing Article 296 
(formerly Article 223), the EC was hoping to create the conditions for a market-based consolidation 
process in the European A&D industry. In the end, this initiative failed because of political 
resistance from member states. 
 
During 1996-1997, the EC, led by Internal Market and Industrial Affairs Commissioner 
Bangemann, became very involved in defence industrial issues. The EC hosted a number of 
informal seminars and meetings with representatives from business, think tanks, national 
administrators, etc. to discuss how to make the European armaments industry more competitive 
(notably vis-à-vis America). In November 1997, the EC presented a two-part communication on 
“Implementing [EU] Strategy on Defence-Related Industries”. The report’s first part laid out 
proposals for a joint European armaments policy. The second part, dubbed “Draft Action Plan for 
the Defence-Related Industry”, outlined concrete short-term and long-term actions that should be 
taken to strengthen the European DITB.1292 The following action items were presented: 
 
“[I]ntra-community transfers, a European company statute, public procurement, RTD, 
standardisation, customs duties, the innovation transfer of technology and small and 
medium-sized enterprises, competition policy, exports dual-use goods and conventional 
armaments, structural funds, indirect taxation and direct taxation, principles for market 
access, benchmarking, and enlargement.”1293 
 
Furthermore, a streamlined, fully integrated European DITB would also require the creation of a 
joint European Armaments Agency in charge of coordinating defence cooperation and RTD 
initiatives.1294 In 1995 and 1996, the relevant European industry associations – AECMA1295 for the 
aerospace industry and EDIG1296 for the defence industry in general – were already beginning to 
present their own reform proposals. The urgency to change the status quo in Europe was clearly 
palpable at the time: 
                                                      
1290 Bangemann report [(COM (96) 10, 7)] quoted in Ibid., p. 67 
1291 (COM (90), 600 final, 5) quoted in Ibid., p. 70 
1292 Ibid., pp. 71-72; 96 
1293 Ibid., p. 96 
1294 The EDA launched by the European Council in July 2004 would subsequently take on that role, with the six-nation 
OCCAR organisation serving as a complementary entity. See Chapter 6.2 for more detailed information on both 
institutions. 
1295 AECMA = Association Européenne des Constructeurs de Matériel Aérospatial 
1296 EDIG = European Defence Industrial Group 
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“Only if the current fragmented structure of the industry is superseded by a few large 
transnational organisations which are unimpeded by individual policies based on national 
borders can the industry remain both competitive and profitable.”1297 
“Europe requires an aerospace industry to support its role in global air transport, to allow 
an autonomous foreign policy and defence position, to safeguard its access to space and to 
contribute to technologically driven growth.” […] [This means that the preferred way for 
the restructuring of the European aerospace industry “is to replace the current loose 
cooperative arrangements with transnational company structures which have truly 
European dimensions.”1298 
“The major prerequisite to establishing a European Domestic Market will be that the 
member governments harmonise their operational requirements to enable common 
procurements. Other sensitive and complicated problems [that member governments] will 
have to resolve : harmonisation of acquisition procedures, laws and regulations, standards, 
security of supply, reciprocity of market access within Europe, work share and industrial 
return, and export controls.”1299 
 
The push for a harmonised European defence export control regime was doomed to failure as it 
would have constrained the ability of major EU players like France and the UK to use foreign 
military sales as a powerful tool of their foreign and security policy. The creation of a European 
company statute (SE – “societa europea”) proved to be another thorny issue that was not resolved 
until the EU Nice Summit in December 2000, when EU leaders finally agreed to provide the kind of 
legal framework which would allow companies to merge across borders and to transfer their 
registered offices from one EU member country to another without any changes in their legal 
personalities.1300 
 
Ultimately, it proved impossible to create the necessary political conditions to allow for a market-
based A&D industrial consolidation process. That was simply never going to happen in this 
strategic sector. European governments were not willing to abandon the national sovereignty and 
prerogatives enjoyed over their respective A&D companies as enshrined in TEU Article 296. Also, 
the 14-point “draft action plan” for defence industrial restructuring presented by the EC in 
November 1997 (ranging from public procurement reform to harmonised export policies) was 
certainly ambitious to say the least. At the same time, the structural problems in Europe’s DITB 
                                                      
1297 AECMA report (AECMA 1996, 55) is quoted in Moerth (2003) p. 76 
1298 AECMA report (AECMA 1996, 23) is quoted in Ibid., p. 76 
1299 EDIG report (EDIG 1995, 3, see also 14) is quoted in Ibid., p. 76 
1300 Ibid., p. 90, Chapter 4, footnote 17 
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persisted because of “inaction” on many of these crucial issues. “[T]he general image of European 
defence and aerospace is one of fragmentation, and one in which the industry needs to be 
consolidated in order to compete with American companies.” Moerth summed up the “market field” 
activities as follows: 
 
“[T]he Commission has, together with the [A&D] industry, and through special journals 
and policy centres such as CEPS1301 created a political crisis awareness pointing to various 
economic, industrial, and technological threats from the [US].”1302 
 
It is important to point out that the EC’s attempted reinterpretation of TEU Article 296 to achieve a 
market-based consolidation and restructuring process would have required certain national security 
safeguards (Golden Shares, etc.) to protect Europe’s A&D companies against (hostile) take-over 
attempts by US mega-primes.1303 
 
In the end, however, Europe’s historic, transnational A&D industrial consolidation process during 
the late 1990 – embodied by EADS – made the really important and decisive strides outside the 
EC’s institutional framework (that is, outside of the “market field” dominant in the “First Pillar”). 
After all, the EADS deal ultimately required the political consent and support of all three 
governments involved. EADS was not the simple result of a market-based consolidation process 
that was allowed to play itself out independent of wider political considerations in the “defence 
field”. At the same time, though, the relationship between the “market field” and the “defence field” 
was certainly interdependent: 
 
“It is difficult to imagine that complex cross-border mergers between defence industries 
would have taken place if there had been no credible political development of a European 
defence policy. This being said, it is also quite clear that the industry itself created the 
pressure for political initiatives and also that the process toward a strong European defence 
industry is driven by market factors and not only by the logic within the defence field.”1304 
 
The crucial role played by actors and developments in the “defence field” and “market field” can be 
analysed from two perspectives. First, the 15 EU member states (led by France, the UK, and 
Germany) made a largely concerted EU-wide effort to strengthen the bloc’s nascent autonomous 
security and defence policy, especially after the Kosovo War (“Spirit of Cologne”). Second, the 
                                                      
1301 CEPS = Centre for European Policy Studies 
1302 Moerth (2003) p. 146 
1303 Ibid., p. 83 
1304 Ibid., p. 74 
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EU’s leading A&D nations, including France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Spain, and Sweden, took 
steps outside of the EU institutional framework to streamline Europe’s DITB.1305 
 
On 9 December 1997, the leaders of France, Germany, and the UK signed off on a Joint Statement 
declaring that their countries “share a vital political and economic interest in an efficient and 
globally competitive European A&D electronics industry.”1306 In particular, they recognized the 
“urgent need to restructure the A&D electronics industries”, which “should embrace civil and 
military activities […] and should lead to European integration based on balanced partnership”. 
Finally, Paris, Berlin, and London requested that their respective A&D companies “present a clear 
plan and detailed timetable for this restructuring and integration by 31 March 1998”.1307 At the 
time, the political “grand vision” was still to create one fully integrated European Aerospace and 
Defence Company (EADC)1308. While DASA, BAe, Aérospatiale, and CASA were able to present a 
report on the founding principles of a future EADC by the 31 March 1998 deadline, the document 
did not contain the requested “clear plan and detailed timetable” for European defence 
restructuring. Ultimately, the industry-government talks “never reached the stage of real 
negotiations. They were essentially an exchange of ideas and a general discussion of possible 
avenues to explore”1309. Besides, there were concerns that the planned restructuring into EADC 
would have violated EU competition laws.1310 With BAe’s take-over of GEC-Marconi announced in 
January 1999, the grand EADC vision was finally put to rest. 
 
In retrospect, the United States played a crucial role in shaping European political and economic 
actions in both the “defence field” and the “market field” – the very developments that would 
ultimately bring about much-needed (cross-border) A&D industrial restructuring / consolidation in 
Europe: 
 
“There are similarities between the market and defence fields in the sense that they both 
concern the notion of Europe’s need to enhance its capacity in relation to that of the [US]. 
What is presented in these two fields is the need to create a European actor and to pursue 
                                                      
1305 Just to re-emphasise, the defence industrial / procurement area had been a field “reserved” outside the EC since 
1958. 
1306 Joint Statement by the President of the Republic and the French Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Restructuring of the European Aerospace and 
Defence Electronics Industry, 9 December 1997. The Joint Statement was supported by the Heads of Government of the 
Republic of Italy and the Kingdom of Spain. 
1307 The Joint Statement also invited other European companies / countries to join the initiative and called for “swift 
progress” in establishing Airbus SCE. Ibid. 
1308 See Chapter 4.2 of this thesis for more information on the EADC discussions. 
1309 Schmitt (2000) p. 30 
1310 Moerth (2003) p. 81 
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European economic and military strategies. The Other in this identity-seeking and capacity-
building process is clearly the United States.”1311 
 
The “market field” actors like the EC as well as the relevant A&D companies and industry groups 
involved certainly viewed the US as a gathering economic-technological (civilian) threat. 
Accordingly, America’s mega-primes were perceived as fierce and threatening competitors, but not 
as mortal (military) enemies (even though one could easily get war-like impressions when 
following the high-stakes zero-sum dogfight between Boeing and Airbus). The ultimate goal of 
Europe’s major A&D groups was to acquire the necessary critical mass through (trans)national 
consolidation to allow them to compete with the US giants on an equal footing. In fact, to gain 
better access to the lucrative American defence market, European CEOs were quite willing and 
interested in potentially entering into full-fledged alliances / mergers-between-equals with suitable 
US partners.1312 However, for such a scenario to play out, the Europeans would first need to 
consolidate their own A&D companies, be it through the creation of national champions (like BAE) 
or transnational champions (EADS).1313 
 
The EC and the private sector played an important role in first putting the issue of A&D industrial 
competitiveness on Europe’s political agenda. That being said, the EC’s attempt to integrate this 
strategic, “high politics” sector into the EU’s supra-national “First Pillar” was doomed to failure as 
political leaders in London, Paris, Berlin, etc. strongly resisted such dramatic and revolutionary 
reforms. While “market field” actors and developments played a critical role in shaping European 
perceptions of the gathering threat posed by the US mega-primes, they alone were not sufficient in 
bringing about large-scale (trans)national A&D industrial restructuring in Europe. For that to 
happen, the relevant national governments had to be on board; and they felt much more comfortable 
dealing with these highly sensitive issues through the EU’s “Second Pillar” (see relevant ESDP 
declarations on that subject matter) or on an ad-hoc, informal, outside-of-the-official-EU-
framework “coalition of the willing”-type basis. 
 
“In comparison to how the issue of armaments has been part of the two fields – defence and 
market – the empirical evidence shows that the political breakthrough in the EU for the 
issues occurred when the EU became involved with defence issues. […] [W]hen the [EU] 
                                                      
1311 Ibid., p. 88 
1312 In the late 1990s, the American defence equipment market was far larger than the European, given the beginning 
recovery in US defence spending and continuing cutbacks in German, Italian, and other procurement budgets. This was 
part of BAE’s rationale for going “transatlantic” – the market was simply much larger there. 
1313 European governments were also opposed to EC efforts to weaken or remove Article 296 for fears that US mega-
primes could potentially acquire critical elements of Europe’s DITB, thus fostering an increased economic-
technological dependency on America. 
 
264 
governments activated the issue of armaments in the defence field, they codified a political 
and industrial process that was already under way in the market field.”1314 
“[At the same time though,] activity within the defence industries in Europe suggests that 
the increased industrial collaboration into transnational defence companies has put 
pressure on the governments to ‘act’ European instead of national. The only item on the 
political agenda seemed to be to help industry cope in a more internationalised and 
competitive environment.”1315 
 
The desire of Europe’s major A&D nations to restructure their respective national corporate players 
outside of the EU institutional framework (i.e., to stay clear of the “First Pillar” / “market field” 
controlled by the EC) also became evident when France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Spain, and 
Sweden signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) in July 1998. The goal of the non-binding LoI was “to 
establish a co-operative framework to facilitate the restructuring of European defence industry”, 
notably with regard to sensitive issues like security of supply, export provisions, security of 
information, research and technology, treatment of technical information, harmonisation of military 
requirements, and the legal framework.1316 The LoI attempted to provide rather specific guidance on 
how to handle the various industrial and national security implications connected with the potential 
future creation of a Transnational Defence Company (TDC)1317 in Europe. In what is probably the 
LoI’s most revolutionary element, the six nations even agreed to “accept mutual interdependence 
and the possibility of abandoning industrial capacity”. 
 
“[The Joint Statement] in December 1997 and the succeeding LoI have been discussed as a 
reaction toward the demands and pressure from the European defence industry, especially 
from the aerospace industry. Indeed, the LoI process started as a helping hand to the 
industry, but has evolved into a more independent and comprehensive political process. It 
also started as a political initiative to support the aerospace industry, but has gradually 
encompassed the European defence industry in general. Furthermore, although the [US] is 
hardly mentioned in the political statements, it is obvious that the Other is omnipresent and 
that the American consolidation of its defence industry was an important driving force for 
the European political process.”1318 
 
                                                      
1314 Moerth (2003) p. 86 
1315 Ibid., p. 86 
1316 LoI (1998) 
1317 The LoI defines a TDC as follows: A corporate, industrial or other legal entity within the territories of the 
Participants, formed by, or consisting of, elements of Defence Industry from two or more of the Participants national 
defence industries for the purpose of supplying Defence Articles or performing Defence Services.” Ibid., Annex B, 
Definition of Terms. 
1318 Moerth (2003) p. 109 
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In April 1998, the French, German, Italian, Spanish, and UK defence ministers had issued a Joint 
Statement confirming that “a strong, competitive and efficient defence industry is a key element of 
European security and identity as well as of the European scientific and technological base”.1319 It is 
important to reiterate that the perceived economic-technological competitive threat posed by the US 
mega-primes to the European A&D industry was primarily civilian in nature. In fact, that is how the 
EC as well as the relevant business players first defined “le nouveau défi américain” and 
subsequently helped put it on the political radar screen of European governments. And even after 
the (major) EU members did get involved at the political-military level to build “a strong Europe”, 
it was clear that they were not trying to build on the planned A&D industry restructuring to turn the 
EU into an all-out strategic rival to the US. 
 
“[Like in the market field], the theme of the importance of a strong Europe is also a major 
one in the defence field. However, the European experience in the two fields is interpreted 
differently. In the defence field the EU is striving to acquire the strategic capability worthy 
of a great power. There is no aspiration to become the equal of the [US] – for instance, in 
nuclear weapons or aircraft carriers – but to have the independent capability for robust 
military crisis management even at great distances from Europe proper.”1320 
 
At the same time, however, it was obvious that the EU and its major A&D powers recognised that 
the US economic-technological (“low politics”) threat, if left unchecked, would ultimately have 
important negative political-military / national security (“high politics”) implications, both for 
Europe’s relationship with America and its relative standing and power position vis-à-vis the rest of 
the world. In the post-Cold War era, after all, the traditional demarcation lines separating “low 
politics” from “high politics” certainly became blurred, if not somewhat reversed (especially when 
one considers the military spin-on effects deriving from civilian / dual-use technologies). Also, as 
was already discussed in the previous chapter, increased international competition and the fight 
over economic growth, technological innovation, and access to information could certainly be 
“described in realist terms – as economic warfare between leading countries in the world”.1321 This 
analytical approach is particularly relevant for the A&D industry, which sits at the intersection of 
“low politics” and “high politics”. 
 
“By combining a ‘realist’, Machiavellian, approach to international relations with the 
language of security and the economic insights of ‘strategic trade theory’, advocates of a 
                                                      
1319 LoI (1998), Annex A, Joint Statement of 20 April 1998 
1320 Moerth (2003) p. 141 
1321 Ibid., p. 160 
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more mercantilist approach have achieved some intellectual respectability and made some 
impact, in the US especially.”1322 
 
For Europe’s leading powers, it was paramount to have a capable, internationally competitive A&D 
industry; one that could withstand the expected onslaught of the American mega-primes and that 
provided the Europeans with the necessary “marge de manoeuvre” (in terms of technological 
capabilities, security of supply, etc.) to act militarily without US political backing or material 
support (also outside NATO if required). Beginning in the late 1990s, European efforts to 
collectively achieve more independence / autonomy in security and defence matters vis-à-vis 
America had intensified significantly, both within the EU and NATO. While trying to become more 
independent from the US, European countries deliberately made further moves towards creating an 
“ever closer union”. These integrative efforts at the political, economic, and military level took 
place both inside (Euro, ESDP, etc.) and outside (LoI1323, EADS, etc.) the EU’s institutional 
framework. 
 
In the case of EADS and the LoI, the companies and countries involved were willing, in principle, 
to accept the increased mutual interdependencies and the associated potential political-military 
vulnerabilities necessary to achieve the goal of an integrated European A&D base. Vis-à-vis the 
American hegemon, in contrast, the same European countries were eager to avoid the very 
dependencies and potential vulnerabilities resulting from having a small, fragmented, and 
technologically inferior A&D industry that could not compete with the US. For EADS and the LoI 
to materialise, it was necessary to have an “us. vs. them” threat perception and identity-creating 
processes in Europe. The “Other” was clearly America and its mega-primes, both at the political 
and the business level. 
 
The creation of EADS (and the LoI) took place against this “threat image”, which “is not only 
instrumental for actors in their pursuit of interests […] [but] also important in the European 
identity-building processes”.1324 In sum, the Europeans seemed more willing to trust each other than 
they were willing to trust the Americans (at least within the EADS-LoI community of nations). Of 
course, transnational A&D industrial integration in Europe was certainly facilitated by the trust and 
institutional cooperation established following several decades of collective efforts to achieve “ever 
closer union”. Furthermore, the four Airbus partners (three of which would subsequently form 
                                                      
1322 Cable (1995) p. 307 
1323 While the LoI was established outside the’s EU institutional framework, it nonetheless made reference to the EU’s 
CSFP “Code of Conduct on Arms Exports” for defence trade transactions involving non-LoI countries. See relevant LoI 
provisions on “Export Procedures”. 
1324 Moerth (2003) p. 159 
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EADS) were already cooperating through an aerospace consortium that was locked into a high-
stakes zero-sum transatlantic dogfight with Boeing: a set-up ideally suited to establishing “us. vs. 
them” identity patterns. 
 
That being said, America was not simply perceived as a unitary political-economic threat. European 
A&D companies were very eager to explore partnership / merger options with their American 
counterparts once the industry restructuring and consolidation on the Old Continent had reached a 
critical mass. One must not forget that the US restructuring process served as a model for Europe: 
the creation of a small number of big A&D players. The industrial consolidation processes on either 
side of the Atlantic clearly interacted with each other. The fact that there were several different, 
partly competing US mega-primes made it possible for European business executives to 
(theoretically) conceive entering into potential alliances with select American players (for example, 
BAE joining forces with LMC, EADS with NGC, etc.): “The case of armaments shows that the 
[US] seems to be a friend and a foe [of Europe] at the same time.”1325 
 
Interestingly, many of the factors at play – EU integration, Airbus vs. Boeing dogfight, etc. – had 
been present before without causing sovereign European countries to merge their major A&D assets 
into one company. It took a “Perfect Storm”-type scenario in the late 1990s to achieve a goal that 
had been politically impossible before. According to Terrence Guay and Robert Callum, four 
factors explain that the European A&D industry “transformed itself from a collection of medium-
sized, nationally orientated firms to one dominated by two giants, with several smaller firms closely 
linked to these leaders”1326: (1) “developments within the US defence industry; (2) the impact of 
technology and defence economics; (3) general economic restructuring within the EU, coupled with 
a nascent defence industrial policy; and (4) progress towards the creation of […] ESDP.”1327 
 
Writing specifically about the EU’s internal economic restructuring, Guay and Callum argue that “it 
is possible that the arrival of the [E]uro, and confidence in the success of a common currency, 
constitute a major reason why Europeans became more receptive to the idea of further integration in 
defence”. From that perspective, sharing a common European currency served as a crucial building 
block towards achieving the integration and shared control of the European A&D industry. It is 
important to emphasise that these four factors are not independent variables. For example, Guay 
and Callum posit that “an argument could be made that the external forces [(1) US defence 
restructuring and (2) technology / defence economics] influenced the timing of the EU-specific 
                                                      
1325 Ibid., p. 160 
1326 (Guay & Callum, 2002) p. 757 
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factors”. And indeed, the major strides in European A&D industry restructuring were made only 
after the US mega-mergers were completed. In short, America took the initiative and acted, Europe 
followed and reacted. In fact, “Given its dispersion among several countries, it was unlikely that 
Europe’s defence industry would undertake much serious reorganisation before the US sector.”1328 
For sure, the process of globalisation and the changing dynamics of defence economics (rapidly 
rising R&DP costs, etc.) affected A&D companies around the world. But as the industry and 
technology leader, America was the first to wrestle with the dramatic changes that became apparent 
after the Cold War. 
 
Regarding the EADS “merger of mergers”1329, Guay and Callum draw particular attention to the 
role played by the private sector in accounting for the fact that EADS succeeded while other 
attempts to pull-off a cross-border A&D merger failed: “The best explanation is that the exigencies 
of the new defence market had finally become impossible for industry executives to ignore.”1330 
Indeed, before the “urge to merge” became simply inescapable, A&D business leaders in Europe 
were generally opposed to cross-border mergers for fear that such large-scale restructuring could 
undermine the “cosy relationships” the different “national champions” had established with their 
country’s respective political leadership and military-industrial complex. It is also true that the rapid 
pace of US A&D industry consolidation in the 1990s – notably the BMD merger – sent European 
business executives scrambling to achieve the size and critical mass necessary to ensure their 
survival vis-à-vis the American mega-primes. In the end, Guay and Callum argue, it was the private 
sector rather than the respective national governments concerned, that took the lead in pushing for 
EADS. 
 
“The creation of EADS was not driven by national leaders who had for years been 
preaching the importance of consolidation – sermons that inevitably came to a naught over 
the political price of job losses; on the contrary, during the highly secretive discussions that 
led to EADS, the industry executives involved made a conscious and calculated decision to 
keep their respective national leaders uninformed of the plans until the negotiations had 
reached an advance stage. By such discretion, political meddling in what was essentially a 
business decision was kept to a minimum.”1331 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1327 Ibid., p. 757 
1328 Ibid., p. 769 
1329 In the context of EADS, the term “merger of merger” refers to the fact that several “national champions” agreed to 
merger their various A&D assets into one new, fully integrated transnational company. 
1330 (Guay & Callum, 2002) p. 758 
1331 Ibid., p. 761 
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The initial merger discussions between BAe and DASA were certainly private-sector driven. Both 
companies were privately held and primarily (if not exclusively) driven by business objectives; 
factors that explain their natural affinity to one another. As a result, BAe and DASA were less 
influenced by political considerations than their French counterparts, notably state-owned 
Aérospatiale before its partial privatisation and merger with the Lagardère Group’s MHT to form 
AM in June 1999. On the French side, businessman Jean-Luc Lagardère emerged as the central 
player in the EADS merger discussions with DASA.1332 On the German side, DCX CEO Juergen 
Schrempp took the lead in negotiating with the French.1333 As private-sector executives, both 
Lagardère and Schrempp were instinctively wary of political interferences by their countries’ 
respective leaders and therefore decided to keep the EADS merger discussions largely secret. In the 
end, however, top-level political backing from the participating countries’ governments, especially 
in Paris, was indispensable for the EADS negotiations to succeed: 
 
“The St. Malo and Helsinki declarations provided the political support for private sector 
reorganisation. For instance, it is unlikely that the French government would have 
acquiesced to a merger between Aérospatiale and DASA much before 1999.”1334 
 
Earlier pronouncements such as the 1998 LoI also demonstrate that key European governments 
were, in principle, increasingly willing to move beyond the traditional national security concerns 
and constraints of the past. European A&D companies, along with the EC and relevant industry 
associations, were among the first to put the competitive threat posed by America’s mega-primes on 
Europe’s wider political agenda. Like in the case of the actual EADS merger discussions, the 
private sector took the lead in formulating a (first conceptual) response to “the American 
challenge”. But in-between recognising a problem (i.e., Europe risks being left behind in an 
economically and strategically important high-technology sector) and trying to provide an adequate 
private-sector response (i.e., to engage in cross-border consolidation and restructuring to achieve 
the necessary economies of scale) must come the implicit or explicit political backing of the 
relevant European governments concerned. 
 
In stark contrast to most other “normal” industry sectors, the primary concern of national political 
leaders when evaluating the potential implications of cross-border consolidation and restructuring 
operations in the A&D business has not traditionally been about securing jobs at home. Rather, the 
primary concern has been about the potential national security implications – i.e., (in)security of 
                                                      
1332 Schmitt (2001) 
1333 Ibid. 
1334 (Guay & Callum, 2002) p. 770 
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supply, etc. – associated with being dependent or interdependent on a foreign company or 
government for hardware or technology deemed relevant for protecting the country’s military and 
geo-economic security. Making sure that jobs and, even more importantly, relevant R&DP 
capabilities remain on national territory are certainly a relevant sub-set of considerations in 
evaluating virtually any international M&A transaction, both for the corporate and the political 
players involved. However, it would be a mistake to attribute the long-time inability of Europe’s 
A&D companies to form fully integrated cross-border corporate entities merely to “concerns at 
potential job losses” among the different national governments involved. If considerations about 
maximising economic utility had really trumped national security concerns, Europe’s major A&D 
companies (that is, at least those forming the Airbus consortium) would have fully integrated their 
operations long before AIC or EADS (which initially comprised only three of the four Airbus 
players) saw the light of day. 
 
In spite of (or possibly because of) adopting a “national champions” approach, Europe’s fragmented 
A&D industry – essentially “a collection of medium-sized, nationally-orientated firms”1335 – 
punched below its international weight and stature for decades. How else could one explain 
Boeing’s exceptional civil aircraft market position immediately after the BMD merger?1336 The 
pressures to engage in full-fledged cross-border M&A transactions were somewhat softened by the 
fact that Europe’s major A&D players did cooperate internationally, both among themselves and 
with non-EU partners (primarily with the US for that matter). And to a certain extent, the 
remarkable success of Airbus seemed to suggest that the status quo was not only tenable but also 
working. At the same time, however, these international collaborative efforts were generally very 
limited in scope and duration. As a result, they were therefore also often subject to the economic 
pitfalls generated by “juste retour” policies and the uncertainties created by shifting politico-
military procurement priorities (for example, Germany’s trimming of the Eurofighter and its 
A400M military transport orders). One additional reason for companies wanting further cross-
border integration was the awareness that development costs for each major new civil / military 
aircraft were so huge that government support – by several governments – was indispensable. 
 
For the EADS project to go ahead, the respective national governments (prodded, for sure, by the 
A&D sector) first had to come to the conclusion that the anticipated negative consequences of 
inaction (i.e., maintaining the status quo and not engage in major cross-border restructuring and 
consolidation) outweighed the potential risks associated with giving up (partial) direct or indirect 
                                                      
1335 Ibid., p. 757 
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(in the case of privatised companies) national control over their major A&D assets. Europe’s major 
governments confronted the fundamental choice between seeing their “national champions” 
steamrolled by the American mega-primes and consolidating at the European level by “accept[ing] 
mutual interdependence and the possibility of abandoning industrial capacity”1337. In the end, 
Germany and France (subsequently joined by Spain) opted for transnational integration and created 
EADS. For DASA, the bilateral link-up with AM was admittedly only a second-best solution; but it 
was arguably the only merger option left after BAe’s acquisition of GEC-Marconi. 
 
Given the generally close relationship that even fully privatised A&D companies such as BAe / 
BAE maintain with their home governments, it goes without saying that the (ultimately abandoned) 
merger talks with DASA would have certainly required top-level political backing for their 
successful conclusion. There are also reports that the British government did not really like the 
BAe-Marconi deal and “would have preferred a marriage between Marconi and Thomson-CSF in 
support of the reorientation of its European defence policy, as symbolised by the Anglo-French St. 
Malo declaration […]”.1338 This episode illustrates at least the relative political independence of 
privately-owned BAe vis-à-vis the British government compared to the much more “dirigiste” ties 
connecting the French government to A&D industrial base. 
 
The willingness by European governments, expressed in their 1998 LoI, to “accept mutual 
interdependence and the possibility of abandoning industrial capacity” was of fundamental 
importance for all the corporate players involved. Knowing that they had been given the top-level 
political green light, corporate executives at DASA, AM, BAe, etc. then felt free to pursue potential 
industry restructuring options beyond the confines of the traditional “national champions” 
approach. Previously, the private sector players would not even have envisioned major EADS-style 
cross-border mergers as these would have surely been opposed on national security grounds by at 
least one of the European governments concerned. 
 
At the same time, it is also clear that the pressures of globalisation and the related growing 
internationalisation of the A&D industry in Europe and America (i.e., cross-border M&As, 
collaborative JVs1339, or the reliance on foreign-sourced / foreign-controlled parts or technologies) 
resulted in a greater marge de manoeuvre for the corporate players vis-à-vis their respective 
national governments: 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1336 “Despite a 30 percent market share, Airbus still only has 13 percent of the fleet of civil airliners flying and less than 
10 percent of the seats, making it effectively a market entrant still for decades to come.” Bruce (1999) p. 127 
1337 LoI (1998) 
1338 Schmitt (2000) p. 36 
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“What is novel about this […] movement towards greater Europeanisation of defence 
matters is undoubtedly the reversal of roles: it is no longer governments that are steering 
European cooperation on armaments but industry itself that is moving ahead of political 
constraints and adapting them, precipitating change and now acting as a driving force in 
the implementation of common defence.”1340 
 
In retrospect, Gnesotto’s sweeping statement might well be described as premature and overly 
broad.1341 To this day, the French and German governments remain the ultimate arbiters when it 
comes to making strategic EADS decisions: who are the top EADS / Airbus executives in charge 
and what’s their distribution / break-down in terms of nationalities? Where and how should EADS 
restructure its operations, close factories, cut jobs, etc.? While the German government would 
generally prefer to adopt a hands-off / laissez-faire approach vis-à-vis EADS, continuing 
interferences by the French political leadership in the company’s management have made it 
imperative for Berlin to respond in kind to safeguard Germany’s political, economic, and military 
interests. In fact, rather than acquiesce to German demands that Paris sell its remaining 15-percent 
stake in EADS, the French Senate published a report in June 2007 calling on Berlin to take a direct 
stake in EADS “to guarantee its interests in the company”.1342 So far, Germany has refused to take a 
direct stake in EADS, but has confirmed it was studying a potential “golden share” arrangement 
that would formally give Berlin special veto rights over strategic decisions (to fend off unwanted 
investors, etc.).1343 In that sense, EADS can certainly be described as a regiocentric company 
“blending strategic interests with regional integration / national sensitivity”.1344 One of the long-
term obstacles to transnational integration in the A&D sector was the underlying French 
determination to retain strategic direction from Paris, even as others merged into a European 
conglomerate. This issue is still not entirely resolved. BAe resolved it by opting out; German 
executives and policy-makers are still fighting… 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1339 JV = Joint Venture 
1340 Gnesotto (July 2000) p. v 
1341 Another analyst, writing about the defence industry’s growing internationalisation ten years earlier, came exactly to 
the opposite conclusion: “Why multinationalism? [defined as the rise of multinational corporations that ‘control the 
shape and level of R&D spending and corporate investment in more than one state’] […] In many ways [this trend] can 
be summarised as reflecting the readiness of governments to compromise political preferences for security of supply in 
order to bring to bear the economic pressures of competition and scale which they hope will bring lower, or rather more 
bearable, prices. Corporate behaviour reflects changing tolerances and policies on the part of governments.” Taylor 
(1990) pp. 66-67 
1342 (Reuters & AP, 2007) 
1343 The Daily Telegraph (2007) 
1344 Hayward (1999) p. 9 
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7.3 Britain and the US Defence Market 
 
Given the long-standing UK-US “special relationship”, senior BAe executives reasoned that they 
stood a better chance of penetrating the highly lucrative American defence market (and sealing a 
potential transatlantic merger of equals) if they stayed clear of continental European (especially 
French) entanglements and instead signed a deal in January 1999 to acquire GEC-Marconi to forge 
BAE Systems. The US$12.7 billion acquisition made BAE the biggest foreign defence contractor in 
the US.1345 1346 1347 In mid-November 1999 – even before BAE CEO Weston obtained formal 
regulatory approval to take over Marconi’s US subsidiaries – he was told by the Clinton 
administration that further acquisitions in the US would be “welcome”.1348 In private talks with 
Weston, Deputy Defense Secretary Hamre conveyed that Washington was opposed to a “Fortress 
Europe” vs. “Fortress America” approach in defence consolidation. The Pentagon’s #2 official also 
encouraged BAE to look at ways of expanding its activities in the US market.1349 Soon after 
completing the take-over of Marconi and its US subsidiaries (including Tracor) in November 1999, 
BAE made a bid to acquire Lockheed’s electronics warfare unit AES, including its crown jewel 
Sanders, the biggest US electronic warfare company. Interestingly, two of the four bidders for AES 
were either a foreign-owned company (BAE) or had a foreign partner in their consortium (EADS 
had formed a 20-80 consortium with US-based L-3 Communications).1350 
 
While Pentagon representatives were adamant that they did not pressure LMC to choose a US 
bidder over their foreign rivals, it is also clear that at least a few senior DoS and DoD officials 
leaked their concerns about the BAE and EADS bids to the press. Vago Muradian provides a 
                                                      
1345 In June 1998, GEC-Marconi’s North American subsidiary completed the US$1.4 billion acquisition of advanced US 
defence electronics company Tracor. The UK-US take-over deal received US regulatory approval (CFIUS, etc.) in less 
than two months; a remarkably short time span given the highly sensitive nature of Tracor’s sensitive Pentagon 
projects. The Pentagon’s take-over approval was granted based on the condition that GEC-Marconi establish a “proxy 
board” composed of US citizens with appropriate security clearances in charge of management operations on a day-to-
day basis. With the acquisition of Tracor, GEC-Marconi became the largest foreign-owned defence company operating 
in the US, and the fifth-largest Pentagon defence contractor overall. GEC-Marconi was rechristened Marconi 
Electronics Systems (MES) before it was spun off from GEC to merge with BAe. 
1346 At the time of their 1999 merger, BAe and MES had a combined annual US turnover of US$3 billion, making BAE 
the biggest foreign-owned defence contractor operating in America. Muradian (November 1999) 
1347 In 2006, BAE CEO Turner emphasised that his firm was pursuing a “core strategy of being the premier transatlantic 
defence and aerospace company”: “In the US we now have a business that turns over some [US]$10 billion a year, 
employing 38,000 people in 36 States. We are involved in key programmes for the [DoD], where we now rank as the 
7th largest contractor, and for the Intelligence and other federal agencies. […] Although we are headquartered in 
London, almost 50 [percent] of our shareholders are American, 26 [percent] of our revenues come from sales in the US, 
and almost 40 [percent] of our 100,000 employees are in the US.” Turner (2006). According to unnamed US 
government sources, BAE North America already employed “more than 1,500 US citizens with top security clearances 
or above” at the time of its bid for AES / Sanders. Muradian (June 2000) 
1348 Harrison (November 1999) 
1349 Ibid. 
1350 The two other AES bidders were American (NGC and private equity firm Carlyle Group). 
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fascinating insiders’ perspective on these US national security concerns and the corresponding 
underlying anti-foreign / anti-European sentiment and distrust: 
 
“‘I don’t see what’s gained in selling one of the most important capabilities we have, that 
no one else in the world can match, to an overseas buyer,’ one senior State Department 
official said […]. ‘Any way you look at it, electronic warfare is a very sensitive technology, 
and very sensitive equals very important, and very important equals must be controlled.’ 
[…] 
‘With L-3-EADS, the problem is ‘How comfortable are you with the French?’ […] [a] 
senior defence official said. ‘There are lots of people who still feel that their [French] 
security is not compatible with the [US]’, in which case would you sell a particularly 
sensitive capability to a company with a major French component before you go through a 
process of demonstration that there are adequate technology safeguards? There are people 
who say this is too early to do that.’”1351 1352 
 
Speculation that the BAE bid for AES-Sanders could be derailed was also fuelled by the April 2000 
departure of Deputy Defence Secretary Hamre, one of the Clinton administration’s most prominent 
champions of closer transatlantic A&D industrial links. In an interview I conducted with Dr. Hamre 
in May 2007, the current President and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) confirmed that he was convinced that BAE’s acquisition of Tracor and AES-Sanders posed 
no threat to US national security. In Hamre’s view, the security standards and firewalls established 
by BAE through its US subsidiary even exceeded the security measures taken by many US A&D 
companies. In the end, the BAE-AES deal received Washington’s regulatory approval in late 
November, making it the biggest transatlantic defence merger to date.1353 BAE’s unprecedented 
                                                      
1351 Muradian (June 2000) 
1352 US suspicions of the French, and their relaxed approach to third-country exports, remained much stronger than of 
the UK or even Germany. 
1353 Shortly after the BAE-Sanders take-over deal was announced, one US journalist described the following scenario to 
illustrate the potential problems and risks associated with the acquisition of a leading US defence company by a foreign 
rival: “One of the most troublesome issues in the sale of Sanders to a non-US company [BAE] is the matter of 
protecting newly acquired sensitive intelligence data, although Britain is one of our closest allies, and typically there is 
close coordination between the two nation’s intelligence agencies. For example, if the Pentagon’s Defence Intelligence 
Agency learns that Russia is developing a new antiaircraft missile designed to counter the signal radiated by the ALE-
55 towed decoy, in the past Sanders would be promptly informed so it could develop an effective countermeasure. 
Observers question whether word of a new Russian threat and a Sanders-developed countermeasure could be withheld 
from BAE’s management. The reason is that BAE, which is developing the FOTD [Fiber-Optic Towed Decoy] for the 
new Eurofighter, would need to incorporate a similar fix as quickly as possible. Further, it seems likely that the problem 
/ solution would leak to France’s Thomson-CSF which has a joint program with BAE to develop a FOTD for French 
military aircraft. A related problem is likely to arise in dealing with BAE’s foreign sales. For example, if BAE obtains 
British government approval to sell its Eurofighter FOTD to a former Soviet Bloc country, which the Pentagon opposes 
because the British FOTD employs a novel modulation similar to one devised by Sanders for the ALE-55, will BAE 
need to prove that the technique originated in its British operation?” Klass (2000). According to press reports, US 
Defense Secretary William Cohen also requested “to be kept continually briefed on the status of the transaction as it 
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take-overs of Tracor and AES / Sanders were a powerful reminder that “The British are trusted with 
technology, and are allowed to buy into the US market, in a way that the French and the Germans 
are not.”1354 1355 
 
In February 2000, following twelve months of negotiations, US Defense Secretary William Cohen 
and his British counterpart Geoffrey Hoon had signed the “US-UK Declaration of Principles for 
Defence Equipment and Industrial Cooperation”.1356 The non-binding declaration was to provide a 
road map for strengthening bilateral US-UK defence industrial cooperation, notably with regard to 
“harmonization of military requirements, assurance of supply of defence goods and services, export 
procedures, information and technology security, ownership in corporate governance, and R&D 
cooperation”.1357 According to senior Pentagon officials, the declaration reflected the fact that the 
US had become “more open-minded” about defence industrial cooperation, both with regard to the 
UK and other allies around the world.1358 The May 1997 take-over of Tracor by GEC-Marconi was 
described as “groundbreaking in the sense of the size of the deal, the complexity of the deal, and the 
sensitivity of the technology involved”.1359 The Pentagon also reiterated its opposition to fully-
fledged transatlantic mega-mergers (at the prime contractor level) and instead argued in favour of 
more joint US-European projects (teaming arrangements, joint ventures of varying size and 
complexity) as viable alternatives. The Pentagon’s opposition to such mega-mergers was “not […] 
a matter of philosophy, but […] a matter of practicality”.1360 
 
During my interview with Dr. Hamre, he pointed out that the BAe-Marconi merger had made it 
virtually impossible to achieve a full-blown US-UK mega merger in the future (i.e., NGC-BAE). 
LMC and Boeing (or whatever firms were left out) would have strongly lobbied against any US-UK 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
moves through the regulatory process. Sources have said that Cohen’s request is unprecedented, but necessary given the 
importance of AES to US national security.” Muradian (September 2000) 
1354 (Guay & Callum, 2002) p. 761 
1355 Washington and London maintain a bilateral “Defence Priorities and Allocations System” (DPAS) allowing the two 
governments to “seek urgently needed (often classified) equipment through firms that have signed up to special 
streamlined order-processing procedures”. UK House of Commons (2003) paragraph 44. “Since 1990, the UK has 
received such US assistance under these provisions on 170 occasions (including on eight for the recent Iraq War), while 
the UK has assisted the US four times. Ibid. (footnote no. 115) 
1356 (US DoD & UK MoD, 2000) 
1357 DoD (2000) p. 2 
1358 At the time, the Pentagon was involved in similar talks with France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Australia. 
Furthermore, the US confirmed that Sweden would eventually also be included in that group. See Ibid., p. 6. James 
Bodner, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, expressed the Pentagon’s rationale behind the new 
“open-mindedness” towards international defence industrial cooperation as follows: “[E]nsuring [US] national security 
requires that we do both – we have to have effective export controls and technology security, and we also have to have 
effective mechanisms for international cooperation in defence products and services. We need to prevent technology 
from going where we do not want it to go, and at the same time we have to facilitate the technology transfers to and 
from those with whom we expect to conduct military operations in the future.” Ibid., p. 1 
1359 Ibid., p. 5 
1360 Ibid., p. 8 
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merger deal involving BAE Systems by arguing that it put the other US players at a distinct 
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the newly created transatlantic defence giant. In other words, if 
it had not been for the creation of BAE Systems, BAe and GEC-Marconi individually would have 
been prime candidates for potentially two separate US-UK equity mergers involving at least two 
different American partners. “The Brits have themselves and the BAe-Marconi deal to blame for the 
fact that there were no transatlantic mega-mergers.”1361 
 
Despite the long-standing “special relationship” between Washington and London, the DoD 
representatives acknowledged that there still remained major political and institutional barriers 
preventing closer US-UK (let alone transatlantic / international) defence industrial cooperation; 
chief among them complex, cumbersome US export licensing procedures.1362 According to its 
Pentagon backers at the same time, the Declaration of Principles laid forth “a road map that we 
intend to walk down, leading potentially to other agreements that would be legally binding, that 
would in fact change systems and processes”.1363 In the end, however, British hopes that this 
document would herald a major shift in American strategic thinking and significantly facilitate 
closer US-UK defence industrial cooperation would be dashed. 
 
Most disappointingly, there was only very little progress regarding the easing of US export 
restrictions. Washington did not grant Britain the much-coveted ITAR waiver status, an important 
step that would have made it much easier for companies active in both countries to transfer 
unclassified defence goods and technologies across the Atlantic without first going through the 
regular export licensing processes. According to BAE Chairman Sir Richard Evans, “the principal 
[ITAR waiver] benefit would be a much greater degree of interchange between individuals engaged 
in our companies on joint programmes […].”1364 While the US-UK negotiations were delayed by 
the change of administrations in Washington as well as the 9/11 attacks, both sides had largely 
reached an agreement on the ITAR waiver by 2002.1365 However, the deal was defeated in the 
House of Representatives, where Henry Hyde (R-IL), Chairman of the International Relations 
Committee, refused to pass the agreement – above all for reasons related to US national security / 
“leakage” of US technology to third parties.1366 
                                                      
1361 Hamre (2007) 
1362 “In preparing to have these discussions with the [UK], [the Pentagon] […] surveyed some US concerns and asked 
for their views as to what the impediments, were. And the largest single impediment that was identified by everyone 
was the export license process, […] an area that we are paying particular attention to.” DoD (2000) p. 3 
1363 Ibid. 
1364 UK House of Commons (2003) paragraph 47 
1365 Ibid., paragraph 49 
1366 Ibid., paragraph 49. House Armed Services Committee chairman Duncan Hunter (R-CA) was another prominent 
opponent of the UK ITAR waiver. 
 
277 
 
To this day, America has failed to grant ITAR waiver status to Britain, and the matter has become a 
source of growing disappointment and frustration on the other side of the Atlantic. As Pierre Chao 
and Robin Niblett warned in May 2006: 
 
“In the last few years, […] one long-standing irritant is growing into a major tension and 
now threatens the closeness of the bilateral [US-UK] relationship. The issue revolves 
around the limits and restrictions that [America] imposes upon UK access to US defence 
technologies, and the inability or unwillingness of successive US administrations to change 
the situation measurably despite their stated intention to do so.”1367 
 
The core of the problem is that the UK, while being America’s closest security ally, is also viewed 
by policymakers in Washington “through the lens of its potential – like any other country – to be a 
gateway for sensitive US technologies to third countries or actors”.1368 For the United States, 
“maintaining technological superiority over all potential adversaries is a central national 
priority”.1369 While American restrictions on UK (and transatlantic / international) technology 
transfers are primarily driven by US national security concerns, Chao and Niblett also identify 
related commercial / mercantilist motivations. 
 
“Some US officials as well as corporate executives are not always disposed to give to their 
UK partners intellectual property and technologies that have been developed with 
substantial amounts of US taxpayer dollars while the UK is unable to make equal 
investments to achieve similar advances – especially when such transfers could enhance the 
competitiveness of UK defence firms vis-à-vis their US counterparts in the UK, European, 
and global defence markets.1370 
 
Chao and Niblett warn that restrictions on US defence exports and technology sharing, if left 
unaddressed, could have potentially serious negative political, military, and economic repercussions 
for both countries. From the British perspective, the existing impediments to closer US-UK defence 
industrial cooperation interfere with London’s stated objective of achieving “operational 
sovereignty” over its key weapons systems. To that end, the UK wants to be in a position to 
independently “maintain, operate, upgrade, and modernize its key weapons platforms purchased 
from the [US] or other third parties”.1371 1372 Of course, British firms already enjoy much better 
                                                      
1367 (Chao & Niblett, 2006) p. 9 
1368 Ibid., p. 25 
1369 Ibid., p. 6 
1370 Ibid., p. 26 
1371 Ibid., p. 4 
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(i.e., more lucrative) access to American technologies and the US defence market than any of their 
European competitors.1373 That preferential access, however, comes with certain trade-offs and with 
a certain price. BAE, for example, is compelled to create “two-pillar structures that undermine the 
logic of having Anglo-American defence firms and limit the hoped-for synergies”.1374 
 
“If the issue of information and technology exchange is not ultimately resolved, shareholder 
pressure and management frustration will force an unwinding of these transatlantic 
industrial relationships, to the detriment of both the [US] and UK.”1375 
“[I]f the [US] and the UK, the two closest of allies, are unable to overcome the continuing 
obstacles to the efficient sharing of defence-related technologies, what hope is there for 
broader transatlantic defence industrial and technological cooperation?”1376 1377 
 
As one US analyst summed up Europe’s difficulties to enter the American defence market: 
 
“For European arms producers, then, entrance into the US military market for sales and 
collaborative programs is critical for both the economic viability of their defence industries 
and the technological sophistication of their armed forces. However, it entails a Hobson’s 
choice: accepting US technology-transfer constraints. Unwilling to lose control over the 
destination and use of its exported technologies, services, and technical data, the [US] 
requires that even close allies agree to retransfer / end-user restrictions and conform to key 
US export controls. From the perspective of other governments, the cost of entry to the US 
market is increased dependence for them and greater political leverage for the [US].”1378 
1379 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1372 “The central British concern was their desire for operational sovereignty. The UK did not seek, or need, to produce 
or own [IP] for every part of the JSF. But the UK asserted the need to make deliberate and independent decisions on a 
capability – especially in an operational context. In their view, the UK forces must be able to operate independently and 
without continually seeking permission – or worse, struggling to get permission – for the latest software updates, threat 
information, etc. The UK has its own operational approach and seeks to act autonomously in operations, even when 
operating systems they acquire from or develop with the [US].” Bialos (2009) vol. II, p. 573 
1373 (Guay & Callum, 2002) p. 761 
1374 (Chao & Niblett, 2006) p. 5 
1375 Ibid., p. 5 
1376 Ibid., p. 3 
1377 “[T]echnology licensing on the JSF remains a sore spot to this day and highlights an underlying reality of the long-
standing US policy of keeping defence strategy and armament cooperation largely divorced from technology transfer 
policy. JSF is only the latest of a series of cooperative programmes on which the [US] and its allies have faced 
intractable technology issues.” Bialos (2009) vol. II, p. 573. 
1378 Neuman (2006) p. 439 
1379 There are also long-standing European suspicions that US end-user controls were sometimes misused (and had been 
misused) to disadvantage European companies when competing for exports with US firms. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This thesis uses the theory of realism to demonstrate that transatlantic rivalries over the political, 
military, economic, and technological power and prestige derived from the A&D industry exist 
even among close Western NATO allies. The specific findings of this thesis can be summarised as 
follows: the US – which became the world’s sole superpower after the end of the Cold War – 
adopted an ethnocentric approach to US A&D industry consolidation in an effort to better defend its 
hegemonic position in the international system vis-à-vis potential challengers, both in Europe and 
beyond. Realist / neo-mercantilist concerns about the potential national security / economic risks 
associated with foreign dependence, unauthorised technology transfers / proliferation, as well as the 
implications of foreign ownership, control, and influence vis-à-vis the US domestic A&D industrial 
base clearly shaped the choices and preferences of policymakers in Washington, DC, particularly on 
Capitol Hill. 
 
The US government and especially Congress feared that large-scale, full-fledged transatlantic A&D 
mergers could seriously undermine America’s military-technological lead by facilitating potential 
leakages of sensitive military / dual-use technologies to European NATO partners as well as third 
countries around the world. Commercial aerospace companies also provide significant economic 
benefits (including export earnings, jobs, and technology clusters) for their respective home 
countries, thus providing powerful neo-mercantilist incentives for national governments to prevent 
these firms them from falling into the hands of foreign competitors. In America, aerospace 
companies have been the most important industrial contributor to US merchandise exports since the 
1950s. In 2008, for example, that leading US export sector alone had a positive external trade 
balance of more than US$62 billion while the country as a whole ran a gaping trade deficit (-
US$816 billion). To ensure that the defence / military as well as the economic-technological 
benefits of that key strategic industry sector continued to benefit primarily the United States, 
policymakers in Washington decided to foster the creation of US mega-primes under American 
control and majority-ownership. After all, if US companies had been allowed to merge with their 
European counterparts, the US government would have enjoyed far less influence and leverage over 
these new transatlantic mega-primes than is otherwise the case under the constraints of an 
ethnocentric consolidation of the American A&D industry. 
 
This ethnocentric approach to A&D industry consolidation is fully in line with the key tenets of 
realism, which would predict, in essence, that sovereign, independent states will try to prevent 
strategic companies / industries of critical importance to their national security and survival from 
coming under full or even partial foreign control. During the 1990s, relations between Washington 
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and many of its European allies were strained over a number of different issues, ranging from the 
Kyoto Protocol to the ICC as well as the EU’s attempt to establish a common security and defence 
policy to act independently of the US and NATO if necessary. Since America and Europe were no 
longer united by a common Soviet threat and found themselves increasingly at odds over the 
fundamental principles governing the exercise of power in the international arena (unilateralism vs. 
multilateralism, etc.), it is not surprising that Washington was not eager to provide the Europeans 
and their A&D players with the substantial relative gains (in terms of access to US state-of-the-art 
technologies, etc.) that full-fledged transatlantic mergers of equals would have entailed. 
Washington also feared the potential proliferation of sensitive US technologies from Europe to third 
countries and that such transfers could result in countermeasures that would jeopardise the 
survivability of US systems. France’s relatively liberal export control policies were deemed to be of 
particular concern. 
 
According to realism, international cooperation is constrained by sovereign states’ fears that such a 
strategy could (1) cause a relative shift in the existing international balance of power configuration 
(i.e., by allowing one of the partners to derive a disproportionately greater benefit from cooperation 
than the other) and (2) create new national security vulnerabilities due to the increased dependency 
on other countries associated with heightened cross-border cooperation. In the US case, realist-type 
considerations were certainly driving the ethnocentric approach to A&D industry consolidation 
adopted by Washington in the 1990s. In realist terms, the potentially uncontrolled diffusion of 
proprietary, cutting-edge US technologies in the strategically important A&D sector – be they for 
military, civilian, or dual-use purposes – to European countries and beyond certainly risked causing 
a corresponding (relative) loss of American power and influence vis-à-vis the rest of the world. In 
fact, after it had emerged as the world’s sole superpower during the early 1990s, the American 
hegemon stood even less to gain and even more to lose from international / transatlantic A&D 
industrial cooperation than during the Cold War – a time when transatlantic A&D trade (the success 
of Airbus notwithstanding) was essentially a “one-way street” from America to Europe. In 
November 2002, Burkard Schmitt provided a succinct summary of the various factors hampering 
closer transatlantic A&D industrial cooperation: 
 
“In the US, both the political leadership and the armed forces are extremely reluctant to 
rely to any extent on foreign suppliers. On the other hand, in Europe there is widespread 
anxiety in many arms-producing countries about the possibility of US market hegemony. 
Both attitudes make it very hard to create a positive political climate for transatlantic 
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armaments cooperation. Even more important, transatlantic cooperation is hindered by a 
fundamental imbalance of power between the US and Europe: […] 
The US has such enormous financial resources, defence-industrial assets and military 
capabilities that they simply do not need armaments cooperation or arms imports. From the 
US perspective, the potential benefit of transatlantic cooperation is, at best, the cohesion of 
the Alliance. This argument, however, is hardly sufficient to overcome bureaucratic and 
political resistance. […] 
Last but not least, the US pursues an explicit and coherent strategy for defence-related 
industries, aimed at technological superiority in all relevant sectors.”1380 
 
The Clinton administration’s call for major A&D industrial consolidation at the 1993 “Last Supper” 
was primarily driven by the projected drastic post-Cold War cuts in Pentagon procurement, R&DP, 
etc. during the 1990s. Washington stressed that it wanted the various US prime contractors to 
consolidate quickly to reduce overcapacities and drive down costs in order to allow the Pentagon to 
get “more bang for the buck”. It appears that the DoD planners were trying to seize on the unique 
strategic opportunities afforded by America’s “unipolar moment”. For the American hegemon it 
was important to use its massive (military) procurement and R&DP dollars wisely to preserve its 
dominant position in the A&D industry well into the 21st century. In retrospect, one can of course 
argue that the unprecedented consolidation process in the American A&D sector was bound to 
occur anyway and would have happened even without US government intervention: 
 
“Today, the industry is stronger than it would have been absent consolidation, albeit not 
without major challenges remaining. Not only has the government benefited greatly, so did 
the shareholders. Sadly, the burden was borne by that large number of very loyal, able 
employees who paid the price of the restructuring as the industry downsized and their jobs 
vanished. […] Perhaps the greatest irony is that it was inevitable that much of this 
restructuring would occur sooner or later, anyway.”1381 
 
The sequencing of events on both sides of the Atlantic clearly indicates that large-scale A&D 
industry consolidation was driven by the US, with the Europeans lagging behind and essentially 
confined to a largely reactive role. The unique status of the US A&D industry as the strategic 
industry sector par excellence – one that remains largely closed off even to America’s NATO allies, 
including Britain – is powerfully illustrated by the fact that major transatlantic M&A deals took 
place in many non-strategic business sectors during the 1990s. European companies moved to 
                                                      
1380 Schmitt (2002) 
1381 Augustine (2006) 
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acquire or merge with major US companies – including Chrysler, BankersTrust, and VoiceStream – 
and were ultimately able to overcome all obstacles (political, regulatory, or otherwise) to 
successfully conclude their M&As. In other words, the A&D business is arguably the one major 
industry sector where large-scale, full-fledged transatlantic M&A merger of equals involving US 
prime contractors and their European counterparts have never even been attempted because they 
would have most certainly been blocked by either the US government or lawmakers on Capitol Hill. 
In that sense, the US A&D industry – despite the undeniable pressures of globalization embodied 
by increasing internationalisation and cross-border collaboration that have become even more 
apparent in recent years – remains to this day a unique, strategic industry sector with enormous 
relevance for American national security and military-technological leadership in the world. 
 
The closest that the Clinton administration – or any US administration for that matter – came to 
supporting a full-fledged transatlantic A&D merger was when the Pentagon’s senior leadership 
(primarily Deputy Defense Secretary Hamre) contemplated a potential NGC-BAe link-up as an 
alternative to the blocked NGC-LMC merger. In the end, however, this really bold idea never 
materialised. In my interview with Hamre, he emphasised repeatedly that the Pentagon, in principle, 
had been “open” and “receptive” to such a transatlantic deal. In the end, according to Hamre, the 
surprise BAe-GEC-Marconi merger announced in January 1999 spelled the end of the envisioned 
NGC-BAe tie-up. Once BAE Systems had been formed, a full-fledged transatlantic merger with 
NGC was no longer feasible, since rival US companies (primarily Boeing and LMC) would have 
strongly lobbied against the creation of such a powerful competitor. 
 
In Dr. Hamre’s view, a NGC-BAe merger (potentially followed by other US-UK / transatlantic 
A&D deals) would have been the most effective step to prevent the potential emergence of a 
protectionist and antagonist “Fortress America” vs. “Fortress Europe” scenario. It is doubtful, 
however, whether even the strong backing by a handful of senior Pentagon officials would have 
been enough to overcome the deep-seated hostility and scepticism within Congress (and the State 
Department) vis-à-vis full-fledged A&D mergers with European companies, even one with such an 
excellent security track record such as BAe. But even if the envisioned NGC / BAe deal had come 
to fruition, it would most likely have done little, if anything, to pave the way for a full-fledged 
merger between other American mega-primes and their Continental European counterparts. US 
realist / neo-mercantilist concerns about the potential national security risks associated with A&D 
industrial cooperation with mainland Europe were even much greater than those related to working 
with UK companies. 
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In Europe, the transnational EADS merger can also be explained and interpreted by a 
predominantly realist analytical framework. By pooling their major A&D assets into one company, 
France, Germany, and Spain were trying to foster the creation of an economically and 
technologically competitive European champion that would be able to survive the onslaught of the 
emerging American mega-primes. It is important to differentiate between the interests and 
motivations of European corporate leaders and their political counterparts. For the key French and 
German private sector A&D executives driving the EADS deal (the Lagardère Group’s Jean-Luc 
Lagardère and DaimlerChrysler’s Juergen Schrempp), the merger was above all about improving 
their relative international competitiveness by gaining the critical mass necessary to realise 
economies of scale that could only be reached by going beyond the confines of the respective 
French or German “national champions”. Their primary motivations were business-driven, focused 
on maximising corporate profits and shareholder value. 
 
Lagardère and Schrempp each wanted to join forces and “balance” against the US mega-primes to 
avoid being permanently relegated to the status of much smaller, technologically inferior A&D 
subcontractors for the Americans. This kind of “technology-gap fever” was essentially the primary 
motivation behind earlier catch-up efforts led by the EC and the relevant industry associations, 
which put the issue of Europe’s threatened competitiveness (again) on political radar screens in the 
mid-1990s. According to neo-realism, international tensions, rivalries, and conflicts among 
sovereign states are not merely played out in the “high politics” arena of traditional military 
security. Neo-realism adopts a much broader analytical approach to inter-state competition for 
power, influence, and security. In particular, it recognises that the “low politics” of economics and 
technology are important shapers of state motivations and capabilities in the anarchic international 
system. From a realist / neo-mercantilist perspective, a country’s A&D industry is arguably a 
unique strategic sector, sitting right at the intersection of national security (“high-politics”) and 
business / economics / technology (“low politics”). In recent decades, the industry’s strategic 
position has been further strengthened by the growing importance of dual-use technologies relevant 
for military security as well as economic power and international competitiveness, with the two 
latter factors being key sources of national power and greatness in a globalised world economy. 
 
Neither the French nor the German business leaders involved in the creation of EADS had any 
interest in seeing this transnational merger foster the emergence of a “Fortress America” vs. 
“Fortress Europe” confrontation. Escalating protectionism on both sides of the Atlantic would have 
severely hurt EADS’s bottom line. A&D industry leaders in Germany and even France (let alone 
the UK) shared a strong desire to gain access to the lucrative American defence procurement 
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market. From the private sector’s perspective, the Franco-German EADS merger must therefore be 
seen as a potential stepping stone towards achieving more, closer, and above all more balanced 
transatlantic A&D industrial cooperation with America and its mega-primes. For Europe’s business 
executives, the much-hoped-for benefits of closer collaboration with America (including potential 
transatlantic mergers of equals) were access to the lucrative US defence market and its state-of-the-
art technologies. The business leaders driving the EADS deal forward were not mere puppets or 
agents of their respective national governments. For the executives involved, joining forces to 
create EADS and to collectively gain the critical mass necessary to compete with the American 
mega-primes was a matter of survival. Taken individually, the French, German, and Spanish A&D 
“national champions” were much smaller than Boeing, LMC or NGC. Even if Washington had 
authorised full-fledged transatlantic mergers, these link-ups could never have been balanced merger 
of equals because of significant size differences between the respective European and US firms. In 
this situation, combining several of the European “national champions” to create EADS seemed to 
the best – if only – way forward. 
 
To put the EADS merger into its proper European and transatlantic context, one must also analyse 
the interests and motivations of the political actors involved. Paris and Berlin (as well as Madrid) 
had to approve this unprecedented full-fledged transnational link-up in a strategic sector of such 
vital importance for their countries’ respective national security. Several factors both external and 
internal to the EU spurred the bloc’s two leading powers – the Franco-German engine – to venture 
into a political, strategic, and military territory (i.e., the EADS merger) where neither one of them, 
nor any other countries in the world, had gone before. It is important to differentiate between 
external and internal political factors pertinent to the creation of EADS. Externally, the end of the 
Cold War had drastically reduced Europe’s strategic dependence on the US. During the 1990s, with 
the Soviet threat gone and America emerging as the world’s sole superpower, one could witness an 
increase in transatlantic tensions over a number of issues, ranging from the ICC and the Kyoto 
Protocol to the French-led attempt to build an EU security and defence capability autonomous of 
NATO. The ESDP effort, in particular, raised American suspicions that Europe was trying to 
position itself as a counterweight and political-strategic competitor to Washington. In trade and 
business, after all, US and European companies were already competing head-on in a vast range of 
sectors, including, very importantly, the A&D industry (Airbus vs. Boeing, etc.). 
 
Beginning in the 1990s, French-led ESDP ambitions and fundamental transatlantic differences over 
the rules and constraints imposed by international law and multilateral organisations put the Old 
Continent at odds with the American superpower. At the external level, it was therefore relatively 
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easy for key EU members like France and Germany to come to think of America as “the other” – 
that is, the crucial if not indispensable element in any collective identity-building process. 
Transatlantic political differences with Washington, coupled with the preponderance of US power 
in the international system, naturally called for selective European counterbalancing against the 
American hegemon. Here again, realism provides the most appropriate analytical framework to 
explain (Continental) European anti-hegemonic counter-balancing actions vis-à-vis the US 
superpower during the 1990s. For sure, neither Paris nor Berlin had the ambition or capacity to turn 
the EU into an all-out strategic / military competitor to the US. Even extremely far-reaching neo-
Gaullist aspirations notwithstanding, such an ambitious full-fledged counterbalancing project would 
have been certainly doomed to fail. However, the unwillingness and inability by Paris and Berlin to 
transform the EU into an all-out strategic / military competitor rivalling the US did not mean that 
the two countries were not able to get their act together when core national security and economic 
interests – i.e., the need to maintain capable, technologically advanced and internationally 
competitive A&D companies (including their respective national champions as well as Airbus) on 
their territory – were threatened by the American mega-primes. From the perspective of Europe in 
general, and of that of France and Germany in particular, the rapid ethnocentric consolidation of the 
US A&D industry (especially in the context of the BMD merger) seemed to be part of America’s 
ambition to preserve its post-Cold War superpower status and prevent the rise of any potential peer 
competitors (including its European NATO allies). 
 
The perceived competitive threat posed by the BMD merger was compounded by the fact that any 
weakening of Europe’s (relative) economic and technological position in the international A&D 
industry was bound to have a corresponding negative impact on its ability to act collectively as an 
independent security and defence policy player (that is, outside of NATO if necessary). For 
example, the Kosovo War in the spring of 1999 served as a powerful reminder of Europe’s dramatic 
military and technological deficits compared to the US and subsequently made the strengthening of 
the Continent’s A&D industrial capabilities an important priority for policymakers in Paris, Berlin, 
London, and beyond. In this context, it is noteworthy how the governments of the major EU arms-
producing countries (LoI members France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, and later Sweden) 
repeatedly emphasised the crucial role played by the A&D industry in terms of providing the 
underlying basis for the power-projection capabilities necessary to conduct EU-led security and 
defence operations abroad. In the context of the RMA debate during the 1990s, airpower was seen 
as an indispensable element of network-centric warfare in the future. In April 1998 the defence 
ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK issued a Joint Statement confirming that “a 
strong, competitive and efficient defence industry is a key element of European security and 
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identity as well as of the European scientific and technological base”.1382 In their July 1998 LoI, all 
six European countries even agreed to “accept mutual interdependence and the possibility of 
abandoning industrial capacity”. The American hegemon, in contrast, would never have signed off 
on such a sweeping statement; for Washington it was of paramount importance to maintain 
unmatched technological superiority in all relevant sectors with a maximum degree of industrial 
independence and autonomy – even vis-à-vis close Western allies. In the A&D industry, “high 
politics” and “low politics” are inextricably intertwined. 
 
On the internal European level, the creation of EADS also reflected the fact that during the 1990s, 
key EU members like France and Germany had made great strides in terms of advancing Europe’s 
economic and political integration. For example, the founding members of the Eurozone – which, 
interestingly, included the two EADS partners France and Germany, but not the UK – decided to 
create a common European currency; an unprecedented step that required the pooling of national 
sovereignties and the corresponding acceptance of major political, economic, and financial 
interdependencies. In fact, even the launch of the Euro can at least partly be interpreted from a 
realist perspective, namely as a Franco-German-led attempt to provide the necessary macro-
economic and financial framework to improve the EU’s competitiveness compared to other major 
regional blocs in the world – notably the US. 
 
The great political importance attached by Paris and Berlin to the creation of EADS was also 
illustrated by the fact that French Prime Minister Jospin and German Chancellor Schroeder 
participated in the signing of the EADS founding agreements in Strasbourg – a city symbolic of 
Franco-German reconciliation and European integration – in October 1999. In early December 
1999, Spanish Prime Minister Aznar was again joined by his Franco-German counterparts on the 
occasion of CASA’s entering EADS. The fact that top government leaders from France, Germany, 
and Spain were present at the creation of EADS underscores the important political dimension of 
this unprecedented transnational A&D merger. EADS was not a “normal” cross-border M&A 
transaction in Europe. For sure, one could argue that the direct EADS shareholdings of the French 
and Spanish governments were the reason why Prime Ministers Jospin and Aznar participated at the 
signing ceremony for the new company. However, when French and Dutch flag carriers Air France 
and KLM announced their merger in 2004, neither the French nor the Dutch prime ministers were 
present.1383 
 
                                                      
1382 Annex A, Joint Statement of 20 April, LoI 
1383 As a result of this merger, the French government’s stake in Air France dropped from 54.4 to 44 percent. 
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Finally, realism can also account for BAe’s decision to pull out of the merger negotiations with 
DASA and to join forces with GEC-Marconi instead. According to realist theory, there are two 
basic strategies to deal with a hegemonic power in the international system. The first approach is to 
try to balance against the hegemon, namely by forging countervailing alliances with like-minded 
states in the international arena; the second strategy is to bandwagon with the hegemon, that is, to 
support the hegemonic power in an attempt to safeguard one’s own survival or to share in the 
hegemon’s spoils of conquest. From BAe’s perspective, agreeing to a full-fledged merger with the 
German and French “national champions” would have been tantamount to attempting to balance 
against the American hegemon. In particular, the eventual participation of France in a British-
German UK-DASA tie-up would have risked raising serious suspicions in Washington about the 
trustworthiness and ultimate political orientation of the UK’s biggest A&D company. GEC-
Marconi’s Tracor acquisition had demonstrated that UK firms were granted unprecedented access 
to America’s defence industrial base because of the UK-US “special relationship”. A full-fledged 
BAe merger with one of its Continental European counterparts would have dealt a serious blow to 
the company’s efforts to expand into the American A&D market. It is interesting to note that Tony 
Blair’s pro-EU government preferred that BAe join forces with the German and French “national 
champions” rather than merge with GEC-Marconi. Ultimately, however, the BAe leadership – 
without being over-ridden by government direction – decided otherwise and opted for the creation 
of a UK “hypernational champion” instead. Clearly, the Blair government was not following the 
dictates of realist theory. 
 
In realist terms, BAe’s decision is tantamount to bandwagoning with the US hegemon. For BAe, the 
hoped-for benefits of staying on good terms with the Americans – i.e., improved access to the vast 
US defence procurement market, etc. – outweighed the anticipated benefits derived from a potential 
pan-European German-Franco-UK A&D tie-up. Rather than joining an emerging European alliance 
to balance against the American hegemon, BAe’s leadership reasoned that it was better off if it 
stayed clear of Continental “entanglements” and pursued a decidedly US-focused corporate strategy 
instead. After all, it was the American superpower – and not European countries like France or 
Germany – that would have the necessary resources to award lucrative procurement deals worth 
hundreds of billions of dollars in the future. BAE System’s subsequent decision to sell its 20 
percent stake in Airbus is further evidence of the company’s major strategic reorientation and focus 
on the US market. Given BAE’s successful transformation into one of the top US defence 
contractors, a 20-percent stake in Airbus – a company widely criticised in America for its alleged 
improper reliance on European government subsidies – could have created perceived conflict of 
interest issues and / or raised potential doubts about the national security trustworthiness of the 
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British firm. By selling its 20-percent stake in Airbus, BAE left no doubt about the fundamental 
priorities driving its corporate strategy: America first, Europe second. The EADS merger, in 
contrast, was driven by a different logic: Europe first, America potentially second (in terms of a 
transatlantic merger-of-equals with a US mega-prime). 
 
By analysing the different consolidation processes in the American and European A&D industries 
during the 1990s, this thesis provides new, relevant insights into the potential for international 
competition and cooperation, both among states and companies. States compete with each other for 
power, wealth, status, prestige, etc. in the international system (“high politics”). Companies 
compete with each other for profits, markets, innovative technologies, etc. in the globalised 
economy (“low politics”). A&D companies are unique in the sense that they sit at the intersection of 
both political worlds. The A&D industry’s relative performance and technological sophistication 
has a direct impact on the national security and economic competitiveness of its respective home 
countries. 
 
This thesis also examined the question as to which actors – national governments or private-sector 
companies – were the driving forces behind the A&D industrial consolidation processes in America 
and Europe. In the US, it was the government, led by the Pentagon, which took the lead in 
convening the 1993 “Last Supper” and convincing the assembled business leaders that they had no 
choice but to “consolidate or die”. Washington facilitated the consolidation processes by relaxing 
anti-trust restrictions and absorbing some of the M&A related adjustment costs. In America, the 
government played a crucial role in initiating the consolidation process; afterwards, however, it was 
up to the privately owned A&D companies to work out the details: who merges with whom? Who 
sheds which business areas, etc.? While the US government did little to micromanage the actual 
consolidation process during the 1990s, the Pentagon stepped in again after a new leadership there 
felt that the “urge to merge” had gone too far and that it was time to rein in the private sector to 
maintain a certain minimum level of competition among different US mega-primes. As a result, the 
proposed LMC-NGC mega-merger was blocked; a sudden change of heart on the part of 
Washington causing surprise and dismay among the business leaders involved. The decision also 
marked the end of the “merger mania” era in the American A&D industry. 
 
In Europe during the 1990s, in contrast, the competitive threat posed by the rapidly consolidating 
American mega-primes was first recognised by the A&D companies themselves. Relevant industry 
associations and the EC began to frame the issue as part of the Old Continent’s long-standing 
concern about a (widening) “technology gap” vis-à-vis the US; an urgent issue that required a 
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coordinated response to ensure the continued independence and survival of the European A&D 
industrial base. The private sector took the lead in defining the problem and putting it on Europe’s 
political radar screen. Earlier types of “technology gap fever” had already struck the Old Continent 
back in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s without causing any major transnational mergers in the A&D 
sector. In this context, the Airbus consortium stands out as the most successful, if only, collective 
European response to “le défi américain”. During these earlier times, the challenge was primarily 
defined in economic-technological, i.e., civilian terms. In the 1990s, in contrast, the new American 
challenge also acquired a deeper strategic dimension: a competitive European A&D industrial base 
was seen as an indispensable element of a stronger, more capable EU that can autonomously 
safeguard its international security interests even without American backing. 
 
While the negotiations about the potential transnational consolidation of the European A&D sector 
(e.g., EADS, BAe-DASA, DASA-CASA) were initiated and driven by private-sector executives, it 
is also clear that the talks would not have taken place and could not have been concluded 
successfully (in the case of the EADS merger) without the political backing of the respective 
national governments. It is fair to say that Paris, Berlin, London, or Madrid would have intervened 
(either openly or behind the scenes) to block a cross-border consolidation transaction involving 
their “national champions” that was deemed harmful to their national security interests. It was only 
after Europe’s key governments had recognised that “business as usual” was no longer an option 
that full-fledged transnational A&D mergers like EADS were seriously contemplated by the 
private-sector executives. Also, Jean-Luc Lagardère and Juergen Schrempp would not have been 
interested in forming EADS if it had not been for the French government’s decision to at least 
partially privatise Aérospatiale. Here again, real progress on private-sector-led A&D industrial 
consolidation required the appropriate political framework (i.e., the green light on partial 
privatisation from Paris). 
 
This thesis conclusion provides not only a summary of its analytical findings, but it also identifies 
suitable areas for further academic research. The first question that merits in-depth analysis 
concerns EADS’s post-merger integration and the extent to which Paris and Berlin have attempted 
to exercise national political influence over the European aerospace giant. France’s government, 
which maintains a direct 13-14 percent stake in the company, has been particularly vocal in terms of 
its involvement (critics would say “interference”) in strategic EADS management matters, 
including trying to decide which French or German executives should be nominated for key 
leadership positions within the EADS / Airbus group. As a result, Berlin has repeatedly felt 
compelled to push back to make sure that Paris does not engineer a silent take-over of EADS that 
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would impose (French) political and strategic priorities over commercial decisions. To this day, 
EADS insiders readily acknowledge that the company is still sharply divided along national lines. 
As so often with large-scale international M&A transactions, cultural differences rank among the 
biggest and most stubborn obstacles to effective post-merger integration. In the case of EADS, 
things are made even more difficult by the company’s strategic importance and the fact that Paris 
and Berlin are suspiciously watching each other’s every move to make sure the other side does not 
gain undue influence or control over the firm. There can be no doubt that the Franco-German 
political infighting at EADS has left the company at a serious disadvantage compared to its more 
unified and streamlined ethnocentric rivals. 
 
The second area for further academic research concerns the political backlash in America against 
on-going European efforts to penetrate the US defence procurement market. In recent years, 
European A&D companies seem to have made some progress in terms of successfully competing 
for important American procurement deals. In January 2005, the Pentagon selected a joint 
consortium formed by Anglo-Italian helicopter maker AgustaWestland and LMC over its American 
competitor Sikorsky to build the next-generation Marine One helicopter for the US President. At 
the time, the US$1.7 billion landmark deal was primarily interpreted as an important victory for 
Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Italian counterpart Silvio Berlusconi, both of whom had 
supported the Bush administration in the controversial 2003 Iraq War. The jury is still out as to 
whether transatlantic defence procurement has been transformed from a “one-way street” into a real 
“two-way street” where European companies have a real shot at securing major, multi-billion dollar 
deals. 
 
The Pentagon’s decision in February 2008 to award a US$35 billion refuelling tanker contract to a 
transatlantic consortium led by NGC-Airbus could have easily been interpreted as the most visible 
sign yet that the protectionist “Fortress America” mentality that was so prevalent in Washington for 
so long was finally coming to an end. However, ousted rival Boeing launched a massive political 
lobbying campaign on Capitol Hill against “the French tanker” and also filed a protest with the 
independent Congressional watchdog GAO. The GAO’s non-binding report published in July 2008 
found “that the Air Force had made a number of significant errors that could have affected the 
outcome of what was a close competition between Boeing and [NGC].”1384 As a result, the GAO 
recommended that the “Air Force reopen discussion with the offerers, obtain revised proposals, re-
evaluate the revised proposals, and make a new source selection decision, consistent with the 
                                                      
1384 GAO (July 2008) p. ii 
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GAO’s decision”1385. Just a few weeks after the GAO report, Defense Secretary Gates announced 
that the Pentagon would conduct a new “fast-tracked” KC-X competition and announce the winner 
by the end of 2008. That deadline passed and it is now up to the more protectionist-minded Obama 
administration to make the ultimate decision about the urgently needed KC-X program. Feeling that 
the Obama administration had established new KC-X selection criteria that clearly favoured 
Boeing, NGC pulled out of the tanker competition in March 2010, while EADS is still weighing 
whether to launch another Pentagon tanker bid. As it happens, Boeing is now headquartered in 
Chicago, the political home of President Obama. And even if Airbus were to win the competition a 
second time around, the multi-billion dollar funding would still need to be approved by Congress. 
Given that protectionist Democrats and Republican national security hawks are powerful players on 
Capitol Hill, closer transatlantic defence industrial integration is likely to remain an elusive goal for 
years to come. 
 
The third and final potential research area concerns the impact of the BRIC1386 countries’ political, 
economic, and military rise on the competitive dynamics shaping the A&D industry in America and 
Europe. China has made it a national priority to create technologically sophisticated and 
internationally competitive A&D companies that will boost the country’s on-going transition to 
great-power status. In particular, Beijing is attempting to get access to leading Western technologies 
by demanding teaming and assembly arrangements with Airbus and Boeing as “deal sweeteners” 
for multi-billion dollar aircraft acquisitions in the rapidly expanding Chinese commercial airline 
market. Russia has also attempted to forge closer links with EADS / Airbus and Boeing. In 2006, 
then state-owned VTB bank acquired a five-percent stake in EADS “to seek technology-sharing 
partnerships and Airbus manufacturing work”.1387 France and Germany rejected Russian demands 
to get a seat on the EADS board and made it clear that they were not interested in a strategic 
partnership with the Russian A&D industry. In the meantime, Italy’s Finmeccanica teamed up with 
Sukhoi to develop the regional Superjet 100 aircraft, with major subcontracting and consulting 
work performed by Boeing. Brazil’s Embraer is already a major international player in the rapidly 
growing regional jet market; a position it could build on to help mount a collective international 
challenge to the Boeing-Airbus duopoly in the large commercial aircraft segment. In their 
aggressive competition for lucrative export opportunities abroad, Boeing and Airbus have in recent 
years been forced to provide unprecedented outsourcing and off-shoring opportunities to aerospace 
companies located in Japan, China, India, etc. This proliferation of state-of-the art Western 
technology (coupled with IP violations and / or industrial espionage) could soon help turn these 
                                                      
1385 GAO (June 2008) p. 67 
1386 BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
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aerospace firms into formidable peer competitors. Boeing and Airbus would be clearly worse off if 
they lost their current duopoly-style dominance in the large aircraft market to emerging rivals from 
the BRIC countries and beyond. Are the European and US aerospace industries in general, and 
Airbus and Boeing in particular, therefore finally moving closer together to better defend against 
new potential rivals? How will Western governments responding to protect their A&D companies 
against the growing investment clout of ultra-rich SWFs1388 from the BRICs and elsewhere? The 
enormous political, military, economic, and technological power and prestige derived from the 
A&D industry will ensure that this strategic sector remains a uniquely important, high-stakes 
battlefield involving states and companies on a global scale. 
 
+++ 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1387 Robertson (2007) 
1388 SWF = Sovereign Wealth Fund 
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Annex 
 
Table 1: Economic Weight of the US Aerospace Industry 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Civil Jet 
Imports 
(Millions of 
Dollars) 
8,251  9,268  9,719  8,628 8,792 8,296 9,881 12,976 16,837 
Civil Jet 
Exports 
31,517  35,548  36,906  31,823 30,050 25,079 29,477 40,075 51,999 
Surplus of 
Commercial 
Sector 
23,266 26,280 27,187 23,195 21,258 16,783 19,596 27,099 35,162 
Military Jet 
Imports 
3,550  3,735  3,943  3,555 3,571 3,213 3,787 5,159 6,273 
Military Jet 
Exports 
7,566  8,239  8,111  7,596  7,322 7,991 10,792 10,299 12,072 
Surplus of 
Military 
Sector 
4,016 4,504 4,168 4,041 3,751 4,778 7,005 5,140 5, 799 
          
Total 
Aerospace 
Industries 
Surplus 
27,282 30,784 31,355 27,236 25,009 21,561 26,601 32,239 40,961 
          
Total 
Military 
Aircraft 
Shipments 
1,053 911 753 954 766 816 558 511 418 
Total 
Commercial 
Aircraft 
Shipments 
2,268 2,181 1,790 1,630 1,545 1,625 1,662 2,269 3,122 
          
Employment 
(in 
Thousands) 
840.7 784.0 710.5 624.0 552.1 514.4 514.2 554.9 578.6 
 
Sources:  
- Aerospace Industries Association (based on reports from member companies) 
- General Aviation Manufacturers Association 
- Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration 
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Table 2: US Aerospace Trade Balance 1981-2001* 
 
 
* includes aircraft, missiles, space vehicles, and parts) 
 
Source: Aerospace Industries Association 
 
 
 
Table 3: US Aerospace Export Share of Production 
 
 
 
Source: Aerospace Industries Association 
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Table 4: FY1987-FY2007 DoD Budget Authority 
 
 
 
Source: National Defence Budget Estimate for FY2003, Office of the USD (Comptroller) 
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Table 5: Consolidation in the US A&D Industry 1980-2001 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry (2002) p. 7-4 
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Interviews: 
 
Cohen, Eliot, Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of 
Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at the Johns Hopkins University, author interview in 
Munich on 9 February 2007. 
 
Cole, August, Defence Industry Reporter, The Wall Street Journal, various author interviews during 
2008-2009. 
 
Davis, James W., Chairman, Centre for Security Economics and Technology, University of St. 
Gallen, various author interviews during 2007-2010. 
 
Enders, Tom, President and Chief Executive Officer of Airbus, author interview in Munich on 27 
November 2009. 
 
Gansler, Jacques S., former US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (1997-2001), author interview at the University of Maryland on 17 July 2007. 
 
Hamre, John, former US Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration (1997-2000), 
and current President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS), author interview in Washington, DC on 10 May 2007. 
 
Helm, Robert, Corporate Vice President, Government Relations, Northrop Grumman Corporation, 
various author interviews in Washington, DC and Munich during 2007-2010. 
 
Hughes, Peter C., President, Croton Institute, various author interviews in Washington, DC during 
2007-2010. 
 
Jackson, Bruce, former Director of Global and Corporate Development at Lockheed Martin 
Corporation (1993-2002) and Founder of the “US Committee to Expand NATO”, author interview 
in Washington, DC on 25 June 2009. 
 
Kaminski, Paul G., former US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (1994-
1997), author interview in Washington, DC on 15 May 2007. 
 
Niblett, Robin, former Executive Vice President of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) (2001-2007), various interviews during 2006-2007. 
 
Schmitt, Burkard, then-Deputy Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies (ISS), author 
interview in Paris on 8 March 2001. 
 
von Nordheim, Manfred, former Senior Advisor to the President and CEO of EADS North 
America, various author interviews during 2005-2009. 
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